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This dissertation describes the genesis of the idea of femicide in a period of English and
American Letters,  the last  decade of the eighteenth century and the first  half  of the nineteenth
century, in which patriarchal values and constructions were entering a crisis which resulted in the
revision of the idea of gender—in a way, that was the period in which the concept of gender was
coded. In the first chapter,  I look at the way the term femicide was first  given currency in the
English language in 1827 through Robert Macnish’s The Confessions of an Unexecuted Femicide, a
fiction disguised as a true story, and how it spawned a short-lived literary sub-genre. In the second
chapter, I examine Poe’s reworking of the femicide story, and to the ways in which he has drawn
attention to its Gothic roots. Finally, in the third chapter, I offer a reading of Memoirs of the Author
of ‘A Vindication of the Rights of Woman,’ in which I argue that Godwin’s “sentimentalised” portrait
of  Mary  Wollstonecraft,  and  by  extension  of  the  female  intellectual,  constitutes  an  implicit
refutation of her ideas, and therefore can be profitably compared to the portraits Poe’s femicide









Esta dissertação descreve a  génese  da ideia  de femicídio durante  um período nas  letras
Anglo-saxónicas, entre a última década do séc.  XVIII e meados do século seguinte,  em que os
valores e elaborações ideológicas patriarcais entravam numa crise que conduziria a uma revisão da
ideia de género (de certo modo, poder-se-ia mesmo dizer que é nesse período que o conceito de
género começa a ser codificado). No primeiro capítulo, descrevo como o termo femicídio ganhou
pela primeira vez projecção na língua inglesa depois da publicação, em 1827, de The Confessions of
an Unexecuted Femicide de Robert Macnish, uma ficção apresentada ostensivamente como relato
verídico que deu origem a um efémero sub-género de ficção, a que chamo “história de femicídio.”
No segundo capítulo examino a reinterpretação da história de femicídio por Edgar Allan Poe, e
sobre o modo como este autor pôs em evidência as suas raízes góticas. Finalmente, no terceiro
capítulo, apresento uma leitura de Memoirs of the Author of ‘A Vindication of the Rights of Woman’
em que argumento que o retrato “sentimentalizado” que Godwin aí faz de Mary Wollstonecraft, e
por extensão da mulher intelectual, porquanto constitui uma refutação implícita das ideias dessa
autora, ganha em ser comparado com os retratos que os narradores femicídas de Poe fazem das suas









As I see it, a University is a place where people are given time to think, question, and debate
their ideas. As a student in the Program in Literary Theory in the School of Arts and Humanities at
the University of Lisbon I have been given that time and I am very grateful for it. I would like to
express  my gratitude  to  my tutors,  Profs.  João R.  Figueiredo  and  António  M.  Feijó,  for  their
guidance, unconditional support, and frank, often challenging criticism. I would also like to thank
Prof. Miguel Tamen, whose Research Seminar had a crucial role in the development of this thesis. I
am also obliged to the Centro de Linguística at the University of Lisbon (CLUL), which hosted my
research, and without whose exemplary support it would not have been possible. 
I would like to extend my gratitude to the following institutions for their financial aid: the
FCT (Fundação para  a  Ciência  e  a  Tecnologia),  which  supported  my research  through a  PhD.
Scholarship, the Fulbright Commission in Portugal, by whom I was awarded a Fulbright Research
Student grant to spend four months at Fordham University in New York, and the Luso-American
Development  Foundation  which  awarded  me  a  grant  to  present  a  paper  in  The  American
Comparative Literature Association 2014 Annual Meeting. I would also like to thank Susan Jaffe
Tane, whose generosity enabled me to participate in the Meeting of the Poe Studies Association in
2015.
With  their  support  I  have  travelled  regularly  to  the  United  States,  where  I  was able  to
participate in conferences and share my thoughts with other scholars with similar interests. I have
also spent six months in the GSAS at Fordham University, in the Bronx (only a few blocks away
from the cottage where Poe spent many years of his  life),  where I  worked with Prof.  Leonard
Cassuto,  whose generous advice was invaluable,  and profited immensely from that  institution’s
excellent library (a special word of gratitude goes out to the outstanding librarian Peter Mix for his
assistance, and, most of all, for making me feel welcome). I was fortunate enough, also, to have met
personally Prof. Susan Amper whose work I had admired from afar, and with whom I have since
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had many a stimulating discussion, and Jeffrey A. Savoye, the man behind the web site of the Edgar
Allan Poe Society of Baltimore, to whom all students of Poe’s work are indebted. I was also a
frequent visitor to the Centre for English Studies at the University of Lisbon (ULICES/CEAUL),
where I felt I was always welcome. I leave a word of gratitude to the team of researchers there, and
especially to Margarida Vale de Gato for the generous loan of bibliography on Edgar Allan Poe.
I am also indebted to the Facultade de Filoloxía of the University of A Coruña where I have
worked as a lecturer  in Portuguese from 2010 to 2012, and especially  Profs.  Francisco Salinas
Portugal, Carlos Paulo Martínez Pereiro and Carme Fernández Pérez-Sanjulian.
I am also very grateful to Ariadne Nunes, Sebastião Cerqueira,  Lia Cavaleiro,  and most




In  this  dissertation  I  will  analyse  literary  representations  of  femicide  and  the  femicide
character in England and America in the last decade of the eighteenth century and the first half of
the nineteenth century. The rhetoric of femicide depends on a set of sentimental elaborations that I
think still pervade the critical discourses of our time in insidious ways. This is illustrated by the
current  criticism of  the  texts  that  form my subject.  Such  elaborations  have  created  a  layer  of
misunderstanding that can only be removed, I think, by the sort of careful analytical exercise I have
attempted here.
The basic  assumption  I  make in  this  dissertation  is  that  there  is  in  the  works  of  Mary
Wollstonecraft and Edgar Allan Poe a common element of subversion of the patriarchal ideology
prevalent in their time and of the language that upheld it. I will argue specifically that both authors
conveyed ideas, particularly conceptions of gender identity and of the relations between the sexes,
that  could not  be expressed openly within a  patriarchal  cultural  framework. These two authors
achieved  this,  of  course,  in  very  different  ways,  and  for  the  most  part  in  distinct  branches  of
literature—Wollstonecraft  was  essentially  a  philosopher  who  wrote  novels  and  occasionally
criticism; Poe, on the other hand, was certainly no philosopher, but a “magazinist,” that is, a poet, a
critic, and short story writer, working whithin the first modern democracy. Yet, I believe, despite
their  diverging  approaches,  there  is  some  fundamental  affinity  between  them.  This  is  the
constitutive “duplicity” of their texts, which engage the available language with a view to reform it.
Incidentally, this duplicity is arguably the distinctive trait of a text, as Michael Riffaterre has shown.
In  his  book  La  Production  du  Texte,  particularly  in  the  first  chapter  “L’explication  des  Faits
Littéraires,” he maintained that failure to recognise the disruptive potential of a text is a way of
silencing it.
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When she pleaded for the emancipation of women, Wollstonecraft found out that the only
language  available  to  her  was  that  of  a  literary  and  intellectual  establishment  that  was
overwhelmingly male, and dominated by a patriarchal worldview. She realised, therefore, that, as a
woman writer seeking to be taken seriously, her only option was to subvert this language, pushing it
to absurd extremes, while radically revising the accepted representations of gender. Hopefully, from
the wreck of the old speech a new language would emerge, and with it a new readership. Sandra M.
Gilbert and Susan Gubar have argued in  The Madwoman in the Attic  that woman writers in the
nineteenth  century  “created  submerged  meanings,  meanings  hidden  within  or  behind  the  more
accessible ‘public’ content of their works, so that their literature could be read and appreciated even
when its vital concern with female dispossession and disease was ignored” (72). I will argue that
this applies also to the writings of my two subjects.
Nominally, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman addresses men in their own language—that
is, in the language of patriarchy. This, of course, posed a seemingly unsurmountable difficulty. The
patriarchal  establishment  did  not  recognise  women  basic  intellectual  capabilities.  A  woman
philosopher like Wollstonecraft could not, according to mainstream ideology, be conceived; the idea
could not even be expressed. It was a contradiction in terms. She would therefore necessarily be
perceived as a monstrous hybrid creature: a masculine woman. Woman, it was thought, could at best
ape the external, superficial features of reason, which was regarded as being essentially male. As
she could not  become a man, she could appear, but never be rational, or even reasonable. At the
same time, this supposedly hopeless effort would rob her of her femininity—but not of her radical
femaleness.
As a result, a public conditioned by patriarchy—and the public for philosophy was virtually
entirely  male—would  not  condescend  to  discuss  such  matters  with  a  woman.  Therefore,
Wollstonecraft thought, man would have to be forced to acknowledge her arguments. And this could
only be achieved by derailing patriarchal rhetoric. Woman, it was said, was naturally submissive,
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and man was formed to lord over her through reason. And yet,  Wollstonecraft  pointed out,  the
soldier, commonly regarded as the paragon of virility, was the most systematically submissive and
intellectually dependent of creatures. By patriarchal standards, he should therefore be regarded as a
“feminine man.” This, of course, made no sense. Wollstonecraft thus aimed to demonstrate that the
patriarchal system of oppression was preposterous and absurd,  and that it  belied man’s boasted
rationality. The soldier was trained to have no will of his own; and so, argued Wollstonecraft, was
woman.
Mary Wollstonecraft lived and wrote in a period in which gender conventions were in a
crisis. Her work was an expression of that crisis, and so was Gothic fiction which, as George E.
Haggerty writes in Queer Gothic, “reached its apex at the very moment when gender and sexuality
were beginning to be qualified for modern culture;” this fiction, he continues, presented figurations
of “unauthorized genders and sexualities” ranging from “sodomy” and “romantic friendship” to
“sadism, masochism, necrophilia,  cannibalism, masculinized females, and feminized males (2).”
According to this critic, then: “Transgressive social-sexual relations are the most basic common
denominator of Gothic writing” (2). But the subversive element in the Gothic has been persistently
overlooked. I will look closely at some episodes in Matthew Lewis’s  The Monk (1796) and Ann
Radcliffe’s The Italian (1797) that I believe illustrate this point. This is especially true, however, of
the critical reception of Edgar Allan Poe’s work.
It is my understanding that he and Wollstonecraft have been the victims of a process of
“sentimentalisation” by mainstream criticism, which remains rooted in patriarchal preconceptions.
This “sentimentalisation” has functioned as an appeal to overlook their text, and to replace it with
something, we may call it an ideology, that lies beyond it, as it were, and which is supposed to take
precedence over their actual meaning. This functions as a sort of pre-existent text. This essentialist
view of literature has often caused criticism of my two authors’ works to be more a reading of this
supposed archetype than of their actual words. This I regard as a particular case of the kind of
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“rationalisation” to which critics traditionally resort, and which, according to Riffaterre, negates the
nature of the text itself, by accommodating it to “l’idéologie en cours, à la mythologie connue, au
rassurant” (8).
The term “sentimentalisation,” then, is here used to denote a specific form of rationalisation
that normalises contents and representations that patriarchal ideology regards as aberrant. Within
that framework, female authorship, for example, was inevitably perceived as freakish. This view
was somewhat qualified in the late eighteenth century, and throughout the nineteenth, through the
extension of the doctrine of the “separate spheres” of male and female activity to literature. This
resulted in a gendered theory of genre, which identified “sentimental” literature in general, and the
novel  in  particular,  which were then regarded as minor branches of literature,  with the woman
writer. This perception was reinforced by an actual change in the demographics of authorship. The
field  which  had  previously  been  dominated  by  male  writers  like  Henry  Fielding,  Samuel
Richardson,  and  Laurence  Sterne,  had  been  mostly  taken  over  by  women  like  Ann  Radcliffe,
arguably the most successful novelist of the period.
“Sentimental”  prose  fiction  was  deemed  a  suitable employ  for  women  because  it  was
imagined that it did not demand abstract thought, but only a lower form of intellect. Thus, for a
while, the fiction that women were not capable of thinking, in the proper sense of the word, was
maintained, even at a time when the female author was on the rise. Meanwhile, the “higher” regions
of philosophical speculation, scientific research, serious poetry—or what was then regarded as such
—, which were thought to involve real thought, continued to be reserved to man.
Thus, the female author was normalised. Providing she developed her activity within the
limits assigned to her sex, it was acceptable for a woman to become a writer. The significance of
Mary Wollstonecraft to the history of modern thought lies in her open defiance of the patriarchal
doctrine that man thinks, and woman feels. And this is precisely what Godwin has succeeded in
obscuring by his sentimental rewriting of his wife in Memoirs of the Author of A Vindication of the
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Rights of Woman. He taught us to overlook her arguments, which he claimed were deficient, and to
look for  the emotional  content  of  her  work instead—hence sentimentalisation.  Perpetuating the
confusion  between patriarchal  authority  and authorship—the very  confusion  Wollstonecraft  had
sought to dispel—he tells us that her text had no intellectual content worth mentioning. Thus, in
effect, he denies her work the status of text, by appealing to the typically patriarchal view that the
statements of a woman express nothing but emotion. Thus, he does Wollstonecraft a disservice, for
instead  of  revising  the  conceptions  of  gender  according to  her  views,  he  reconciles  her  to  the
patriarchal ideology she rejected. He admits, in other words, that a woman philosopher would be a
“masculine”  woman;  but  Mary—for  Godwin  she  is  always  plain  Mary—was  no  philosopher,
therefore, he reassuringly concludes, she was a woman.
Most feminist critics, however, have subscribed Godwin’s portrayal of Wollstonecraft—in
doing so,  as Brenda Ayres has argued, they have allowed his opinion of Wollstonecraft  to take
precedence over her own opinions. This position, I will argue, flows from an equivoque about the
meaning of reason.  Modern feminism emphasises the specificity  of the female experience,  and
regards  reason  as  a  patriarchal  construction.  Thus,  it  distanced  itself  from  the  meaning of
Wollstonecraft’s proposals, and tended to value her more for her life than for her work, essentially
agreeing with Godwin that she had attempted to appropriate intrinsically “male” modes of thought.
For  Wollstonecraft,  however,  reason  meant  the  basic  intellectual  capability  that  was  generally
denied  to  woman,  and which  justified  the  a priori  dismissal  of  her  opinions  on  all  “abstract”
subjects. Women had no voice in science, philosophy, or politics. In our time, I hope, this basic
intellectual ability is recognised to women by most people, and Wollstonecraft played no mean role
in bringing about this cultural change. Are women and man on an equal footing? Certainly not. Do
women face implicit bias? Of course. In Wollstonecraft’s time, however, the bias against women
was explicit. The female scientist and the female philosopher are now a reality most men would be
ashamed to deny. In Wollstonecraft’s day, on the other hand, most men would be ashamed to admit
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even the possibility of the female intellectual—especially if the woman suspected of intellectuality
was their wife.
Thus understood, sentimentalisation is the mechanism by which patriarchy asserted itself,
and illegitimated dissent. Gilbert and Gubar have persuasively argued that Western literary history
is intrinsically patriarchal, and that this continued to be true of the work of modern critics like
Harold Bloom who “metaphorically defines the poetic process as a sexual encounter between a
male poet and his female muse” (Gilbert and Gubar, Madwoman 47). Where,” the former ask, “does
the female poet fit in?” (47). Significantly, the same male criticism that has systematically devalued
female  authorship,  has  also  expressed  reluctance  in  admitting  Poe  to  the  canon.  In  F.  O.
Matthiessen’s epoch-making  American Renaissance, for example, Poe is mostly relegated to the
footnotes.  More importantly,  most  modern  criticism of  Poe  offers  a  completely  sentimentalised
portrayal  of  the  author.  Almost  everyone  agrees,  indeed,  that  most  of  Poe’s  work  is  basically
meaningless, and that it is the product of emotion, rather than intellectual effort. In a word, most
critics claim that what Poe did in his poetry and most of his prose (the detective stories being
usually excepted) was mostly the result of feeling, as opposed to thinking. This is precisely the
point Godwin made for Wollstonecraft. Therefore, I argue that Poe does not fit into the patriarchal
view of the history of literature any better than the woman writer does—and this for very similar
reasons.
The traditional reading of Poe—which has remained largely unchallenged to this day—is a
special case, I think, of the traditional reading of Gothic fiction, which has also generally been
regarded,  with  very  few exceptions,  as  artistically  rudimentary,  and  worth  reading  only  as  an
unsophisticated,  and  almost  unmediated  document  of  the  subconscious  of  its  authors.  In  fact,
psychoanalytically inclined critics frequently equate Gothic novels with dreams. Thus, the Gothic is
credited “with, in Robert B. Heilman’s words, the ‘historical office’ of ‘[t]he discovery of passion,
[the]  rehabilitation  of  the  extra-rational”  (qtd.  in  Sedgwick  1).  Likewise,  Poe  has  been  either
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dismissed or extravagantly praised for his extra-rationality. In either case, he is not considered an
artist, and the role of conscious elaboration in his work has often been completely devalued, if not
downright denied. Harold Bloom, notably in his introduction to the volume of his  How To write
About series dedicated to him, significantly stated that it was always best to read Poe in translation,
thus  denying  in  the  strongest  possible  terms  the  status  of  text  to  his  writings.  Indeed,  in  the
prevailing “sentimental,” intrinsically patriarchal critical approach, Poe became identified with the
deviant paradigm that is the correlative of the “masculine woman:” the “hysterical man.”
Critical portrayals of Poe have usually emphasised “feeling” over “thinking” in an extreme
way, as if, first, the two were mutually exclusive, and second, it was possible to conceive writing as
a  totally  “extra-rational”  process.  In  the  final  analysis,  this  would  mean  that  any  attempt  to
understand  Poe  would  be  futile—the  hypothesis,  of  course,  confirms  itself  and  is  therefore
unassailable, providing the underlying axiom is granted. This, I insist, is exactly what Godwin has
done for Wollstonecraft. As a result of sentimentalisation, then, the very possibility of a submerged
meaning to Poe’s work has been denied in the face of compelling textual evidence to the contrary.
I  would  also  like  to  stress  that  the  selection  of  the  corpus  of  texts  examined  in  this
dissertation was not determined by a preexistent thesis. On the contrary, I came to Wollstonecraft
and Godwin’s  biography of  her  by way of  Poe.  My starting  assumption  was that  Poe’s  work,
contrary to what is often stated, was legible, or in other words, that it could be understood, and that
the best way to understand him was to attempt a more comprehensive survey of the context of his
work than had previously been attempted. Indeed, another result of the sentimentalisation of his
work, was that he came to be regarded as somewhat of a “singularity” in the history of literature.
His creations, it is generally thought, sprang directly from his “perverse” psyche, and are essentially
unrelated to anything that had been done before—in other words, there was no context or pretext for
them.
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I sought to find both the context, and a viable pretext, for two of Poe’s tales, “Morella” and
“Ligeia,” which present particularly aberrant representations of gender—aberrant, that is, in relation
to the prevailing patriarchal views represented in the tale by the male protagonist. Indeed, these two
tales are notable for their depiction of intellectual women, who are idealised post mortem by their
husbands, in a narrative that claims to be  about  them, but is, in reality, more a biography of the
writer than a biography of its ostensible subject. The impression that results from such narratives,
moreover, is that the title-character was not exactly a woman, or at least that her behavior was
fundamentally unfeminine. These aspects of the tale are, indeed, very nearly unprecedented in the
literature  of  Poe’s  day,  and,  therefore,  particularly  significant  literary  facts  requiring  critical
interpretation.  Criticism  of  Poe’s  work,  however,  has  mostly  taken  these  distinguishing
characteristics for granted, under the assumption that they were somehow typical of the age. At face
value these tales do indeed appear to reinforce the kind of patriarchal prejudices that determined
Godwin’s assessment of Wollstonecraft. However, I am convinced that they too have a submerged
anti-patriarchal meaning.
I  believe,  specifically,  that  “Morella” and “Ligeia” are  deliberate parodies in the Gothic
idiom of Godwin’s Memoirs, which is the only precedent in Poe’s culture of the most salient formal
traits  of  those  two  tales.  I  also  argue  that  the  relationship  of  Wollstonecraft  and  Godwin  is
paradigmatic of the plight of the female intellectual in the patriarchal society of her and Poe’s time.
Although this fact has been obscured by decades of over-sympathetic and ingenuous criticism of
Memoirs,  recent  scholarship has  pointed out  the necessity  of disentangling Wollstonecraft  from
Godwin’s image of her, and particularly of emancipating our understanding of her work from his
sentimental rhetoric. Poe, I will further argue, was peculiarly aware of the ways in which Godwin
subtly,  and  seemingly  accidentally,  demeaned  his  wife’s  work,  and  therefore  modelled  the
ideologically charged rhetoric of his anonymous narrators after Memoirs, in order to give visibility
to the submerged patriarchal resonances of Godwin’s book.
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The  arguments  developed  in  this  dissertation,  however,  are  cumulative.  The  thesis
expounded in the previous paragraph is  supported by the research documented in the two first
chapters, in which I attempt to describe how Poe coded the submerged sense of his fiction. In order
to do this, it was necessary to place “Morella” and “Ligeia” in the broader context of Poe’s work,
and also to attempt a survey of the texts to which he surreptitiously alludes in those tales, and on
which that submerged meaning depends.
I  argue  that  the  two  tales  which  form  the  basic  focus  on  my  analysis,  “Morella”  and
“Ligeia,” belong to a distinctive subset of Gothic fiction, or rather a particular development of the
Gothic  that  I  have  termed  the  “femicide  story.”  This  is  a  genre—in  the  same  sense  that  the
“detective story” may be termed a genre—that has hitherto been completely ignored by critics of
nineteenth-century fiction. This oversight, incidentally, has decidedly contributed, in my opinion, to
the overstatement of Poe’s originality. The “femicide story,” then, is a type of short story that is told
in the first person by a male narrator who belatedly confesses he has killed, or at least implies that
he was responsible for the death of a female lover, but somehow managed to avoid punishment for
the deed.
The genesis of the “femicide story” is comparable to that of the detective story. Poe’s 1841
story “The Murders in the Rue Morgue” is universally recognised as having set the template of all
subsequent iterations of the form. Although many antecedents have been proposed for it, no one
seriously challenges Poe’s priority. Likewise, the femicide story has many antecedents, namely in
Gothic fiction, the Broadside ballad, and the Blackwood school of narrative, but, the particular form
to which I wish to bring attention, was originally established by Robert Macnish’s Confessions of an
Unexecuted Femicide, published anonymously in 1827. This was undoubtedly the model of a string
of tales written during the following decade by Charles Dickens, Edward Bulwer-Lytton, and Edgar
Allan Poe, among others, all of which share some family resemblances that point back to Macnish.
The  form enjoyed  a  brief  period  of  great  popularity  during  the  1830’s,  before  it  vanished  as
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suddenly as it had appeared. This, and Macnish’s untimely death at the age of 34, in 1837, partly
explain  why  this  literary  fad  has  gone  mostly  unnoticed.  Poe,  however,  continued  to  present
variations  on the femicide template  throughout  his  career.  In fact,  with him the femicide story
developed into a veritable art form.
It is my conviction that Poe’s femicide stories constitute the artistic acme of this short-lived
form—, but also that they form a special group within the femicide story tradition, which reflects
Poe’s peculiar approach to fiction. These are, I argue, covert femicides, that is, tales of femicide in
which the femicide—the criminal and the crime—are not readily perceivable, but rather cunningly
disguised. The true identity of the narrator is intimated through a wealth of hints, or clues, both
textual and intertextual. These two stories, indeed, lack a formal dénouement—for this reason, their
plot  has  been  regarded  as  indefinite,  which  in  turn  has  been  taken  as  confirmation  of  Poe’s
reputation for “extra-rationality.” In reality, however, I believe they are a particular embodiment of
the “mystery,” a form of fiction that Poe described and theorised in his review of Dickens’s Barnaby
Rudge and Nathaniel Hawthorne’s  Twice-Told Tales. The “dark hints” of murder in that novel, he
tells  us,  should  only  have  been  employed  if the  reader  was  supposed  to  discover  an  unstated
dénouement,  that was notwithstanding inherent to the “plot.” And this,  I argue, is precisely the
purpose such hints serve in “Morella” and “Ligeia.”
Yet, at the same time, these stories have a viable patriarchal interpretation, which ensured
their  circulation.  In  this  sense,  then,  they  develop  the  sort  of  subversive  duplicity  that  is
characteristic of the Gothic. This duplicity, incidentally, was integral to Macnish’s original femicide
story, which was itself a development of the Gothic formula. The Gothic represented patriarchal
oppression, but always in a setting that was conventionally displaced to an ostensibly alien setting,
remote  in  time,  space,  or  both.  In  the  late  eighteenth-century,  however,  a  new form of  fiction
emerged  that,  while  retaining  the  essential  characteristics  of  the  Gothic,  dispensed  with  this
disguise. A good example of this is Mary Wollstonecraft’s unfinished novel Maria; Or, the Wrongs
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of Woman. There, the typically Gothic horrors were transferred to the here and now. The medieval
castle where the heroines of Radcliffe had been confined gives way to the modern madhouse to
which Maria is consigned by her husband, and the vague threats of femicide are replaced by, among
others, the until then unutterable horror of life-threatening abortive procedures. Thus, the plight of
woman  was  becoming  increasingly  visible—or  harder  to  sweep  under  the  rug.  Macnish’s
Confessions is another symptom of this cultural shift. According to the OED, the word “femicide”
had previously,  in  1801,  been employed figuratively  to  denote  the  abandonment  of  a  pregnant
woman by her “seducer” (entry 1); but Confessions, first published in 1827, is, according to same
source, the first time the word was used to denote a form of actual violence for which there had
been no name (entry 2).
Almost forgotten for more than a century, this tale has, in the last few decades, gained some
notoriety  in  modern  discussions  of  “femicide.”  However,  it  has  been confused  with  a  real-life
confession of an actual femicide, that is, as a heartfelt document of the extreme patriarchal ideology
that determined the crime. This was, of course, Macnish’s intention—but there is a great difference
between a real  femicide and a fictional  femicide.  The history of the publication of this  fiction
demonstrates conclusively two things: firstly, that Macnish intended to give visibility to a form of
ideologically determined violence that he felt was not being acknowledged, and secondly, that he
was convinced that it was not safe to associate one’s name to a fictional depiction of femicide. In
order to circumvent censorship, and avoid public outrage, he disguised his fiction as a true story, but
took pains to ensure the disguise was not thoroughly convincing. In this sense, then, his tale had an
element of subversion to it, that Edgar Allan Poe would later greatly expand.
William M**r, Macnish’s femicide, indeed, develops exactly the same extreme patriarchal
arguments that were inherent to the then commonplace comparison of women with angels. Such
representations implied that woman was alien to the physical world, and particularly to sexuality.
She thus became an emblem of absolute altruism and self-sacrifice,  as well  as the rejection of
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sensual pleasure. This ideal woman, as Gilbert and Gubar point out, had no body, and therefore,
while apparently exalting women above humanity, in practice this dehumanising discourse degrades
them: “It is debilitating to be any woman on a society where women are warned that if they do not
behave like angels they must be monsters” (Madwoman 53). These critics also point out the obvious
inference to be drawn from this kind of argumentation: “Whether she becomes an object d’art or a
saint, however, it is the surrender of her self—of her personal comfort, her personal desires, or both
—that is the beautiful angel-woman’s key act, while it is precisely this sacrifice which dooms her
both to death and to heaven. For to be selfless is not only to be noble, it is to be dead” (25). In other
words, the only “good” woman is a dead woman, for only through death can she atone for her
carnality.
The object of the femicide story, as conceived by Macnish and developed by Poe, was, I
argue,  precisely  that  of  implying that  femicide  was the  logical  consequence  of  a  dehumanised
patriarchal view of woman. In his fiction and poetry—and for Poe, a poem was also a form of
fiction,  in  the  sense  that  it  “feigned”  opinions  and  feelings  of  an  imaginary  character—he
systematically  associated  such  extreme  idealisations  of  women,  more  or  less  explicitly,  with
femicide and necrophilia. The male characters of those fictions are, indeed, like the femicide in
Macnish’s tale, presented as a sort of “everyman,” with which the reader is invited to empathise.
But then, their authority is discreetly—or not so discreetly, if one pays close attention to the text—
discredited through many clues. Thus, I believe that Poe, and in a less radical way Macnish, did
more or less the same thing that the female writers mentioned in The Madwoman in the Attic were
doing in the same period: “By the end of the eighteenth century (…) women were not only writing,
they were conceiving fictional worlds in which patriarchal images and conventions were severely,
radically revised” (Gilbert and Gubar 44).
I argue also that Poe displays the “femicidal” sensibility discussed above not only in his
“serious” fiction, but also, for example, in the openly satirical “A Loss of Breath,” and in poems like
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“The Sleeper.” I also point out that Poe’s debilitating representations of women, although perfectly
typical of his time, are presented in a completely unorthodox way. The irony that undermines such
representations in Poe is entirely absent from most contemporary versions of the myth of the angel-
woman. I illustrate this point by comparing the femicide story with Bulwer-Lytton’s Eugene Aram.
Furthermore, I attempt to read “Morella” and “Ligeia” in the context of Poe’s work, and to
accommodate them to his criticism, but also to trace Poe’s many covert allusions in those tales to a
variety  of  sources—these  allusions  were,  I  argue,  one  of  the  ways  through  which  he  coded
submerged meanings into his text. The most significant of these is perhaps his allusion in the second
of those tales to the notorious witch-hunter Joseph Glanvill, which is indirectly singled out as the
representative of the patriarchal superstition that I believe Poe intended to uncover.
In the first chapter of my dissertation, then, I attempt to define the femicide story, its corpus,
and its peculiar rhetoric, and integrate “Morella” and “Ligeia,” and other of Poe’s tales and poems,
in that specific tradition. The main focus of the second chapter is Poe’s method of composition.
There I take a closer look at his poetry and criticism. I also attempt to show that, in addition to his
borrowings from the tradition of the femicide story, Poe adapted materials from many other sources
for “Morella” and “Ligeia” that are equally decisive to understanding his aims.
Of the three chapters,  the second is  the lengthier.  This is  in  part  the result  of the great
number of sources portions of which Poe adapted for the two tales on which I have focused my
analysis. Most of all, however, the greater length of the second chapter comes as a consequence of
the  necessity  of  dispelling  what  I  regard  as  some  widely  accepted  critical  misconceptions
concerning Poe and his work. Poe is usually seen as an extreme Romanticist, that is, as a visionary
who regarded literature as the vehicle of “extra-rational” transcendent intuitions. I believe, however,
that this theory was imposed on his text, a close reading of which reveals that he systematically
ridicules all forms of “transcendentalism” and “irrationalism,” as well as the Romantic myth of
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poetic creation itself, through the same mechanisms of misdirection that allow him to draw attention
to the submerged plight of the thinking woman.
Finally,  in  the  third  chapter,  I  endeavor  to  demonstrate  that  Godwin’s  representation  of
Wollstonecraft is in evident contradiction with all of her statements, and particularly that his claim
that she suffered, during the last months of her life, an ideological crisis that resulted in her rejection
of most of the views that she had expressed in her work is entirely unfounded, and that to accept it
is to accept that Godwin’s authority on the subject of Wollstonecraft overrides her own. I also argue
that the former’s opinions have, in some cases, been confused with those of the latter, and that this
is  the  origin  of  the  misconception  that  in  A Vindication she  had rejected  sexuality  and denied
sensual pleasure. The contrast between her opinions, preserved in her work, and her biographer’s
portrayal of her, I further argue, is similar to the contrast between Poe’s narrator’s depiction of their
wives and their statements. This final chapter, however, should not be regarded as a comparison
between Poe, on the one side, and Wollstonecraft’s work and Godwin’s biography of her on the
other. The exercise I propose to the reader is of a different nature. I believe that Memoirs and the
writings of Wollstonecraft constitute the pretext of Poe’s text, and that he intended to draw attention
to the way in which she was sentimentalised by Godwin. As I have previously stated, I arrived at
Wollstonecraft through Poe, and my reading of her story is, therefore, informed by two of Poe’s
tales, “Morella” and “Ligeia,” which I think are a deliberate representation of her case.
The intellectual women in Poe’s tales are, as Richard Wilbur put it in the introduction to his
editions of Poe’s Poems (1959), “pythagorised” out of existence, in order that their husbands may
appropriate their memory into their psyche. These stories may be regarded as reinterpretations of
one of the common incarnations of the Romantic myth of creation, in which the beloved woman
typically  becomes  a  symbol  of  the  irretrievable  spiritual  essence  of  man,  without  which  he  is
fundamentally incomplete, and for which the poet is doomed eternally to search. Thus, Poe’s tales
have been themselves taken as extreme statements of the Romantic creed.  This fails to take into
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account, however, the hints of femicide in the tales, on the one hand, and, on the other, the many
indications that the narrator is deluded, and distorts the events in the tale. Thus, Poe brings into
relief  that  the Romantic  myth is  fundamentally  sexist,  and suppresses  women by incorporating
them, as it were, into men. This, Poe’s text suggests, is what Godwin has done. Indeed, the death of
Wollstonecraft is the condition of Godwin’s revision of her. In this sense, then, one might say that
she had to die, in order to be domesticated by her husband, just like Morella and Ligeia had to be
“Pythagorised.”
Godwin’s  act  of  character  assassination,  indeed,  manifests  his  inability  to  admit  the
existence  of  the  woman  intellectual,  which  developed  into  a  form of  blindness  that  is  clearly
displayed in Memoirs. Poe’s narrators in “Morella” and “Ligeia” display a similar blindness, only
slightly  exaggerated.  Through their  revision  of  their  wives  they  construe  them as  pseudo-men,
hence as  pseudo-intellectuals.  Thus,  they annul  the threat  their  intelligence represented to  their
fragile ego by representing them, in effect, as witches. I think one must admit that, without noticing,
Godwin was very close from arriving at a similar conclusion. By putting all these Godwin-like
sentiments into the mouth of a femicide, Poe indirectly brought into view Godwin’s implicit bias
against his exceptional wife, thereby exposing it as a manifestation of the prevailing patriarchal
culture that, according to his review of A Drama of Exile, had denied women like Elizabeth Barrett
Browning a fair chance of being recognised as a great poet.
From the foregoing I think it becomes clear that this dissertation does not fall within the
category of “cultural studies.” It is—at least, I hope it is—strictly a work of criticism. As I see it, the
duty of the critic is to understand the text. I believe, indeed, that the only duty of the critic, or any
scholar for that matter, is intellectual honesty. By this I mean that a critic should never admit an
explanation  that  he  or  she  does  not  understand,  only  because  it  is  the  most  widely  accepted.
Arguments from authority should never be allowed to take precedence over one’s own judgment.
The views expressed here contradict,  in many respects, the assumptions that form the common
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ground on which most of Poe and Wollstonecraft scholarship have been built. These assumptions,
however, appeared to me to be flawed, and therefore I tried to come up with new answers for old
questions. I advance these answers, however, not for the sake of novelty, but because they appear to
me more compelling than those previously proposed. In short, I thought it was my duty to make an
honest attempt to understand the texts I look at here—and that is my only excuse. This answers are,
of course, still very much determined by previous criticism. As regards Poe, particularly, I benefited
immensely from the insights of others, but most of all, from Susan Amper’s contributions to the
field. She maintained the unorthodox view that Poe was only kidding in his so-called serious tales—
I think she is right.
Being intellectually honest, of course, is not the same thing as being infallible. All human
knowledge is relative. Poe constantly reminded his readers of this, warning against what he called
the “frantic spirit of  generalization” and ridiculing flattering pretensions to absolute knowledge,
which were habitually accompanied by a set of directions (Poe, “Exordium” 43). The writers who
purported to impart such knowledge instructed the reader to refrain from thinking and relinquish the
“narrow” views of the understanding. Poe mimicked this rhetoric in his work, but always subverting
it so as to expose it as a form of pernicious irrationalism—in the second chapter, for example, I
attempt to show that Poe was not, as is so often claimed, an adept of animal magnetism, but that he
consistently ridiculed its doctrines, in the same way that he ridiculed “transcendentalism.” Poe, and
in this he agreed with Wollstonecraft, suspected all discourse that inhibited thinking, and all self-
evident “truths.”
His hoaxes showed me that we, as readers, are much more credulous, and much more easily
mislead than we like to think. One can never be too cautious with Poe. We find ourselves again and
again falling into his tricks, only to realise our mistake later on. The time I spent reading him has
brought  me  nothing  but  a  feeling  of  sobering  humiliation.  But  I  cherish  this  humiliation,  for
overtime it developed into what I regard as a healthy scepticism. I learned to value my sense of
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doubt.  I  believe this was what Poe intended. Those of his  readers who accept irrational claims
uncritically are punished with vague horror and confusion; on the other hand, the reader who doubts
appearances, and suspects commonly held views, is rewarded with a solution to his mysteries. Thus,
by leading us to confront our own superstitions, he forces upon us the realisation that we are as
superstitious now as we have ever been; that we have not become generally enlightened, and never
will,  and therefore must never abstain from thinking, or allow ourselves to believe that all  our
thinking was already done for us by others. To be sure, the consequences of being deceived by
fiction are never too severe. However, the same means may be employed in non-fiction, where there
is much more at stake. Therefore, Poe’s benign charlatannerie may not be altogether unprofitable.
He does not tell us these things, for he is not a scientist or a philosopher. He is a poet, in the
broadest sense of the word. The job of the poet, he thought, was to craftily deceive his readers. As
he saw it, in order to be read, the poet had to appear to conform with the opinions of the majority—
this was especially true in a democracy—, but he could—and indeed should—lead us to question
such opinions. Thus, he reminds us, through all the humiliation to which he has subjected us, that all
our knowledge of the world is based on the concept of probability, and that we must either accept its
limitations, or become the hopeless dupes of countless humbugs; that we all, regardless of our sex,
must embrace uncertainty,  and learn to measure it,  or be dazzled into submission by claims of
absolute knowledge. My hope for this  dissertation is that it  may contribute,  in a small  way, to
encourage others to think and question. Some might say I aim too low; others that my expectations
are presumptuous. I believe, however, that, as a scholar, I have no right to expect more, or hope for
less.
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I – Robert Macnish and the Genesis of the Femicide Story
28
1 – The Original Femicide
From the late 1820’s to the mid 1840’s, approximately, there flourished, in England and the
United States alike, a peculiar style of short prose fiction with certain very specific  thematic and
formal traits. This distinctive type of fiction will  be referred throughout this  dissertation as the
“femicide story.” I include under this heading Edward  Bulwer-Lytton’s “Manuscript Found in a
Madhouse”  (1829),  Charles  Dickens’s  similarly titled “A Madman’s Manuscript,”  from  the
Pickwick Papers (1836-37), “The  Somnambulist,”  an  anonymous  narrative  published  in  Tait’s
Edinburgh Magazine in 1838 (which, however, will be discussed in the second chapter, which deals
more specifically with some hitherto unidentified sources of Poe’s fiction), and a string of tales by
Edgar Allan Poe (1809-1849): “Loss of Breath” (1832)1 (which will also not be dealt with in this
chapter, but a detailed analysis of which may be found in the third chapter), “Berenice” (1835)
“Morella” (1835) (all of which belong to the first group of Poe’s short-fictions, the so-called “Tales
of the Folio Club”), “Ligeia” (1838), and “The Black Cat” (1843). All of these very peculiar tales
can be traced to a common ancestor, a hoax entitled Confessions of an Unexecuted Femicide by the
Scottish physician and habitual contributor of Blackwood Robert Macnish (1802-1837) in which all
the  characteristics  for  which  the  other  tales  are  remarkable  were  combined  for  the  first  time.
Originally published as a pamphlet in Glasgow in 1827, and now mostly forgotten, along with its
author—it  was  last  printed,  as  far  as  I  could  ascertain,  in  1844—,  this  narrative,  which  was
marketed as a true story, made quite a splash in its day. I should point out, however, that this is not
meant as an exhaustive list.
The femicide story forms a distinct group within the fiction of that era which I believe it
would be useful to treat as a separate genre, or sub-genre. I deliberately employ these terms in a
loose sense,  as  this  study is  not intended as  a  systematic  inquiry into the problem of genre in
1 The tale was first published under this title in September 1835, in the Southern Literary Messenger. This was, 
however, a reworked version of “A Decided Loss,” which had appeared originally in the Saturday Courier of 
Philadelphia, in September 10, 1832. It is, therefore, one of Poe’s earliest tales.
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literature; the problem I intend to discuss is the femicide story itself. The kind of inquiry I propose
has never been attempted. Indeed, because they have not been treated as a group, each of these tales
has tended to be regarded by critics as something of a singularity in the history of literature.
Such classifications  necessarily  involve  choices  on  the  part  of  the  critic  that  may seem
injudicious to others. In this case, my choices tend to emphasise the family resemblance between
these stories, with the conviction that this may promote a better understanding of particular texts,
which is the ultimate object of my analysis. I will argue, then, that the femicide story is a literary
entity reasonably distinguished from other forms of fiction. This distinction is based on formal,
thematic, as well as historical criteria which I will try to define as accurately as possible from the
outset.
Formally, these are short prose tales told in the first person by the male protagonist. They are
invariably presented as “confessions,” in which the narrator present facts about his life that had not
been publicly known, or which had only been suspected. All of these men have caused the death of
at least one woman, typically a female lover, occasionally a mother, sister or daughter. In many of
the tales, the violence is explicit, in others implicit, to be discovered by the reader. Sometimes the
deed is performed by physical, others by psychological violence. Thus, in some of the stories the
narrator is a confessed femicide (this is the case in what I regard as the original femicide story,
Robert Macnish’s Confessions of an Unexecuted Femicide, or Poe’s “The Black Cat”), in others he
is a suspected femicide, and indeed must ultimately be exposed as one, as the interpretation of the
facts that allows him to exculpate himself, and which usually presupposes supernatural intervention,
does not stand up to reason—these stories, all by Poe and following a scheme of his own devising,
belong to a special category, the covert femicide story (“Ligeia,” “Morella” and “Berenice” fall in
that subgroup). The narrator may also confess the intent to kill but declare he did not carry out his
plan. This is the case of the “madman” narrator in Dickens’s “A Madman’s Manuscript,” and also of
Poe’s early satirical sketch “A Loss of Breath.” In the latter, the narrator was on the point of killing
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his wife when he lost his voice; in the former, he was about to stab his wife in her sleep when she
suddenly came to—the shock, however, and the very reasonable fear that if she fell asleep she might
never  wake up,  which the  narrator  did nothing to  allay,  ended up killing her  anyway.  Another
variant is the narrator who either commits or appears to commit femicide by proxy: the actual
killing is done (“The Somnambulist”), or may at first appear to be done (“Ligeia”), by another, who
nonetheless  acted  in  compliance  with  the  narrator’s  wishes.  Also,  though  this  may  not  be
immediately  apparent,  the  motives  of  the  narrator  frequently  involve  incest  (Confessions,
“Berenice,” “Morella”).
In all cases, the narrators cannot entirely conceal that they are sexually attracted to dead or
dying women, and this desire often prompts gruesome acts of violence (“Berenice” is perhaps the
most obvious example of this) or of more or less explicit necrophilia. Yet, their perverse sexuality is
always disguised by the posthumous sentimental idealisation of the dead woman. The narrators are
also invariably haunted by the image of their victims, and express regret for their loss in the most
pathetic  tones.  Yet, at the same time, even  when  they  recognise  the  deed,  they  disavow
responsibility for it. In some way or another, they agree that the death of the beloved woman could
not be helped.  In fact, the narrator speaks as if he, not the dead women, were the victim: he was
prompted by an innate evil propensity which could not be resisted; the cat made him do it; his old
flame finished off his ailing wife; his insanely jealous dead wife came back from the grave to kill
her rival. 
Yet, although they always find an excuse for themselves, most of them allow none for the
women  who  were  sacrificed.  Some  suggest  the  dead  women  had  sinned  against  conventional
patriarchal  morals  in  some  way,  either  by  letting  themselves  be  seduced  by  the  narrator  and
engaging  in  extra-marital  sex,  or  by  studying  evil  and  witchcraft,  and  therefore,  they  imply,
deserved to die. In other cases, they are more subtle. In “The Black Cat,” for example, the explicit
moral of the tale presupposes the idea that women rank lower in the scale of being than cats. The
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narrator of “Ligeia,” the sliest and most perverse of the bunch, gives us to understand that his first
wife did not actually deserve to die, but that he had no way of knowing it before she died—for only
through her deed of death did she prove worthy of his exacting love. Dickens’s “madman” narrator
is, in this respect, an exception. He acknowledges that he killed his wife and does not attempt to
extenuate his guilt by intimating she somehow deserved to die—yet, he too exempts himself of all
responsibility.  The mildest, least criminal, of all these characters is Bulwer-Lytton’s “madman,”
whose physical monstrosity, which he had deliberately concealed from her, frightens his pregnant
bride to death.
At first glance, all these tales appear particular embodiments of the typical male narrative
identified by Gilbert and Gubar in The Madwoman in the Attic. But the theme of all these tales is, I
will argue, not merely the death of a beautiful woman—that most poetic of topics mentioned in
Poe’s “The Philosophy of Composition”—but femicide. Indeed, I believe these tales are designed to
suggest that the kind of male sensibility that associates dead or dying women with sexual desire,
which is represented by the narrators, is the cause of these women’s deaths. In other words, the way
in which these deeds are handled by the authors of femicide stories tends to highlight the specificity
of those deeds. The focus of these authors, however, is not so much the deed, but the femicide
character, the narrator of the tale, and his motivations. What makes this narrator singular, is that he
carries to the extreme a common male sensibility. By focusing on this sensibility, the authors of the
femicide story intimated that the deeds depicted in the tale formed a separate phenomenon, that
should be distinguished from common homicide. This political  agenda was clearly indicated by
Macnish’s title, but became less obvious, although no less decisive, in later tales.
Bulwer-Lytton’s tale, however, is something of an exception within this context. Although,
according to  the criteria I  defined,  it  must still  be regarded as a femicide story,  thematically  it
pushes the limits of the genre, inasmuch as the narrator of the tale is no longer a bona fide femicide,
but  the  innocent  instrument  of  his  wife’s  destruction.  As  I  see  it,  Bulwer-Lytton  subverts  the
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femicide story, in the same sense that the other femicide stories may be said to subvert the typical
patriarchal sentimental narrative.
Finally, the femicide story, may also be regarded as a historico-literary phenomenon with
very clear chronological boundaries. Dickens, Bulwer-Lytton, Poe, and the anonymous author of
“The Somnambulist” were probably all aware of their debt to Macnish, or at the very least of their
debt  to  each  other.  All  of  them accepted  the  rules  that  had  been  established  beforehand  by a
predecessor and introduced variations to  the basic  outline that  he had provided. This is  clearly
indicated by the formal and thematic characteristics shared by these tales. The form enjoyed its
greatest popularity in the 1830s—most of the tales I mentioned were written during that decade—,
and then quickly faded from view. Even in that period, it was a minor fad—none of these writers
appears to have written more than one femicide story, with the single exception of Poe. Yet, two of
the most successful English writers of that period (for, although his star as long since faded, in his
day Bulwer-Lytton’s popularity as a novel writer was perhaps only rivaled by Walter Scott’s) tried
their hand at it. Then, just as the femicide story was getting out of fashion, Poe wrote some of his
best tales in the idiom. Indeed, I regard “Ligeia” as both the apex and the swansong of the femicide
story.  The  last  true  femicide  story,  I  would  contend,  is  “The  Black  Cat,”  also  by  Poe,  which
appeared in 1843.
Other tales of that period dealt with similar themes, “The Stroller’s Tale” in  Pickwick is a
good example, but do not fulfill the formal criteria for inclusion in the femicide story group, though
they certainly document a general concern with femicide. On the other hand, although the femicide
story,  as  I  have  here  defined  it,  virtually  disappeared  after  1843,  it  certainly  left  its  mark  in
literature. It would be tempting to include in my canon such influential and critically acclaimed
works as Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment. That particular work and many others on which the
influence of those of Poe’s tales I analyse here is equally noticeable are not only formally distinct
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from my stories,  but  were also written in  a  different  context,  and respond to different  cultural
anxieties than those by which I believe the authors of my stories were actuated.
I credit the authors of femicide stories with the invention of a new fictional character which
reflects cultural concerns that had become particularly acute in that period. This narrator defines the
singular point of view from which the tales are written, their peculiar tone; in other words, it defines
their style. In this sense, the femicide story is character oriented. Its protagonist-narrator defines the
femicide story much like the detective defines the detective story. Of course, there have always been
woman-killers in fiction. Many can be found, for example, in as widely read bodies of literature as
the works of Shakespeare and traditional ballads. These may be regarded as the forerunners of the
femicide,  in  the  same sense  that,  say,  Oedipus  may be  said  to  be a  forerunner  of  the  modern
detective. The direct ancestors of Macnish’s femicide, however, are the villains of late eighteenth-
century Gothic novels—particularly “monks,”  and at their head the notorious Ambrosio, the
unforgettable protagonist of Matthew Lewis's The Monk. Still, it must be remarked that, despite the
many obvious affinities between the monk and the narrator of Confessions, Macnish was the first to
employ the word “femicide” to identify such a character, and, availing himself of a type of authorial
fiction popularised by the Maga circle, also the first to confine the reader to the perspective of such
a character, with very little or no commentary.2
As a literary figure, the femicide exploits the well-known tendency of the reader to identify
with  a  first-person  narrator.  Yet,  the  authority  in  the  tale  is  problematic.  Indeed,  the  femicide
2 Dickens’s “A Madman’s Manuscript”  is the only exception. The “clergyman’s manuscript”  which came to Mr.
Pickwick, supposedly written by the madman himself, concluded with a commentary in another hand, presumably
that of the physician who attended the author in the madhouse. The unidentified commentator regarded the story as
“an instance of the baneful results of energies misdirected in early life,”  aggravated by “the strange delusion,
founded upon a well-known medical theory, strongly contended for by some, and as strongly contested by others,
that an hereditary madness existed in his family”  (“Madman’s” 145). Macnish’s femicide, as we will see, is also
convinced that he was the victim of an innate, unaccountable tendency for evil, although he does not believe it to be
hereditary. In any case, Macnish also gives as ground to suspect that he is deluded on that point.
The tale, though etched into the narrative of the adventures of the Pickwick club, receives no further
commentary from either the third-person narrator or his characters. Mr. Pickwick himself, it is true, was somewhat
startled by his reading: “casting a fearful glance around, he once more scrambled hastily between the sheets, and
soon fell asleep.” When he awoke, “The gloom which had oppressed him on the previous night, had disappeared
with the dark shadows which shrouded the landscape, and his thoughts and feelings were as light and gay as the
morning himself” (Dickens, “Madman” 145-46). He never gave the story a second thought.
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functions as a sort of perverse everyman figure, and in this it is fundamentally distinguished from
the male tyrants  of  Gothic  novels.  A double mechanism of  moral  distancing ensured that  such
characters got no sympathy from the reader. The third-person narrator, which represented a voice of
authority that tends to be identified with the author, was the moral compass of the tale. This voice
was  never  aligned  with  the  terrible  male  villains  of  the  novels.  Secondly,  Gothic  novels  were
invariably set in some ostensibly alien place, distant in time, space, or both. The femicide, however,
is permitted to narrate his own tale, and to extract a moral from it without being contradicted. In
addition, his tale is set in the very near past, and narrated in the present. In many ways, the narrator
speaks and thinks as the average man of his time, and even seems to claim the reader’s sympathy by
invoking a  common moral  ground—he does  not  seem Gothic  in  the  least.  The femicide story,
therefore, distinguishes itself from the typical Gothic by not being ostensibly didactic. Yet, these
men  did  very  unusual  things,  by  deed  or  omission  they  have  assaulted,  killed,  imprisoned,  or
otherwise terrorised women. This creates a characteristic atmosphere of moral ambiguity. To be
more precise, the moral of the tale, despite the narrator’s confidence, is unsettled—and this in turn
affects the credibility of their take on events. The use of an unreliable first-person narrator, and the
absence of an authorial voice, then, is characteristic of the femicide story. Although the author never
intervenes, as it were, in his own person, to pass moral judgment on his narrators, he insidiously
discountenances  his  narrator’s  views  behind  his  back.  Thus,  the  reader  is  presented  with  an
alternative: either accept the femicide’s moral or detect the flaw in his discourse.
The femicide, then, defines the femicide story. But what exactly does the word “femicide”
mean? The form “-cide” being the English transliteration of two different Latin suffixes, “-cidium”
and “-cida,”  which refer to the act of killing and its agent, respectively, the same spelling,
“femicide,”  corresponds to two different words, defined by the OED as “the killing of a woman”
and “one who kills a woman” (entries 1 and 2, respectively). In its strict etymological sense, indeed,
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“femicide”  refers to a variety of “homicide”  (both the deed and the doer) defined by the
specification of the victim’s sex.
However, the word “femicide” is now seldom used in the sense consigned by the dictionary.
In modern usage, it is almost never used to refer to the killer, and almost exclusively to the killing,
and even then in a restricted sense of a crime defined not just by the victim’s sex, but by its motive,
which has been the subject of explicit theorisation starting in the mid 1970’s. Since then, in the
loose sense of sexist murder of women, the term has gained currency in academia and, to a lesser
extent, also in the press. Recently, the term has even been assimilated to the official language of the
World Health Organisation.3
The feminist scholar Diana E. H. Russell appears to have been the first to  establish this
narrow meaning of “femicide.” During the First International Tribunal on Crimes Against Women,
held in Brussels in 1976, she argued for the adoption of a specific denomination for the misogynous
murder of women. In  Crimes Against Women: Proceedings of the International Tribunal, Russell
and her collaborator Nicole Van de Ven wrote: “We must realize that a lot of homicide is in fact
femicide. We must recognize the sexual politics of murder. From the burning of witches in the past,
to the more recent widespread custom of female infanticide in many societies, to the killing of
women for ‘honor,’ we realize that femicide has being going on for a long time” (104). Though at
the time Russell did not attempt an explicit definition of “femicide,”  she and her collaborators
proposed several in the following decades, which she enumerated in her 2009 article “Femicide:
Politicizing the Killing of Females:” “the killing of women because they are women;” “’the murder
3 A document issued in 2012 by the Pan American Health Organization, the regional office of the World Health
Organisation, and available at their web site entitled “Understand and Addressing Violence Against Women,”
focuses “on the narrower definition commonly used in policies, law and research.”
The WHO also promoted, with PATH, the Inter-American Alliance for the prevention of Gender-based
Violence (Intercambios) and The Medical Research Council of South-Africa, the conference “Strengthening
Understanding of Femicide: Using Research to Galvanize Action and Accountability,” held in Washington DC in
April 2008. An “overview” of the conference was published the following year, with the same title, in which were
contained two crucial articles to the understanding of the story of the conceptualisation of “femicide” by Monique
Widyono and by Russell herself, who was also the key-note speaker at the conference. The latter’s article is
significant in the context of the present discussion also for other reasons. In it, Russell recounts how she originally
came by the term, and decided to adopt it, and how she later found out that it was not a modern coinage.
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of women by men motivated by hatred, contempt, pleasure, or a sense of ownership of women’,”
motivations which may be generically termed sexism; and finally, “the killing of females by males
because they are female” (27).
Prior to that date, her most structured attempt to outline the political implications of the
concept had been the article “Femicide: Sexist Terrorism Against Women,” which she coauthored
with Jane Caputi in 1992, in which femicide and rape were represented as crimes determined by the
same kind of patriarchal political motivations.  Femicide was, like rape, “the direct expression of
sexual politics, an act of conformity to masculinist sexual norms (…), and a form of terrorism that
serves to preserve gender status quo,”  which they  felt should be distinguished from “murders
targeting women,” which is very nearly a paraphrase of the dictionary definition (14-15).4 “When
the gender of the victim is immaterial to the perpetrator,” Russell later explained, “we are dealing
with a non-femicidal murder” (Russell, “Femicide: Politicizing” 28). Russell’s concept of femicide
also  adds  to  the  specification  of  the  gender  of  the  victim,  coded  in  the  strictly  etymological
definition, the specification of the gender of the aggressor.
Looking back on Russell’s work with the concept of femicide, Monique Widyono writes in
“Conceptualizing  Femicide”  (2009)  that: “She intended to highlight femicide in the context of
unequal gender relations and the notion of male power and domination over women (8-9). In other
words, Russell regarded femicide not so much as an individual crime, but as a collective crime, the
consequence of a political fact, gender inequality. This politisation of the crime tends to dilute the
agency of the crime, which is ultimately ascribed to the male oppressor, in the abstract, rather than
the individual perpetrator.
Russell, however, thought it necessary to counteract the generalising tendency of her original
definition by some additional restrictions, which emphasised individual agency. For example, for
the “deaths of women resulting from male acts of power and domination, including, for example,
4 According to the OED’s definition, of course, the term “femicide” applies to the killing of a woman even when it 
does not qualify as murder.
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women who die from AIDS or female genital mutilation” (Widyono, “Conceptualizing” 11), which
her original definition was not specific enough to exclude, she proposed the alternate term “mass
femicide.”  This  additional  restriction  allowed  her  to  separate  such  broad  consequences  of
patriarchal domination from the deliberate killing of women for sexist reasons, to which the term
femicide should be restricted. Moreover, though, theoretically, a female could be the perpetrator of
“femicide,” abstractly  understood as a killing that enforces dominant masculinist politics, Russell
preferred to appropriate the word “femicide”  exclusively to crimes perpetrated by males, and
proposed the term “female-on-female murder” for “murders of females by females because they are
females” (Russell, “Femicide: Politicizing” 29). The exact definition of “femicide” remains to this
day the focus of a lively debate.
Russel, without doubt, was responsible for the introduction of the term “femicide” in the
vocabulary of modern politics and philosophy. In 1976, in fact, Russell was convinced that she had
been the first to use the word in public and accordingly made rhetorical use of the idea of priority:
“femicide,” she then wrote, “has been going on for a long time. But since it involves females, there
was no name for it until Carol Orlock invented the word ‘femicide’” in 1975 (Russell and Van de
Ven, Crimes Against Women 104)5. Indeed, at the time the International Tribunal for Crimes Against
Women was held, in 1976, Russell thought the term had been invented by Orlock, but by 1990 she
recognised she had been mistaken:
When Harmes was looking for articles on femicide for our book, Femicide in Global
Perspective, she stumbled across the third edition of a short book entitled The
Confessions of an Unexecuted Femicide, published in 1827, and authored by William
Macnish, who wrote about his seduction, impregnation, abandonment, and murder of
a young woman. This led to the next surprising discovery: the term femicide was first
5 “I first heard the word femicide in 1975, when an acquaintance told me that an American writer, Carol Orlock, was
preparing an anthology on femicide. Although her book was never published, the term resonated with me
powerfully as one that was needed to refer to sexist murders of females by males”  (Russell,  “Femicide:
Politicizing” 27).
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used in 1801 in the British publication The Satirical Review of London at the
Commencement of the Nineteenth Century to signify ‘the killing of a woman.’ And
according to the 1989 edition of the  OED, which defined femicide in an identical
way, the term femicide appeared in Wharton’s Law Lexicon, in 1848, suggesting that
it had become a prosecutable offense.
Despite Harmes’ discovery of this brief history of the term femicide, I was not
tempted to substitute the dictionary definition for my own, because I was, and still
am, convinced that the sexist aspect of most murders of females by males needs to be
incorporated into the definition of femicide. (Russell, “Femicide: Politicizing” 29)
Russell writes as if the  dictionary  definition  were  incompatible  with  hers.  I  think  this
assumption  is  conceptually  unsound.  The  dictionary  is  descriptive  in  nature,  not  normative.  It
registers, that is, the senses in which particular words have been used in what its authors consider to
be the corpus of the language; it  does not prescribe rules for their  use.  And then, of course,  a
dictionary does not exhaust, nor does it purport to exhaust, the semantic possibilities, much less the
political undertones of a term.  Reading her text, we also get the impression that awareness of the
political implications of “femicide” came suddenly to our enlightened time. She recognises, that is,
that the term had not been “invented” by Orlock, as she had supposed, but implies that this was
immaterial for her purposes. The term, she supposed, referred to a sort of violence to the political
implications of which the people who first gave it currency were blind. As it turns out, the facts are
much more complex than Russell’s grossly inaccurate “brief history” suggests
The “invention” of a new word responds to a necessity of expression. One must assume the
writers who “invented” the term had themselves felt that the language had no word to express the
meaning they intended. In this case, specifically, the “invention” of a gendered term bespeaks the
writers’ conviction that available non-gendered terms like “murder” and “homicide” were too broad
for their purposes. This in turn suggests that they were concerned that the sex of the victims was not
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being adequately considered, and also that they intended to correct this. Thus far, at least, they must
have  agreed  with  Russell.  I  believe  the  scholar’s  job  is  precisely  to  inquire  into  the  cultural
perceptions  that  determine  such  significant  choices,  in  order  to  avoid  the  sort  of  tempting
generalisation that informs the previous quotation.  The anxieties that motivated this nineteenth-
century “invention” of femicide were not and could not possibly be the same that determined its
reinvention in the twentieth century, but the contrast is not nearly as stark as Russell assumed it to
be. Indeed, the assumption that awareness of the political implications of “femicide” came suddenly
and at once to our enlightened time is informed by a simplistic understanding of the life of ideas.
Russell’s concept may have been new, but it must have had its antecedents. Indeed, her handling of
the matter obscures what may be termed the pre-history of the idea of femicide.
Harmes’s “discoveries,” all three of them, are precisely the three texts quoted by the OED’s
two entries  for  the  form,  which  Russell dismisses  as  a  matter  of  course. Or they would be if
“William Macnish” and The Satirical Review were not misreadings6. I will start by the second. The
OED quotes from a book published in 1801 entitled not “The Satirical Review of London,” but A
Satirical View of London at the Commencement of the Nineteenth Century by “An Observer.” There
the  term is  employed  figuratively in reference to the seduction of “virgins:”  “This species of
delinquency may be denominated femicide; for the monster who betrays a credulous virgin, and
consigns her to infamy, is in reality a most relentless murderer!”  (60).7 The passage presupposes,
without questioning it, the privileged position of the male in  human sexuality,  as  socially  and
culturally construed in a patriarchal society. According to this distinctly sexist outlook, a single
woman who engages in sexual intercourse is a fallen woman—she is, to use a modern colloquialism
—damaged goods. Femicide denotes here that fate “worse than death” that respectable young ladies
were taught to fear. This sentimental common place, which presupposes the helplessness of women,
6 Russell’s phrasing and her footnote convey the erroneous impression that the definition “the killing of a woman” is 
a quotation from the earliest known use of the word; in fact, Russell quotes the OED’s definition itself.
7 Subsequent editions of this successful book, which reached its fourth edition by 1809, identified its author as John
Corry.
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is embodied in such landmarks of sentimental literature as Richardson’s Clarissa, where the female
protagonist  dwindles  and  dies  after  losing  her  “honor”  to  Lovelace.  The indignation of the
“Observer” is clearly not aimed at male privilege per se, but at the man who abuses it, the infamous
seducer, of which Lovelace was the type. This use of “femicide” does not require any significant
revision of Russell’s historical sketch. But what if the seducer decided to truly and literally kill his
“conquests?” 
This dreadful prospect is acted out in The Confessions of an Unexecuted Femicide, the
original femicide story I mentioned above, and here the distortion resulting from Russell’s account
is far from negligible. First, the title does not refer, as she implies, to the killing, but to the killer—it
is the criminal, not the crime, that goes “unexecuted.”  Strictly speaking, therefore, this is not the
word employed by Russell. Indeed, this little book is quoted by the OED as the earliest known
instance of the other meaning of “femicide,”  “one who kills a woman”  (entry  1). As the title
indicates, the narrator confesses he murdered a woman—Mary Elliston, who was pregnant with his
child. However, “William Macnish” is not the author of book; he is a mistake. The name is a mash-
up of the name of the author, Robert Macnish, correctly identified by the OED, and the name of the
fictional narrator, “William M**r, Esq. of —, in the County of Stirling, Scotland.”
Thus, Russell  and Harmes were taken in by a very elaborate hoax. The author not only
omitted his name from the original publication—the authorship would not be publicly divulged until
1838, after Macnish’s death—, but, to further the ruse, permitted the story to circulate under the
truncated name of the narrator, as if he were a real person, with a real family whose privacy had to
be  protected. The story was prefaced by an excerpt from the narrator’s will, determining its
posthumous publication, which contributed to the air of truth. And the story was plausible enough.
No one seems to have thought it very unlikely that a seducer would kill a poor “conquest” to avoid
scandal, or that this crime could go unpunished. Yet, this was not an honest hoax. 
41
The  narrative  was  accompanied  by  several  para-textual  indications  that  were  clearly
designed to tip  the knowing reader  off.  One such indication was the tell-tale  disclaimer which
preceded all editions of the narrative: “No fiction.”8 No factual narrative, or intended as such, has
ever been accompanied by such an obtrusive denial of its fictional nature, which actually prompts
the reader to doubt. Indeed, the hoax would have been much more credible without this disclaimer
—evidently, full credence was not the author’s design, who seems rather to have actively sought to
discredit his fictional cover.
The disclaimer suggests that the femicide was a persona assumed by the anonymous author.
The sophisticated reader was used to this sort of mask play, which the famous Blackwood magazine
had brought into fashion. Indeed, “the projection of a deliberately created magazine persona was
one of the dominant journalistic conventions of the age,” and one which Poe adopted early on
(Allen,  Poe  and  the  British  Magazine  Tradition 34) and so, most of  the  essays  published  in
Blackwood were, strictly speaking, fictions, in the sense that contributors did not only write under
pseudonym, but assumed a fictional persona, such as the Ettrick Shepherd (James Hogg) or the
Opium Eater (Thomas De Quincey). Such personas formed a kind of fictional framework for the
magazine. The disclaimer suggested William the femicide was another kind of fictional persona,
and this was all but confirmed, as we shall see, by the texts that accompanied the publication of the
narrative in the English periodical press.
8 I have not been able to obtain a copy of the first edition of the original pamphlet, but all of the many early editions
which appeared in the British papers from August 1827 onward reproduce this disclaimer. The catalogue of the
Library of the University of Edinburgh, which holds a copy of an early unspecified edition, dated 1827,  of the
pamphlet, specifically mentions the words “No Fiction” printed  on the verso of the title page. Incidentally, the
obscurity into which Macnish and his work have fallen have led the librarians to the mistaken conception that
Confessions is a true story, as stated. This is indicated by their decision of filing the narrative under the tag “Murder
– Scotland – Personal Narratives,” a mistake which may partly account for Russell’s (“The Confessions.” Library
Record). Below I present the convoluted history of the publication of the tale in the periodical press in more detail.
The 1828 “fourth edition” of the original Macphun pamphlet,  the earliest  to which I have had access,  does
indeed carry the “No Fiction” disclaimer, mentioned by the Library of the University of Edinburgh in the verso of
the title page. Page two contains a longer title, which stakes a more ambiguous claim of authenticity than any of the
previous editions: “A Tale of Horror: Founded on Fact. The Confessions of an Unexecuted Femicide.” 
Finally, the version of the tale included by D. M. Moir in his  anthology of Macnish’s literary remains
reproduces the disclaimer, below the title, between commas (see Moir, The Modern Pythagorean 69). There the title
of  the  tale is altered to The Confessions of an Unexecuted Feminicide, in  compliance  with  Macnish’s  own
suggestion (see letter from Macnish to Moir transcribed below).
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Not surprisingly, the real author of Confessions, Robert Macnish was closely associated to
Blackwood’s. As “The Modern Pythagorean” he contributed prose tales, verse, and even aphorisms
to the magazine, and, less frequently, to other of the many literary magazines of the period, starting
in 1826. Under his own name, he also published two relatively successful treatises on psychological
subjects,  The Anatomy of Drunkenness (1827) and The Philosophy of Sleep (1830), as well as an
introduction to Phrenology.9 
Within months of Macnish’s death in 1837, his friend D. M. Moir published a collection of
literary remains in two volumes, entitled The Modern Pythagorean (1838). The second volume was
a collection of Macnish’s tales that included Confessions; the first was a long literary biography of
Macnish, interspersed with cullings from his correspondence with the editor, as well as some of his
poems. This was the first time Macnish’s name was publicly linked with his literary persona, and
also, as far as I could ascertain, the first time the secret of the authorship  of Confessions was
published. Macnish told the whole story to Moir, whom he had met for the first time the previous
month,  in  a  letter  dated  August  13,  1827,  the  first  of  many he  would  write  him.  The relevant
passages are transcribed in The Modern Pythagorean:
I also sent you a whimsical affair of mine, which is just out. It has been published
with its ridiculous title, merely for the purpose of creating a sensation, and make the
Glasgow folks stare a little. The strictest secrecy is preserved with regard to the
authorship, which is solely confined to the knowledge of the publisher, and one or
two others. (Moir, The Modern Pythagorean 1:50)
9 The first of these books was published originally in Glasgow with the title The Anatomy of Drunkenness: An
Inaugural Essay in 1827, by Macphun  of  Glasgow, Macnish’s  habitual  publisher,  who in the following year
published a heavily revised second edition, “enlarged to more than the double the size of the former.” The title was
also shortened to The Anatomy of Drunkenness, and a dedicatory to “Delta,” Moir’s literary pseudonym, who would
later become Macnish’s literary executor, was  added. In the same year, the “1st American Edition, from the 2d
London [sic] Edition”  appeared. The fifth Macphun edition, of 1834, was the last during Macnish’s lifetime, but
was reprinted several times during the two following decades.
The Philosophy of Sleep was first published in 1830, also by Macphun, and was equally successful. Continuing
demand justified a second edition in 1834 and a third in 1836, both of which were overseen by the author, who
revised and made additions to the text.  In 1845, long after Macnish’s death, Macphun made a final printing of the
book, after which interest in it seems to have faded. In 1977, however, Daniel Robinson prepared a new edition of
the book—the first in more than a century.
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Moir confirms the “affair”  in question was the Confessions, which had been published
sometime before,10 and did create the  sensation its author intended. In October 2, less than two
months after its initial  publication,  Macnish tells his friend “My Femicide, or Feminicide, as it
should have been, has gone through a second edition, and a third will be probably required’” (Moir,
The Modern Pythagorean 1:57).11 He adds: “I am not sure that it is a very creditable thing to trick
the public, as has been done by this pamphlet. I, however, stand acquitted of anything mercenary,
for I gave the manuscript to Macphun to make a kirk and mill if he liked of it’” (1:50). Moir shared
his friend’s uneasiness regarding the legitimacy of tricking the public with a yarn like Confessions,
of which he was indeed not too fond. Still, he had to confess the hoax was skillfully managed and a
great success in its kind: “It was a most truculent story; but the tone of truth is so well sustained
throughout, that it took to a miracle” (1:51).
This  “tone  of  truth”  and  the  secrecy  observed  by  all  involved  no  doubt  contributed
decisively to create the confusion that surrounds the authorship of Confessions to this day, but other
fortuitous circumstances obscured the matter still further. Macnish died unexpectedly in 1837, at the
age of 34, at a time when he was still struggling to make a name for himself as a creative writer. The
popularity  of  his  scientific  output  proved a little  more  enduring  than that  of  the  tales  of  “The
Modern Pythagorean,” but not much. Karl Miller, one the very few scholars that has dealt with
Macnish’s work, wrote in 1975 that Macnish “was once quite well known” but “has since virtually
disappeared from view,” and that his stories, in particular, have completely “sunk from view” since
the time of their greatest popularity (203, 216).
All this has made it easier for Russell and her collaborators to be taken in by Macnish’s
“trick,” and integrate the Confessions into their overriding narrative. Femicide had been around long
before people came up with a name for it. This was only another story of “seduction, impregnation,
10 The earliest mention to the pamphlet I could locate, was in the August 11, 1827 issue of The Ant, a Glasgow
Magazine, which suggests the pamphlet had appeared in the preceding Saturday, that is, exactly a week before
(though the reference seems to me a little ambiguous on that point). The reference in question is quoted below.
11 In fact, the work had reached a fourth Macphun edition by 1828.
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abandonment, and murder of a young woman” to be grouped under the “new” concept of femicide
(Russell  “Femicide: Politicizing,” 29). But  this  was not some ingenuous statement of fact.  The
femicide  had,  in  a  very  real  sense,  been  invented  by  Macnish.  Russell,  Harmes,  and Caputi’s
mistake  highlights  the  fact  that,  although  this  particular  story  did  not happen,  it  could  have
happened. But this is exactly the point Macnish was trying to make. This, then, was what was
supposed to make people “stare,” as he put it. And his intuition proved flawless. For a while at least,
he had people staring—and not only in Glasgow, but the whole United Kingdom.
A well-orchestrated campaign—what may be termed a publicity stunt—, probably designed
by Macphun himself, ensured this. Starting on August 20, or perhaps a few days earlier, roughly a
week after  Macnish revealed  his  new friend Moir  the  secret  of  The Confessions,  two different
versions of the tale, one complete in one installment, another divided in two parts, each with its own
editorial  note,  surfaced  almost  simultaneously  in  Liverpool  and  London:  in  The  Albion,  The
Mercury,  and the  Kaleidoscope, or Literary and Scientific Mirror,  from the former,  and in  The
Standard (which would later become The Evening Standard), and perhaps The St. James Chronicle
from  the  latter.12 Then  followed  in  quick  succession  the  Saunders  News-Letter,  the  Belfast
Commercial Chronicle, the Tipperary Free Press, the Cumberland Pacquet, the Inverness Courier,
The Atlas, of London, The Sun, also from London (in its “Police Intelligence” section!), Bell’s Life
in London, and Sporting Chronicle (oddly enough), and finally the Pertshire Courier, which ran the
story in November 1, 1827. By this time the story was cooling off, but as late as May 16, 1828, the
Dublin Evening Mail  was still running it. Meanwhile, Macphun kept the market stocked with the
pamphlet. All in all, the hoax was an enormous success. Of all Macnish’s short prose narratives, this
was almost certainly the most widely divulged. However, very few at the time knew he had written
12 The Standard of August 23 and The Mercury of the next day were the earliest newspaper publications of the entire
tale and of its first half I could obtain. The Mercury was almost certainly the first newspaper to publish the entire
tale. There are reports, however, that the Albion of Liverpool published the first part of the tale on August 20, and
there  is  some  evidence  that  suggests  that  it  appeared  originally  in  the  St.  James  Chronicle.  I  discuss  the
circumstances of  the publication of  The Confessions  in detail  in the following pages.  I  refer  the reader to the
Appendix containing a chronology of the publication of the tale.
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the story, or even that the author was The Modern Pythagorean who had written some tales for
Blackwood. By the time Moir divulged the secret, the story was more than a decade old, and almost
entirely forgotten.13 Thus, Confessions, which was a fairly obscure matter even in its day, was, over
time, shrouded under a mist of misunderstanding. As a consequence, the influence his story had on
contemporary writers became invisible.
I say that Macnish invented the femicide. He thought that his character was distinct enough
to require a new name.  The author’s hesitation between “femicide”  and “feminicide”  in the title,
indeed, testifies that he considered the term a neologism, or at least thought that it  was not well-
established in the language. This strongly  suggests that he too felt that the kind of violence he
depicted in the tale, which Russell herself admits falls into the modern definition of femicide, had to
be named. This naming  is  itself a political gesture. The fact that William the femicide’s story
perfectly matches Russell’s definition of femicide, indeed, is the result of deliberate choices on the
author’s part, choices that bespeak his intention of exposing precisely what Russell calls the “sexist
aspect” of femicide. Thus, the rhetoric of the fiction undermines the rhetoric of the narrator.
 Like all fictional characters, the femicide is patterned after real people. Yet, although he
may represent,  in many ways,  the patriarchal  ideology common in his  time,  this  was an effect
wrought by Macnish, who evidently did not feel the character represented his views, his attitudes, or
his feelings. Coded in the text, therefore, is the distance between the author and his narrator. The
role of the critic is to attempt to gauge this distance.
Macnish’s invention,  of course,  is  not  without its  precedent in fiction.  As I  have before
mentioned, its ancestors are the terrible male tyrants of the Gothic, who imprisoned and harassed
women, typically in some decrepit old castle, to force them to comply to their wishes. Indeed, the
Gothic disguise allowed a certain degree of license to Ann Radcliffe and her imitators that was not
granted the writers who set their fiction in the present. In her novels, most notably in The Mysteries
13 I provide a chronology of the publication of  Confessions in the Appendix. This is not an exhaustive list, and is
presented merely for reference purposes.
46
of Udolpho, she hints at the notion of femicide, that is, the killing of women by man for sexist
reasons within the framework of an extreme patriarchal society. Indeed, she tantalises the reader
with  suggestions  of  the  deed,  only  to  swerve  from  it  in  the  last  moment,  usually  by  some
preposterous coincidence that provides an alternate explanation for the suggestive circumstances
that  pointed  toward  the  crime.  Jane Austen, in her Northanger Abbey (1817), burlesques this
strategy of suspense, where the imagination of the  novel-reading heroine leads her to apprehend
terrible, but inexistent crimes. Thus, Radcliffe obeys a very strict code of decorum. The heroine of
the novel is never killed. On the contrary, she is rewarded for her trials with at least a nominally
happy ending.
Few Gothic novels challenge these rules of Gothic decorum, and none as egregiously as
Matthew Lewis’ The Monk. Under pretence of exposing the distortion of character wrought on the
protagonist  by a monastic life of celibacy and self-denial, Lewis has the hypocritical monk
Ambrosio, commit femicide—twice.  The  Gothic  dealt  in  the  cultural  taboos  of  incest,  sexual
violence, and matricide, or more precisely, in hinting of their possibility, without ever realising it.
The monk goes one step further, for his victims are his mother and sister, the latter of whom he also
rapes. Thus, he enacts all those familial horrors which had only been hinted at in Radcliffe’s novels.
Lewis also swerved from her ideologically reassuring didacticism, which greatly scandalised many
of his contemporaries. The evil male tyrant is the focus of the tale, which had never been the case in
Radcliffe’s novels, which are always focused on the female victim of his cruelty until  The Italian
(1797), which is itself a reply to Mattew Lewis’s scandalous novel. And then, Antonia, the monk’s
sister, whose role matches that of Radcliffe’s heroines, is not providentially saved from the horrors
they had apprehended, and ends up being raped and murdered.
The  Gothic,  of  course,  as  its  name  implies,  was  set  in  an  epoch  that  was  ostensibly
distinguished  from  the  present,  and  which  was  conventionally  associated  with  superstition,
particularly  the  belief  in  ghosts  and  apparitions.  This  effect  of  cultural  distance  is  sometimes
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achieved by setting the tale in some “Oriental” setting—William Beckford’s  Vathek  (1786) is the
most famous example of this Oriental Gothic. Usually, however, the novels are set in the context of
unreformed Christianity. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, however, another form
of fiction appeared which was not strictly speaking Gothic, but developed from it and tapped on the
same cultural anxieties. Thus, novels such as William Godwin’s Caleb Williams (1794), which are
often  classified  as  Gothic,  were  set  in  present-day  England.  The  American  novelist  Charles
Brockden Brown (1771-1810), who considered himself Godwin’s disciple, wrote several novels in
this style. The femicide story follows this trend of transferring Gothic horrors to a contemporary
setting.14
Among  Brockden  Brown’s  novels,  Wieland (1798)  is  particularly  important  for  our
purposes, as it provides a link between William the femicide and Lewis’s monk. The eponymous
character of the novel is a man who kills his wife and children in obedience to what he believes was
a divine commandment. In chapter XVIII, Clara, the protagonist’s sister, could not believe that her
brother killed his family. Her, and Wieland’s, uncle then tells her: “Thou art anxious to know the
destroyer of thy family, his actions, and his motives. Shall I call him to thy presence, and permit
him to confess before thee? Shall I make him the narrator of his own tale?” (Brown, Wieland 151).
He then presents to her a transcription of the killer’s confession, which occupies most of the next
two chapters.  Thus,  by  adopting  the  subjective  perspective  of  the  uxoricide,  Brockden  Brown
foreshadows the femicide story, 
However, in the novel, the femicide is not permitted to be the sole narrator of his tale. But
Wieland’s uncle’s question implies a challenge. What if the reader were to be left alone with the
femicide, and be strictly confined to his subjective outlook? The femicide, of course, laments what
he has done, and feels the horror of his deed. The image of his agonising wife still haunts him. Yet,
14 Mary Wollstonecraft’s posthumous Mary, Or the Wrongs of Woman (1798) should also be mentioned. There she
openly portrays the danger of death involved in rudimentary techniques of abortion to which single women were
compelled to subject themselves, and even has the protagonist’s female baby die as a result of the mother’s
confinement in a madhouse by her husband.
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he feels himself justified. In his view, it was his duty to kill her, no matter how he felt about it. Of
course,  in  Wieland,  his  perspective  is  contrasted  with  others,  and  this  makes  his  superstition
apparent. This superstition is something he has in common with Ambrosio the monk, and, by and
large,  all  Gothic  villains.  In  Macnish’s  femicide  story,  however,  the  reader  must  scrutinise  the
narrator’s character, and form his own judgment of his character without help from the author. 
Can the reader trust William? What kind of character is he? In what does his perspective
differ from that of the author? Is he fundamentally different from the average, normal reader? Is the
narrator really a reformed femicide, as he claims, or is  his outlook constitutionally femicidal?
Indeed,  the  rejection  of  the  reassuring  Gothic  fiction  that  the  male  tyrant  was  the  result  of
superstitions that had been exploded in modern societies suggests the question may not be merely
academic. Would the reader, that is, be able to detect the femicide before he killed? These questions
are as pressing as they are disturbing.
Indeed, William’s deed, inasmuch as it goes against all accepted moral codes, brings his
statements under suspicion. He sounds calm and collected. In fact, most of the time, he sounds like
a normal male writer  of his time. The sentimental clichés he deploys to describe the two main
female characters, his victim and lover Mary Elliston and his sister Eliza, were characteristic of the
fiction of the era—they would not be out of place in any of the many conventional tales of love and
loss that filled the magazines. Yet, such passages as the following, though they would otherwise be
perfectly  unremarkable,  being  put  in  the  mouth  of  the  suspicious  femicide  character  become
themselves suspect:
I know not how it was, but this pure-minded and intellectual girl conceived for me a
strong affection. God knows, there was little in my society to attract the love of any
one, and, above all, of such as she. I never did her an act of kindness. I scarcely ever
spoke to her with common civility; yet, strange to say, I unknowingly gained her
heart, and she loved me at last as if I had been the most deserving object upon earth.
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How my grovelling soul came to be invested with such power, remains a problem
which I have never been able to solve. In all other respects, the mind of Mary was
pure and heavenly. That spirit so full of poetry and romance—that mild enthusiastic
spirit, conversant only with lofty thoughts, and whose existence had passed in a
world of fancy and feeling—how did it descend from its high estate to seek
companionship with a base earth-born heart like mine. In this only she erred—in this
only she showed that tinge of humanity which clings to all below. 
(Macnish, Confessions 11)
This is a perfectly orthodox specimen of a kind of sentimentality that was common in the
early nineteenth-century. His own merely “male” unworthiness attests the passive “female” virtues
of his lover, whom he exalts right out of this world. The ideal woman of most fiction of that time
was characterised by forbearance and selfless abandonment to a male lover who was also typically
represented as being unworthy of her.  Considering the speaker killed this woman, however,  the
double bind to which this sort of gallantry holds her is not as harmless as it otherwise might have
seemed. Indeed, William interprets this double-bind rather literally. Ideally considered, woman is
superior to man, according to his exaggerated masculinist rhetoric, because she has no interest in
sex, and only as long as she remains chaste. Man, on the other hand, is tacitly represented as being
incapable of restraining his sexual impulses.
Woman,  then,  once she  “stoops”  from her impossibly “lofty”  position, falls below the
dignity of humanity—she is lost. Therefore, she  is  condemned to be either above or below
“humanity.” How could, the appalled femicide wonders, the female spirit of purity stoop to physical
love? In so doing, Mary showed her nature was tainted, as he puts it, with “humanity.” In contrast, it
is only “human”  for man to pursue sexual desire. Hence, whereas his human status is a given,
woman is never, strictly speaking, conceived as a full human being—she must either be a body
without soul, or a soul without body.
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The idea, implied in the foregoing passage, that women come from heaven and cannot last
long after their “descent” to earth, may be regarded as the peculiar superstition of the femicide. This
is  the  idea  that  underlies  all  his  actions  and  attitudes  both  before  and  after  the  killing  of  the
“unchaste” Mary Elliston.  Indeed,  although, unlike Wieland,  William is  not  overtly  depicted as
such, Macnish coaxes the reader to conclude that he is a superstitious man; that is, to realise that his
representations of ideal womanhood are fundamentally out of touch with reality, and therefore tend,
by  their  very  nature,  to  femicide.  William himself  renders  this  superstition  with  epigrammatic
terseness when he recalls his mother’s death.  The spirit “of woman is like the dew of heaven upon
the flower, and is melted away by the breath of misfortune”  (Macnish,  Confessions 8).15 Married
women, of course, are considered chaste according to the common patriarchal ideology to which he
appeals—the marriage vow sanctifies sexual intercourse by channelling it to the culturally accepted
end of procreation. At the same time, her death is offered as confirmation of William’s overriding
superstition. Whereas the unchaste woman is sacrificed for her “humanity,” the chaste woman must
die in order to confirm she is too good for this world, that is, above “humanity.” To confirm, that is,
her indifference to sensual pleasure.
Thus,  although we are  never  told  William is  superstitious,  he himself  betrays  a  sort  of
superstition that we are given to understand is peculiar to the femicide. In this sense, I would argue
that the femicide is still fundamentally a Gothic character. The Gothic is often described in terms of
the contrast  between superficial pseudo-historical “trappings” and profound meanings, however, it
may also be described, I believe more productively, in terms of a tension between superstition and
rationality, which is dramatised by the contrast between the views of the superstitious characters and
those of the author, which may or may not be represented explicitly in the text by an enlightened
character of third-person non-participant narrator. In Radcliffe’s widely-imitated formula, the voice
15 Morella, in Poe’s tale of the same name, invokes a similar conception of gender in her death-bed address to her
husband: “It is a fair day for the sons of earth and life—ah, more fair for the daughters of heaven and death!” (232).
The irony in these words is apparent. Morella will proceed to curse her husband before she dies. I argue below that
this narrator was one of Poe’s first femicides.
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of reason always makes itself heard, against superstition—this is what is known as the supernatural
explained.
In Horace Walpole’s  The Castle of Otranto  (1767), universally considered the first Gothic
novel, the author craftily concealed himself from the reader behind a Gothic mask. In this sense,
Otranto may be  said  to  represent  an  extreme “Gothicism,”  that  was  considerably  mitigated  in
Radcliffe’s  novels. Walpole’s  original preface  explained that the premise, in the vulgar modern
sense of the word, of his “romance” was the strict adherence to the superstition which was supposed
to prevail in the time in which the narrative takes place.  In the first edition, Walpole had not yet
assumed the authorship, and presented his work as an anonymous translation from a sixteenth-
century Italian original. The “solution of the author’s motives,” Walpole wrote, with his tongue in
his cheek, 
is (…) offered as a mere conjecture. (...) Miracles, visions, necromancy, dreams, and
other preternatural events, are exploded now even from romances. That was not the \
case when our author wrote (…). Belief in every kind of prodigy was so established
in those dark ages, that an author would not be faithful to the manners of the times,
who should omit all mention of them. He is not bound to believe them himself, but
he must represent his actors as believing them. (Otranto 17-18)
In this sense, the Gothic implied from the start the assumption of a superstitious persona. In
other  words,  the  author  simulated  beliefs  he  did  not  share.  Of  course,  the  suggestion  that  the
“author” did not share the superstition of his time, being conspicuously anachronistic,  playfully
hinted that the “romance” was of modern invention. The reader who heeded these signs, of course,
understood perfectly the nature of the game. One would have to “conjecture” the “motives of the
author,”  distinguishing him from the  superstitious  mask he had chosen to  adopt.  In  this  sense,
therefore, the Gothic was a play of masks. Considering this mask as the defining characteristic of
the Gothic, one might say that  Confessions, although lacking the picturesque trappings of olden
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times and faraway places that are usually identified with it, is nonetheless closer to the original
spirit of the Gothic “romance” than the typical Gothic novel.
The author of Confessions intimates his narrator’s superstition, indeed, by the few means the
severe  formal  constraints  he  imposes  himself  left  him.  These  include stretching the  character’s
otherwise culturally acceptable views to the most extreme fundamentalist lengths, and making him
appear as much of a depraved scoundrel as he could without immediately giving up the game. The
following will illustrate my meaning. Even as he makes his confession, William still blames Mary
for yielding to his advances, despite admitting that he most dishonorably tricked her: “But how was
my poor, hard conquest gained? By a proceeding the iniquity of which no language can
characterise. I invoked the MOST HIGH to witness that my future intentions were honourable; and
swore, in the name of all that is sacred, to make her my own. I never intended to keep my promise”
(Macnish, Confessions 11).
His dishonesty,  however, does not excuse her. According to William’s inflexible logic,
woman must resist her “humanity,” which he regards as alien to her true “lofty” nature, even against
such disloyal attacks. In fact, he implies that it is the man’s role to tempt her, in order to test her
virtue. Thus, although she is only allowed a passive role in it, woman has everything to lose in the
rigged game of seduction. Her loss, however, is the gain of the man who seduces her who, no matter
how treacherous, is credited a “conquest,” as William significantly insists to call Mary even after he
killed her.
In essence, William’s views are certainly not extravagant—which partly explains the success
of the hoax. Many contemporary men who did not kill women thought, felt, and spoke essentially
like him. Most were not as extreme in their convictions, but the distinction is a very fine line indeed,
and one which could easily get overlooked. And that is precisely Macnish’s point. He chose to have
a femicide enunciate sentimental commonplaces to which his readers were used. And he tampered
very little  with these commonplaces.  He knew, of course, that this would create a very strong
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suggestion that the femicide is the potential consequence of the kind of sentimentality embodied by
his character’s discourse and, ultimately, of the gender politics they express. Thus, Confessions was
clearly intended as an anatomy of femicide, or as an intellectual biography of the femicide, which
brings into visibility the essential traits of his character. The femicide, of course, is not aware that
femicide  is  inherent  to  his  sensibility  and  way  of  thinking.  And  this,  the  fact  that  he  could
successfully  fool  himself  and  others  as  to  his  true  nature,  is  what  makes  the  femicide  story
disturbing.
William’s sentimental clichés effectively carry the suspicion over to the public’s side. Might
not some of the men that speak almost exactly like him be potential femicides, and yet be able to
conceal this even from themselves? The ominous “Extract from the Last Will and Testament” of the
femicide which precedes the narrative suggests this may be the case: “It is my express wish, that the
MS. in the lower drawer of my escritoir, entitled, ‘The Confessions of an Unexecuted Femicide,’16
be published to the world, (…) to the effect that others may be deterred from the commission of a
similar sin, by the thought, that if they escape the punishment of the law, they are sure to meet with
that of a racked and harrowed conscience” (Macnish, Confessions 3).
This is a tacit avowal that the punishment was unlikely, and therefore that the law was not
effectually deterring men like William from committing femicide. All they had to fear was their
conscience,  and this  is hardly reassuring.  This in turn affords a very good clue of the author’s
intentions in writing the hoax. The point he appears to have been making is typical of sensationalist
press,  that  an ineffective legal  establishment  is  creating the conditions  in  which criminals may
thrive. In this particular case, the laws of matrimony, which granted husbands absolute power over
their  wives and their  property—which, incidentally,  women only in very specific circumstances
were legally entitled to control—, actually added a financial incentive to William’s crime.
16 As we have seen, Moir altered the title of the tale in his edition in accordance with a suggestion by Macnish
himself. See note 14 above.
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Mary Elliston, the woman William seduced with false promises of marriage, was a destitute
orphan his father had taken in and raised with his own children. Although he was sexually attracted
to her, he did not think of her as a suitable bride for a man of his position, and therefore never
intended to marry her. When she became pregnant, in fact, he started courting a rich heiress of the
neighborhood. At the time, he tells us, he concealed Mary’s pregnancy, not out of shame, but purely
as a matter of convenience, or more precisely, to secure his financial interests: 
I cared little for exposure, on the score of honour or virtue, but I dreaded it on that of
self-interest. Let me get possession of my object—let her [the unnamed prospective
bride’s] wealth be once fairly secured in my iron hand—and my shame, for aught I
cared, might be trumpeted to the uttermost ends of the earth. But till then—till that
decisive—that irrevocable moment, it behoved that all should wear the aspect of
integrity. (Macnish, Confessions 13)
This “irrevocable moment” is, of course, the wedding, in which a woman’s wealth became,
for all practical purposes, her husband’s. In those days, once married “a woman was irretrievably
bound to her husband regardless of his behavior”  (Sapiro,  A Vindication 149).  Even in cases of
infidelity or physical abuse, and indeed even  when the husband evidently posed a threat to the
wife’s life, she was not likely to be granted a divorce.
In those days, therefore, femicide was far more likely to be rewarded than punished. At least,
this  is  what  William  thought,  which  means  that  the  law,  in  his  case,  actually  constituted  an
inducement  to  the  crime.  Femicide  was,  indeed,  a  very  real  concern  in  Macnish’s  time.  The
apparently demure “Gothic”  novels of the best-selling Ann Radcliffe constantly kept before the
public’s eye how utterly at the mercy of men women were. Indeed, although dislocated to exotic
settings, her plots were perfectly and sadly probable in England. In fact, her happy endings could
not much allay the unsettling anxieties in which she dealt. A tragic outcome, the reader could not
help but realise, was much more probable than the marvelous train of coincidences that saved her
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heroines. Macnish goes one step further. Not only does he portray an actual femicide, but by making
the “irrevocable”  nature of the marriage contract a factor in his hero’s calculations, Macnish
deliberately forces on the reader the realization that the law makes it worth his while to cover-up his
previous indiscretion with Mary Elliston by whatever means necessary. The crime did involve the
risk of punishment, but that risk was balanced by the well-founded prospects of enrichment that
made the gamble tempting.
Initially, William merely intended to keep Mary in hiding until his wedding, but a vague
threat of disclosure in a letter she sends him persuades him to take more energetic measures to
defend his financial  interests. I find it significant that the sentence that sealed Mary’s fate should
also contain an appeal to female gender consciousness, and a call for solidarity between the victims
of male abuse: “I know you are addressing another, but if she has the spirit of a woman, never will
she listen to you after what you have done to me” (Macnish, Confessions 14). William reacts with
indignation, and immediately forms the resolution of killing her. Coolly and with premeditation, the
femicide procures  a  dagger  and rushes  to the out-of-the-way country  estate  where he kept  his
pregnant lover in hiding: 
While she clung to my bosom, and called me her own—while her deep melting eyes
were thrown so expressively on my savage countenance,—yes, the deed was then
done—done at the moment when any heart, but that of a demon, would have been
disarmed. I drew slowly the dagger from my pocket, and—my spirit shudders while I
relate it—stabbed her in the back! A shriek, and she fell to the earth.
(16)
Macnish could not have done more to counteract the reader’s natural tendency to empathise
with a first-person serious narrator. Here depicted is, according to the very sentimental conventions
to which William himself appeals, the most moving spectacle conceivable. Surely, there must be
something wrong with a man that can listen unmoved to such appeals, and carry out his murderous
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resolve. The circumstances are, furthermore, of the most aggravated nature: he stabs this woman in
the back.17
Despite his ideology, however,  William was himself so awed by the horror of the  deed he
had committed that he becomes delirious  as he flies the scene of the crime: “a thousand phantoms
and forms of darkness seemed to dance before my eyes. I was pursued with unutterable despair,
while a voice like that of my murdered victim rung incessantly in my ears, ‘Spare me—spare my
unborn babe!—pity, pity, pity.’ I stopped them, but in vain: the same sound, the same agonizing
voice, pursued my footsteps wherever I went” (Macnish,  Confessions 17).  The  fact  that  the
murderer “stops” his ears, shows us that his guilty conscience was evoking the last words of his
victim.
The raving William eventually finds his way home, but the phantom of his victim follows
him there: “I went to bed, but for my eyes there was no rest. The night was horrible—inexpressibly
horrible. The torments of hell took possession of me, and I rolled and tossed about in delirious
agony. A vision came before me—it was the pale spirit of Mary—the same which has nightly
haunted me since that awful hour”  (Macnish,  Confessions 17).  Indeed,  the  ghost  makes  its
appearance punctually at ten o’clock every night—the hour at which the crime took place. Shortly
thereafter, William is tried for the murder of Mary Elliston, but, though the crime was “too evident
to admit of doubt in any mind,”  it could not be proved in court, owing to the testimony of two
servants who “swore an alibi in my favour” (20, 19). The defendant is then narrowly acquitted by
the jury, and begrudgingly dismissed by the judge.
Although the financial motive is plausible enough, the events in the second part of the tale
suggest that it is a rationalisation masking deeper  motivations. The two poles of the femicide’s
17 The crime itself resembles, both in the circumstances and the motive, that depicted in one of the most popular of the
English “broadside ballads,”  “The Gosport  Tragedy,  or,  The perjured Ship-Carpenter.”  The protagonist  is  also
similarly haunted by the ghost of his pregnant lover. In the ballad, however, he speaks of the ghost to the captain of
the ship who employed him after the crime, thus revealing his crime. The English Broadside Ballad Archive, of the
University of Santa Barbara, holds digital copies of five different editions of the ballad, with the numbers 35483,
33259, 31213, 32460, and 33261.
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dualistic dehumanised conception of womanhood, the lost “earthly” woman and the pure angelic-
woman,  are  projected  on  the  contrasting  figures  of  Eliza,  his  sister,  and  Mary,  his  lover,
respectively.  After  the  death  of  her  childhood  friend,  indeed,  Eliza,  guessing  her  brother  had
murdered her,  “faded away like a flower beneath some pestilential vapour”  and died (Macnish,
Confessions 20). This language, through its similarity with the passage concerning the death of his
mother, evokes the stereotype of the pure, ideal woman, who was too good to live long in the world
of the flesh. Having died a virgin, of course, Eliza had not displayed that “taint” of humanity which
lowered Mary in his estimation. Thus, the idea that she was more worthy than her is ingrained in the
rhetoric of the tale.
Indeed,  although  he  expresses  remorse  for  having  killed  Mary,  this  remorse  is  highly
ambiguous. For he implies that he regrets killing Mary not so much for her own sake, but mostly
because this was the indirect cause of the death of his “pure” sister, whose life is implicitly valued
over that of the “fallen” woman he had killed. Accordingly, he will eventually erect a monument to
his sister’s memory—not Mary’s. In other words, we get the distinct feeling that it was somehow
less  wrong,  as  it  were,  to  kill  Mary  than  it  was  to  kill  Eliza,  and  this  makes  the  femicide’s
confession almost as morally repulsive as the crime itself. All his acts and feelings can be traced to
the same femicidal superstition.
The opposition between the “fallen” lover and the “pure” sister, incidentally, reflects itself
on the bipartite structure of the tale, which has two climaxes. The first of these is, of course, the
murder of Mary Elliston itself. The second climax, which unites many loose ends in the narrative,
hinting of a hidden motive for the crime, occurs during the wake of William’s beloved only sister,
whom he unaccountably regards, completely dismissing Mary, as the only being who ever truly
loved him: “Years have rolled away since that fatal parting; but it is yet fresh in my memory, and
will remain uneffaced till life is extinguished within me. I sat by night in the room where her corpse
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was laid out in its last mournful dress. (…) A halo of immortality seemed to float around her. Never
to my eyes did death appear clothed in such beauty” (Macnish, Confessions 20).
William could hardly believe Eliza was dead: “I thought the expression of living nature was
lurking within; but alas! the cold lip, the icy cheek, and the soulless eye, proclaimed that the flame
of existence was quenched, and that the grave had triumphed”  (Macnish,  Confessions  20). Seen
from afar, she looked to him like a live woman, and only closer inspection, and the touch of her cold
skin, could at last persuade him that he was in the presence of a bona fide corpse. This will prove
decisive in the sequence.
At this point, the narrator makes a most unusual decision: 
Yes, poor Eliza! I shall do my last sad duty to thee at least with a sincere heart. I shall
perform thy mournful wake alone. I shall weep in atonement and repentance for what
I have done to thy gentle bosom. None shall hear me, unless, perchance, thy spirit,
hovering nigh, may catch the tones of remorse and affliction from thy wretched
brother. (Macnish, Confessions 21)
Considering Mary’s wake is not so much as mentioned, this lavishing of attention on Eliza’s
wake is itself indecorous, as is the emphasis the femicide puts on his remorse for what he has done
to her. But this is where things get really weird. William here decides to spend the night alone with
the corpse, acknowledging that he knew at the time that no one could hear him. The reader should
know William, though he would not admit it even to himself, had been madly in love with his sister
for a long time—and I am not talking of brotherly love. He thought she was the most beautiful dead
woman he had ever seen; this is not surprising, for he thought she was also the most attractive live
woman he had ever laid eyes on. In fact, he thought she was perfect. He details her physical charms
with rapture: “Poor  Eliza!  she  was  every  thing  that  is  amiable  in  woman.  Fair,  beautifully
proportioned, and graceful in her movements, beyond even the most gifted of her sex—her light and
airy form—her blue, deep-blue eye—her lip ever crossed with smiles, and her complexion clear as
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heaven itself” (Macnish, Confessions 9). He evidently had much to say about his sister’s body. In
fact, by stopping himself ostensibly from further description, he gives us reason to suspect he had
too much to say. “Of all these things I could speak, but it avails not” (9). He could? If he had not
mentioned it, one would never suspect he had not said all he had to say on the subject. Still, he says
enough: “My sister had a form and a mind which fancy never excelled, even in her brightest
dreams” (9).
But it is by favorably comparing her body, or “form,” to that of her friend Mary, his lover,
that William provides the  more embarrassing clues of his unconfessed desire for his sister. Mary
“was tall and exquisitely made,”  but “[h]er form wanted the richness and voluptuous swell of
Eliza’s,” although “it was  more airy, and, if possible, more graceful”  (Macnish,  Confessions  10).
Evidently, William was more attracted to the “voluptuous” body of his sister to the “airiness” of
Mary. And now, as he watched alone, the “voluptuous” dead body looked as perfect and desirable as
ever.
As he surveys it, he “communicates” to this lovely body his decision of spending the night
weeping “for what I have done to thy gentle bosom,” which, under the circumstances, is certainly
not the best choice of words (Macnish,  Confessions 21). Just moments before, William had left
some “flowers, such as she was wont to love, upon her bosom: I plucked them,” he adds, “with my
own hands and laid them there”  (20). Presumably, it was then that he had had the opportunity of
touching the cool skin of the dead woman—for he recognises that he was only satisfied that she was
dead after he touched it. The literal “bosom”  in this last sentence creates a sort of metonymical
contamination which puts some flesh in the trite sentimental metaphor. The result is the suggestion
that William was secretly—or not so secretly, as it turns out—aroused by touching the beautiful life-
like “bosom”  of his sister, and that the unconfessed intention of satisfying post mortem a desire
which he had to repress while she was alive, but which he now found an opportunity of satisfying,
lay at the bottom of his decision of “performing” the wake alone.
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The stage is now set for what William regards as the great crisis in his life. What comes next
will probably not be totally unfamiliar to the reader:
It was the fatal hour, and I remarked it not, so utterly was I occupied with my own
meditations, but it passed not by undistinguished. It was the hour of ten—to me so
full of sorrow and of crime. I heard it strike, and when looking intently on the body
of my sister, I saw—no, it was not a phantom of imagination—I saw the pale and
bleeding form of Mary. She was still the same as she had hitherto appeared to my
eyes; but her visit seemed not to be for me, but for the corpse of her friend. She
looked with unspeakable affection over it, and kissed it again and again. I was
transfixed with fear and astonishment. I tried to weep; but I could not. I tried to
speak; but my tongue was tied. I tried to move; but I remained stupified and bound to
my seat, as if by enchantment. Then the form threw her arms around my sister, who
got up to receive her embraces. The pale cheeks of the latter became flushed with
primeval beauty—her eyes were re-animated and sparkled as bright as ever—her lips
burst the silence which had enchained them—she spoke and smiled delighted, while
she returned with ardour the embraces of her friend. I could stand it no longer: my
heart was overwhelmed with joy, and I started up to clasp Eliza to my bosom. I threw
my arms around her, and kissed her; but horror-struck, I shrunk back. My lips were
laid upon her frozen cheeks—I had laid hold of her corpse. She lay stretched out in
the shroud. The candle was fading in its socket, and the chamber of death, faintly
illumined by its expiring glow, was more ghastly than ever. Where was the phantom?
She had fled and left no token of her presence behind save the cry of ‘REPENT,’ the
echo of which, like a knell of the dead, still rung in my ears! (Macnish, Confessions
21-22)
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2 – Chasing the Ghost of Ligeia
Many readers who have never heard of Robert Macnish, but are acquainted with Poe’s work,
will probably find  this picture oddly  familiar, especially if I tell them that Eliza, whose freshly
deceased body to which the narrator pays his solitary homage, had not only blue eyes, but also
“yellow hair like streaks of sunshine,” whereas the entombed Mary, whose phantom intrudes on his
meditation, had “black and shining” hair and eyes “of the same complexion” (Macnish 74, 76). The
basic outline of this scene perfectly matches that of the memorable, most mysterious finale of a
much more famous tale, Poe’s “Ligeia.” There too the first-person male narrator recalls how he had
watched the corpse of the blonde, blue-eyed Rowena, when he was visited by his former lover,  a
taller, slenderer woman, dark-haired and black-eyed, the lady Ligeia, who had been long dead and
buried; he is also convinced that, upon the return of the dark lady, the corpse in the room was briefly
reanimated. Furthermore, the mourner in Poe’s tale—a most unusual circumstance in itself—also
spends the night alone with the corpse, making sure that no one was within earshot.
The general outline is enough to guarantee that the scene would not be completely new to a
reader who had read  Confessions, especially considering how outrageously singular that general
outline is. This parallelism is then reinforced by many minor similarities between the plots of the
two stories, the feelings expressed by the narrators, and sometimes even by verbal echoes. However,
this relationship has, as far as I know, never been detected and as a consequence the originality of
Poe’s “Ligeia” has been much overrated. Some striking similarities with contemporary tales have
been noticed, which I will discuss later on, but they were not enough to dismiss the impression that
the tale was fundamentally idiosyncratic. Most critics felt that it came almost entirely out of Poe’s
head,  and  that  only  his  supposedly  perverse  genius  could  come  up  with  something  quite  so
startlingly unexpected. As it turns out, however, Poe had in fact been pilfering from a very obscure
source. Despite this, his story is highly original, but not absolutely original.
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There are very good reasons for the source of the tale never to have surfaced. By 1838, when
Ligeia was originally published, the sensation created by Macnish’s little hoax was long forgotten,
and he himself was slowly but surely fading into obscurity. The few readers in England who came
across Poe’s tale in those days probably did not recall  Confessions, and therefore would not have
made  the  connection.  For  reasons  I  will  presently  explain,  connected  with  the  peculiar
circumstances of its publication in America, Poe’s first audiences were extremely unlikely to even
have read the original femicide story in its entirety. In America, the tale, or more precisely the wake
scene  I  transcribed  at  the  end of  the  previous  section,  was  not  merely  forgotten,  but  virtually
unknown.  By  the time scholars became seriously  interested in Poe’s work,  many  years  later,
Macnish himself was, as we have seen, already almost completely forgotten.
Almost, but not quite. At least two Poe scholars, Maxwell Morton and Thomas Mabbott
noticed some of Poe’s tales distinctly resembled sketches Macnish had published in  Blackwood’s,
but  saw  no  evidence  of  the  influence  of  Confessions,  in  particular,  in  Poe’s  work.  Thus,  the
relationship between the two, which I believe constitutes evidence of Poe’s imitation, eluded even
the few Poe scholars who, being aware of Macnish’s influence on the American writer  may be
supposed to have read both Confessions and “Ligeia.” There is, however, ample and, in my opinion,
indisputable evidence of the influence of Confessions on “Ligeia.”
The evidence of which I speak, albeit indisputable, is not always readily apparent. This is
owing  to  Poe’s  peculiar  method  of  composition.  He  never  imitated  without  introducing  some
significant variation on the original material, which allowed the conjecture that he and the author he
imitated had merely hit on a similar idea, or that the imitation was involuntary. The wake scene in
“Ligeia” is a good example. The resemblance with the scene in Confessions is striking, but so is the
difference. The details, however, show that the imitation was nothing if not deliberate.
The evidence that, in my opinion, clinches the matter, are Poe’s covert, or buried allusions
not only to Confessions, but to many other sources from which he borrowed for “Ligeia,” which I
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regard as being paradigmatic of Poe’s method. I use the term “buried allusion” I employ here was
first used to describe Poe’s technique by Burton R. Pollin in his analysis of Poe’s Brevities. In his
studies of the Pinakidia, and other similar works like the Marginalia and the Suggestions, which he
joined together  under  that  common heading,  Pollin  showed that  one had to  look beyond Poe’s
displays of “factitious erudition,” and learn to trace them to their “buried sources,” in order to get at
the  sense  of  these  little  notes,  which  depends not  on  the  prestigious  sources  mentioned in  the
articles, but rather on a relatively small number of secondary sources from which Poe derived most
of his abstruse lore and to which he leaves sly but effective clues (Introduction xii). The radical
duplicity of Poe’s rhetoric, Pollin argued, required a special kind of source study which focused on
these “inferred sources,” and regarded ostensible allusions as potentially misleading (“Sources and
Borrowings” xxiii). The idea of “inferred sources” is not new. The novelty in Pollin’s approach is
that he treats such sources, or rather the hidden allusions to such sources, not as indexes of a process
of association of which the writer may not have been aware, but rather as deliberate nods to the
reader, designed to explode the pedantic persona he assumed. This is what I mean when I employ
terms like buried, covert, or hidden allusions.
In his Discoveries in Poe, Pollin showed that Poe used the same method in his other work,
notably in his fiction, and traced “the chain of circumstances which led Poe from one author to
another or from one borrowed allusion to a second from the same source,” attempting, as he puts it,
“a summation in ‘slow time’” of “Poe’s much faster insights and his ingenious dexterity in handling
sources” (Introduction vii). Moreover, Pollin masterfully exposed Poe’s use of “buried sources” to
carry a buried meaning, which often subverts the obvious one, while at the same time revealing the
true sources of his inspiration, which are never stated. In fact, Pollin found out that Poe “buried
private jokes—‘jeux d’esprit’ as he liked to call them,” the process of exhuming which he described
as follows: “It has been like playing against a powerful opponent who enjoys the sport and yet, half
wishing to be downed, grandly throws away the victory with some interesting gesture” (Discoveries
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in Poe ix). Later in the text, Pollin refers to this mechanism of misdirection as “the tricks that he
[Poe] played upon the reader” (x). The same insight underlies Susan Amper’s statement that Poe’s
great secret was that “he was kidding” (“Poe’s Darkest Secret”).
Poe played the same tricks in “Ligeia,” which may also be regarded as a literary puzzle.
Indeed, the narrator of that tale, like most of Poe’s serious narrators, has much in common with the
pedantic persona Poe assumed in the Brevities, in the sense that the sources to which he ostensibly
alludes do not bring us any closer to the solution of the many mysteries of the tale. Poe, however,
points the reader in the right direction, and away from the misleading ostensible allusions, using the
technique he had perfect in the Pinakidia, Marginalia, and Suggestions series: covert allusion.
Poe, then, took the basic idea for “Ligeia” from Macnish’s Confessions. It too is a story of
femicide, about a man who has the phantom of the dark lady he murdered constantly before his
eyes, and suffers a delirium while veiling the corpse of his second, blonde and blue-eyed victim.
Yet, as I said, this is not readily apparent. It takes some effort to recognise that this is the case—
indeed, it takes some effort to extract any sense from the confusing, incoherent narrative Ligeia’s
husband offers. The murder of the dark lady is the defining event in both tales, but in Poe’s, it is
concealed.  The narrator does not openly acknowledge the deed, but neither does he succeed in
completely suppressing the clues that reveal it. Thus, although femicide is the decisive fact in his
life, the word is never mentioned in the text. I am convinced this is the main reason why Morton
and Mabbott,  who in all likelyhood read both tales, never did identify  Confessions as the main
source of “Ligeia.”
Macnish’s tale, however, is not the only buried source of “Ligeia.” The tale also includes
nods to all the femicide stories I mentioned earlier. Some of these allusions, namely to Bulwer-
Lytton’s and Dicken’s “madmen” stories have been identified by other scholars, others are here
identified for the first time. Some of the more conventionally “Gothic” details in plot, setting, and
even phraseology, can also be traced to such landmarks of the Gothic fiction out of which the
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femicide story developed as Lewis’s The Monk, Radcliffe’s The Italian, and even to two of Walter
Scott’s novels, Ivanhoe (1820) and Anne of Geierstein (1828)—in which, incidentally, the influence
of the Gothic, and of Radcliffe in particular, is very clear. There are also distinct echoes of “Wake
Not the Dead,” a vampire tale published in 1823 which has, apparently on mistaken assumptions,
been identified as a translation of a German original by Ludwig Tieck.
Indeed,  by tracing the many buried allusions  in  “Ligeia” to  literary  femicides  and their
Gothic  ancestors  one  is  enabled  to  delineate  a  very complete  picture of  the  geneaology of  the
femicide story. Through such allusions, Poe displays his sense of tradition, and the extent of his
readings in the field, which were perhaps unmatched in his generation. He also sets a new standard
for poetic artistry. “Ligeia” is at the same time absolutely new, and shamelessly derivative. I believe
it was Poe’s intention to inscribe his work in the tradition of which his tale is the epitome, while
displaying the ingenuity of his treatment of old themes and motives, in order slyly to highlight his
deliberate  work  of  combination.  Indeed,  through  its  complex  patchwork  of  hidden  allusions
“Ligeia” defines the femicide story with a degree of self-awareness that is quite beyond anything his
predecessors had done. In fact, in describing the genesis and development of the femicide story, I
have merely followed Poe’s hints; in other words, my description of the femicide story is, in more
than one sense, nothing more or less than a close reading of “Ligeia.”
Before we go any further, it is important to place Poe’s peculiar way of handling sources in
historical context.  None of the many sources I have mentioned are named in “Ligeia,” and the
material Poe lifted from them is always altered in a way that makes it hard for the reader to detect it.
Odd as this may appear to contemporary readers, Walter Scott, one of, if not the most successful
writer of “prose romances” of Poe’s time, followed the same practice. Coleman Oscar Parsons has
shown conclusively that “Scott consciously altered his borrowings” (“Demonological Background”
604). In fact, in his  Journal, Scott openly admits that this had given him an advantage over the
competition: 
66
Another thing in my favour, is that my contemporaries steal too openly. Mr
[Horace] Smith has inserted in  Brambletye House whole pages from Defoe’s  Fire
and Plague of London.
“Steal! foh! a fico for the phrase—
Convey, the wise it call!”
When I convey an incident or so, I am at as much pains to avoid detection as
if the offense could be indicted in literal fact at the Old Bailey. (1:275)
In his illuminating account of Scott’s method, Parsons remarks that the “study of Scott’s
narrative  borrowing is  made even more  difficult  by his  practice  of  interweaving material  from
widely different sources—‘old and odd books, and a considerable collection of family legends,’
together with personal experience” (“Demonological Background” 605). Thus, Scott realised earlier
than  most  the  change  of  critical  criteria  that  had  been  brought  about  by  Romanticism.  The
borrowings  which  had  once  been  exhibited  as  marks  of  literary  competence,  had  come  to  be
regarded as constituting a literary high crime, and therefore had to be concealed. Scott understood,
of  course,  that  all  writers  borrowed—had  to  borrow—whether  they  realised  it  or  not.  Being  a
shrewd and practical professional, he also understood that it was better to borrow as deliberately as
possible. And so, he developed a method to obscure his sources, and protect himself from being
accused of the heinous crime of imitation—which, according to the common Romantic theory of
creation, was almost equated with plagiarism. He combined elements, ideas, scraps of narrative,
from unrelated sources, which were usually obscure to begin with, and then, for extra safety, he
deliberately tampered with his borrowings to make them less recognisable.
Poe followed much the same method. One thing, at least, he had in common with the student
in “The Raven:” he was well read in “many a quaint and curious volume of forgotten lore” (Poe,
Poems 364). Indeed, many of his borrowings are lifted from widely-different, mostly very obscure
sources—but  while  Scott  scavenged  historical  works  for  material  for  his  novels,  Poe  usually
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selected sources, such as Macnish’s Confessions, that, although equally obscure, were of much later
vintage. Sometimes, however, he borrowed boldly, but slyly, from some of the most popular works
of his time, which were certainly not forgotten—for “Ligeia,” for example, he visited Scott’s own
novels, or Dickens’s Pickwick Papers. And then, instead of cautiously limiting his borrowings to a
minimum, like Scott would have done,  and reworking them so that they had the least  possible
resemblance to the original, Poe, while he also disguised his sources from an uninformed look, left
in the tales a trail of “incriminating” details, which included plot devices, salient and unusual words,
and sometimes even phrases, that lead the reader to his source.
Like Scott, Poe took care to give the appearance of absolute originality to his creations, at
the same time, however, he also made sure that his tales could be traced to their sources, so his
careful work of appropriation could be recognised. Had avoiding detection been his only concern,
indeed, it would have been very easy for him to do exactly what Scott had done. That is, he could
easily have introduced changes to make his many borrowings appear involuntary, or even dubious,
in the unlikely event of detection, but he seems to have done something much more difficult. Most
of the time, he reworked the material, adapting it to the distinctive style of his narrator and the
peculiar atmosphere of mystery of “Ligeia,”  but only slightly, so as not to leave any doubt in a
reader who found the source that the pilfering was deliberate. Indeed, I must conclude that Poe
chose defiantly  to exhibit his plagiarism—or what  he knew most  of  his  contemporaries  would
construe as such—right under the audience’s nose.
Indeed, the radical change of literary ethos brought by Romanticism may be described in
terms of a shifting of attitude towards imitation. Under Romanticism, the prestige that had been
previously attached to  voluntary  borrowings became attached to  involuntary borrowings,  which
alone were permitted. Borrowings had, at least, to appear involuntary. Thus, I think Percy Bysshe
Shelley perfectly interprets the spirit of his age when he writes that “there must be a resemblance,
which does not depend upon their own will, between all the writers of any particular age” (Leon and
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Cyntha 136). This downplays the importance of voluntary imitation in creation, in favor of obscure
associations of which the creator is supposed to be unaware—indeed, Shelley here is actually proud
of his unawareness. As a writer, Poe’s narrator perfectly corresponds to this description, and this led
most people to suppose Poe himself was not aware of his sources. But he left behind him enough
clues to prove that, unlike his “Romantic” narrator, he was perfectly aware of his borrowings—at
least, most of them—and prided himself in his art of deliberate imitation.
“Ligeia” is a tour de force in Poe’s sly new method. As an imitation, or rather a grotesque
parody of Macnish’s  Confessions,  indeed, it  is a feat of incredible technical virtuosity.  There is
enough of the original to ensure recognition, but also a difference that makes a difference, in which
the  writer  displays  his  art—and  his  sense  of  humor.  Indeed,  Poe  cleverly  disguises  his  true
intentions along with his debt to Macnish.
The title-character of “Ligeia,” then, physically resembles Mary Elliston in every detail. She
is dark-haired, black-eyed, “tall, somewhat slender, and in her latter days, even emaciated”  (Poe,
"Ligeia" 311). Eliza’s physical description, on the other hand, matches that of the “fair-haired, blue-
eyed Lady Rowena Trevanion of Tremaine,” the narrator’s second dead wife—she is even shorter,
and more corpulent than Ligeia (321). As Mary’s “phantom” approached Eliza’s corpse,  as the
reader  will  recall,  William  imaged  the  blonde  corpse  came  back  to  life.  In  other  words,  the
“phantom” combined with the images  before him,  originating a  momentary illusion which is  a
mixture of fact and hallucination. In “Ligeia” we find a slightly different idea. Instead of a sudden
reanimation, we have an endless cycle of apparent reanimations and what may be termed for lack of
a better term mortifications, each accompanied by “I know not what of wild change in the personal
appearance of the corpse,” at the end of which the narrator finally reports that “the thing that was
enshrouded advanced bodily and palpably, into the middle of the room”  (329). This “thing”  is
identified by him as Ligeia of the raven-black hair, his first wife. Thus, the narrator never sees
Rowena come back to  life—he “sees”  Ligeia coming back to  life.  This  is  the most  significant
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difference between the two analogous scenes. In Poe’s tale, then, the juxtaposition of the raven-
haired entombed woman’s “phantom” on the corpse of the blonde is so complete that they become
one. Or so it appears to the narrator. This is one distinctive characteristic of Poe’s tale, through
which, according to Ellen Weinauer, “Poe strikingly renders the loss of individual identity incurred
by women in marriage. Defined primarily by their status as married women, Ligeia and Rowena are
not really different at all. The former can return in the body of the latter because, as wives, the two
are fundamentally interchangeable” (“Undead Wives” 177).
But the phenomena described by the narrator is not, as is so often affirmed by critics, a case
of common body-swap, or metempsychosis: the narrator gives us to understand that the body of his
very blonde second wife transformed into the body of his entombed, long-dead, raven-haired, first
wife.
In September 16, 1839, in a letter to Poe, who had previously sent him a copy of the tale,
Philip Pendleton Cooke complained precisely of this. In a rather amusing display of ingenuousness,
declares himself
shocked by a violation of the ghostly proprieties—so to speak—and wondered how
the lady Ligeia—a wandering essence—could, in quickening the  body of the Lady
Rowena (such is the idea) become suddenly the visible, bodily, Ligeia. If Rowena’s
bodily form had been retained as a shell or case for the disembodied Lady Ligeia,
and you [Cooke means the narrator, of course]had only become aware gradually that
the blue Saxon eye of the ‘Lady Rowena of Tremaine’ grew daily darker with the
peculiar, intense expression of the ‘look’ which had belonged to Ligeia—that a mind
of grander powers, a soul of more glowing fires occupied the quickened body and
gave an old familiar expression to its motions—if you had brooded and meditated
upon the change until proof accumulated upon proof, making wonder certainty, and
then, in the moment of some strangest of all evidence of the transition, broken cut
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into the exclamation which ends the story—the effect would not have been lessened,
and the ‘ghostly proprieties’ would, I think, have been better observed. (Cooke)18
But, though the narrator suggests this violation took place, he does not actually say so.
Moreover,  the facts he reports are not, in themselves, incompatible with common ghost lore—his
interpretation  of  those  facts,  which  is  disingenuously  suggested  rather  than  stated,  is  what
contradicts received ideas on ghosts. A “thing enshrouded” appeared in the middle of the room, the
question is, was it a “ghost” or an actual body. Indeed, the narrator has no doubts regarding the
identity of the apparition. By his own admission, the sight of the enshrouded Rowena brought him
“memories of Ligeia,”  and transported him in spirit to the time when he “had regarded her thus
enshrouded,” and it is she, not Rowena, he “sees” in the end. Of this he is quite certain. After all, it
is impossible to mistake his two wives. Ligeia was even taller than Rowena. Indeed, when he first
“sees”  the  “thing  enshrouded,”  the  narrator  is  puzzled:  “had she  then  grown  taller  since  her
malady?” (Poe, “Ligeia” 326, 330). The fact that he was thinking about Ligeia’s “enshrouded body,”
of course, suggests that his imagination had conjured her image, as it were, into existence.
Despite this, the narrator is firmly convinced that this was not a ghost—that Ligeia had been
there, however briefly, in the flesh,  and this, as Cooke remarks, defies the very notion of a ghost,
which is traditionally defined, precisely, as a presence that impresses the  sight, and perhaps the
hearing or the sense of touch, but is immaterial or, at best, of very subtle materiality. In short, a
ghost is usually regarded as the barely sensible manifestation of a disembodied spirit.19 Underlying
the belief in ghosts  is the dualistic conception of human nature that informs the traditional
18 This letter is quoted from the collection  The Letters of Edgar Allan Poe in the website of the Poe Society of
Baltimore, prepared by J. A. Savoye, which is the only reliable source for most extant letters written to Poe. This is
an expanded edition of  The Collected Letters of Edgar Allan Poe  (2008) Savoye had previously prepared with
Burton R. Pollin, which included only letters written by Poe.
19 As Walter Scott  remarks in the first  of his  Letters on Demonology and Witchcraft  (1830),  the idea of  ghostly
apparitions is itself intrinsically paradoxical. In other words, common ghosts are themselves a violation of “ghostly
proprieties,” that is, they contradict, more or less blatantly, the distinction between matter and spirit: “philosophers
might plausibly argue, that, when the soul is divorced from the body, it loses all those qualities which made it, when
clothed with a mortal shape, obvious to the organs of its fellow men. The abstract idea of a spirit certainly implies,
that it has neither substance, form, shape, voice, or any thing which can render its presence visible or sensible to
human faculties” (5). 
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conception of death as the moment when the spirit leaves the body. This latter conception of death
is implied by the words of the narrator of “Ligeia,”  who recounts how he “struggled alone in my
endeavors to recall the spirit still hovering” by the corpse of Rowena  (Poe, "Ligeia" 327). This
statement has two important implications: first, Rowena had not merely fallen into a cataleptic state,
but was truly dead; second, that death is  not irreversible.  The narrator  thus echoes the original
femicide’s hope that his sister’s “spirit, hovering nigh, may catch the tones of remorse and affliction
from  [her]  wretched  brother”  (Macnish,  Confessions  21). Poe’s narrator, however, had before
thrown hints to the effect that a spirit had been “hovering” about the room for quite some time. It
was there, he suggests, even before Rowena’s spirit left her body. Through certain well-placed hints,
he conveys the idea that this spirit belonged to Ligeia, the strong-willed first wife. Such hints create
a strong expectation of metempsychosis, the possibility of which is more or less implied in the
conventional pneumatology to which Cooke appeals. The adverbs “bodily”  and “palpably,”
however, which the narrator applies to the “thing that was enshrouded” convey the impression that
what happened in the room was neither metempsychosis nor a regular haunting, but another hitherto
ignored phenomenon.
The narrator tells us, then, that this “thing” advanced “palpably” to the middle of the room.
His peculiar turn of phrase, however, allows room to suspect this is not a fact, but his interpretation
of the facts.  “One bound and I had reached her [the thing’s] feet!,”  he recounts, but: “Shrinking
from my touch, she let fall from her head the ghastly cerements which had confined it, and there
streamed forth into the rushing atmosphere of the chamber, huge masses of long and disheveled
hair; it was blacker than the wings of midnight!” (Poe, "Ligeia" 330). The apparition then, “shrunk
from his touch,” which means, of course, that he might not have actually touched it, hence, may
have only conjectured that it was “palpable.”
In his reply to Cooke, dated September 21, 1829, Poe wrote that he would correct the ending
to make it clear that his narrator, like William the femicide, ends up, as he began, alone with a
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blonde corpse, “the bodily alterations having gradually faded away”  (Letters 193). I suspect Poe
never intended to do anything of the sort.20 Mabbott remarks, the “story was revised with the
greatest care,”  and therefore “must be regarded as a thoroughly conscious and complete work of
art” (Mabbott, Tales 306). I agree. If Poe suffered the ending to remain as it was, introducing only
minor verbal corrections, that means he saw nothing wrong with it. It appears to me, in any case,
that the proposed alteration would be redundant. Poe could not have made it any clearer that what
the narrator “saw” in the middle of the room was not the reanimated  corpse of Rowena, but the
phantom of Ligeia.
The circumstances admit, therefore, of the same explanation that similar phenomena receive
in Confessions. The bare facts  are,  indeed, very nearly the same. What changes is the way the
solitary  mourner  interprets  those  facts.  William  recognised  that  he  had  been  betrayed  by  his
imagination  as  soon  as  the  phantom  vanished;  but  Poe’s  narrator  never  realised  that  he  was
daydreaming. Indeed, there is no real reason to suppose what happens in “Ligeia” is anything but
the same projection of the “phantom” of the tall, slender, dark lady on the body of the shorter, more
corpulent blonde. This  perfectly  accounts  for  the  apparent  “personal”  change to  the  corpse.  If
anything, this change makes Poe’s narrator’s illusion easier to dismiss, for the entrance of Ligeia
appears to have had no effect on Rowena’s corpse: the narrator thinks he saw her come back to life;
Rowena remained dead.
20 G. R.  Thompson expresses  a  similar  opinion.  He remarks that  Poe not  only did not  introduce the change he
mentioned to Cooke, but “took out the passage about Rowena’s seeming to struggle with an invisible foe, so that
Ligeia’s final appearance was made more abrupt (…)! Given this context, the undertone of Poe’s letter to Cooke is
clearly recognizable as ironic and sarcastic” (Poe’s Fiction 79).
Thompson’s account of Poe’s revision to this portion of the text, however, is inaccurate in two respects. Poe did
cross the words “with an invisible foe,” but not the whole passage in question, in his private copy of Tales of the
Grotesque and Arabesque.  This copy “(from which title page and preliminary matter have been removed) was
annotated by the author in 1842 to serve as copy for a projected later edition, and contains a manuscript table of
contents and [a new] title page,” which read  Phantasy Pieces  (Mabbott,  Tales 1:1398). Many of the manuscript
alterations to the text of “Ligeia” contained in this text are what Mabbott calls “abortive,” that is, they were not
adopted  in  later  editions  of  the  tales.  Poe  did  not  adopted  the  change  to  which  Thompson  alludes,  which,
incidentally, is not as extensive as he suggests, in the two occasions in which he revised the tale for publication, first
for The New World, and then for the Broadway Journal, of which he was then the editor.
Thus, the fact remains that Poe never complied with Cooke’s suggestions.
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According to a small article in Coleridge’s Table Talk, a selection of samples of the poet’s
private conversation culled by his nephew Henry Nelson Coleridge, the psychological mechanism
involved in “vulgar ghosts” is an inversion of regular perception: “in all such cases,” S. T. C. is
there reported to have said, “that which is supposed to be seen is, in fact, not seen, but is an image
of the brain. External objects naturally produce sensation; but here, in truth, sensation produces, as
it were, the external object” (14). The narrator’s imagination was filled, by his own admission, with
images of Ligeia “thus enshrouded,” therefore, his vision is perfectly consistent with the process
described here. Since the narrator apparently did not touch the “bodily” Ligeia after all, we may
conclude that the perfect juxtaposition of the ghost on the corpse prompted him to assimilate the
two, and immediately to jump to the conclusion that the “enshrouded” Rowena had miraculously
turned into the “enshrouded” Ligeia. Considering this juxtaposition, it is not at all surprising that
Poe’s  character should experience more difficulty in separating his ghost from reality  than  his
predecessor.
Besides, the extravagant decoration of the bridal chamber where these events took place had
been specifically designed, as the narrator himself admits, to produce a “phantasmagoric effect;” to
produce, that is, precisely the kind of illusion he seems to experience (Poe, “Ligeia” 322). As Terry
Castle remarks, the term “phantasmagoria” had a precise “technological meaning” which “seemed
to drop away altogether” throughout the nineteenth century, during the course of which, “[t]hrough
a  strange  process  of  rhetoric  displacement,”  it  became  a  metaphor  for  abnormal  states  of
consciousness, and for perception itself (“Phantasmagoria” 32):
But what does this fantastical word phantasmagoria really mean? We are familiar, of
course, with its late romantic denotation, as in the third entry under the term in the
Oxford  English  Dictionary:  ‘a  shifting  series  or  succession  of  phantasms  or
imaginary  figures,  as  seen  in  a  dream or  fevered  condition,  as  called  up  by the
imagination, or as created by literary description.’ But few people, I imagine, know
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the  word’s  original  technical  application  to  the  so-called  ghost-shows  of  late
eighteenth-century  and  early  nineteenth-century  Europe—illusionistic  exhibitions
and public entertainments in which ‘spectres’ were produced through the use of a
magic lantern. (…) it is precisely this literal meaning—and the connection with post-
Enlightenment technology and popular spectacle—that has been lost. (30)
As Castle also notes, these spectacles exploited superstition under pretense of debunking it,
for,  though presenting themselves as “mock exercises in demystification,  (…) [e]verything was
done,  quite  shamelessly,  to  intensify  the  supernatural  effect”  (“Phantasmagoria”  32).  Thus,  the
creators of “phantasmagoria” added some powerful adjuncts to the main device of projecting magic-
lantern “spectres” on distorting mirrors and smokescreens, such as the “muffled sounds of wind and
thunder” and the “[u]nearthly music emanated from an invisible glass harmonica,” employed by
Étienne-Gaspard Robertson in his “Salle de la Fantasmagorie” (33). Yet, the most potent ingredient
of the illusion was suggestion, and the clever manipulation of the very superstition that was the
ostensible object of the spectacle to ridicule. Thus, in order to raise the imagination of his audience
to the highest pitch of excitement before presenting his illusions, Robertson prefaced his spectacles
with “a somber, incoherent, speech on death, immortality, and the unsettling power of superstition
and  fear  to  create  terrifying  illusions”  (33).  Incidentally,  the  same  combination  of  unsettling
auditory stimuli and morbid suggestions that played such an important role in Robertson’s illusions
is present in Poe’s “phantasmagoric” chamber.
The “phantasmagoric” design itself, moreover, by a mechanism of optical illusion, facilitated
the illusion that the dark-haired woman was taking the place of the blonde. In “Poe’s Visual Tricks,”
Barbara Cantalupo has already unambiguously maintainted that the return of Ligeia was an optical
illusion artificially created by the narrator which obscures “his purposeful role in Rowena’s death,”
and  also  that,  despite  his  efforts,  he  “discloses  the  mechanisms  that  produce  the  ‘miraculous’
transformation of Rowena into Ligeia,” thus discrediting his presentation of himself as an innocent
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bystander (55). Although I agree generically with these assertions, it appears to me that the specific
“phantasmagoric” device at play in Rowena’s room is not “anamorphic,” as Cantalupo contends, but
involves rather a mechanism which combines optical and mental projection and entails, therefore,
an element of subjectivity. I will state my objections to this reading more fully in the second chapter
of this thesis, where I will present a more detailed reading of the illusions of the narrator.
In any event, I agree with Cantalupo that, given the peculiar character of the phantasmagoria
the narrator created, the dark-haired intruder cannot possibly be regarded as a wholly mental picture.
On the contrary, if a phantasmagoria is designed precisely  to produce the illusion that ghosts are
about, one might say that this particular phantasmagoria was calculated to facilitate the “apparition”
of the person the narrator admits was always before him “in fancy” (Poe, “Ligeia” 311). In other
words, the narrator actually did see many things that reminded him of the image he had always
before his eyes, as it were, and this blurred the distinction between reality and imagination. In the
last paragraph of the tale, for example, he claims that the hair of the returned Ligeia streamed in the
“rushing atmosphere  of  the  chamber,”  a phrasing which attracts  his  previous  mention  of  that
artificial “wind (…) rushing hurriedly behind the tapestries,” of which he told Rowena “the very
gentle variations of the figures on the wall” were “but the natural effects” (324). This wind is one of
the principal devices of his phantasmagoria.
Indeed, the shifting of the figures in the tapestry caused by this wind satisfactorily accounts
for his perception that Ligeia’s hair was “rushing” in the air. The same very singular stuff could be
seen everywhere in the room: the “walls (…) were hung from summit to foot, in vast folds, with a
heavy and massive-looking tapestry—tapestry of a material which was found alike as a carpet on
the floor, as a covering for the ottomans and the ebony bed, as a canopy for the bed, and as the
gorgeous volutes of the curtains which partially shaded the window” (Poe, “Ligeia” 322). This
material was “the richest cloth of gold (…) with arabesque figures about one foot in diameter, and
wrought upon the cloth in patterns of the most jetty black” (323). These designs were “arabesque.”
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The term refers  to  the  intricate  geometrical  or  stylised  vegetable  designs  of  interweaving lines
employed in Muslim architecture. These black arabesque designs, then, were kept in motion by “the
artificial introduction of a strong continual current of wind behind the draperies—giving a hideous
and uneasy animation to the whole”  (323). This,  the  narrator  adds,  “vastly  heightened”  the
“phantasmagoric effect” (322).
This means, of course, that no matter where he looked, the narrator would see—actually see
—something that very nearly resembled the “jetty” black curls of his beloved Ligeia waving in the
wind. He reinforces the suggestion that he was confusing mental pictures with realities in the last
paragraph of the tale,  by recalling that,  when the “enshrouded” Ligeia made her appearance in
Rowena’s room, he felt paralysed by “a crowd of unutterable fancies connected with the air, the
stature,  the  demeanor  of  the  figure,  rushing  hurriedly through  my  brain”  (Poe,  “Ligeia”  329
emphasis mine). He had previously applied the very same phrase, “rushing hurriedly,” to the wind
that set the arabesques in the tapestry in motion. This chain of verbal echoes culminates in the very
last sentence of the tale, with Ligeia’s “disheveled hair” flowing about in the “rushing atmosphere
of the room” (329). Thus, Ligeia’s hair and the narrator’s brain, on the one side, the artificial wind
and the black arabesques, on the other, are associated in a way that confirms, in practice, he was
confusing the two.
But  the  illusion,  in  itself,  as  I  have  said  earlier,  is  not  the  decisive  element  in  a
“phantasmagoria.” The art of the creators of “phantasmagoria” consisted in making their spectators
forget, if only momentarily, what they had known all along—that the spectres were only illusions.
The  spectator  was  not  hallucinating,  that  is,  imagining  things;  rather,  he  was  tricked  into
misinterpreting what he actually saw. Likewise, all would be well if the narrator of “Ligeia” could
believe that he was experiencing an illusion—but he could not. Excited by the combined influence
of opium, remorse, and superstition, the narrator easily convinced himself that the arabesques were
Ligeia’s curls. 
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And the decoration of the chamber, being dominated by the black arabesques on the golden
background of the tapestry, itself suggests  the superimposition of the dark hair of Ligeia on the
blonde Rowena. The narrator of the tale was evidently not immune to this suggestion. In this sense,
and given the subjective perspective adopted by Poe, the animated tapestry is not merely a symbolic
foreshadowing of the climax of the tale; it is its probable proximate cause.
The purpose of the stage illusion known as phantasmagoria was precisely that of promoting
the confusion between mental pictures and external reality. By reminding us of the technological
devices involved in such spectacles, and forcing us to consider the factors that went into the creation
of a “phantasmagoric” effect, Poe shows us that his narrator was fooled by an illusion he created by
means he does not  fully  understand.  Superstitious in despite of himself,  and obsessed with the
image of his late first wife, Poe’s narrator is in fact in that peculiarly susceptible state of mind
Robertson attempted to induce in his public by the morbid speeches by which he prepared the
entrance of his spectral and auditory illusions.
Therefore,  I  cannot  agree  with  Castle’s  assessment  of  the  phantasmagoria  in  “Ligeia.”
According to that critic, the “mental picture” that haunted the narrator “appears to come to life,
fantastically, in the flesh. The phantom becomes a reality. Granted, hints of illusionism remain. (…)
But,” he concludes, “even as we recognize these signs of artifice, we also succumb—along with the
narrator (...)—to the incontrovertible reality of what is seen. It is (…) the real Lady Ligeia who rises
from the bier” (“Phantasmagoria” 41). We, the readers, do indeed succumb, like the spectators of a
real-life phantasmagoria, to suggestion—but the question is whether we must, as is here implied,
unavoidably do so. It appears to me that Castle confuses the phantasmagoric effect of the tale itself
with its true import, without fully grasping the implications of the extreme subjective focalisation
adopted by Poe. The narrator does not understand the illusion he created, and therefore succumbs;
but the reader is not doomed to be trapped in the phantasmagoria, for he is provided not with mere
“hints  of  illusionism,”  but  with  a  complex  mixture  of  obsessions  and  technologically  induced
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illusions to which all his phantasms may, and indeed must be reduced. Castle himself comes very
close to what I believe is the key to the tale: “The entire Rowena/Ligeia transformation is very
much like the phantasmagorical effect known as transmutation, achieved by shifting two magic-
lantern slides together” (41). In reality, the transformation is not merely analogous to the optical
process  of  superimposition;  it  is,  in  fact,  the  result  of  an  actual,  albeit  bizarre,  process  of
superimposition.  Indeed, contrary to Castle’s suggestion,  the “incontrovertible reality of what is
seen”—what the narrator  unquestionably saw—corrodes  the credibility  of his  claim that  Ligeia
returned in the flesh.
Although  he  admits  Poe  was  “well  aware,  of  course,  of  the  technical  meaning  of
phantasmagoria,” which was already in the process of being forgotten, Castle maintains that the
phantasmagoria in “Ligeia” is actually a metaphor. “The familiar metaphor enforces a pervasive
sense  of  the  illusory:  just  as  we  take  artificially  produced  effects  of  light  and  shadow  for
apparitions, or see figures in moving draperies, Poe implies, so we mistake the images in our heads
for realities” (“Phantasmagoria” 40, 41). Yet, the “phantasmagoria” in “Ligeia” is not a metaphor. In
its  literal,  technical  sense  the  term  “phantasmagoria”  denoted  a  stage  illusion  based  on  the
projection of images by means of a magical lantern; later, this spectacle became a metaphor of
haunting,  or more precisely,  the magic-lantern became a metaphor for the mind of the haunted
individual, who, according to the common associationist explanation of the phenomenon embodied
by Coleridge in the passage transcribed above, projected—as it were—a mental picture on external
reality. In “Ligeia,” Poe quite deliberately deploys both meanings, the literal and the figurative, at
the same time, letting the former clash with the latter. As a result, the metaphorical sense becomes
inviable, for one simply cannot reasonably attribute an apparition to supernatural agency that may
be explained as a phantasmagoric effect.
This  effect,  being  the  most  conspicuous  sign  of  the  narrator’s  complete  unreliability,
inasmuch as it blurs the details of the story into a “mystical” vagueness, is also his most effective
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disguise. Thus, it performs the double function of obscuring the narrator’s true character along with
his crime, and Poe’s borrowings from Macnish. Indeed, Poe’s greatest debt to Macnish is the kind of
unreliable narrator he used in his tales, and the “tone of truth” that guaranteed the success of his
hoax. The narrator of “Ligeia” is not only unreliable in the same way, he is also a femicide. This
basic resemblance is then confirmed by many small details, but these details are themselves masked
by the overall atmosphere of mystery. Thus the connection between the two tales is itself indistinct,
and not readily apparent. Just like his narrator confuses past and present, so the reader who reads his
and Macnish’s tale inevitably ends up jumbling the two together, without being able, at first, to
clearly define the affinity between the narrators. This is one of the characteristic effects of Poe’s art.
Specifically, many circumstances that are adequately explained in Confessions are presented
without  any  explanation  in  Poe’s  tale.  For  example,  like  William,  Poe’s  narrator  knew  his
adventures with the cadaver of the blonde woman would have no witnesses, for Rowena’s room was
located in a “turret (...) altogether apart from the portion of the abbey tenanted by the servants,” and
from which there was no way to call them “without leaving the room for many minutes”  (Poe,
"Ligeia" 327). But, while in Confessions William openly acknowledges he dismissed the servants,
the  narrator  of  “Ligeia”  merely  states  the  fact,  as  if  this  was  a  fortuitous  circumstance,  thus
misleading the reader. Indeed, he had prepared his new bride’s quarters before his marriage. With
this sentence, therefore, he indirectly admits he had imprisoned his wife in the remotest part of the
building as soon as they got home, but provides no explanation for it.  The decision, of course,
speaks for itself.
This pattern is repeat throughout the tale.  Poe systematically withdraws the explanations
from his imitation. Here is another example. William was gazing on the exquisite “form” stretched
before him, and “remembered what she had been to me.”  This sight, therefore, induced a sort of
reverie, which so totally absorbed him that he “remarked (…) not” the arrival of the “fatal hour” of
ten. Every night at that hour, the hour of the crime, Mary appeared to remind her murderer of his
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guilt. There is nothing especially mysterious about this,  for  the  reader  knows  why William is
haunted by the ghost of Mary Elliston. In “Ligeia,” a very similar ghost—for all indicates it is a
ghost—occurs under very similar circumstances, but, as usual, things are made considerably more
mystical. There too the watcher had  his eyes fixed on “the pallid and rigid figure upon the bed”
when he started reminiscing, only in his case, he thought about his first wife, the long-dead, dark
Ligeia  (Poe,  “Ligeia”  326). He abandoned himself, during the whole grotesque spectacle, to
“passionate waking visions of” her, just like William, who had a distinct predilection for full-
blooded blondes, pictured her sister in her living days (327). Both were engrossed by their favorite
subject,  but they had different tastes in women. And then,  like his predecessor, the narrator of
“Ligeia” “had taken no note of time” when he was startled from his reverie by what he believed was
a sigh. When the “fatal hour” arrived, therefore, one “remarked it not,” while the other was taking
“no note”  of time: two ways of saying the same thing (326)21. Ligeia  made her appearance in
Rowena’s wake at midnight, whereas Mary appeared at ten, but this does not make a whole lot of
difference, aside from the fact of midnight being conventionally termed the witching hour. What is
significant, is that the narrator is unsure: “It might have been midnight, or earlier, or later” (326). He
assumed it was midnight—but why? One suspects his ghost was as punctual as William’s.
And here is another coincidence. William’s flattering illusion of reanimation is punctured
when he touches the “icy”  corpse. Likewise, the corpse of Rowena  looks lively to Poe’s  narrator
when he regards it from afar, with his head full of thoughts of Ligeia, but every time he gets up and
touches it, he is disappointed. In this case, the comparison between the two tales is irresistibly funny
—although the joke is perhaps a little crude. In both, the narrator is the only living actor in a ghostly
drama performed for the reader. But, whereas William realises he was imagining things the first
time he touches the corpse, Poe’s narrator is caught in a loop, going back and forward between his
seat and the bed where the corpse lay, without grasping the obvious: that what he was “seeing” the
21 The narrator of Ligeia started seeing things at about midnight, but that does not make a whole lot of difference.
Besides, he is, as usual, unsure: “It might have been midnight, or earlier, or later” (Poe, "Ligeia" 326).
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ghost of the dark lady. Each time he finds his corpse as cold and stiff as William had found his, but
imagines  the body is cycling  between life and death,  when  it  would  have  been  much  more
reasonable for him to conclude that he was labouring under an illusion. Ultimately, both narrators
are left alone with a corpse, but while William openly acknowledges that the “phantom” “had fled,
and left no token of her presence behind;”  this  too is  only  implied  in  Poe’s  tale  (Macnish,
Confessions 22).
The similarities  between  the  two scenes  extend  to  the  reactions  of  the  narrators  to  the
apparent  reanimation  of  the  woman  whose  wake  they  are  performing.  William found himself
“bound to his seat;”  Poe’s character suffers a similar paralysis: “I felt my heart cease to beat, my
limbs grow rigid where I sat”  (Poe, “Ligeia” 327).  The paralysis in Poe’s tale is more explicitly
death-like—the narrator fancies himself literally  mortified—; the insistence on “rigidity” is also
more suggestive of sexual arousal. This and the narrator’s obvious obsession with death have led
Amper, who was not acquainted with Confessions, to remark that the ending of the tale “acts out,”
as she puts it, “a necrophilic orgy” (“Masters of Deceit” 140).
This  suggestion,  however,  which Poe conveys,  as  is  characteristic  of him,  mystically,  is
much more  obvious  in  the corresponding passages  of  Macnish’s  tale.  In William’s  reverie, the
corpse of his sister is revived by the kisses of her female friend Mary and the two then engage in an
exchange of “embraces.” The narrator speaks of Mary’s fondness for his sister as an “unspeakable
affection,”  and I believe Macnish thus signaled to his reader that the femicide’s  disturbed fancy
presented to him a homosexual encounter between the two friends, which was itself an expression
of his own “unspeakable affection”  for his sister, which had been transferred to her friend Mary.
Thus, Mary, who had provided a viable outlet for his forbidden desire for his sister, now becomes a
weird sexual mediator between the two. Indeed, the lone watcher found the vision of the two friends
exchanging caresses so overpoweringly pleasing that he could “stand it no longer,” and, recovering
from his temporary death-like paralysis, joined them. Here the implied sexual tension reaches its
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peak, and the reader cannot be blamed if he wonders just exactly what the narrator meant when, a
few lines before, he had declared “I never loved her till now” (Macnish, Confessions 20). A similar
impression results from “Ligeia,” though, as usual, the train of associations that leads to it is much
more convoluted. As we have seen, the preferences of the narrators are inverted in the two tales.
Poe’s narrator was sexually attracted primarily to the dead Ligeia. Of her, the narrator tells us: “in
death only was I fully impressed with the strength of her affection” (Poe, "Ligeia" 317). When he
saw the enshrouded Rowena, he was reminded of Ligeia “thus enshrouded.” Apparently, the shroud
triggered recollections of a previous necrophiliac encounter with her, and, through association, his
desired was again aroused.
The wake scene in Macnish’s Confessions, with its suggestions of necrophilia, is itself an
obvious nod to the most memorable scene in Matthew Lewis’ delightfully outrageous shocker, The
Monk. In book III, chapter IV the infamous title-character, Ambrosio the monk, eagerly awaits the
reanimation of the ravishing Antonia in the crypt of the female monastery next door to his (the two
convents being, of course, in typical Gothic fashion, conveniently connected by an underground
passage), after having slipped her a special potion that he had been assured would plunge her in a
state of inanimation almost exactly resembling death. Ambrosio had made repeated sexual advances
to  Antonia,  whose virtue proved unassailable,  and at  length adopted the  scheme that  had been
suggested to him by his companion and former lover, the super-learned witch Matilda. The object of
that scheme was, precisely, to guarantee the monk some time alone  with the “corpse,”  far from
prying eyes and ears. He had “no cause to dread an interruption,” and felt certain that “totally in his
power,  Antonia  would  comply  with  his  desire”  (M.  Lewis,  The  Monk 377).22 His  situation,
therefore,  almost  exactly  matches  that  depicted  in  the  climactic  scene  of  Confessions.   This
resemblance is increased by the fact that Antonia and Ambrosio were brother and sister—although
neither  of  them knew this  at  the  time.  Yet,  the  expectations  of  Ambrosio  are  not  frustrated  as
22 I have used Howard Anderson’s edition of the novel, which follows the manuscript on which the first edition was 
based.
83
William’s: his seductive sister does come back to life, as predicted, that he may satisfy his unlawful
desire. He realises his fantasies, therefore, under cover of death, but with a live woman—although
he ends up killing her once the deed is done. In Confessions, of course, “love” comes significantly
after the death of the sister.
Like William, by the time he watches the life-dead object of his sexual fantasies the monk
had already committed femicide and was haunted by the recollection of that crime. Ambrosio had
killed Elvira, Antonia’s and, as he would later find out, his mother and now, even as he indulged his
lust for his sister, the sight of the “rotting bones and disgusting figures” of the bona fide corpses of
nuns in the tomb, the thought of his victim, “by him reduced to the same state,” intruded on his
fantasies (M. Lewis,  The Monk 379). The monk is actually guilty of all those unspeakable crimes
that the male tyrants in the novels of Anne Radcliffe’s school of Gothic, who are never as evil as
they seem, had not been permitted to commit: femicide, rape, incest, and even matricide.
Contemporary audiences were simultaneously fascinated and appalled by the open depiction
of sexuality and horror which previous Gothic novels had promised but never delivered. As Emma
McEvoy remarks: “It is not that the 1790s was a homogeneously conservative decade, but rather
that the frightened conservatives of the time reacted strongly to the book,” and raised the tone of the
controversy with “hysterical reactions” (Introduction x). Lewis was charged with corrupting public
morals, an accusation that was all the more serious as the novel was then seen as a genre aimed at
women  and  young  men,  and  therefore  required  to  conform  to  strict  notions  of  decorum  and
didacticism. On the one hand, most readers felt Lewis’s titillating descriptions of the female body,
and representation of the joys of sex, made vice, as sexual pleasure was perceived by the puritanical
establishment, alluring to a public from which these critics thought these things should be zealously
concealed.  It  was  also  thought  that  this  supposedly  ingenuous  and unprepared  public  required
simple and unambiguous inducements to chastity. On the one hand, the monk’s evil schemes to
satisfy  his  lust  were  crowned  with  success,  which  was  bad  enough  in  itself.  And  then,  most
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shocking of all,  the virtue of Antonia and Elvira in general,  and the modesty of the former in
particular,  were not  ultimately rewarded,  as was also customary in  the novels of Radcliffe,  but
rather punished, as it were, by death at the hands of the profligate monk. Thus, it was feared that the
book might prove an irresistible encouragement to vice for a susceptible audience, which was not
likely to be frightened by the monk’s being at length snatched by a devil which represented the
Gothic superstition which had been ridiculed throughout the novel, and carried to a Hell of fire and
brimstone the belief in which had long  since fallen out of fashion.
Also levelled at Lewis’s novel was the more serious accusation of blasphemy. Indeed, the
novel  contained  some  iconoclastic  passages  that  proved  even  more  shocking  to  contemporary
audiences than the openly erotic passages. The narrator’s equiparation of “[m]any of the narratives”
contained in the Good Book with pornography was particularly criticised: “Every thing is called
plainly and roundly by its name; and the annals of a Brothel would scarcely furnish a greater choice
of indecent expressions. (…) this is the Book (…) which but too frequently inculcates the first
rudiments of vice, and gives the first alarm to the still sleeping passions” (M. Lewis,  The Monk
259). Not only did Lewis call things by their name, he dared to suggest that his book was no more
immoral than the Bible.
Indeed,  in  The  Publication  of  ‘The  Monk:’ A Literary  Event,  1796-1798  (1960),  which
remains the most comprehensive study of the scandal surrounding the novel, André Parreaux shows
that  immorality  and  blasphemy  were  the  two  accusations  commonly  hurled  at  it  by  its  first
reviewers. As regards the first,  he writes,  “The Monthly Review  asserted simply that ‘a vein of
obscenity’ pervaded the whole novel and made it ‘totally unfit for general circulation.  Coleridge,”
however, in a review published in Critical Review for February 1797 “did not content himself with
such vague generalities: he was much more specific in his criticism. He blamed the ‘libidinous
minuteness’ with which the temptations of Ambrosio were described; ‘the shameless harlotry of
85
Matilda and the trembling innocence of Antonia’ were made ‘the vehicles of the most voluptuous
images’” (89-90).
However, Parreaux also notes that: “It was only after the identity of the author was revealed
that the book began to be branded as immoral” (Publication  87). Indeed, the first edition did not
identify the author,  and Lewis  only owned his  creation in the second edition,  published in  the
Summer of 1796. Some critics, notably Coleridge, were particularly incensed by the fact that Lewis
had identified himself as a Member of Parliament. In the wake of this scandal, which would plague
him for the rest of his days, Lewis was tried for immorality. According to Emma McEvoy:
Although contemporary accounts do not make clear how far the proceedings went, it
is known that Lewis was taken to court, with the result that he had to pledge and
recall existing copies of the third edition and alter and delete certain passages for the
fourth. In the censored edition there are no mentions of sexual activity, no ‘on-stage’
seductions or murder attempts, and gone are the descriptions of unclothed female
bodies. All the musings on physical pleasure and the physical differences between the
sexes have disappeared, and the climatic crypt scene is omitted as are all mentions of
such provocative words as ‘lust,’ ‘incontinence,’ and ‘enjoyment.’ (Introduction ix) 
Parreaux concurs that the most sexually suggestive scenes had been cancelled along with the
more provocative words, including “the long scene in the vaults of the convent, where Antonia is at
last  violated”  (Publication  121).  However,  such  accounts  of  Lewis’s  revisions  are  not  entirely
accurate. Louis F. Peck, in his  A Life of Matthew Lewis (1961), which remains the most reliable
biography of the author, remarked that “Lewis’ alterations of his romance are superficial and do not
affect the narrative or the central idea of the story” (35). In fact, Lewis left some very conspicuous
references  to  sexual  activity,  notably  in  the  crypt  scene,  which  was severely  abridged,  but  not
altogether omitted. Such references, however, were significantly toned down for the revised edition.
In the original, the monk horrified his reader when he
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lifted her [Antonia] still motionless from the Tomb: He seated himself upon a bank of
Stone,  and supporting  her  in  his  arms,  watched impatiently  for  the symptoms of
returning animation. Scarcely could He command his passions sufficiently, to restrain
himself  from enjoying her while yet insensible.  His natural lust was increased in
ardour by the difficulties, which had opposed his satisfying it: As also from his long
abstinence from Woman. (M. Lewis, The Monk 379)
Like  William  the  femicide,  Ambrosio  found  the  seemingly  dead  woman  irresistibly
attractive. In fact, he was evidently about to assault her even at a point when it was still unclear
whether she would actually come back to life. Since the monk was as attracted to the “person” of
Antonia as before, the reader is not permitted to doubt he would have satisfied his lust anyway. In
those days, of course, necrophilia could not openly be depicted in print. Yet, Lewis shamefacedly
challenges this taboo, forcing his reader to acknowledge the possibility of an unutterable act the
realisation of which he denies in the last moment, thus complying, at least nominally, with the moral
code.  In  this  sense,  he mimics  the subterfuge that  had been employed so many times  by Ann
Radcliffe in her novels to suggest the possibility of unspeakable sexual acts and femicide.
In the first three editions, Antonia gradually came to, at which point the monk attempted to
talk her into having sex with him, and, failling to do so, finally resorted to brute force. His victim is,
however,  piously spared from witnessing her own rape:  she “fainted ere the completion of her
disgrace: She only recovered life to be sensible of her misfortune” (M. Lewis, The Monk 384). The
several paragraphs describing these events were expurgated from the fourth edition, and replaced by
a single elliptical paragraph culminating in the following sentence: “Animation was only restored to
make her [Antonia] sensible that the monk was a villain, and herself undone!” (M. Lewis, Ambrosio
196). Thus, while Lewis expunged all the graphic details from the scene to spare the sensibility of
his readership, thus apparently complying with the demands of his censors, he made the rape of
Antonia resemble even more an act of necrophilia than before, by enacting the shocking possibility
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which he had narrowly avoided the first time and which, surprisingly, his detractors seem to have
found acceptable.  Indeed,  the monk now explicitly  rapes  Antonia before she ever  regained her
senses. Thus, I cannot quite agree with Peck when he writes that “Lewis fully complied” with the
demands of his more indignant critics by preparing a version of the novel that “contains nothing
which could endanger the most fragile virtue” (A Life  34). On the contrary, it appears to me that
Lewis deftly circumvented those demands.
Public outrage surrounding the first editions of  The Monk, as well as the more favorable
reception of the revised novel, signalled to other writers that the graphic depiction of sexual acts
would not be tolerated, but also that the implied representation of such acts, even in such horrific
circumstances, was acceptable. Indeed, just as the monk had to take his unlawful lust to the crypt—
for this had been a means of concealing his criminal sexuality—, so, after the strong public reaction
to the graphic narrative of his exploits, Lewis’s imitators had to encrypt the sexual content in their
imitations of his novel to elude censorship, and this is exactly what Macnish accomplished in The
Confessions, where sexuality is constantly implied, but never actually stated. Poe will then encrypt
the scene still further, while making his and Macnish’s debt to “Monk” Lewis much more obvious
by adding five “sarcophagi” to the room—presumably containing decaying corpses like those in the
monk's crypt—and by having his narrator suggest that Rowena was prematurely buried after some
“ghostly” drops had fallen into her wine,23 which he “mystically” hints were placed there by none
other than the ghost of the dark lady “Ligeia,”  whom the narrator suggests was, like Matilda, an
adept of the dark arts.24
All this demonstrates, I think, the point I have made at the beginning of this section. There is
nothing original about any of this. Yet, by skillfully weaving together all these sources, Poe created
23 When he “saw” Rowena start to stir, the narrator thought: “I could no longer doubt that we had been precipitate in
our preparations—that Rowena still lived” (Poe, “Ligeia” 327). Later, of course, he revised his assessment, deciding
that it was Ligeia that still lived.
24 The revelation of Matilda’s dealings with the devil is, in itself, one of those typical Gothic twists by which Lewis
redeems his transgressions against conventional morality. In this connection, it should be noticed that the drops she
gave Ambrosio are not a supernatural elixir, but a soporific.
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something  that  was  radically  new.  But  of  course,  the  materials  from  which  this  grotesque
extravaganza  was  created—or,  more  precisely,  composed—did  not  come  from  the  high-brow
Romantic literature by which Poe is generally supposed to have been inspired, but rather from the
middle-brow prose fiction that has, for the most part, been ignored by modern scholars. Some of the
tale’s most “mystical”  sentences are,  I  think, clues to the “composite”  nature of the tale. For
example, Poe has his narrator say that the he got, “not unfrequently from passages from books” the
same mysterious feeling that Ligeia’s eyes used to inspire in him (Poe,  "Ligeia" 314). He, the
narrator, however, does not say which passages, and speaks only of vague, obscurely felt
connections. It is another matter with the author—he evidently knew exactly where he had found
his narrator’s feelings.
3 - The Mysterious Note
Besides the tale itself, Poe left us another clue, in the form of a bewildering unsigned note
on “Ligeia”  published in the February 15, 1845 issue of the New World, which also included the
third ever publication of the tale. The note divulges information about the tale and its composition
that could only have come from the author himself, and which was not then publicly available. This,
along with its  mischievous tone,  convinces  me that  it  was  planted  by Poe as  another  of  those
elaborate  hoaxes  he  so  often  employed  to  quiz  the  public.  The editor starts by extolling the
“boldness of the conception and the high artistic skill, with which the writer’s purpose is wrought
out,” and then adds: 
Mark the exquisite art, which keeps constantly before the reader the ruined and
spectre-haunted mind of the narrator, and so suggests a possible explanation for the
marvels of the story, without in the least weakening its vigor as an exposition of the
mystical thesis which the tale is designed to illustrate and enforce.
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The story will be, we presume, entirely new to most of our readers. It
appeared we believe originally in England, in a volume of which only a small edition
was printed. The volume is now out of print. We suggest that some of our
enterprising publishers would do well in giving it to the public without delay. In our
copy of LIGEIA, the author has put the last hand to his work, and improved it by
several important changes and additions. In its present form it has not seen the light
before. We shall have the pleasure of laying before our readers hereafter other similar
contributions from the same source. (Mabbott, Tales 333n22)25
Mabbott scrupulously relayed the note, but, taking it at face value, saw in it nothing more
than shameless self-puffery. “No authoritative record of the English printing mentioned has been
found,” is his terse remark (Mabbott, Tales 333n22).  However, “mention” is too strong a word. The
note does suggest such a publication, but you could never pin the writer down to the statement in
Mabbott’s paraphrase—the note-writer ensured plausible deniability. What he actually says is that
the “story” would not be “entirely new” for those acquainted with a certain volume that had never
been published in America. Readers  were likely to imagine that the note did refer to an English
volume of his tales, and this was just as well, from the professional writer’s point of view. The
mother country was still very much the standard of taste in the quondam colony, and therefore, an
English publication still commanded respect in America.
Closer inspection shows that the note is actually absurd if we suppose it to refer to the
mythical English publication of “Ligeia.” Why would the writer urge the American republication of
a volume containing an earlier form of a tale an “improved” version of which was being published?
The nonsense itself should have tipped Mabbott off. It is there to signal that the note is not what it
seems; that it is a poser. Indeed, this is the sort of bibliographical riddle that Poe had long been in
the  habit  of  palming  on the  public.  Its apparent import is that “Ligeia”  had been “originally”
25 I quote the note from Mabbott’s transcription, included in one of his notes to “Ligeia.” A photographic reproduction
of  the  original  note,  which  appeared  in  page  105 of  The New World,  may be  found in  ProQuest’s  American
Periodicals Series.
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published in England—indeed, it implies not only that the tale had been published there, but that
this had been the first time it had been printed. This is what may be termed the spirit of the text. But
this implies several surmises on the reader’s part which directly contradict its letter. But then, it is
almost impossible to paraphrase the note without making  many  such surmises, such is its
vagueness.
However vague it may be in other respects, the note positively ascertains, for example, that
the “story” which appeared in that number of The New World was not “original.” And, since it was
not original, the presumption that it would be, nevertheless, “entirely new” to the  majority of the
readers of the New World leads to the conclusion that the original “form” of the tale had not been
made generally available to the American magazine-reading public and, conversely,  that it would
be only partially new to those who had seen that “volume” of which only a “small edition” had
been “printed,” and which was “now,” at the time of writing, “out of print.” 
Mabbott assumes “story” is a synonym of “tale.” This is another surmise the text does not
allow. Indeed, the distinction between the two is implied in the first sentence I transcribed. The term
“story” unequivocally refers to the sequence of events, namely the “marvels” depicted, while “tale”
relates to the point of view of the narration, hence, to the particular mode of representation. “Story”
here roughly corresponds, therefore, to Aristotle’s “μῦθος.” Indeed, the note writer—at this point, I
think we might as well call him Poe—begins by drawing attention to the fact that the same “story,”
or sequence of events, may be told in any number of ways. This particular tale, “Ligeia,” is itself
characterised by the contest  between two conflicting interpretations of the “story.” One the one
hand, we have the “possible explanation”  that is “suggested,” hence not stated; on the other, the
“thesis” which the tale is ostensibly “designed to illustrate and enforce.” This “thesis,” of course,
corresponds to the narrator’s own interpretation of the “marvels,” which is said to prevail over the
alternative explanation. However, the note actually slyly contradicts the narrator, thereby suggesting
that he succeeded only in drawing the readers to a false conclusion. Indeed, it flatly states that the
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alternative explanation,  that the narrator  is  delirious,  is  possible—if  this  is  the case,  there is  of
course  no  reason  to  accept  the  narrator’s  impossible  hypothesis.  In  fact,  the  reasoning  which
supports his thesis  is  predicated on the assumption that the “marvels” of the “story” cannot be
explained. In effect, the note implies that the tale is a hoax, as I have attempted to demonstrate in
the previous section. Since no one had ever so much as suspected it of being a hoax, this provides
very strong evidence that Poe was the author of the note. What I would like to emphasise here,
however, is that the note stakes no claim to originality of “story,”  extolling instead the “exquisite
art” of the telling.
This fundamental distinction reveals the solution to the riddle. Poe is not boasting of an
English publication of his tale. He  had explicitly rejected “absolute originality”  as a standard of
artistic merit in his criticism—indeed, he disputed its possibility—, and now draws attention instead
to his own cleverness in stealing a  “story” he admits he knew the American public  would not
recognise.  Open confession of imitation,  as  Scott  had  earlier  realised, would be tantamount to
literary suicide. Poe, therefore, did not openly confess his  imitation,  but  left  a trail of literary
crumbles by which the reader might appreciate the “exquisite art” of what he regarded as his highest
literary achievement. This art consisted in making striking new combinations of motives, ideas, and
even whole “stories,” that were already in circulation and making the product of this combination
appear spontaneous.
This interpretation, however, would have remained  only a  conjecture if  a “volume”  that
responded to Poe’s challenge could not be located. The Confessions of an Unexecuted Femicide is a
perfect match. First, and most importantly, the “story,” particularly the “marvels” in the wake scene,
namely the apparent reanimation of the blonde corpse upon the apparition of the entombed dark
lady, are close enough to “Ligeia” to justify the note’s claim that they were not entirely new. Of
course,  in  Confessions  the  “possible  explanation”  mentioned  in  the  note  is  not  obscured  by a
supernatural “thesis,” which also corroborates the suggestion that “Ligeia” presents an old story in a
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new way. And then, from a bibliographical perspective, the original pamphlet edition also perfectly
corresponds to the description. The “story” had been originally published, as the note specified, in a
“volume,”  that is, in book form. This is distinctive in itself, for most short fiction in those days,
including Poe’s and Macnish’s, was first published in the  periodical  press.  Even the doubt
expressed by the note regarding the place of publication (“we believe in England”) is a clue.
Confessions was first published sometime before August 11, 1827 in Glasgow, Scotland, which,
strictly speaking, is not England.26 The original pamphlet, moreover, had by 1845 indeed been long
“out of print,” as the note implies.
The note further implies, as we have seen, that the original story had not been published in
America. This too was not  entirely  true. Although Macnish’s hoax was far from unknown to the
American public, the peculiar circumstances of its publication in the United states made it very
unlikely that his readers would detect the source of Poe’s “story,” and especially his borrowings
from the wake scene. As far as I could ascertain, the first American periodical to print the story was
The New-York Mirror, and Ladies’ Literary Gazette, in October 6, 1827. Then followed the Phenix
Gazette of  Alexandria,  Virginia,  The American Watchman & Delaware Advertiser, the North
American, or, Weekly Journal of Politics, Science and Literature of Baltimore, the Midgeville
Southern Recorder of Milledgeville, Georgia,  The Casket, or, Flowers of Literature, Wit, and
Sentiment of Philadelphia, the Indiana Palladium of Lawrenceburg, Indiana, and finally the Ariel,
also of Philadelphia, which featured the tale in its November 17 edition. For some reason, more than
a year later, on February 13, the Hagerstown Mail, of the town of that name in Maryland, gave a
new lease of life to the story. Evidently, Confessions was very widely available in America, which
apparently disqualifies it to be the solution of Poe’s riddle—but only apparently.
26 The earliest public reference to the publication of the pamphlet I could locate is in an article in the August 11
edition of the short-lived Glaswegian magazine The Ant, the relevant portion of which is transcribed below. This
states that the tale had appeared in Glasgow the previous Saturday, that is, August 4, 1827. A chronology of the
publication of The Confessions may be found in the Appendix.
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With the sole exception of the small Lawrenceburg Palladium, these papers printed only the
first half of the tale. The events that follow the killing, from the first apparition of the ghost of the
murdered dark-haired woman to the wake scene and the apparent reanimation of the blond Eliza,
and beyond, were excluded from this edited form of the tale. Since this was precisely the part of the
tale  that  had  a  more  noticeable  resemblance  with  “Ligeia,” Poe’s source was virtually
unrecognisable in the form in which it had been made available to most American readers. More
importantly, this was the form published by the magazines,  New-York Mirror, The Ariel, and  The
Casket.  These were relatively expensive publications,  which,  unlike the disposable newspapers,
were meant to be bound in a volume. Therefore, the incomplete version of the tale could still be
easily procured. But very few copies of the November 4, 1827 issue of the Palladium, containing
the second part of the tale, would still be around more than ten years after publication. This, then,
justifies the mysterious note’s appeal to “enterprising publishers,” urging them to giving the original
of Poe’s “story” to the American public.
The explanation for the systematic omission of the second part of the tale, with the entire
wake scene and its shocking thinly veiled hints of incestuous necrophilia, is traceable to the history
of the publication of Confessions in the English newspapers, from which the American periodicals
picked it up. In the days and weeks that followed its original publication in Glasgow, circa August
4, 1827, two different versions of the narrative appeared in the British press: one complete in one
delivery, the other divided in two installments, the first of which invariably ended abruptly on the
same spot, with the murder of the pregnant Mary Elliston. The Liverpool Mercury, in its August 24
edition, was unquestionably the first to adopt the first procedure, as may be gleaned from the fact
that the editorial  note that accompanies this edition of the tale being partially transcribed as an
epigraph for  the  fourth  Macphun edition,  where  it  is  identified  as  part  of  a  “A Review in the
Liverpool Mercury” (Macnish,  Confessions 1). The two-part version was apparently much more
widely available. The earliest printing of the first installment I could locate appears in the first page
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of the August 23 edition of The Standard, where it is preceded by a different editorial note, which
begins  with  the  words  “A deeply  affecting  narrative.”  The  American  papers  and  magazines  I
mentioned  earlier  all  published  this  two-part  version  of  the  tale,  always  accompanied  by  the
respective note, but most of them claim to have lifted it from an earlier publication, the “Liverpool
Albion” of August 20, 1827, a copy of which I have not been able to locate. Most of the note that
accompanied the first part of the tale is also included in the fourth pamphlet edition of Confessions
as a second epigraph, but is there attributed to a different source, The St. James Chronicle, which I
also have not seen.
In  The Standard, the earliest printing of the two-part version I could locate, the editorial
statement ended with the announcement that the conclusion of the story would be published in the
following edition of the paper. “We insert, to-day, an extract from the first part of the Confessions,
and,   in   our   next   paper,   we   purpose   making   an   extract   from   the   sequel   of   the   story  .” (Editorial The
Standard emphasis mine). For undisclosed reasons The Standard never fulfilled its promise, and
neither did most of the other English papers who carried the first part of the tale with the same note.
Perhaps the editors deemed the second part too scandalous. In any case, the  Standard’s failure to
publish the announced conclusion suggests that it copied the story from some other paper, perhaps
the  Chronicle mentioned by Macphun, along with the editorial  note,  and then,  upon seeing the
second installment, decided not to publish it.
For  some  reason,  all  the  American  periodicals  mentioned  above  published  the  first
installment of the tale, as it appears in  The Standard, and always preceded by the same prefatory
note,  with the exception of the last  words,  underlined in my transcription.  Thus,  none of them
signaled the intention of featuring a sequel to the “extract” being published and, as far as I could
ascertain,  did not  publish it,  with the single exception of the  Indiana Palladium,  which,  oddly
enough, also did not announce the conclusion, but went on to print it anyway in its November 24
issue,  reiterating  that  it  had  been  taken  “From the  Liverpool  Albion.”  Thus,  despite  its  being
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divulged widely in America, the American reading public, with exception of those few readers who
may have had access to the original British publications, had only seen a truncated version of The
Confessions,  in  which  the  wake  scene  was  omitted—and  this  more  than  a  decade  before  Poe
published the first version of “Ligeia,” and almost two before the mysterious note appeared in The
New World.
Poe, on the other hand, evidently had not forgotten the narrative, which had almost certainly
attracted his attention at the time. By 1827 Poe was starting out as a writer, and would have been
then, as he was for the remainder of his career, very attentive to the literary magazines. And he had
reasons to be especially attentive to The North American of Baltimore, which some months prior to
the publication of the first part of The Confessions had been one of the first publications to feature
one  of  the  poems  from  Poe’s  first  book  of  verse,  the  ill-fated  Tamerlane  and  Other  Poems
(1827).2728 Perhaps he encountered Macnish’s tale for the first time there. By September 1838, at
least, when “Ligeia” was first published, he had evidently obtained a complete copy of Confessions.
27 “The Happiest Day” appeared in the North American for September 15, 1827, where it was signed with the initials
of Poe’s brother, “W.H.P.” The poem had originally appeared in  Tamerlane and Other Poems, By a Bostonian,
which was, according to Mabbott, “on sale about July” 1827 (Poems 21).
28 The “extract” from Confessions also appeared in a magazine with which Poe’s career is intimately connected, The
Casket,  which would be merged with  Burton’s Gentleman’s Magazine  to form  Graham’s Magazine,  which was
edited by Poe from April 1841 to May 1842.
Poe’s interest in the Casket, of course, predated his professional engagement with Graham’s. He must have
known, at least, when The Casket published one of his poems, the “Sonnet -To Science,” in October 1830, fairly
early in his career.
Earlier that same year, an enigmatic anonymous poem entitled “The Femicide” had appeared in the magazine
which was calculated to interest a writer like Poe. It was preceded by the following note: “The picture I have
endeavored to draw in the following stanzas is from life. The incidents are literally true. Though the general reader
may discover in the ‘Femicide’ some analogy, in circumstance, to that humbling picture of human depravity, ‘The
Confessions of an Unexecuted Femicide,’ an extract from which may be found in the 11th No. of the Casket for
1827, yet it is not the same, nor are they like, save in the catastrophe of female error” (141).
Had he missed it the first time, I am perfectly convinced that this note could not have failed to excite Poe’s
curiosity for the tale mentioned in the note, and to which the poem’s very title alludes. The note is, in any case, an
important document for the history of the femicide story. It documents that Macnish’s hoax was at least a minor
sensation in the United States too. More than two years after it first came to America, it was still remembered, and
what is more, the very word “femicide” was still being associated with it. 
And then, there is also the distinctively provoking tone of the note, concentrated in the last line, the irony of
which only those who had read Confessions were equipped to appreciate. The title may be presumed to refer to the
killer, not the killing. One gets the impression that the poem represents the feelings and the point of view of that
unsavory character. Though the note asserts this is a different “femicide,” mention of “female error,” suggests that
this femicide is not all that different from the original. All this seems to me a very good indication that at least some
people in America had got Macnish’s hoax before Poe started publishing his variations on the theme.
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Indeed,  I  think the parallelism is  to close and detailed as to  make the hypothesis  of fortuitous
coincidence too unlikely to deserve serious consideration, even without the tell-tale 1845 note.
I suspect, however, that Poe had by that time been long acquainted with the wake scene in
Macnish’s narrative. Indeed, the evidence of the influence of the femicide story on some of his
earliest sketches is quite compelling. “Berenice,” for example, originally published in the Southern
Literary Messenger in March 1835, already contains some details that indicate Poe’s acquaintance
with the second part of  Confessions, namely the fact of the narrator Egæus being haunted by the
specter of an unidentified dark-haired woman whom he unaccountably confuses with the blonde
Berenice. Still, the resemblance with the original femicide story is fairly generic, especially when
we compare this tale with “Ligeia.” I suspect this has a very simple explanation. By 1835, Poe
would have to presume the author of Confessions, whoever he was, still lived. By 1838, however,
the situation was different.
Again, the mysterious note in  The New World proves misleading. Although the Macphun
pamphlet had then been, as before stated, long out of print, a new edition of Macnish’s tale was then
available  in  England,  under  a  slightly  different  title,  “The  Confessions  of  an  Unexecuted
Feminicide.” This was included in the second volume of The Modern Pythagorean, the collection of
Macnish’s literary remains edited by his friend Moir, and published by Blackwood, editor of the
famous  magazine  of  the  same  name.  The  book  is  dated  1838,  but  was,  judging  from  some
newspaper adds, available by the end of the previous year. Poe, who kept a close watch on the
English literary scene, and had a particular interest in all things Blackwood, as his “How to Write a
Blackwood Magazine” shows, would not miss  The Modern Pythagorean, which was titled after
Macnish’s Blackwood persona. Poe must have learned then the secret of the authorship of the tale,
which was there made public for the first time. One thing is certain, after the news of Macnish’s
death was divulged,  he certainly borrowed more freely than before from his work,  presumably
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because he felt that the likelihood of his borrowing from that source being detected, which was
never very great, had now been drastically reduced.
The intention of presenting “other similar contributions from the same source,” manifested
by the writer of The New World note on “Ligeia,” suggests that Poe would continue to borrow from
Macnish. Indeed, some scholars have seen the influence of the “Modern Pythagorean”’s Blackwood
sketches in some of Poe’s tales written both before and after Ligeia. Maxwell Morton, in A Builder
of the Beautiful  (1928), called attention to the resemblance between some portions of “Bon-Bon”
(1832), “Lionizing” (1835), two of the tales in the so-called Folio Club series, and “The Devil in the
Belfry” (1839), on the one side, and three of the sketches the Modern Pythagorean contributed to
Blackwood’s during the course of 1826, the year in which he made his debut in the magazine:
“Metempsychosis,” “Man With the Nose,” and “The Barber of Gottingen,” respectively. Realizing
that his find brought into question the already well-established critical myth of Poe’s “originality,”
Morton remarked: “If Poe is the father of the short-story, Dr. Robert Macnish, M. D., LL.D. (the
‘Modern Pythagorean’), may, perhaps, be regarded as one of its grandfathers;” but thought Macnish
had been an inspiration only for “the grotesqueries of the American,” that is, for his openly satirical
pieces (39). Much later, when he prepared his edition of Poe’s fiction, Mabbott accepted Morton’s
suggestions.  In  1975 Alexander  Hammond considered  Macnish’s  influence on Poe was beyond
dispute: “Poe’s knowledge of Macnish, who wrote his  Blackwood’s  tales under the pen name ‘A
Modern Pythagorean,’ is established by the influence of ‘The [sic] Metempsychosis’ (…) on ‘Bon-
Bon’” (“Further Notes on Poe’s Folio Club Tales” 48n8). In 1980, in Popular Literature: Poe’s Not-
so-Soon-Forgotten Lore,  J.  Lasley Dameron convincingly argued the influence of a fourth tale,
“Who can it Be?” (1827) on Poe’s “The Man of the Crowd” (1841), thereby suggesting for the first
time  the  influence  of  The  Modern  Pythagorean  on  Poe’s  apparently  serious  tales—in  fact,
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Dameron’s findings tend to dilute the conventional classification of Poe’s work in two groups, the
serious and the “grotesque.”29
The fact remains, however, that no systematic study of Macnish’s influence on Poe has ever
been attempted. This is unfortunate, as Macnish may be the link between Poe’s innovative prose
fiction  and  the  British  magazinists.  Indeed,  the  Scottish  writer  foreshadows some of  the  most
innovative aspects of Poe’s method. For example, his shifting of focus from the originality of the
material  to  the novelty  of  its  treatment.  When he was told that  his  “Who can it  Be?”  was an
imitation  of  Washington  Irving’s  “The  Stout  Gentleman,”  indeed,  rather  than  repudiating  the
allegation, Macnish told his friend Moir: “I flatter myself that the execution is entirely my own, and
as different as possible from Irving’s very admirable performance” (Moir, The Modern Pythagorean
1:56). This is something one images Poe himself could have said.
And  there  are  other,  more  subtle  affinities  between  Macnish  and  Poe  that  I  also  find
significant. As Karl Miller remarked, Macnish belonged, with James Hogg, to “a kind of avant-
garde” which “helped to domicile” the German tale of horror in Scotland, and by extension in the
English-speaking world (Cockburn’s  Millenium  208,  206).30 Poe too  was,  even in  his  life-time,
regarded as an adapter of the German horror story. Macnish’s work, and his literary persona in
particular, also foreshadows Poe’s treatment of the theme of the double—itself of German ancestry
—in connection with metempsychosis. Indeed, the origin of the former’s pen name was his first
Blackwood’s tale, “Metempsychosis,” which is quintessentially Poesque,  avant la lettre: “Macnish
was a Pythagorean, or Metempsychosist by virtue of his humorous of fanciful use of Pythagoras’s
29 Here is the relevant passage: “Macnish, a popular writer of tales as well as a physician, contributed fiction to
Blackwood’s that  would  have  interested  Poe.  Macnish’s  tale  ‘Who Can It  Be?,’ appearing in  Blackwood’s  for
October, 1827, is similar to Poe’s ‘The Man of the Crowd’ (…) in that the narrator experiences the anguish of a
searching curiosity” (Dameron, Popular Literature 8-9).
Bruce I. Weiner, in “‘That Metaphysical Art:’ Mystery and Detection in Poe’s Tales,” published in 1986, also
discusses the influence of “Who Can it Be?” on Poe’s “The Man of the Crowd.” Regarding Poe’s acquaintance with
Macnish’s fiction, the author has the following to say: “There is no mention of Macnish or his fiction in Poe’s
works, but the American was a careful reader of Blackwood’s and could not have failed to notice ‘Who Can It Be?’
or tales like it that Macnish published under the pseudonym A Modern Pythagorean” (33).
30 According to Miller, Macnish’s “Metempsychosis” and The Confessions “are treatments of the double life, and both
seem to be responding to Hogg’s recently published [The Private Memoirs and] Confessions [of a Justified Sinner]
and to the German subject-matter which it helped to domicile in Scotland” (Cockburn’s Millenium 206).
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doctrine of the transmigration of souls, a doctrine which could accommodate conjectures about the
double nature of man,” Miller writes, adding that “the stories were unlikely to win converts to the
teachings  of  Pythagoras”  (203-204).  The  same author,  commenting  on  Poe’s  debt  to  Macnish,
remarked  that  he  too  “was  prepared  to  pose  as  a  Metempsychosist”  (213).  Indeed,  when  Poe
mentions “the modified Παλιγγενεσια of the Pythagoreans” in “Morella,” a tale where the narrator
is concerned with the deep mysteries of personal identity—even while living a mockery of marriage
with his  own child—, he is  probably paying homage to his  obscure predecessor.  Still,  I  insist,
Macnish’s single most important contribution to Poe’s work is the femicide narrator.
By the time “Ligeia” was published in the New World, in February 1845, Dr. Macnish had
been dead for more than seven years. But he was not yet completely forgotten. As I am sure Poe
knew, a second edition of Moir’s memoir and anthology of Macnish had appeared in London the
previous year, under a different title: Tales, Essays, and Sketches. Still, Poe could well afford the sly
hint in The New World. He knew that the average reader, and even the “enterprising publishers,”
would not bother to look his allusion up, and so he must have felt that his secret was fairly safe for
the time being. Hopefully, someone would eventually get the joke. He is as proud of his handiwork
as the narrator of The Black Cat (another femicide, incidentally), and equally confident in his ability
to conceal his crime. The narrator of that tale recommends to the police’s attention the
craftsmanship of the wall into the substance of which he had integrated the body of his victim, even
going so far as to strike it with his cane. Likewise, Poe encourages the reader to admire the text into
the substance of which he had mixed his original. Like his fictional femicide, the author wants to
get caught, only he knows it.
The revelation, however, should not come too soon, lest the tale be banished for its lack of
originality. The crime must be hidden, yes, but not too well-hidden, for the author’s hope of
divulging a complete picture of his “high artistic skill”  depends on the clues he leaves behind.
Without them, in other words, no one would  ever know how clever Poe really had been. The
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apparent sincerity of the narrator, which is essential to the hoax, is also part of the disguise that
enables the writer to appear absolutely original, and cover up his debts to other writers. In one of
several reviews he did of Nathaniel Hawthorne’s Twice-Told Tales, published in Godey’s Lady’s
Book for November 1847, Poe wrote that the “most vitally important point in fiction”  is “that of
earnestness or verisimilitude,” implying that the semblance of truth of a fiction depends on its tone
(Rev. of  Twice-Told  Tales [1847] 583).31 A few years earlier, an anonymous review of his own
Tales, probably written, or at least suggested by Poe himself and  published in the Aristidean in
October, 1845, defined “earnestness”  as the appearance of “sincerity:”32 “A writer must have the
fullest belief in his statements, or must simulate that belief perfectly, to produce an absorbing
interest in the mind of his reader” (873). Of the two, however, the second, the ability to simulate
“sincerity,” is regarded as the most artistic: “That power of simulation can only be possessed by a
man of high genius” (Poe, rev. of Tales 873). The true measure of a writer’s art was, therefore, his
ability to simulate opinions he did not share. This was, of course, the exact opposite of the
Romantic belief that sincerity could be intuitively recognised.
In fact, this brings all literature under suspicion. If a writer really can “simulate” as perfectly
as Poe suggests, how can we distinguish the simulator from the authentic article? Another important
question emerges from this idea of literature as “earnest” simulation. How can an ambitious author
of a first-person “earnest” narrative ever hope to display his art? Poe solves this problem by, first,
31 I quote this review from the reprint in the Library of America’s volume of Poe’s Essays and Reviews, organised by
G. R. Thompson, where the original title, “Tale Writing—Nathaniel Hawthorne,” is omitted.
32  Thomas Olive Mabbott attributed the review to Thomas Dunn English, then editor of the Aristidean, who at
the time was still on good terms with Poe, but qualifies his statement so as to make the attribution merely nominal: “Dr.
English had undoubtedly discussed the story with Poe,  but  probably had included ideas  of his own” (Tales  1:395
emphasis mine).
Subsequent editors  have thought best  to regard this review as the work of  Poe himself.  G. R. Thompson
includes it among Poe’s critical work both in the collection of his Essays and Reviews he prepared for The Library of
America and in the anthology  The Selected Writings of  Edgar Allan Poe for Norton Critical  Editions, adding in a
footnote to the last mentioned that: “Most scholars believe that Poe wrote a good deal of this review and planted it with
Thomas  Dunn English  for  the  latter’s  magazine,  the  Aristidean,  for  October  1845” (Thompson,  Selected  Writings
670n1).
The website of the Edgar Allan Poe Society of Baltimore contains a very good discussion of the debate about
the authorship of this piece. Based on the arguments of William Doyle Hull, the editor also cautiously attributes the
review to Poe: “It is certain (…) that Poe contributed in some way since it does, as previously noted, contain details
known only to Poe” (Poe Society of Baltimore, “Notes”).
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ridiculing his narrator, as it were, behind his back, and then broadcasting different kinds of clues in
the text, namely bibliographical riddles, that document the writer’s deliberate labor of composition.
Thus, the visionary cluelessness  of  the  narrator,  which  has  been  repeatedly,  and  erroneously
attributed to Poe, is exposed as a parody of the Romantic mythology of creation.
In this sense, the anonymous review of Poe’s Tales is a warning to the reader. We are told
that the power of simulation that characterises the highest genius was “possessed by Mr. POE, in its
full perfection” (Poe, Rev. of Tales 873). This, of course, was the same sort of power that Macnish
had displayed. Not surprisingly, we find here for the first time the opinion Poe himself would later
privately communicate to Philip Pendleton Cooke and Duyckink, that “Ligeia” (which, much to his
chagrin, had not been included in the collection) was his best tale33. This reviewer is, I think, not a
stranger to us. We recognise here the hand of the trickster that wrote the note in The New World, that
is, of the great simulator himself.
The author of “Ligeia” certainly deserves the high praise that is here bestowed upon him. He
reveals himself, at the narrator’s expense, as a skilled and prudent thief, who pilfers from the work
of his contemporaries only that which no one is likely to miss, and then takes care to make the
purloined wares appear as “original” as possible when he replaces them on the market. The proof of
his crime of voluntary imitation is the text itself, into the very substance of which he mixes the
corpus delicti, that is, the many evidently conscious borrowings. This corpus delicti, indeed, is
everywhere noticeable on the surface of his apparently idiosyncratic tale—on the text, that is—, but,
of course, no trace of it can be found in the unfathomable depths of metaphysical speculation in
33 “The Fall of the House of Usher” “is an elaborate tale—surpassed only by ‘Ligeia,’ in our judgment” (Poe, rev. of
Tales 870).
Shortly thereafter, in a letter dated January 8, 1846 (Letter 223), Poe would express the same high opinion of
the tale to Duyckinck, who he was trying to interest in publishing a new edition of Tales, which never materialised:
“Would not Mr. Wiley give me, say, $50, in full for the copyright of the collection I now send. It is a far better one
than the first—containing, for instance, ‘Ligeia,’ which is undoubtedly the best story I have written” (Letters 550).
A few months after this exchange, Poe would complain to Cooke, in a letter dated August 9, 1846 (Letter 240)
about Duyckinck’s decision to exclude “Ligeia” from Tales (1845) (see note 18 to this chapter).
“Ligeia” was also the first of a list of “my best tales” that Poe included in the famous account of himself he had
given James Russell Lowell in a letter dated July 2, 1844 (Letters 450).
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which the narrator plunges the reader.34 The “earnestness” with which Poe delivers the opinions of
his narrator is the pinnacle of that art of simulation in which he had, indeed, no rival, and this art is
the cover that allowed him to denounce the Romantic fiction of originality from within. Indeed, the
tale demonstrates that sincerity can indeed be simulated.
Like the note that accompanied it in The New World, “Ligeia” is a riddle. Once we find its
solution, we cannot understand how we could have missed it before. At the same time, we cannot
help but admire the skill of the riddle-maker, who managed to divert our attention from the obvious
clues by sending us on a wild goose chase through the profound regions where truth is sought but
never found.
The anti-romantic rhetoric of Poe’s special hoax was, therefore, carefully disguised under a
cloak of “earnest” Romanticism, which has tricked almost everyone—even some of the shrewdest
critics of the last  century.  Yvor Winters,  who by the way intensely disliked Poe,  however,  was
perhaps  the  first  to  realise  how  extreme  Poe’s  Romanticism  was. In fact, I believe Winters’s
intuitions are invariably sound. He once wrote Poe was “pushing certain essential romantic notions
very nearly as far as they could go” (Winters, Edgar Allan Poe 260). I think he was almost right.
Poe pushed them, in reality, much farther than that. He took these notions much, much farther than
any even moderately reasonable person would take them, stretching them until they snapped. And
that was the point. His narrator is not a reasonable person and, Poe suggests, neither were those who
could take him or his preposterous “Romanticism” seriously.
Strictly speaking, a hoax is a fiction that poses as fact. “Ligeia,” however, follows the basic
formal pattern of Confessions, which I have called  a dishonest hoax. Both are ostensible fictions
designed to trick the unwary reader into believing the morally repulsive narrator is a mouthpiece of
the author, while hinting to the more sophisticated that this is not the case. Poe’s narrator, indeed, is
34 The wall of the cellar in “The Black Cat”  may well be a deliberate allegory of this artistic “plagiarism.” Indeed,
there is reason to believe that the substance of the corpus delicti, that is, the body of the narrator’s wife, is not
wholly within the wall; some of it may be present, perhaps even visible on the surface, just as a figure of cat had
mysteriously appeared on the wall of the narrator’s bedroom after he had hanged Pluto the black cat. In the next
section I present my reading of that tale as a femicide story.
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almost as obtrusively evil as his predecessor. He  combines an apparently harmless tendency for
visionary mysticism,  which  was  common  enough  in  those  days, with a  far from endearing
propensity for  misogyny. He admits he “loathed”  his second wife, Rowena, “with a hatred
belonging more to demon than to man”  (Poe, "Ligeia" 323). He hated, that is, for no apparent
reason.
And from the very start he treated Rowena as an object. He admittedly buys her  from her
aristocratic but impoverished male relatives, and receives her in a secluded room of a tower in an
isolated and decrepit old English abbey, which he had decorated with funereal, phantasmagoric, and
generally unwholesome devices. She was the prop that completed the Gothic scenario he prepared.
The narrator  even admits that terrorizing her gave him pleasure. Some critics even  think he may
actually have poisoned her, and there are certainly a number of circumstances that point towards
that conclusion.
The unfavorable impression produced by the narrator’s appalling treatment of Rowena,
however, is apparently contradicted by the way he talks about Ligeia. Indeed, as we have already
seen, many have suggested that he descended into madness after his loss, and that this mitigated his
guilt. He keeps telling us how much he regrets the loss of Ligeia, his first wife, for whose death he
feels responsible. It appears he was still mourning her during his second marriage. Indeed, it was
certainly her he mourned in Rowena’s wake, and he mourns her still as he writes his tale. Thus, he
conveys the impression that he does not despise all women, but only women such as Rowena. This
implied comparison between the two leads to the cruel suggestion that some women deserve to live,
and others do not. In other words, the narrator gives us to understand that not all women deserve to
be locked where the sun never shines and terrorised out of their wits—but some do. This is an
implicitly misogynous sentiment, no question about it; yet, most people have concluded that Poe
was fundamentally on his narrator’s side. Perhaps he had gone crazy after losing Ligeia, which most
critics have regarded as a symbol of the narrator’s insight into the world of the Ideal. Thus, they
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thought, the narrator was respectable in a way. In reality, the narrator’s “love” for “Ligeia” actually
confirms that, for him, the only good woman is a dead woman. In this sense, he and William the
femicide represent exactly the same kind of male sensibility; a sensibility that amounts, in practice,
to violent hostility toward all live women. For these men loved these dead women, by their own
admission, only after they were dead.
The author of the femicide story signals that the moral his narrator extracts from the events
he describes,  and which  is  implied  in  the  ostensible  “thesis”  of  the  tale, is a symptom of the
propensities that made him kill women in the first place. Another way of discrediting the narrator is
making him acknowledge remorse for the wrong things. William, for example, literally worships the
memory of his blonde sister: “I raised, in the burying-ground, a monument to Eliza’s memory. It
was of marble and of virgin whiteness—an emblem of her own purity,”  hence, a reminder of the
impurity, as he saw it, of her friend Mary (Macnish,  Confessions  22). Indeed, the reverence the
narrator shows to his “monument” tacitly  reiterates the  disparagement of the pregnant woman he
had stabbed in the back. On their way to or from the church, he writes, people “would point to it
(…) and tell how I had broken her [Eliza’s] heart—how I had destroyed her friend—and how, as a
memento to her [Eliza’s] worth, I had caused this sepulchral column to be raised” (23). In “Ligeia,”
Poe merely inverts the color-scheme and the chronology. His narrator worships the entombed dark
lady and despises the recently deceased blonde.
The narrators’ feelings of remorse do not prompt any revision of the rigid dualism of their
concept of womanhood. They keep forcing their women into either of the two equally dehumanised
poles of a double bind. They perceive them either as fleshless angels or emblems of carnality. Death
only can certify the purity of the first class of women, and those who betray their “humanity” also
end up dead. It simply is not safe to be a woman around the femicide. And, inasmuch as they
continue to adhere to this belief system, which the tale denounces as a form of superstition, they
remain femicides throughout—this is their character. In William case, we are forced to conclude, I
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think, that he is not a reformed femicide, as he claims. In “Ligeia” it is the other way around—the
narrator had always been a femicide. Indeed, I would argue that the hints of this crime are the
reason why the tale has always made readers in general, and critics in particular, uncomfortable.
This uneasy feeling depends on identification, or sympathy. This narrator is not that different
from the average male writer of his time—this is what gives the tale its “tone of truth.” His opinions
are believable, and this naturally tends to suggest this was the way the author himself felt about
women. But then, this identification is disturbed by the fact of the narrator being a femicide, which
raises  some disturbing questions.  If  this  is  so,  then perhaps the author  was himself  a  femicide
without knowing it. Come to think of it, perhaps all men that speak and feel like this are potential
femicides. This, I think, is what lies at the bottom of all the uneasy feeling the tale generates. This is
precisely the impression the femicide story is calculated to produce; we might call it the femicide
effect.
Theoretically, of course, the first readers of Macnish’s hoax did not know it was not real and
would therefore not be concerned with conjecturing the author’s motives. But the difference is not
as great as it sounds. The editorial note that preceded the first part of the tale in the  Standard of
London, and which later appeared in all the American editions I could trace, contained the following
specimen of double-talk:
A deeply affecting narrative, under the above title, has just issued from the Glasgow
press. It is declared to be “no fiction.” It is published according to the will of ‘Mr**r,
Esq., of —— , in the county of Stirling, Scotland,’ for the purpose of deterring others
‘from the commission of a similar sin, by the thought, that if they escape the
punishment of the law, they are sure to meet with that of a racked and harassed
conscience.’  The Confessions are powerfully written, and seldom have we read a
more touching narrative than that, which is contained in the work before us.
(Editorial)
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What I find most remarkable about this text is the editor’s scruple to commit himself to the
authenticity of the story, which forms a striking contrast with his lack of scruple in praising the
quality of the article. Not only is it “powerfully written,” the gruesome tale of violence is described
as “deeply affecting,” and, indeed, as one of the most “touching narratives” the editor has ever seen.
This is too much. Obviously, no editor would publish such a statement if he truly suspected it to be
a true story. Whoever wrote this knew the story was not real, and slyly but effectively intimated this
to the reader.  I  suspect Macphun was behind the whole campaign, and may have written these
statements himself.
Macphun may also have had something to do with the  references to the Confessions in a
serial published by the short-lived  Glasgow magazine The Ant, “The Heron Correspondence,”
which was a sort of satirical review of current events focusing on Scottish literature and gossip. The
first of these references, dated August 11, 1827,  is, as far as I know,  the first public mention of
Macnish’s hoax.35 In a post scriptum to one of his letters, Charles Heron—the protagonist of the
series—recommends to his cousin—hence to the readers of the Ant—the story of William the
femicide: “I am able to send (…) a copy of a very extraordinary little work which appears here on
Saturday. Its title is a startling one (…) but if you are not frightened by that from its perusal, you
will find (…) some very powerful language, clothing fearful and towering thoughts” (Heron, “to his
Cousin Mary” 216). Macphun could not have wished for better publicity for his latest publication,
which had apparently appeared on the previous Saturday, August 4, 1827.
The concluding sentence in Heron’s notice of the little book provides further indication that
the redaction of The Ant was part of the conspiracy. “It is,” Heron admits, “an odd enough present to
a lady, but you are so blue, that you would not forgive a neglect that would shelter itself under some
quibble of excessive nicety” (Heron, “To his Cousin Mary” 216). In the September 8, 1827 issue of
The Ant, the  Heron persona once  again promotes Confessions, mentioning a second edition, and
35 In fact, it is the earliest reference to the tale, public or private, that I could find. The letter in which Macnish 
acquainted his future biographer, Moir, with the publication is dated August 13.
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playfully hinting the author’s identity: “I agree with Mr. M‘—— in tracing a certain resemblance
between its best passages and a certain clever orator’s Sterling style. He was, even before he left
Glasgow, a lady killer, you know” (Heron, “To his Brother William” 278). Obviously, The Ant never
doubted The Confessions of an Unexecuted Femicide was a fiction.
The day after  the  first  half  of  the  tale  had  appeared  in  The Standard,  The Mercury  of
Liverpool published the entire narrative. In place of the short note that had appeared in the London
paper,  it  was  accompanied  by  a  long  editorial  statement  which  purported to guarantee the
authenticity of the narrative, but  actually showed why it could be nothing but a fiction, and even
explained that the writer of a story of this kind would have no choice but to present it as fact: 
We have given it [the Confessions] entire in a preceding page;36 and, as many of our
readers, after perusal, are apt to conclude, as we at first did, that ‘The Confessions of
a Femicide’ is a work of pure fiction, it is incumbent upon us to explain the reasons
which induced us to arrive at a different conclusion. Mr. Macphun is a gentleman of
great respectability, and we felt convinced that he would not have deliberately
palmed upon the public, as true, a horrid and appalling story, which had no
foundation in fact. There would have been no excuse for such conduct, as he
possessed the means of detecting the imposture, by ascertaining whether any murder
had taken place in Scotland, twenty years ago, under the extraordinary circumstances
described in Mr. Macphun’s narrative. He might also, with very little trouble, have
traced out the register of the alleged trial. These were the reasons that lead us to
conclude that the story, shocking and unnatural as it is, could not be wholly destitute
of foundation in fact. (“Confessions of a Femicide” 272)
Thus, while stating that the narrative may be a fiction, the editor proceeds to give the reader
the strongest possible incentive—short of a direct avowal—to regard the tale as such:
36 In fact, in the preceding page, 271.
108
We also thought, that if the story had been entirely a romance, the author would not
have ventured to make his principal character so thorough-paced a villain; for,
however strange the assertion may appear, it is a melancholy truth, that more
unnatural crimes have been perpetrated in reality than any writer of fiction has had
the hardihood to introduce into romance. If any author were to found a story upon the
circumstances of a father cutting off his own child’s head, his readers would turn
with disgust from so gratuitous an outrage upon feeling and probability. Sheen,
however, did in reality cut off the head of his own child; and did that act, too, in a
sane state of mind, if we may so conclude from the judge suffering him, after his
acquittal, to go at large. (“Confessions of a Femicide” 272)
Macphun would include most  of the previous statement,  including  the  passages  I
transcribed, in the advertisements of Confessions as well as the fourth edition of his pamphlet. This
text was probably written by Macphun himself, or at least according to his instructions. It is clear, in
any case, that The Mercury perfectly understood the spirit of the hoax.
Femicide was, judging from the history of the publication of Confessions, a hot subject. In
fact, it would appear that the stringent notions of decorum then prevalent made it almost too hot to
handle. In order to publish such a terrible story, it is implied, the editor had to signal his deference
to the supposed “nicety” of the public, by presenting it as a true story, and concealing the identity of
the author. Charles Heron, of the Glasgow Ant, had before suggested that the female readership, in
particular, was thought too sensitive for such crude literary fare.
This highlights the political significance of the public campaign surrounding  Confessions.
The fact that the killing is detected in the story, but its perpetrator not convicted, brings into
question the effectiveness of the judicial system. But there is something in the hoax that goes well
beyond this typical sensationalist device. It also exposes a contrast, very unflattering for the society
of that time—and unfortunately, also of ours—between the severity of the treatment  a writer who
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feigned the character of femicide  was  likely  to  receive, and the high  probability  of  the  actual
criminal avoiding punishment.  The detected femicide was likely to evade punishment for a crime
the fictional depiction of which would not fail to be punished.
Macnish’s story, precisely because it is made up, bespeaks a will to bring out the hypocrisy
of a system of morality that protects women from depictions of a crime of which they are the
potential victims, but, precisely by subjecting them to the supervision of men, actually drastically
reduces their ability to protect themselves from male aggressors. Macnish says he wanted to make
“folks stare a little,” but that is an obvious understatement. In the final analysis the fact that women
are denied the status of citizenship is shown to be the condition under which men like William,
which regard women as essentially inhuman, may thrive.  In a small way, Macnish and Macphun
plotted to create nothing short of a femicide scare.
Of course, we must not take this play of masks too seriously. The identification of the author
of the tale would probably not expose him to prosecution or cause him any serious trouble. Still, Dr.
Macnish, the physician, felt that it would not be good for his professional reputation, on which his
livelihood depended, to own the story. However, Macphun and him actually hoped the disguise was
thin enough that most readers could see through it. The identity of the author might be a secret, but
the fictional nature of the narrative had been obvious enough from the start. This clever strategy of
fake disguise, exposing the over-nice morals of the establishment to derision, forcefully
demonstrated that the moral character of the author was independent from that of the characters in
whose shoes he decided to step. In all this, Macnish foreshadows Poe, who often “simulates” in his
tales, without ever getting out of character, the sentiments of a superstitious, guilt-ridden criminal.
Frequently, and sometimes provokingly, he also reminded his readers that  it  was  risky to  base
judgments about the personal morals and conduct of an author solely on his fiction: “[W]hat has
cutting the throat of our grandmother to do with our poem,”  he once asked the “Frogpondians”
(Poe, “Editorial Miscellany” 315).
110
This is not to say that a story like Confessions, told from the point of view of a character that
was sure to offend the public’s moral  sense,  is  necessarily  amoral,  that is,  meant to bring into
question the validity of moral judgments in general. On the contrary, as indicated by the title, the
outlook of the narrator is distinctly moral. Indeed, there is an implied moral to the femicide’s telling
of his story that the reader is called upon to validate. The question, therefore, is not whether there is
a moral to the tale, but whether one has to accept that which the narrator extracts from his own case.
The note in The Mercury, by signaling that the tale was a fiction, intimated that the author had made
his character as “thorough-paced villain” as he possibly could to show the reader that this moral
should be rejected. And then, the implied moral itself is, as we have seen, itself repulsive. This is
perfectly captured by the note that accompanied the poem entitled “The Femicide” in the Casket, in
which it was alleged that Confessions depicted the “catastrophe of female error” (141n). Thus, the
author of the poem resorts to the same kind of rhetoric that Macnish himself had used, pushing
patriarchal morality to unacceptable extremes.
Worse  scoundrels  than  William  had,  of  course,  been  depicted  in  fables  that  were
unquestionably  designed  to  enforce  the  sort  of  ideology  he  endorses.  But  the  femicide  story
distinguishes itself from such fables precisely by the absence of an unambiguous statement of what
might be termed the male moral of the story. Take for example Perrault’s famous fairy-tale, “La
Barbe  Bleue”  (1695).  The title-character forbids his seventh wife, under penalty of death, of
entering a mysterious locked room, but leaves the key within her reach to tempt her. Unable to resist
her curiosity, however, she opens the forbidden door. Within, she finds the corpses of her blue-
beard’s six previous wives, whom he had murdered. Then, as her husband is about to execute the
punishment he had decreed, she is saved by the timely intervention of her brothers, who promptly
slay the exposed serial-femicide. Being a fable, the tale is capped by an authoritative explanation of
its moral: “La curiosité, malgré tous ses attraits, / Coûte souvent bien des regrets; / On en voit tous
les jours milles exemples paraître. / C’est, n’en déplaise au sexe, un plaisir bien léger; / Dès qu’on
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le prend il cesse d’être, / Et toujours il coûte trop cher”  (Perrault,  Contes 128). The author, of
course, does not condone femicide, and the terrible Blue Beard gets his just deserts. The moral
offered, however, contradicts the modern reader’s tendency to focus on his behavior. It is the
behavior of his victims that Perrault is interested in decrying.
A second “moralité” reiterates that the tale is not directed at potential male aggressors, but at
their victims: “Pour peu qu’on ait l’esprit sensé, / Et que du Monde on sache le grimoire, / On voit
bientôt que cette histoire / Est un conte du temps passé; / Il n’est plus d’Époux si terrible, / Ni qui
demande l’impossible, / Fût-il malcontent et jaloux. / Près de sa femme on le voit filer doux; / Et de
quelque couleur que sa barbe puisse être, / On a peine à juger qui des deux est le maître” (Perrault,
Contes 129). According to this, the femicide is extinct. Men, it  is implied, are now thoroughly
civilised. Women, on the other hand, are depicted as being naturally indiscreet beings who live in a
sort of perpetual childhood, and are therefore presented as being in permanent need of fables. In any
case, according to Perrault’s preface, his tales “tend à porter les femmes à souffrir de leurs maris, et
à faire voire qu’il n’y en a point de si brutal ni de si bizarre, dont la patience d’une honnête femme
ne puisse venir à bout”  (5). Such  tales  as “La Barbe Bleue” are, therefore, designed to induce
women to obey their husbands implicitly. The tale therefore applies to domestic affairs the same
theory that justified absolute rule in public matters, in the understanding that the only alternative to
unquestioned authority is chaos. Women, not being equipped to hold that authority, it is implied,
must be submissive—and hope for the best. Like William the femicide, therefore, the author of “La
Barbe Bleue” tacitly construes the protagonist’s crimes as the “catastrophe of female error.”
I have previously  defined the Gothic as a kind of fiction which is characterised by the
assumption of an ostensibly superstitious perspective, usually projected on an alien setting. In this
sense, Perrault’s may be said to have anticipated the Gothic with his “blue beard” tale. Such cruel
and tyrannical men used to exist “once upon a time,” but now only survive in stories designed to
scare women into obedience. In the Gothic proper, however, the boundary between rationality and
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superstition is by no means as clear. There the reader is  challenged to discern the motives of the
author from the superstition, and this creates a radical duplicity. This duplicity created the
impression that the Gothic setting was not as remote as it seemed. It was not as easy to dismiss the
blue-beard-like characters of Ann Radcliffe to the world of fairy  tales. One got the sneaking
suspicion they were, in fact, modern men in Gothic disguise.
I argued also that the femicide story may be regarded as a particular instance of the Gothic,
in which the protagonist-narrator  displays a set of beliefs concerning women that are implicitly
represented as a form of superstition. The femicide story, in other words, is designed to show that
the opinions of the modern femicide that narrates it are as “Gothic”  as those of his  blue-bearded
predecessors. In other words, by bringing bluebeard to the present Macnish confirms the impression
one got from Radcliffe’s novels, that the Gothic tyrant had not vanished from the earth. The author
of Confessions does not say so, of course,  but he shows it to his reader, by making the femicidal
superstition of his narrator apparent.
By a similar reasoning, one might describe a tale like “La Barbe Bleu” as a “Gothic fable.”
Such fables contain an explicit, official moral, that is conveyed through the authoritative voice of
the non-participating narrator.  Through this moral,  which presupposes a patriarchal outlook, the
fable defines itself as a male story. It should be noticed that this official reading, which is imposed
on the reader, is perfectly aligned with the views of the femicide blue-bearded protagonist. Indeed,
his tale reinforces an overarching narrative about gender according to which the role of men is to
tempt women into error. Indeed, the official moral reiterates blue-beard’s notion that women are
constitutionally unable to resist their curiosity, and that this curiosity is reproachable, and deserves
punishment—according  to  this  notion,  blue-beard’s  mistake  was  that  of  asking  his  wives  the
impossible. Instead of tempting them into an error for which they should be punished but which
they cannot possibly resist for the sake of satisfying his cruelty, it is implied, he should have taken
care to preserve them from temptation. In short, without questioning the position of the husband as
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the absolute ruler of the household, Perrault suggests that this power should be exerted with paternal
benignity.
As I understand it, the femicide story is a subversive “Gothic fable” which distinguishes
itself from its “straight” counterparts, like “La barbe bleu,” by having no official moral. Instead, the
femicide, becoming the narrator of his own story, uses this position to impose his moral “thesis,”
which is corroded by the moral implied by the tale, considered as a work of fiction, and which,
being implied, is nonetheless as strictly coded. The trick, indeed, is to make the reader understand
that the narrator’s outlook is too distorted for this to have escaped the author.  This  difference
between the femicide story and the Gothic fable is clearly displayed by the way the texts themselves
define their readership.  Whereas “La Barbe Bleue” is specifically addressed to the victims of a
crime that no longer exists, women, Macnish’s femicide decided to write his  Confessions, as we
have  seen,  “to the effect that others may be deterred from the commission of a similar sin”
(Macnish, Confessions 3). He writes, therefore, for potential femicides, that is, for men.
In addition to the many evident nods to Macnish’s Confessions which show that this was the
main source of “Ligeia,” which defined its peculiar structure and tone, the tale counts among its
buried sources, as I have before indicated, other femicide stories including Dickens’s “Madman’s
Manuscript”  and Bulwer-Lytton’s  “A Manuscript  in  a  Madhouse,”  whose  protagonists-narrators
share important characteristics with Ligeia’s husband, and which distinguish them all from William.
Bulwer-Lytton’s “madman,” for example, is incredibly learned, and excessively proud of it
—a trait he shares with the narrators of many of Poe’s tales, namely “Berenice,” “Morella,” and
“Ligeia.” He also had a dreadfully deformed body—in fact, he was a monster. When he was on the
point of resigning himself to a life of solitude, he chanced to overhear some young women who
were debating an age-old question, in a manner reminiscent of the proceedings of the mythical
medieval courts of love: was mental beauty enough to inspire love, when the body was deformed?
One of the girls  answered in the affirmative: she would love a monster,  provided he displayed
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“genius  and  affection”  (Bulwer-Lytton,  “Manuscript”  59).37 Encouraged  by  this  statement,  the
narrator  approached her.  Like  the  damsels  of  old  romance,  she  sent  her  suitor  on a  quest,  the
completion of which would prove him worthy of her. But, instead of proving his valor in battle, the
lover was required to prove his intellectual merit: “Go,—pour forth your knowledge to the crowd;
go, gain the glory of fame—the glory which makes man immortal—and then come back, and claim
me,—I will be yours!” (62). After completing his quest for fame, the narrator “sought a meeting
under the same mystery and conditions of old:”
I claimed my reward! And in the depth and deadness of night, when not a star crept
through the curtain of cloud and gloom—when not a gleam struggled against the
blackness—not a breath stirred the heavy torpor around us—that reward was yielded.
The dense woods and the eternal hills were the sole witness of our bridal; —and girt
with darkness as with a robe, she leaned upon my bosom, and shuddered not at the
place of her repose! (Bulwer-Lytton, “Manuscript” 63)
Incredibly,  the  protagonist’s  partner  never  saw her  lover  while  they  consummated  their
marriage. “Thus only,” that is, in total darkness, “we met;—but for months we did meet, and I was
blessed” (Bulwer-Lytton “Manuscript” 64). Nature taking its  usual course, a pregnancy resulted
from these clandestine interviews, which forced the couple to formalise their union. During the
ceremony, and only then, the bride and her family finally saw the groom. “She had prepared to them
to see a distorted and fearful abortion,—but—ha! ha! ha!—she had not prepared them to see me!”
(64). The bride herself collapsed when she finally saw the narrator, and died soon after giving birth
to  “a  dead—but  beautiful  likeness  of  myself,”  as  the  narrator,  who had  likened himself  to  an
“abortion,” puts it (65).
37 Bulwer-Lytton’s tale appeared originally in The Literary Souvenir for 1829, which was, of course, published in late
1828. Poe probably read the tale, however, in an American anthology of the author’s earlier sketches published in 1832,
Conversations with an Ambitious Student in  Ill  Health:  With Other Pieces,  which,  “as  George E.  Woodberry first
observed, plays a substantial  role in the composition of ‘Lionizing’ and other early Folio Club stories” (Alexander
Hammond, “Poe’s ‘Lionizing’” 155).
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Here the contrast with Macnish’s Confessions is significant. In that tale, the immediate cause
of the death of the narrator’s  pregnant lover  was the former’s  moral deformity,  which Bulwer-
Lytton  ostensibly  replaced  with  physical  monstrosity.  On  the  other  hand,  the  “madman”’s
necrophilia is even more conspicuous and exuberant than that of his predecessor’s. “Verily,” says
he, “it is a glorious mirth, to behold the only thing one loves stiff, and white, and shrunken, and
food for the red, playful, creeping worm! (…) I carried them into the wood. I concealed them [the
bodies of his wife and his stillborn child] in a cavern—I watched over them—and lay beside them,
—and played with the worms—that played with them—ha! ha! ha!—it was a jovial time that, in the
old cavern!” (Bulwer-Lytton, “Manuscript” 66). Thus, the narrator performs the role of husband in a
gruesome make-belief marriage, using the corpses of his wife and child as props. Here is a man who
may truly be said to have loved the dead. Of course, Bulwer-Lytton suggests that he lost his mind at
that point. Indeed, a man must be truly mad who laughs in writing—for one must not forget that this
is  a  manuscript.  This  love  for  the  dead  is  something  the  narrator  of  this  tale  shares  with  his
homologues in “Ligeia” and Confessions. His love, however, is much more exuberant, as befits a
certified lunatic. Indeed, both Dickens and Bulwer-Lytton used “madness” as an excuse to shock the
public—the same role  had been performed in  Macnish’s  hoax by the  “no fiction”  disclaimer.  
Mabbott points out that Poe lifted two scholarly-looking allusions from Bulwer-Lytton’s tale
for his “Ligeia.”38 These, together with some other details that add to the resemblance, form one of
those covert  allusions of which Poe was so fond, and by virtue of which the author forces the
scholar to compare the two tales. The first of these allusions refers, in Poe’s tale as in the original, to
the otherworldly beauty of the dead wife’s face. Ligeia’s “was,” her husband tells us, “the radiance
of an opium dream—an airy and spirit-lifting vision more wildly divine than the phantasies which
hovered about the slumbering souls of the daughters of Delos” ("Ligeia" 311). The parallel between
38 The  bibliography  dealing  with  Poe’s  borrowings  from  Bulwer-Lytton’s  work  is  very  extensive.  Alexander
Hammond looks at this issue in the two articles mentioned in the Works Cited list. For an in-depth updated analysis
of the question the reader is referred to Richard Kopley’s “Poe’s Taking of Pelham One Two Three Four Five Six,”
which discusses the more relevant bibliography.
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Ligeia and the madman’s wife is, indeed, obvious: “over the delicate and transparent paleness of her
cheek,” says the deformed narrator, “hung the wanness, but also the eloquence of thought. To other
eyes she might not have been beautiful,—to mine, her face was an angel's.—Oh! lovelier far than
the visions of the Carian, or the shapes that floated before the eyes of the daughters of Delos, is the
countenance of one that bringeth to the dark breast the first glimmerings of Hope!” (Bulwer-Lytton,
“Manuscript” 60).
Mabbott  failed to realise,  however,  that  this  parallel  signals  a similarity  in  the narrators
feelings. They both praise their wife’s beauty in very ambiguous terms, leaving the reader with the
impression that they might, in fact, have been homely, if not downright uncomely. In fact, Bulwer-
Lytton’s narrator goes so far as to make the unkind suggestion that any woman that could overlook
his  monstrosity,  no matter  how ugly,  would  appear  heavenly  to  him.  Likewise,  the narrator  of
“Ligeia,” tells us that the “features” of the title-character “were not of that regular mould which we
have been falsely taught to worship in the classical labors of the heathen” (Poe, "Ligeia" 311). In
other words, she was no Venus—she only appeared so to him. Again, Poe’s narrator says exactly
what one of his predecessors had said, but using other words. This is a pattern in Poe’s borrowings.
If  ever  I  saw backhanded compliment,  this  is  it.  One may perhaps tolerate  this  kind of
language from a man like Bulwer-Lytton’s narrator: after all, he was a monster, and one must not be
too hard on him. But what is Ligeia’s husband excuse? Evidently, he is a monster too, but in the
moral sense, as the second allusion Poe borrowed from Bulwer-Lytton’s “A Manuscript Found in a
Madhouse” suggests. Indeed, an allusion that referred, in the original, to the narrator’s monstrosity,
resurfaces in Poe’s tale in what appears to be, at first, a totally different context, in the description of
the  phantasmagoric  effect  of  Rowena’s  bridal  chamber  on the narrator.  According to  him,  the
arabesque designs on the curtains that covered walls, window, and furniture: “To one entering the
room, bore the appearance of simple monstrosities,” but, as the “the visiter” approached the centre
of the room, assumed “the ghastly forms which belong to the superstition of the Norman” (Poe,
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"Ligeia" 323).  “In referring to the superstition of the Norman,” Mabbott writes, “Poe has in mind
Bulwer-Lytton’s ‘Manuscript Found in a Madhouse,” specifically the following sentence: “I told her
that I was more hideous than the demons which the imagination of a Northern savage had ever
bodied forth” (Mabbott, Tales 1:334n27).
In this  case,  the allusion clearly suggests that the narrator of Poe’s tale is,  like Bulwer-
Lytton’s madman, a monster. Although he gives an impersonal form to his statements by using
expressions  like  “one entering  the  room” and “the  visiter,”  he  is  evidently  describing  his  own
experience in the phantasmagoric room; that is, he is describing the ghosts that haunted him in that
weird  chamber.    And  the  allusion  to  Bulwer-Lytton  suggests  that  these  ghosts  reflected  the
narrator’s own monstrosity, that is, his crime; that he saw himself reflected in that phantasmagoria,
without realising it. This, I believe, is the solution to the mystery of “Ligeia” to which everything in
the tale points.
The terrible secret that the narrator attempts to conceal even from himself, is that he is the
monster who killed both his  wives. In this sense,  Poe is  more faithful to what I  believe is the
common model of all these tales, Macnish’s femicide, than Bulwer-Lytton. Indeed, the femicide was
metaphorically  a  monster;  in  Bulwer-Lytton’s  hands,  he  became  literally  a  monster,  and  only
metaphorically a femicide. With Poe, the monster regains his true shape.
Dickens’s “madman” also never laid violent hands on his wife;  however, unlike his fellow
madman, he did plot femicide, and almost executed it. He was about to stab his wife in her sleep
when she suddenly woke up. After this, he could not nerve himself to carry the plan through. The
victim, however, though spared, never recovers from the shock. Having awaken to see her husband
poised to plunge a dagger in her bosom, and therefore presumably scared of going to sleep, she dies
of a nervous breakdown. The way Dickens’ madman kills his wife without touching her seems to
me a punning allusion to the title of the original tale. 
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“An Unexecuted Femicide” would also have been a fitting title for Dickens’s story, if we
understand the word to refer to the act, and not the agent,  and I believe the irony may have been
intended. That is, the hero of the tale did kill his wife, although he did not “execute” his plan—in
this sense, then, the “femicide” he plotted was “unexecuted.” In another sense of the word, the
femicide—meaning the criminal—was unexecuted, for his crime was undetected and unpunished.
Yet, as the narrator himself recognises, although things did not turn out as planned, “I had carried
my object and killed her” (Dickens, “Madman” 142). The point Dickens appears to have tried to
carry home was that the sort of psychological violence that killed the “madman’s” wife was very
easily overlooked in a society where man’s authority over woman was generally regarded as the
sacred pillar of morality.  Women targeted by acts of extreme psychological violence, or even the
overt threat of murder were, as I said before, not likely to get a divorce. The best they could expect
from a system that was powerless to prevent the crime, and ineffective in deterring the criminal,
was the posthumous redress of their wrongs. Indeed, the diagnosis returned by the doctors who
observed the “madman’”s wife after her husband had attempted on her life was, at least in those
days, perfectly within the bounds of probability. Indeed, their conclusion that she was mad, flows
from the prejudice that regarded women as being constitutionally imbalanced, and therefore, unable
to cope with the normal stresses of everyday life—a prejudice which is inherent to the use of the
term “hysteria”  in  psychiatry.  Thus,  ideological  bias  and pseudo-scientific  prejudices  conspired
against  women  who  were  subjected  to  psychological  violence,  by  making  their  complaints
automatically suspect.
By his own admission, Dickens’ “madman” would have remained at large had he not tried to
kill his brother-in-law. Yet, like William, he did not escape the punishment of a guilty conscience.
From the moment his wife died, he was visited by the ghost of his dark-haired and black-eyed
victim, which forms the missing link between the ghost of Mary Elliston in Macnish’s Confessions
and the phantasm of Ligeia. Thus, while the word “femicide” itself was absent from Dickens’s tale,
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and with it anything that was likely to be legally recognised as such, this was clearly intended to
highlight the shortcomings of the legal system.
Without an effort to understand the circumstances that determine it, however, this awkward
silence about femicide could easily be taken for a confirmation of the misconception that femicide
was unknown and unseen by our ancestors in the nineteenth century. With due allowance for
conceptual, ideological, and cultural differences, the history I outlined briefly in the last few pages
demonstrates conclusively that it was very much in the order of the day. Indeed, Macnish had struck
a sensitive nerve in the collective consciousness of his time. The absence of overt depictions of the
femicide character is not the result of indifference. On the contrary, it appears to have been a sort of
hysterical reaction to a change in gender conceptions that was already under way. Not only was the
problem in  the  collective  consciousness, the paratext of the Confessions clearly intimates that
everyone was talking about it, but also that it was getting increasingly dangerous for writers to print
overt depictions of the crime.
It is to these  very  peculiar  circumstances that Macnish’s hoax responds. The  wake  in
Confessions was a watered-down, ciphered version of the unspeakable horrors of the crypt scene in
Matthew Lewis. As it turned out, however, it was still too shocking for most publishers. As we have
seen, in America the critical scene had been almost universally omitted. Most publishers there had
either neglected to locate the second part of the tale, or were themselves unwilling to risk scandal.
In any case, the scene was virtually unknown to Poe’s public. The challenge to American publishers
which accompanied the publication of “Ligeia” in the  New World shows that Poe was perfectly
aware of this, and was taunting his colleagues in the publishing business for what was, at best,
neglect, and at worse, misplaced delicacy.
In “Ligeia,”  Poe finally corrects this situation, putting the shocking scene of which the
American public had been cheated back in circulation. Now, finally, they got to see it. But Poe
cheated them too through skillful manipulation of their perceptions. The audience did get to see the
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scene, but they did not understand what they saw—any more than the narrator of the tale recognised
the ghosts that haunted him. By the time the ludicrous note about “Ligeia” I mentioned above came
out, more than six years after the tale had originally been published, no one had yet detected Poe’s
ingenious cover-up. There, Poe celebrated his triumph with yet another bold display of his power of
simulation.
Thus, Poe encrypted the femicide story. In doing so, he followed in the footsteps of two of
the most successful novelists of his time, Bulwer-Lytton and Dickens, in whose tales the killing of
the woman was not achieved by overt physical violence, but by terror. Incidentally, in “Ligeia,” the
death of Rowena is quite obviously a nod to Dickens’ tale—she too dwindles from the terror her
husband inspired on her, and which would have killed her, the latter suggests, had the dead Ligeia
not intervened. This kind of crime, then, was a more acceptable iteration—and, as I said, there is
some bitter irony there—of femicide. However, whereas in the “madmen” stories death by terror of
the female bride replaces the violent crime that had been overtly depicted in Macnish’s story, in
“Ligeia” Poe does something bolder. The death of Rowena, which is reminiscent of Dicken’s tale,
culminates in the wake scene, which is inspired in the corresponding scene in Macnish’s tale, and
through which Poe intimates that Ligeia had, like Mary Elliston, died at the hands of her lover.
Thus, while the tale ostensibly presents a transfigured, less gruesome depiction of the shocking
crime of  femicide,  along the  lines  of  what  his  immediate  predecessors  had  done,  and allowed
readers to suppose the narrator had been spared the guilt of actually killing his second wife by the
timely intervention of his dead first wife, Poe cleverly diverted their attention from another crime,
the cold-blooded femicide of Ligeia herself, and from the clues that showed beyond any reasonable
doubt that she had died at the narrator’s hands, and that he had been haunted by the memory of that
deed ever since.
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4 - “Mortar, Sand, and Hair:” “The Black Cat” as femicide story
Later, in the “Black Cat,” Poe took a different approach to the femicide story. There, the fact
that the wife is slaughtered by her husband is not concealed from the reader. On the contrary, the
drama develops, without any disguise, before our very eyes. But is it femicide? In the sense of
sexist murder of a woman, it would appear not, for the narrator blames it all on his pet, a nasty
revenant black cat named Pluto, just as the narrator of “Ligeia” had blamed the death of Rowena,
despite the obvious fact that he was terrorising her to death, on the revenant Ligeia.
Therefore, in a sense, “The Black Cat” can be seen as a sort of retelling of the same basic
story, where the first dark-haired wife is substituted by a black-haired cat. The storyline is, in a
sense, more obvious here than in the previous tale, in that the narrator avows that he had killed both
cat  and wife,  but this  makes the tale,  in another  sense,  even more mysterious.  In  “Ligeia” the
mystery itself is more obvious, that is, we immediately recognise the narrator is not telling us the
whole story, and therefore must attempt to fill the conspicuous holes he left. In “The Black Cat,” on
the other hand, although it is equally clear that the narrator is hiding something from the reader, it is
very hard to understand what it is that he means to conceal. Not that the apparent “thesis” makes
more sense here, but the story seems, at first sight, complete, which was not the case in “Ligeia.”
The key to  this  mystery  is,  as  in  all  femicide stories,  the implied moral  of  the tale.  In
“Murder  as  a  Fine  Art:  Basic  Connections  Between  Poe’s  Aesthetics,  Psychology,  and  Moral
Vision,”  Joseph  J.  Moldenhauer  noticed  that  Poe’s  tales  usually  have  a  “‘didactic’ level”  of
meaning, that is, that they are ostensibly oriented towards the inculcation of a simple moral maxim;
but  also that  this  moral  was usually  too simplistic  to be convincing,  and,  in some cases,  even
blatantly  inappropriate:  “the outcome of  each tale  invites,  from the  childish mind,  a  pat  moral
summary. Thus, ‘The Black Cat’ can be construed to mean something like Be kind to dumb animals
—or else!” (832). In the context, of course, this moral is shocking, in that it devalues the killing of
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the wife. Yet, the tale unquestionably is structured so as to inculcate the moral that one should not
kill dumb animals. The obvious implication, of course, is that it may sometimes be acceptable to kill
women—but never cats. The tendency of the narrator’s rhetoric, therefore, closely matches that of
Confessions and Poe’s own “Ligeia.” The parallel with the latter tale is reinforced by the narrator’s
apparently meaningless suggestion that black cats were not dumb animals, but “witches in disguise”
(Poe, “The Black Cat” 850).
Yet,  most critics have attempted to justify the narrator’s repulsive moral “thesis,” in the
belief that they were justifying Poe himself. The tale has generally been regarded as dealing with
such deep motivations of the human behavior as escape both consciousness and rational analysis.
Thus, in a sense, the conventional critical approach to the tale accepts the rationalisations that allow
the narrator to disavow guilt for the crime for which he was convicted—the murder of his wife. For,
indeed, he clearly indicates that he has already been convicted: “to-morrow I die,  and to-day I
would unburthen my soul” (Poe, “The Black Cat” 849). He did kill his wife, but, according to these
critics, he did not mean to. In other words, his motive for doing so, or, as he implies, his lack
thereof, has never been questioned. Most critics, of course, will tell you the same thing of “Ligeia.”
Yet, it seems to me that in both cases the narrator’s supernatural yarn is an excuse through which
one can very easily see—indeed, one can see through his slippery rationalisations even more easily
than the cops could see through the wall which concealed the wife’s body. William Gargano’s “‘The
Black Cat:’ Perverseness Reconsidered” and Susan Amper’s “Untold Story: The Lying Narrator in
‘The  Black  Cat,’”  which  I  will  quote  throughout  this  section,  are  notable  exceptions  to  the
prevailing critical practice.
Let me attempt to show what I mean. According to the narrator, he had first tortured Pluto
the black cat, “deliberately cut[ting] one of its eyes from the socket,” and then hanged him, for no
reason, just because he felt like it (Poe, “The Black Cat” 851). This is the first act he chalks up to
“perverseness,” the term he uses to designate a supposed basic human tendency for self-destruction
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and humiliation.  After the dead of his unfortunate,  blameless pet,  the narrator recounts how he
encountered another cat that was almost the perfect resemblance of the first: 
One night as I sat, half stupified in a den of more than infamy, my attention was
suddenly drawn to some black object, reposing upon the head of one of the immense
hogsheads of Gin, or Rum, which constituted the chief furniture of the apartment. I
had been looking steadily at the top of this hogshead for some minutes, and what
now  caused  me  surprise  was  the  fact  that  I  had  not  sooner  perceive  the  object
thereupon. (854)
This object, then, was a near duplicate of the sacrificed Pluto. It was black and even missed
one eye. The only difference was a “large, although indefinite splotch of white, covering nearly the
whole region of the breast” (Poe, “The Black Cat” 854). To the best of my knowledge, the way in
which  this  episode  foreshadows  the  climax  of  the  tale  has  been  completely  ignored  in  Poe
scholarship. The second Pluto was found on top of a hogshead; when the police later demolishes the
wall on which the narrator had concealed the body of his wife, the cat had supposedly appeared on
top of her head. Thus, the head of the wife is identified, through a pun, with the head of a pig. This
correspondence suggests the narrator’s animosity toward his wife—an animosity the narrator seems
to  rationalise  away  through  the  story  of  the  cat—preceded  the  appearance  of  the  supposedly
demoniacal cat. Thus, the circumstances of the appearance of the second cat suggest, as it were
through metonymy, that, contrary to his claims, he had had a motive for murder.
This pattern of superimposition of the cat on the wife is then reiterated throughout the tale,
in which the two are systematically confused. This confusion affects the narrator’s statements in
truly disturbing ways, for, at times, we simply cannot be sure whether he is thinking about the cat or
about his wife:
With my aversion for this cat, however, its partiality for myself seemed to increase. It
followed my footsteps with a pertinacity which it  would be difficult  to make the
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reader comprehend. Whenever I  sat,  it  would crouch beneath my chair,  or spring
upon my knees, covering me with his loathsome caresses. If I arose to walk it would
get between my feet and thus nearly throw me down, or, fastening its long and sharp
claws in my dress, clamber, in this manner, to my breast. (Poe, “The Black Cat” 855)
The narrator’s repulse, even horror for an animal that exhibits the typical behavior of the
common house cat is hard to understand—it seems misplaced. That is, until we realise that the cat
represents  the  wife.  It  responded  to  his  violent  behavior  with  kindness;  so  did  his  wife:  “my
uncomplaining wife, alas! was the most usual and the most patient of sufferers” (Poe, “The Black
Cat” 856).  The confusion the tale exploits, between wife and pet, is, of course, inherent to the
conventional  patriarchal  representation  of  woman  as  a  being  naturally  submissive  to  man,  and
whose only concern is to please him. Moreover, the cat was trying to get on the narrator’s “breast;”
thus, metonymy once again corrodes the narrator’s rhetoric, for the cat was, figuratively speaking,
taking the place that belonged to the “wife of my bosom” (Poe, “The Black Cat” 858). Or perhaps
the narrator was already starting to confuse wife and cat even at this early stage.
As the tale approaches its climax, the cat does indeed start to appear consistently where one
would expect the wife—that is, on his bosom. “And now,” says the narrator, 
was I  indeed wretched beyond the wretchedness of mere Humanity.  And  a brute
beast—(…) a brute beast to work out for me—for me a man, fashioned in the image
of the High God—so much of insufferable wo! Alas! neither by day or by night knew
I the blessing of Rest any more! During the former, the creature left me no moment
alone; and, in the latter, I started, hourly, from dreams of unutterable fear, to find the
hot breath of the thing upon my face, and its vast weight – an incarnate Night-Mare
that I had no power to shake off—incumbent eternally upon my heart!
(Poe, “The Black Cat” 855-856)
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But which “creature” does he mean: the wife or the cat? The question is a legitimate one.
The cat is “eternally upon” his heart. This choice of words, in itself, evokes the idea of marriage,
conceived as an indissoluble tie. The marriage vow tied him “eternally” to his wife—to whom the
husband significantly refers as the “wife of my bosom.” Perhaps she, not the cat, was manifesting
her “fondness” for him in the dark? As Susan Amper remarks, the fact that the narrator’s reactions
are “misplaced” is evidence of “the substitution of cat for wife and wife for cat, first described by
Daniel Hoffman and now widely accepted. There is no doubt that the narrator projects his feelings
for  his  wife  onto  his  cat,  but  the  substitution  is  even  more  complete  than  Hoffman  suggests”
(“Untold  Story”  479).  Evidently,  when  we  replace  the  wife  with  the  cat,  the  idea  of  sexual
solicitation immediately springs to mind. In this light, the previous statement becomes a classic
statement of gamophobia: marriage had deprived the husband of his “rest.” Underlying this feeling,
of course, is the anxiety of sexual performance that Poe had manifested much more clearly in one of
his earlier tales, “Loss of Breath” (a reading of which may be found in the third chapter).
The weight of the “cat,” incidentally, plays a role similar to that of the height and color of
hair of the female apparitions in “Ligeia,” and also, as we will see in the next section, “Berenice.”
Such details invariably disturb the narrator’s identification of the intruder. In “The Black Cat,” then,
through obscure symbolism and sibylline statement, the narrator suggests, without realising it, the
true identity of the repulsive—to him—being with whom he was constrained eternally to share his
bed. Evidently, the incubus which tormented him was not, as he implausibly asserts, a very heavy
cat, but his wife—for she undoubtedly weighed much more than a cat. This hypothesis, indeed, fits
the facts much better than his own which is, by his own admission, incredible.
It should be noticed that he himself challenges the reader to find rational explanations for the
facts he reports. This challenge, however, has generally been regarded as a rhetorical device meant
to highlight the radical unintelligibility of his experience: “Hereafter, perhaps, some intellect may
be found which will reduce my phantom to the commonplace—some intellect more calm, more
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logical, and far less excitable than my own, which will perceive, in the circumstances I detail with
awe, nothing more than an ordinary succession of very natural causes and effects” (Poe, “The Black
Cat” 850). The viability of the natural explanation to which he here alludes, and which he induces
the reader to overlook, of course, overthrows his rhetoric.
Moreover, the context of the sentence describing his restless nights is itself ambiguous. The
narrator is apparently blaming the cat for his “wo,” but an equally plausible reading would be that
his indignation was directed at the wife, who he claims had first pointed out that the “splotch” of
white hair in the cat’s “breast” resembled a gallows. He evidently saw this as a sign of his own
doom—which would only make sense, of course, if he was already contemplating the murder of his
wife, as no one is hanged for killing a cat. Indeed, his “sentiments, as Gargano points out, constitute
‘outrageous excess’ if applied merely to the killing of a cat. As a reaction to the murder of one’s
wife, they seem far more appropriate. By contrast, the narrator’s reaction at the time of the incident
on the stairs,” the killing of the wife with an axe blow, “seems wholly inadequate to the enormity of
the deed” (Amper, “Untold Story” 479). 
The term “brute” also apparently points towards Pluto,  but that too is  ambiguous in the
context, for, as we have seen, the narrator had previously evoked the Biblical myth of creation,
contrasting “brute beast” with “man, fashioned in the image of the High God” (Poe, “The Black
Cat” 856). He thereby brings into relief an inherent ambiguity in the myth, which appears in two
different versions in the first two chapters of  Genesis. According to the second of these versions,
God  first  created  man,  and  then  fashioned  woman  out  of  one  of  his  ribs.  Thus,  as  Mary
Wollstonecraft remarked (I will discuss her critique of the myth in the third chapter), woman was
represented as the result of a secondary act of creation. Not only was she not formed in the image of
God, her creation involved splitting the originally created man. Through the extraction of the rib,
the  original  man  was  made  incomplete.  Thus,  as  Wollstonecraft  also  remarked,  women  were
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effectively granted an ambiguous status, half-way between humanity and brute creation. And the
narrator’s confusion of wife and cat itself reiterates the association.
Thus, the pattern of allusion in “The Black Cat,” which corresponds perfectly to what Poe
called an “undercurrent of suggestion,” is a clear indication that the cat did not make the narrator do
it; that he killed his wife because he hated women, and thought that they ranked lower in the scale
of creation than pets—perhaps, they were on a level with hogs, his tale slyly suggests (Poe, Rev. of
Twice-Told Tales  [1842] 571). Only this explains that a man who feels heart-rending remorse for
killing his cat should remain perfectly calm after driving an axe through his wife’s skull.
As already stated, the deed itself, the killing of the wife, is not concealed. But the motives of
the narrator are masked by his supernatural hypothesis. His very “thesis,” however, indicates that
the true motive for killing his wife was a sort of superstition he shared with the protagonist of
Macnish’s Confessions. This superstition, then, shows to the reader that he was not merely a man
who happened to kill a woman, but a femicide by character.
He presents himself, however, as a loving husband, driven to frenzy by a revenant cat he had
killed for no reason. Indeed, in his own estimation, he was guilty only of killing the cat. But this
simply does not add up, for he evidently did not kill the cat for no reason, but through an irresistible
urge to expose his guilt for the murder of his wife, which he was apparently already mediating. As
previously stated, the narrator had hanged his black cat, Pluto, from a branch of a tree in the garden
of his house. This happened in the morning. The following night, he “was aroused from sleep by the
cry of fire.” “It was,” he reports, “with great difficulty that my wife, a servant, and myself, made
our escape from the conflagration” (Poe, “The Black Cat” 852).
The narrator significantly omits any reference to his activities between the hanging of the
cat, and the middle of the following night, when he claims to have been aroused by the neighbors’
cries of fire. He has, therefore, no alibi. The fire, he candidly avows, almost killed his wife—this
was  perhaps  what  he  intended.  Considering  how  he  felt  about  the  “cat,”  indeed,  it  is  not
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unreasonable to suppose he had himself started the fire in a first unsuccessful attempt at his wife’s
life. Incidentally, his declaration that he had, even before the fire, “offered her personal violence” is
consistent with this hypothesis (Poe, “The Black Cat” 851). In fact, if we subject his statements to
the  sort  of  inquiry  a  judge  would  be  obliged  to  conduct,  that  is,  dismissing  supernatural
intervention,  we  are  forced  to  conclude  that  the  circumstantial  evidence  clearly  points  in  that
direction. And then, of course, his own conviction that the sacrifice of the cat foreshadowed his own
hanging,  in  itself,  indicates  that  he was already meditating an offense actually  punishable with
death, the murder of the wife, not the hanging of the cat.
But this is where things really start to get complicated. The house burned to the ground, he
tells us, with the exception of the wall “against which had rested the head of my bed,” where, “as if
graven in bas relief upon the white surface,” the “figure of a gigantic cat” had meanwhile appeared.
The narrator comes up with an utterly preposterous explanation for this. He supposes one of the
crowd that gathered around his house while the fire was raging had thrown the body of the hanging
cat through “an open window, into my chamber,” adding that: “This had probably been done with
the view of arousing me from sleep.” It is hard to admit that a less cumbersome projective, and one
more suitable for this purpose could not be procured. Pilling improbability upon improbability, the
narrator comes up with an even more improbable pseudo-scientific hypothesis to explain how the
cat turned into a bas-relief: the “falling of other walls had compressed the victim of my cruelty [the
cat] into the substance of the freshly-spread plaster; the lime of which, with the flames, and the
ammonia from the carcass, had then accomplished the portraiture as I saw it” (Poe, “The Black Cat”
853).
This is the second time the narrator mentions that the wall had been plastered. Because of
this, he conjectures, it “resisted the action of the fire.” But he offers no explanation for the fact.
Why had the wall been plastered in the first place, and, more importantly, by whom? The answers to
these questions are conspicuously absent from his narrative, but may nonetheless be deduced from a
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few apparently unconnected details which also suggest a much more probable explanation for the
impression of  the  cat  than  the  one  the  narrator  provides.  The idea  that  the  remains  of  the  cat
compressed  against  the  wall  by  the  unlikely  haphazard  process  he  describes  could  somehow
spontaneously arrange themselves into a neat semblance of a cat, the “accuracy” of which is said to
be “truly marvelous,” complete with “a rope around the animal’s neck” is not credible—in fact, it
could not be more incredible (Poe, “The Black Cat” 853). 
Such “compression”  would  no  doubt  result,  rather,  in  a  bloody,  confused mess  of  cat’s
entrails. The absence of the insides of the cat from the picture is the single most unlikely aspect of
the narrator’s hypothesis. If the cat had been squashed, as he tells us, how could they have vanished
so completely? And then, the figure on the wall was not life-size, but gigantic, which pushes the
already overwhelming unlikelihood of the narrator’s proposition into the realm of the ludicrous.
In The Sign of the Four, Sherlock Holmes famously states a basic “precept” of his method:
“How often have I said to you [Watson] that when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever
remains,  however improbable, must be the truth?” (Conan Doyle 638). This, of course, is clearly
derived from declarations made by Dupin in “The Murders in the Rue Morgue.” After satisfying
himself, and the unnamed narrator, that all other means of escape were impracticable, the French
detective concluded that the “murderer” escaped through one of the windows of the room in which
the victims had been found. This, he granted, seemed impossible. However, he reasons that, being
“brought to this conclusion in so unequivocal a manner as we are, it is not our part, as reasoners, to
reject it on account of apparent impossibilities. It is only left for us to prove that these apparent
‘impossibilities’ are, in reality, not such.” He claims that this certainty oriented his investigation,
which ultimately led him to the discovery of the famous broken nail: “My own examination was
somewhat more particular [than the police’s] (…) because here it was, I knew, that all apparent
impossibilities must be proved to be not such in reality” (Poe, “Murders” 551, 552).
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Through the mouth of the narrator of the tale himself, Poe challenges the reader of “The
Black Cat” to play the detective unto its mysteries—that is, to find a natural explanation for his
story.  Is  it  not  reasonable,  then,  to  assume  that  the  same  principle  should  be  applied  to  this
investigation that Dupin applies to similarly mysterious circumstances and which, in the case of
“The Murders in the Rue Morgue,” had led others to admit supernatural intervention? This is the
view maintained by Susan Amper, who, in her article on the tale, “Untold Story,” has taken up the
narrator’s explicit challenge to the reader:
When understood as part fact and part misrepresentation designed to minimize the
narrator’s guilt, the story gains an important virtue it otherwise lacks: intelligibility.
Critics,  indeed,  have  yet  to  put  forth  any  reasonable  interpretation  of  the  actual
events of the story. (…) Until now, the foremost analyses of the stories have come
from those, including Marie Bonaparte, Daniel Hoffman, and William Crisman, who
have abandoned any attempt to address the literal meaning of events, dealing with
them exclusively as psychological phenomena. (“Untold Story” 475-76)
Amper here also makes another important point. If the events in the tale are susceptible of
literal interpretation, the psychological or allegorical interpretation, suggested by the narrator, is
overthrown.
If  we take  the tale  as  a  mystery,  then,  we must  reject  impossibilities  whenever  rational
explanations are viable. Poe could not possibly have come up with a least probable explanation for
the portrait of the cat on the wall. The improbability is such that we may safely regard it, in practice,
as an impossibility—and this is precisely what I believe Poe intended to intimate to the analytical
reader. The narrator’s hypothesis is as absolute an impossibility as may be conceived; therefore, it
must be excluded. And then, even if we were to grant the narrator’s hypothesis, for which he admits
there was no precedent, it still would not explain why the wall was plastered. There is, of course, a
perfectly plausible alterative explanation for all this—and this must be the solution to the mystery.
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Evidently, the portrait of the cat must be human-made. Since he cannot account for his movements
between the hanging of the cat and the fire, one can reasonably suspect that the narrator himself had
been responsible for both the plastering and the portrait of the cat.
Later, after he killed his wife, he shows the reader that he possessed the requisite know-how.
“Having procured mortar, sand, and hair, with every possible precaution, I prepared a plaster which
could not be distinguished from the old, and with this I very carefully went over the new brick-
work.” Hair is,  of course, the key ingredient. Hair, commonly of horses, but sometimes also of
goats, or oxen, was employed for the purpose of providing structural reinforcement to plaster. On
that occasion, the worker complacently surveyed his work, and said to himself: “‘Here at least, then,
my labor has not been in vain’” (Poe, “The Black Cat” 858). This sentence suggests, of course, that
this had not been the first time he had done this kind of work.
His commentary on his work on the cellar wall clearly alludes, I think, to his previous work
on the wall of the bedroom in his previous home. That is, I think it effectively demonstrates that he
had been responsible for the plastering on that occasion too. In retrospect, this provides a plausible
natural explanation for how the cat—or the part of the cat that used to be its surface—got mixed
“into the substance” of the plaster—for, as we have seen, the narrator did not see a squashed cat, but
a portrait of one. Indeed, his specious theory appears to me a desperate attempt to avoid recognising
the obvious: that the only way the cat could have been compressed “into the substance” of the
plaster was if the body, or more precisely its hair—for there was apparently no sign of the entrails
—, had somehow got mixed into the plaster when it was being prepared.
But, as is so often the case with Poe’s fiction, it is easy to get sidetracked. Our attention is
even now being diverted from the crucial facts of the matter. When he saw the figure of the cat, the
narrator  knew, without a doubt, that the cat was inside the house, although he could not credibly
account for this conviction—this is the crucial fact. Not only that, he seems to have been absolutely
certain that the cat had been mixed into the substance of the plaster—for, the very absurdity of his
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explanation  shows  us  that  he  did  not  deduce—could  not  have  deduced—this  singular,
unprecedented fact. Therefore, one must conclude that it was the other way around: his theory was
created to accommodate his preestablished belief that the hair of the cat was mixed into the plaster.
I once again appeal to Dupin’s principle of detection. The portrait of the black cat on the
wall was made out of the body of the cat. This means, of course, that the hair of the cat was visible
on the wall—otherwise, it would not be a portrait of a cat, but merely a squashed cat. And the hair
could not possibly have got into the plaster spontaneously after the plaster had been spread, it must
have been mixed into the plaster when this was being prepared. If this was so, as it must have been
unless a miracle is admitted, the neighbours could not possibly have thrown the cat at him, as he
claims, for the very simple reason that the cat was already inside the house. The narrator, of course,
never doubted that the cat was inside, he just could not figure out how some of it was visible on the
wall.
This brings us back to the other crucial question: why was the wall in his bedroom, and only
that wall, replastered? In my opinion, this is the decisive question. This, I admit, is also the question
I have more difficulty in answering. The narrator’s mysterious remark when he finished the wall in
the cellar,  however,  suggest a parallelism between his two experiments in interior renovation.  I
suspect the wall of the bedroom had been plastered for exactly the same reason for which the wall
of the cellar would later be plastered. The narrator evidently felt that the hanged cat represented his
guilt for the murder of his wife. He would therefore naturally be anxious to suppress the evidence of
the  “perverse”  act  of  self-incrimination  that  was  but  too  clear  an  intimation  of  the  crime  he
meditated. For, as I have before stated, I am convinced that he intended his wife to be killed on the
fire that destroyed his house. If his plan should succeed, the cat might have been the only loose end
in an otherwise perfect crime.
This is what I think may have happened. The same expedient presented to him at that time
that he would later employ to conceal his wife’s body. He took the wall apart, placed the body of his
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victim inside, and carefully replaced the bricks. Finally, he mixed the cat’s hair with mortar and
sand to create a plaster that he thought could not be distinguished from the original. This would
satisfactorily explain many hitherto unexplained circumstances, namely, how the impression of the
cat could have been achieved, and also the strange disappearance of the cat’s insides.
The parallelism between the two instances of “plastering” in the tale itself suggests that it
served the same purpose on both cases, that is, covering up the narrator’s work on the wall. There
are,  of  course,  other  reasons  for  taking  down  walls,  but  the  fact  that  the  narrator  omits  any
explanation,  indicates  that  this  was something he wanted to  conceal  from the reader.  The only
reason I can conceive for all this, is that he had indeed walled Pluto in. When he plasters the wall of
the cellar, as we have seen, the narrator remarks that he had “prepared a plaster which could not be
distinguished from the old” (Poe, “The Black Cat” 857). In the case of the bedroom wall, of course,
this had obviously not been the case. An impression of the cat was visible on the surface of the wall
—according  to  him,  the  very  substance  of  the  cat  had  been  mixed  into the  plaster.  Since  he
evidently is not telling all he knows about that first wall, I suspect the narrator knew he had hidden
the cat inside, but really did not understand how the portrait of the cat had appeared on the surface
of the wall inside which he had hidden it. That is, he never realised he had himself “perversely,” as
he puts it, advertised the tomb by leaving some of his victim’s body in the plaster. Thus, he divulged
the  very  secret  he  had  worked so  hard  to  conceal,  and  which  he  felt  resulted  from a  to  him
incomprehensible  urge  to  denounce  himself,  the  hanging  of  the  cat,  by  another  act  of  self-
incrimination. Indeed, both are the result of that apparently unconscious compulsion to incriminate
himself  that  he  thought  was  unexplainable.  On  that  occasion,  however,  his  slip  was  of  no
consequence. His wife survived the fire; therefore, he had committed no crime.
This hypothesis would also explain the mysterious words he pronounces after finishing his
work on the second wall. “Here, at least,” he tells us, “my work has not been in vain” (Poe, “The
Black Cat” 857). This can be construed as an allusion to a previous unsuccessful attempt to hide a
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body inside a wall.  The second time around, however,  he  felt  certain that he had succeeded in
concealing the body, as he could discern no sign of the wife on the surface of the cellar wall. These
words, incidentally, appear to result themselves from his “perverseness.”
We must now pause to consider his theory of “perverseness” which these revelations force
us to reassess. According to this theory, the narrator killed the black cat Pluto for no reason at all,
through a supposedly universal “longing of the soul to vex itself” (Poe “The Black Cat” 852). This
theory, then, allows him to ignore the true nature of his repeated acts of self-incrimination. Indeed,
he seems to have been under a much stronger compulsion to “vex” himself than most other people.
The reason for this, is obvious: guilt. Guilt for a crime he intended to commit, and for which he felt
he should be sentenced to death. This was evidently a crime he had been meditating for a long time.
Indeed, long before he actually killed his wife, the narrator had been acted upon by this strange
compulsion to manifest his guilt. Evidently, this is what had prompted him to hang the cat in the
first place—for he immediately saw the hung cat as a foreshadowing of his own hanging. However,
he did not perceive that guilt was the hidden spring of all his apparently unmotivated slips. And the
theory of “perverseness” allowed him to continue to ignore this fact.
William Gargano has pointed out, against the bulk of criticism of Poe’s work, both before
and after the publication of his article on “The Black Cat,” that: “If any perverseness exists in the
story, it is the protagonist’s perverseness in being able to dismiss a transparently moral adventure as
a mere consequence of inexplicable events” (“‘The Black Cat’” 178). Indeed, Gargano remarks that
the narrator’s “frenetic deeds and rationalizations have all  the appearance of a blind attempt to
escape  from  ineluctable  moral  consequences  whose  authority  he  unconsciously  admits  by
contemptuous derogations of them” (172).  Gargano also terms such “rationalisations” “specious
intellectual dodges” (178). This constituted an explicit rejection of the school of thought that has
regarded “perverseness” as the central structuring principle of Poe’s work and psyche. Thus read,
Poe became emblematic of Leslie A. Fiedler’s influential conceptualisation of the American Gothic:
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“Our novel of terror is well on the way to becoming a Calvinist exposé of natural human corruption
rather than an enlightened attack on a debased ruling class or entrenched superstition. The European
Gothic identified blackness with the super-ego and was therefore revolutionary in its implications;
the American gothic (…) identified evil with the id and was therefore conservative at its deepest
level of implication, whatever the intent of its authors” (Love and Death 160-61). This idea of the
Gothic  is,  indeed,  easily  translatable  into  the  terms  of  the  theory  of  “perverseness.”  Gargano,
however, successfully demonstrates that Poe and his narrator must not be identified.
Still, Gargano’s reading of “The Black Cat” is not as significative a departure from previous
readings of the tale as it might seem at first, inasmuch as he too dilutes the guilt of the murder of the
wife by construing it as a particular form of the narrator’s compulsion to “sin” against his own
nature: “Having in a furtive manner mutilated himself and thus cut himself off from the resources
and  nourishment  of  his  moral  nature,  he  must  more  publicly  proclaim his  own evil.  (…) The
hanging of the cat is the clandestine equivalent to the humanly revolting murder of his wife; they
are the same deed, in the latter case taking a form that outrages society and must be punished by it”
(“‘The Black Cat’” 176-77).
Moreover, according to Gargano, the tale cannot be reduced to literal sense, but must be read
symbolically. This notion determines his reading of the ending of the tale: “the ‘cat’ is concealed in
the depths of a nature still perversely divided and he [the narrator] is, in spite of his proclamations
to the contrary, highly disturbed” (“‘The Black Cat’” 177). Likewise, the wall spared by the fire
“with the ‘portraiture’ of Pluto on it (…) clearly signifies,” for Gargano, “that what survives of the
narrator will  be haunted  by his inerradicable sin against  his  own nature” (175-76).  Again,  the
murder of the wife is not granted the status of an autonomous crime and, consequently, continues to
be seen as a function of a deep psychological urge to “vex” oneself rather than a deliberate act of
the  will.  On  the  contrary,  I  believe  Poe’s  tale  implies  the  idea  of  moral  responsibility,  and,
consequently, a moral outlook.
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The passage in which the narrator reports that, after having hung the cat and presumably set
his own house on fire, he experienced a “sentiment that seemed, but was not, remorse,” appears to
me crucial to understand his blindness (Poe, “The Black Cat” 853). The reader assumes this feeling
is relative to the killing of the cat, but this makes no sense. A few lines before he admitted he felt
“the bitterest remorse” when he hung the cat from the tree (852). Therefore,  this other feeling,
which was not remorse, it may be surmised, had reference to some other misdeed. I can only think
of one. He was not sorry for having tried to kill his wife. Therefore, he persevered, and eventually
did what he evidently had intended to do all along. Evidently, this “sentiment” to which the narrator
of the tale obscurely alludes, and which was “not remorse,” is the same mentioned in the following
passage of Bulwer-Lytton’s The Last Days of Pompeii (1834), which describes the state of mind of
Arbaces, the villain of the novel, after he kidnapped Ione: “he felt that uneasiness and apprehension
which attend upon the chance of detection even when the criminal is insensible to the  voice of
conscience—that vague terror of the consequence of the crime, which is often mistaken for remorse
at the crime itself” (2: 86-7).
As I have already stated, it may be surmised that the hair of the first victim—the cat—had
been mixed into the plaster, not after it was spread, as he unconvincingly claims, but while it was
being prepared. My guess is that the hair of the second “victim” of his “cruelty” had, like the hair of
the first, been mixed “into the substance” of the plaster, and therefore, that some trace of her was
left on the surface of the wall. This solution, aside from satisfactorily accounting for most of the
loose ends left by the narrator, also makes sense artistically. As we have seen, Poe thought that the
events in a tale should follow necessarily from each other, in an unbroken chain of necessity, and
that no point should be left out. According to my hypothesis, the killing of the cat, the impression on
the wall, and the narrator’s self-incriminating behavior before the police are all referred to the same
cause, the narrator’s unexplainable drive to denounce himself.
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However, I must admit I am not completely satisfied with this explanation. It is very hard to
make sense of this tale. The narrator seems to be half-deluded, and half-dishonest, and this makes it
very hard to conjecture valid motives for his actions. I conjectured that he meant to conceal from
the reader that he had walled the first cat in. But why would he want to do this? He is already
condemned; therefore, one would think he might as well come clean. On the other hand, he does
admit  he drove  an  axe  through his  wife’s  head,  and this  makes  all  his  other  “crimes”  pale  in
comparison. Perhaps that is the point—he may not have realised that nothing could be worse than
the things he openly confesses. One thing, however, is clear: he does not come clean. Perhaps he
intended to guarantee an honourable reputation after he was dead, by blaming it all on the cat. I
must confess, however, I cannot quite figure him out.
Susan Amper, whose interpretation of the tale builds on the same principles that oriented
mine, has nonetheless arrived at a very different solution. She argued that “just as his subconscious
drives him against his will to reveal the hiding place [of the corpse], so does it cause him to plant in
his story telltale clues that disclose his guilty secret” (“Untold Story” 475). Although I agree in
principle with this assessment, the particular explanation she provides for the mystery does not
seem completely convincing to me. Particularly, Amper’s explanation leaves out the appearance of
the cat on the wall of the bedroom, and, more decisively fails to provide an explanation as to why it
was plastered. According to her, the crucial clue to the mystery is inside the wall: 
The climax of the story’s action, and the height of the murderer’s guilt-induced folly,
occur when, just as the police are about to leave, he raps the wall within which his
wife’s  body is  entombed.  In the  same way,  readers  are  but  three sentences  from
finishing the story,  largely accepting of the narrator’s version of events,  when he
reveals  gratuitously the greatly decayed state  of the corpse,  providing the crucial
evidence that exposes his crime” (Amper, “Masters of Deceit” 38). 
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Amper sustains the view that the fact of the body being “greatly decayed,” mentioned by the
narrator, is inconsistent with the narrator’s chronology. The murder had, according to him, been
committed four days earlier. Amper argues the advanced state of decay he mentions could not have
been produced in so short a lapse. Therefore, she concludes, the narrator had killed his wife much
earlier, on the night that his house was consumed by fire, taking the corpse with him to his new
residence. While, as I have stated, I agree with the basic assumptions of Amper’s reading, namely
that  the  reader  is  supposed to  find  the solution to  the  mysteries  the narrator  was powerless  to
unravel, I find this particular solution unsatisfactory. Dupin’s own exposition of the philosophy of
decomposition  of  corpses,  in  Poe’s  later  tale  “The  Mystery  of  Marie  Roget,”  undermines  her
argument: “we can assign no period, with any thing like accuracy, at which the corpse shall rise
through decomposition. Under certain circumstances this result would be brought about within the
hour;  under  others,  it  might  not  take  place at  all”  (742).  This  indicates,  at  least,  that  Poe  was
convinced that such definite conclusions as Amper draws solely from the progress of decomposition
on the corpse were unwarranted—and Poe’s understanding of the subject, I think, would have to
take precedence over whatever notions we might ourselves entertain. In any case, the term “greatly
decayed” is rather vague, and therefore at best provides a fragile support for Amper’s argument. The
narrator may merely be saying that four days after death the corpse was not nice to look at, which,
especially considering the massive damage the head had sustained, appears perfectly plausible.
On the other hand, there is considerable evidence that the wife was still  alive when the
narrator moved to his new home. The more obvious evidence is, of course, the narrator’s testimony
to that effect.  The systematic confusion between cat and wife in the second part of the tale provides
another kind of evidence that the wife was alive that I also find very hard to dismiss. Still, Amper’s
explanation makes sense in other respects. The theory that allows the narrator to disavow guilt,
perhaps to clean his name, is that the revenant cat made him do it. Therefore, it would make sense
for him to lie about the time of death. If he had killed his wife before the cat returned from the dead,
139
this would mean that the crime had been premeditated. Still, I think the slippery rationalizations
through which he pins the rap on the cat are, in and of themselves, ludicrous. And then, Amper’s
affirmation that the state of decay of the body “exposes his crime” is not entirely accurate. From the
point  of  view of  the  reader,  the crime had already been revealed—Amper’s  hypothesis  merely
ascribes it to an earlier period. From a narrative standpoint, on the other hand, the discovery of the
body, regardless of its state of composition, is the evidence that confirmed the police’s suspicions.
In any case, to me, the crucial fact of the tale is the narrator’s compulsion to incriminate
himself,  which  provides  possible  explanations  for  almost  all  those  odd  details  the  narrator
challenges his reader to explain, namely the two salient details his narrative leaves unexplained: the
recently plastered wall in the narrator’s bedroom, and his remark about his work on the cellar. The
solution to the mystery must, I think, provide satisfactory explanations for all these facts, and this is
what I have attempted to achieve.
My thesis, then, is that the corpus delicti was, quite literally, on the surface of the structure
the narrator erected to cover it up. Whether he had left a visible “impression” of his victim on the
plaster, as he clearly had done with the cat, cannot be ascertained—but neither can this hypothesis
be  ruled  out,  given the  manifest  parallelism between  the  two crucial  episodes  in  the  tale.  His
explanation  for  the  police’s  change  of  mind  is,  incidentally,  also  preposterous:  he  contends  a
unearthly scream from within the wall was what ultimately betrayed him—indeed, he appears to
believe that this scream, and not his tapping, was what tipped the police off. Thus, the cat had,
according to him, been responsible both for the crime and for revealing it; it was “the hideous beast
whose craft  had seduced me into murder,  and whose informing voice had consigned me to the
hangman” (Poe, “The Black Cat” 859). But then, as usual, he does not exactly  say  that the cat
“screamed:”
I was answered by a voice from within the tomb!—by a cry, at first muffled and
broken, like the sobbing of a child, and then quickly swelling into one long, loud, and
140
continuous scream, utterly anomalous and inhuman—a howl—a wailing shriek, half
of horror and half of triumph, such as might have arisen only out of hell, conjointly
from the throats of the damned in their agony and of the demons that exult in the
damnation. (858-59).
Is this really the cat we are talking about? One wonders. In any case, this is a positively
unearthly,  hence  utterly  implausible  “scream,”  that  a  detective  would  have  to  regard  as  an
impossibility. A more likely hypothesis is that the narrator’s tapping itself betrayed him. I believe,
however, that they had never been fooled. All things considered, the police may even have noticed
something different about the part of the wall to which the narrator felt an irresistible urge to draw
their attention—though his behavior, in itself, would have suggested that was a good place to begin
the search.
However, the narrator’s claim that the plaster on that wall “could not be distinguished from
the old” (emphasis mine) is certainly suspicious. The parallelism with the other episode in the tale
involving plaster actually makes the statement ambiguous, in a way that strengthens my conjecture.
Perhaps the plaster was not distinguishable from the plaster on the wall of his bedroom, which
would mean that some sign of the victim within might be perceivable without.
In any case, what seems to me beyond dispute is that the narrator had used the hair of both
his victims as an ingredient for the plaster. And his final act of self-incrimination suggests that he
was anxious to bring that fact to the attention of the police, lest its significance be lost on them as it
had been lost on those who saw the figure of the cat on the only wall the fire that had consumed his
previous domicile left standing. In light of this hypothesis, his remark about his plastering not being
“in vain” becomes an instance of tragic irony. By this I mean that the remark foreshadows his
downfall in a way of which he was clearly unaware at the time. He meant to say he had successfully
concealed the tomb of his victim this time. The other time around, the tell-tale “impression” of the
cat having appeared on the wall, he had not succeeded in this. This is what he means to say, but he
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cannot acknowledge the obvious fact that he felt an urge to expose himself to detection, and this
fact suggests an alternative, unintended meaning for his remark. Apparently, no one had realised the
significance of the portrait of the cat, and therefore the narrator was not, as he anticipated and
intimately desired, apprehended. The plastering on the wall of the cellar, on the other hand, did not
prevent the police from detecting him—on the contrary, this time he was detected. If we consider its
intended meaning,  then,  this  outcome proves  him wrong:  his  careful  work of concealment  had
indeed been “in vain.” However, since the secret desire of being detected was the hidden spring of
his behaviour, it is really the other way around. The first time, his work had been “in vain” because
no one had realised what the cat really meant; the second time, he had finally succeeded in bring
about his own downfall.
Moreover, in my reading, the plastering becomes a perfect allegory of the writing of the tale
itself, which darkly intimates the guilt which it ostensibly denies, through clues that are hidden in
plain sight all over its surface. To my mind, this provides, as it were, the aesthetical confirmation for
the foregoing argument. The final lines of the tale reiterate the suggestion that Pluto had indeed also
been walled up. The narrator reports that, to his surprise, the cat had been entombed along his wife:
“I had walled the monster up within the tomb!” (Poe, “The Black Cat” 859). That he had done this
not once, but twice, appears to me the inescapable conclusion. In fact, the cat might not have been
there at all. Its appearance is, indeed, one of the wonders of the tale, for the cat had disappeared, he
claims, after he killed his wife. In mentioning the cat on his wife’s head, he does not refer the only
difference between Pluto the first and Pluto the second: the splotch of white air. Thus, one cannot be
sure which cat he saw, or thinks he saw. Therefore, he may have imagined the first cat was there,
just as he imagined the scream.
Written  almost  five  years  after  “Ligeia,”  “The  Black  Cat”  documents  Poe’s  enduring
fascination with the duplicitous femicide narrator, which was peculiarly adapted for mysteries. Once
all the mysteries are reduced to their true proportions, one ends up with precisely what the narrator
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told us in the beginning his story was: “a series of mere household events” (Poe, “The Black Cat”
849). That is, with a trivial, only too plausible, story about a superstitious femicide. However, Poe’s
first experiments with this peculiar character predated “Ligeia,” as we shall see in the following
section, by several years.
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5 – “Berenice” and “Morella:” Poe’s Early Femicides
In  “Berenice,”  first  published  in  March  1835  in  the  Southern  Literary  Messenger,  the
influence of Macnish’s Confessions was already clearly noticeable, especially in the original version
of the tale, which contained a wake scene that slyly evokes the one in that tale, while anticipating
Poe’s own later reworking of Macnish’s motive in “Ligeia.” In this scene, which Poe would delete
from all subsequent editions of the tale, Egæus, the narrator, is alone with the corpse of his cousin
and fiancée Berenice, when he is startled by the vision of her teeth. Certain clues indicate, however,
that  these  were  not  really  Berenice’s  teeth,  and that  he  was  in  fact  projecting  a  ghost  he  had
previously seen in his study on his cousin’s corpse.
But, whereas in “Ligeia” the projection of the dark lady on the blonde corpse is evident, in
“Berenice” it must be deduced by the reader. Egæus, who was soon to marry his cousin Berenice,
was seating quietly in his study when he received an unsettling visit. Although he had not heard
anyone come in, he recounts that on “uplifting my eyes, Berenice stood before me”  (Poe, 214).39
But why would he say it was Berenice? The “person”  of the visitor was different, in every way,
from that of his cousin: its “emaciation was excessive, and not    one    vestige    of    the    former    being  
lurked in any single line of the contour”  (215 emphasis mine).40 In short, the apparition  looked
nothing like Berenice. And he does mean nothing: “the once golden hair”  was “now black as the
raven’s wing”  (215n); not  even the  height  was  right:  “Perhaps she had grown taller since her
malady”  (214n).41 Poe recycled the idea of the complete assimilation of two entirely different
women, one of whom is a phantom from the past, in “Ligeia,” and, indeed, transferred most of the
last quoted sentence to that tale (it was quite literally a  transference, for Poe omitted it from all
39 The phrase appears in this form in the original publication in the Southern Literary Messenger, as well as the first
book edition in Tales (1840) (Mabbott’s texts A through C). In later editions of the tale, Poe added the words “I saw
that” after the comma.
40 This sentence appears in all editions of the tale overseen by Poe.
41 The text quoted in this sentence comes from the original version of the tale (Mabbott’s text A).
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subsequent editions of “Berenice”).42 In 1845, presumably to avoid a too close resemblance between
the two tales, Poe inverted the “change”  in “Berenice.”  The phantom in the study room had
originally been dark-haired, and the real Berenice blonde; in the revised tale it was the other way
around.  This  change  in  the  color  scheme,  as  I  have  intimated  before,  rendered  “Berenice”’s
resemblance to Macnish’s Confessions a little less conspicuous.
 The “phantasm” in Egæus’s study, then, is evidently not Berenice, but the ghost of another
woman, who, in the original version of the tale, looked just like Mary Elliston. The shorter, more
corpulent  blonde Berenice, Egæus’s  cousin, on  the  other  hand,  resembled  Eliza, the original
femicide’s sister. In both cases, the blonde woman had been the narrator’s sole playmate in infancy.
And the personal signs that would have allowed any reasonable person to distinguish the mystery
woman from Berenice are the same that distinguish Mary and Eliza, and the same which would later
enable the narrator of “Ligeia” to conclude that Rowena had not come back to life. Therefore, all
these tales share the same basic story: a male, evidently deranged narrator is haunted by the ghost of
a dark lady.43
The resemblance, as I have before stated, was clearer in the original version of “Berenice,”
where Egæus appears to actually project the ghost which he incorrectly identified as Berenice on
her body. This scene apparently occasioned complaints of readers that felt the tale was too gruesome
and in bad taste. As a result, in a letter of April 30, 1835 to T. W. White, then editor of The Southern
Literary Magazine, Poe apologised saying that “[t]he Tale originated in a bet that I could produce
nothing  effective  on  a  subject  so  singular,  provided  I  treated  it  seriously,”  avowing  that  “it
approaches the very verge of bad taste,” and promising he would “not sin quite so egregiously
again” (Letters 84-85). However, in the same letter, Poe actually makes a defense of sensationalism,
and of his peculiar approach to fiction, which often involved, as he puts it, treating such repellent
subjects “seriously”—that is,  with complete  earnestness.  He also argues that  celebrated English
42 I have already quoted the relevant sentence: “but had she then grown taller since her malady?” (Poe, “Ligeia” 330).
43 Indeed, the phantom smile which haunt Egæus prior to his cousin’s burial evidently belongs to his first victim, the
mysterious dark lady in the library, not Berenice.
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writers were perpetrating similar offenses against “good taste,” singling out, among others, Bulwer-
Lytton’s “Manuscript Found in a Madhouse.” It appears to me that with “Berenice” he had intended
to test his audience, to find out just how far he would be permitted to go.
Indeed,  Poe would never  materially  change his approach to  fiction.  He appears  to have
realised, however, that he would have to be more discreet in the future. This, I gather, is what he
meant  when  he  told  White  he  would  never  again  “sin”  as  “egregiously”—he  did  continue  to
challenge the sensibilities of his readers, but not as conspicuously. The only material alteration he
made to the text  after  this  episode was the omission of  the wake scene,  which apparently had
particularly shocked his audience. This sacrifice did indeed succeed in preventing further outrage.
Poe’s original wake scene appears to have been a diluted recreation of the corresponding
scene in Confessions, which was itself a watered-down version of the rape scene in The Monk—still,
Poe found out that it was still too crude for American consumption. I would argue that this scene
later  resurfaced,  under  a  more  effective  disguise,  in  “Ligeia.” Indeed, Berenice’s room in this
expunged passage evidently anticipated Rowena’s gloomy and funereal bridal-chamber: “The room
was large, and very dark, and at every step within  its  gloomy  precincts  I encountered the
paraphernalia of the grave” (Poe, “Berenice” 217n).
As in “Ligeia,”  a curtain heightens the “phantasmagoric”  ambiance. The bed where the
coffin of Berenice had been placed had a canopy of “draperies,” under which Egæus stuck his head:
“As I let them fall they descended upon my shoulders and shutting me thus out from the living,
enclosed me in the strictest communion with the deceased;”  while  thus  enclosed,  Egæus
experiences a frightening vision: “The livid lips were wreathed into a species of smile, and, through
the enveloping gloom, once again there glared upon me in too palpable reality, the white and
glistening, and ghastly teeth of Berenice;”  terrified, Egæus runs from “that apartment of triple
horror, and mystery, and death” ( Poe, “Berenice” 217n).44
44 I quote this passage from Mabbott’s footnote to the text. Despite his letter to White, Poe let the passage stand in the
1840 collection Tales of the Grotesque and Arabesque. Only ten years after its original publication did Poe remove
the especially gruesome wake scene, when he revised the text for publication in the Broadway Journal.
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Yet, the reader must not be influenced by the narrator’s disorientation. The mystery is plain
enough. The room was dark, and it was presumably even darker within the sable canopy. This
gloom was, no doubt, the ideal background for the projection of the glaring white “phantasma” of
the teeth, which the narrator had always before him ever since the apparition of the smiling pseudo-
Berenice in his study. In fact, soon after its departure, Egæus admits: “I saw them now even more
unequivocally than I beheld them then. The teeth! — the teeth! — they were here, and there, and
everywhere, and visibly and palpably before me” (Poe, “Berenice” 217n emphasis mine). What may
not appear obvious at first, now appears  evident.  What  the narrator “sees” within this camera
obscura is a composite image, in which the “phantasma” that had appeared to him earlier in his
library is merged with the female body lying on  the bed. And, in proportion as these “teeth”  are
“unequivocal,” the original image of the dark lady gets more “equivocal” than it seemed at first.
And the image of the teeth was very  equivocal to begin with. Egæus conjectures that the
lady in the study was “palpable,” not because he touched her, or she anything in the study, but
because he heard a door bang. He did not actually “see” her depart. He happened to look down after
he “saw”  her and, when he looked up again, she was gone—the “unequivocally palpable”  teeth
were all that remained.  And these disembodied  teeth,  floating  in  midair, were, by his own
admission, less unequivocal than the apparition that preceded them. One can only conclude that he
imagined the whole thing. In this scenario, his claim that the teeth were “palpably” before him when
he peeped under the sable draperies to see the body of Berenice, deserves no credit. After all, he
“saw” the teeth “palpably” everywhere.
In fact, as he was about to stick his head under the curtains that kept Berenice’s coffin from
sight, he admits that “the phantasma of the teeth (…), with the most vivid and hideous distinctness,
(…) floated about amid the changing lights and shadows of the chamber” (Poe, “Berenice” 217n).
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There is, therefore, no reason to suppose the teeth are anything other than a “phantasma,” a word
the meaning of which the narrator clearly does not fully comprehend.45
Indeed, Egæus’s conceptual confusion prevents him from seeing the solution which his own
words plainly convey. Pondering deeply over the apparition, the remark that the teeth “alone were
present to the mental eye” launches him on a train of associations the concluding link of which is
the following thought: “of Berenice I (…) seriously believed que tout ses dents etaient des idées”
(Poe, “Berenice” 216). Yes, the teeth were “ideas” in the “mental,” not objects seen by the physical
eye! There is no reason to suppose otherwise—as  there is no reason to suppose the ghost was
Berenice. Egæus here casually hits on the solution—only to dismiss the only sensible thing he
writes as “the idiotic thought that destroyed me” (216). On the contrary, this was the key that would
have saved him from making a fool of himself.  For it  would have been impossible for him to
actually have seen Berenice’s actual teeth: firstly, “[t]here been a band around the jaws,” which, “I
know not how (…) was broken asunder;” and then, even if the bandage had somehow miraculously
came apart, he still would not have been able to see the teeth, for it was, as he repeatedly asserts, too
dark for him to be able to see anything (217n). The smile he believes he saw in the dark evidently
belonged to the mysterious dark lady whose ghost had previously visited him in the library, and who
was not—could not possibly had been—Berenice. In other words, this was, in fact, the “phantasma”
which he admits followed him everywhere.
In the original version of the tale, Egæus also claims to have no recollection of what went on
after he stormed out of Berenice’s room. The next thing he knew, he was back in his study, with
only “unintelligible recollections:” “I strived to decypher them, but in vain; while ever and anon,
like the spirit of a departed sound, the shrill and piercing shriek of a female voice seemed to be
ringing in my ears. I had done a deed—what was it? I asked myself the question aloud, and the
whispering echoes of the chamber answered me, ‘what was it?’”  (Poe, “Berenice” 218). Judging
45 Webster’s Dictionary (1828) defined “phantasm” as follows: “That which appears to the mind; the image of an
external object; hence, an idea or notion. It usually denotes a vain or airy appearance; something imagined.”
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from the dirty spade that was in his room when he “awoke,” and also from his muddy boots , he had
exhumed his cousin’s body, pulled all her teeth, put them in a box, which was also found in his
study, leaving  “a disfigured body enshrouded, yet still breathing—still palpitating—still alive”
behind (218).
This  are  indeed  mysterious  developments.  Twice before, however,  Egæus recollections
proved to be perfectly intelligible—only not to him. Through  his  mistakes  and  evident
misapprehensions, that is, he mystically intimates to the reader the true story of which he appears to
have been himself unaware; the solution to the riddle he was not able to solve. This appears to me to
be another case in point. Again, the key to this final riddle is the phantom of the dark lady. When he
wakes up in his study, and immediately before he finds the box containing the bloody,  palpable
teeth of Berenice, Egæus is tormented by the recollection of a female voice, which haunts him like
“the spirit of a departed sound.”  But to  whom does this voice belong to: to Berenice or to the
mysterious woman who was not her? Has he done something to the mystery lady that he should be
tormented by her ghost, as he is? More to the point, has he done something to her that he should be
haunted by  her teeth? The narrator has no recollection of having done anything of the kind, but
then, his convenient amnesia perfectly accounts for that gap. He also cannot remember having dug
Berenice up and pulled her teeth.
Egæus speaks of “mystery and terror, and a tale that should not be told” (Poe,  “Berenice”
210-211). Notwithstanding, by telling us about the ghosts that haunt him, he shows us the horrible
tale he would not tell. He saw the ghost in the library. This is a room that brings back memories to
the nostalgic Egæus. “The recollections of my earliest years are connected with that chamber, and
with its volumes—of which later I will say no more”  (209). If only that room could talk! Then
perhaps it could tell us both what Egæus forgets and what he thinks it best to conceal from the
reader. There is something, however, that the narrator can tell us: “Here died my mother. Herein
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was I born”  (209). Both statements are a little odd. Death must have overtaken his mother very
suddenly, otherwise she would have been carried to her room.
And then, it is certainly unusual for someone to be born in a library. So unusual, indeed, that
one at first surmises Egæus is not being literal; that he avails himself of poetic license. And his very
next sentence, at least the first half of it, appears to bear out this interpretation. He was born in the
library, yes: “But it is mere idleness to say that I had not lived before.” Does this mean he was not
actually born in the library after all? No, that is not what he means at all. He means that it would be
idle to say “that the soul has no previous existence. You deny it? — let us not argue the matter.
Convinced myself, I seek not to convince” (Poe, “Berenice” 209). In the characteristic fashion of
Poe’s earnest narrators, Egæus turns our attention from his particular situation to universals, and
from the empirical to the mystical. He now presents his biography rather pompously as a problem in
metaphysics,  or more precisely,  as  an allegory of  the existential  situation of mankind.  He thus
conveys the impression that he was concerned, even then, only with great cosmic truths, and more
particularly with the possibility of the existence of the soul prior to birth. Therefore, it would seem
he is not here speaking of his actual life-story. But that is not the question at all—we must not let
ourselves be carried away from the matter at hand. The question is whether Egæus means to imply
he was literally born in the library? One must ultimately conclude that is exactly what he means to
imply.
Egæus was born in the library, then, but has some vague recollection of his existence prior to
his birth. He explains these recollections by appealing to the popular version of the platonic theory
of reminiscence. Having been graced with these reminiscences, he believes in the “pre-existence” of
the soul, but implies that those less fortunate  cannot be convinced. He describes his recollections
from his “preexistence” with some detail: “There is, however, a remembrance of aerial forms—of
spiritual and meaning eyes—of sounds, musical yet sad; a remembrance which will not be
excluded; a memory like a shadow—vague, variable, indefinite, unsteady; and like a shadow, too, in
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the impossibility of my getting rid of it while the sunlight of my reason shall exist”  (Poe,
“Berenice” 210). A memory like a “shadow” that cannot be dismissed... one could almost say that
the narrator was haunted! And of course, he was haunted, by the mysterious dark lady, only he did
not realise it. That is why these reminiscences looked “unintelligible” to him.
This mysterious  dark lady came to  him, precisely, in the library of the “mansion of his
fathers”  to which his earliest definite memories are connected. He reiterates the connection in a
fresh paragraph after the passage  I  have  just  transcribed: “In that chamber I was born. Thus,
awaking from the long night of what seemed, but was not, nonentity, at once into the very regions of
fairy land—into a palace of imagination—into the wild dominions of monastic thought and
erudition” (Poe, “Berenice” 210). This declaration is even more implausible than the previous one.
Indeed, two equally implausible implications flow from this bizarre statement: first, we are given to
understand Egæus remembers his own birth; secondly, that he knew how to read from the moment
he was born. Following the tone of the narrative, rather than its meaning, the reader will naturally
take this as a metaphor; but, as we have seen, this is not a metaphor. What does it all mean, then?
Egæus’s mystery has an obvious solution—and only one. Egæus himself tells it to the reader
who is, unfortunately, probably  too busy looking for the elusive  key to all the  mysteries of the
human condition  to notice it. The “preexistence”  to which Egæus reminiscences—that is, the
images that haunt him—refer “seemed, but was not, nonentity.” He did not spring into existence in
the library as a fully qualified reader. It only seems so to him because his earliest memories are
connected with that chamber. What this means, of course, is that he could not remember anything of
went on in his life before that fateful occasion in the library to which all his ghosts must be referred.
He appears to have found himself in the library, not knowing how he got there—this, of course,
happened to him a second time after his expedition to Berenice tomb. And his memories of what
appears to him the opening scene of his life are themselves vague and confused—he cannot make
head or tail of them. This suggests, of course, amnesia. Evidently, something happened in the library
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which made such a powerful impression on him that he forgot everything that came before—but he
cannot tell exactly what this momentous event was.
The reader, however, not being afflicted by his peculiar blindness, is in the condition of
fathoming this mystery. “Here died my mother. Herein was I born,” he said. The two events were,
of course,  simultaneous.  This is  the only thing that makes sense.  At this  realisation,  the whole
horrible truth dawns on us irreversibly and at once. The dark lady who haunted Egæus in the library,
and  who could not possibly be Berenice, is his mother. It all adds up, finally. Egæus killed his
mother. That was his dark deed (“what was it?”). His earliest recollections are associated with her,
and the library, and he is haunted by her image—and particularly by the image of her teeth. He
killed her in the library, but he forgot all about it—just as  he will later  forget all about his other
experiments in dental surgery, performed on the body of the dead-alive Berenice. He did tend to
forget this sort of thing. Other mysterious phrases in the tale suddenly become painfully obvious
clues to the original crime. Egæus grew up with his cousin in his “paternal halls,” but, somewhere
along the line, he claims something strange and unaccountable happened: 
Disease—a fatal  disease,  fell  like the simoon upon her  frame;  and,  even while  I
gazed upon her, the spirit of change swept over her, pervading her mind, her habits,
and her character, and, in a manner the most subtle and terrible, disturbing even the
identity  of  her  person! Alas! The destroyer came and went! —  and the victim –
where is she? I knew her not – or knew her no longer as Berenice! 
(Poe, “Berenice” 211)
Where  is  the  victim?  In  the  library,  of  course—where  Egæus  receives  the  visit  of  the
phantom of a woman that is not Berenice, but Egæus’s mother, who had died there, at the hands of
her son. Meanwhile, Berenice had not really become another person. Not realising he was haunted,
he confuses her with the ghost of his mother. Finally, the two become completely identified in his
mind, and he ends up doing to the cousin what he had done to his mother. The story of his mother,
152
then, is the story “that should not be told.” The “destroyer,” of course, was Egæus himself, and this
explains why he was haunted. Now, at last, we begin to understand what that dreadful hereditary
“madness” he goes on and on about really amounted to. Apparently, his mother had been the first
victim of his obsession with teeth.
This ought to teach us not to look for the meaning of life  in a sensational tale, especially
when the ominous hints of foul-play are as obvious as they are in “Berenice.” Egæus memories
were “replete with horror – horror more horrible from being vague, and terror more terrible from
ambiguity,”  but “the fearful page in the record of my existence,”  as he calls it, is not “written all
over with dim, and hideous, and unintelligible recollections”  that cannot be deciphered (Poe,
“Berenice” 217-18). This is a sly statement of the same challenge the narrator of “The Black Cat”
will later make to the reader. These recollections can be deciphered, but not by Egæus.
Yet, even then, in 1835, when Confessions was not yet entirely forgotten, no one connected
the dots, which is not at all surprising. The connection  is indisputable, but it is also dreadfully
“mystical.”  The reader is confined to the tunnel-vision of a narrator who is not only unable to
understand why the ghost of the dark lady visits him, but does not even realise he is being haunted. 
Poe’s contemporaries did not get the tale, and readings naturally got more obscure and mystical as
time went by, and the sources of Poe’s hoax became more and more obscure. Mabbott’s notes on the
tale  show how thoroughly it bamboozled the scholars of the mid-twentieth century. “This kind of
self-hypnotism may have been an experience of the author,” he muses, while searching for clues in
the dead-ends to which Egæus constitutive blindness had led him (220n6). He thought that Poe had
projected on his character his own experience with “intense and abnormal meditation”  (Mabbott,
Tales 1:211). Mabbott  supposed,  then,  that  Poe  shared  his  narrator  obsession  and  no  more
understood it than he did. But Poe has his own special way of sending the reader on a fool’s errand.
I believe Poe had a final joke in store for us. One of Egæus particular obsessions was of his
cousin’s  name itself.  He tells  his  peculiar  meditations  sometimes  consisted  in  a  strange verbal
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exercise.  He  liked  to  “repeat,  monotonously,  some common word,  until  the  sound,  by  dint  of
frequent repetition, ceased to convey any idea to the mind” (Poe, “Berenice” 212). One suspects
“Berenice” was one of the words in question—Egæus certainly likes to repeat it. Now, according to
him, by concentrating on the sound, he broke the bond between the signifier and the thing signified,
and this formed the trigger for his meditations. However, he had previously challenged the reader to
find some discernible  meaning to  his  meditations,  and the emphasis he places on the sound is
suggestive of the mechanism of semantic displacement known as punning.
Some far from meaningless associations, on which Mabbott almost hit, result when we try
the experiment Egæus proposes with it.  “In Poe’s day,” he writes, “Berenice was pronounced as
four syllables, and rhyming with ‘very spicy’”  (Mabbott,  Tales  1:219,  note  on  title). Mabbott
appears to have deliberately avoided stating that “Berenice” sounds almost like “very nicey.” Of
course, if this was the way the word was read, it would have sounded  exactly like “bury nicey,”
which is funny, in a twisted sort of way, considering that the character of that name gets buried alive
in the tale. Maybe Mabbott did not notice the pun which he involuntarily brings to the reader’s
attention;  or  perhaps  he  felt  it  was  too  irrelevant,  or  ridiculous  to  mention.  It  appears  to  me,
however, that the pun is not irrelevant, and that the context, namely Egæus disquisition about the
sound of words, actually makes it impossible to dismiss it. I believe, therefore, that this buried joke
was intended by Poe. One might say the joke is in bad taste—but then, so was “Berenice.”
In April 1835, only a month after “Berenice” first appeared, Poe published another femicide
story, “Morella.” Although it lacks the tell-tale confusion between the lively blonde and the skinny
dark ghost, its tone, the outlook of the narrator, and, most of all, his deeds,  more than justify its
inclusion in the group of Poe’s “femicides.” And this renders the narrator’s use of a biblical image
that had been employed by the original femicide meaningful.
I will provide a brief sketch of the tale’s plot. “Morella” is told by a man who married the
incredibly learned heroine, who died giving birth to a female girl. Their marriage, he tells us, had
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not been like other marriages. Morella was his “friend” and his teacher, but he had never exactly
loved her. The night she went into labour, she solemnly announced to her husband both her death
and the birth of their child and told him he would never again be happy. For a decade afterwards,
the  narrator  kept  their  daughter  a  secret,  never  even  naming  her.  During  this  period,  he  is
increasingly disturbed by the uncanny resemblance between the child and her late mother. Finally,
after she turned ten, he decided to baptise her. In the crucial moment of the ceremony he feels an
irresistible urge to give her her mother’s name. As soon as the word “Morella?” leaves his mouth,
the child collapses and replies: “I am here!” (Poe, “Morella” 235). Apparently, she never recovered
and died soon after. The narrator is convinced that Morella, who had studied Pythagoras’s theory of
transmigration of souls, had reincarnated in her own daughter’s body. This is, at least, the “thesis”
which the tale appears designed to illustrate. As so often happens in Poe’s tales, however, it is very
hard to tell exactly what the “story” is.
One of the things that disturbs the superficial “thesis” is the way he says Morella’s daughter
—for him she is  always  her child—resembled her mother.  As she grew, the father noticed she
looked, talked, and acted too much like her mother. And yet: “Of the mother I had never spoken to
the daughter—it was impossible to speak” (Poe, “Morella” 235). He found this similarity deeply
disturbing. In fact, he tells us it was more than mere resemblance; he speaks of “shadows, as it
were, of similitude,” and of a “too perfect identity;”  and “above all—oh, above all—in the phrases
and expressions of the dead on the lips of the loved and the living, I found food for consuming
thought and horror—for a worm that would not die” (“Morella” 234-35).
This image, which ultimately can be traced to Isaiah, appears in the very first paragraph of
Confessions:46 “Twenty years—and the vision still haunts me!—Yes, it is twenty years since I
46 Mabbott gives the source as Isaiah 66.24 (Tales 1:237n13). The image reappears in the Gospels, more precisely in
Mark 9:48, however, in a context equally meaningful to our purposes. In both places the never-dying worm conveys
the paradoxical idea of the eternal corruption of the flesh, itself a symbol of the punishment of those who renounce
God.
The line in Isaiah quoted by Mabbott is the last one in the book: “And they shall go forth and look on the dead
bodies of the men that have rebelled against me; for their worm shall not die, their fire shall not be quenched, and
they shall be abhorrence to all flesh.” The fate of the rebellious, who will be forgotten, is being contrasted with that
of the chosen faithful, whose “name” shall be preserved: “For as the new heavens and the new earth / which I will
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perpetrated that crime which has poisoned my existence, and thrown over it a cloud of unutterable
sorrow. All other crimes may sleep, but iniquity like mine never can. The worm that dies not preys
upon my heart: I am the victim of remorse” (Macnish,  Confessions 5). The narrator of Macnish’s
tale supplies a meaning for the image, which is only too viable in “Morella.” That is, the parallelism
between the two tales suggests that the “worm” that gnawed at the mind of the narrator of Poe’s tale
was also remorse. For he too had done something terrible to a woman—something which could,
figuratively speaking, be construed as femicide, and which may have actually caused her death. And
I am not talking about some hidden crime. This is something he admits he has done.
He had “snatched” his daughter “from the scrutiny of the world (…), and in the rigorous
seclusion of” his “home, watched with an agonising anxiety over all which concerned the beloved”
(Poe, “Morella” 234). This went on for “two lustra,” during which she was suffered to remain
“nameless upon the earth. ‘My child’ and ‘my love’ were the designations usually prompted by a
father’s affection, and the rigid seclusion of her days precluded all other intercourse” (235). In this
sentence,  while  slyly  placing  the  emphasis  on  the  “father’s  affection,”  the  narrator  admits  his
daughter never saw anybody but him. During all this time, she “received no impressions from the
make / shall remain before me, says the Lord; / so shall your descendants and your name remain” (66. 22). Here the
image does not necessarily require a mystical interpretation, as the idea with which it is being contrasted is that of
political, rather than personal permanence.
The same cannot be said of the passage in Mark where the image reappears in a decisively mystical sense:
“And if your eye causes you to sin, pluck it out; it is better for you to enter the kingdom of God with one eye than
with two eyes to be thrown into hell, where their worm does not die, and the fire is not quenched” (9.47-48). Here
the original metaphor becomes a symbol of retribution in the afterlife.
The narrator of the tale, very prone to the display of abstruse erudition, alludes to the supposed Hebrew origins
of the Christian imagery of Hell, to express the strange change his wife suffered during her pregnancy—of which he
appears to have been unaware until the day Morella announced him she was about to give birth to a child: “thus Joy
suddenly faded into Horror, and the most beautiful became the most hideous, as Hinnom became Ge-Henna” (Poe,
“Morella” 230). This strongly resonates with the image of the never dying worm, used in both the Old and the New
Testament.
Mabbott found in Hobbes the theory of the origin of the idea of Hell to which the narrator appears to allude,
and transcribes the relevant passage in the hope that “it may clarify Poe’s allusions,” but, as usual, regards it as self-
explanatory, though it actually contradicts the narrator’s assertion: “From this abominable place the Jews used (…)
to call the place of the damned (…) Gehenna, or valley of Hinnon (…) Gehenna is (…) usually now translated
Hell” (236-37 n3). Though Hobbes states that Gehenna/Hinnon became “Hell” (and, by the way, the word in the
original Greek of the passage in the Gospel of Mark was itself  a transliteration of Gehenna), he does in no way
imply that Hinnon became Gehenna. In that passage Hobbes also refers that in “the Valley of  the Children of
Hinnon (…) the Jews had committed most grievous idolatry, sacrificing their children to the idol Moloch” (Mabbott
236 n 3). Poe may have derived the idea of Hinnom becoming Gehenna, however, from Milton’s  Paradise Lost:
“Hinnom, Tophet thence / And black Gehenna called, the type of Hell” (1.404-5).
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outward world save such as might have been afforded by the narrow limits of her privacy” (235).
And these were very narrow indeed. Through this tour de force in circumlocution, he lets us know
he kept her locked up and strictly confined to his company for the first decade of her life. Thus, he
is responsible, at the very least,  for having provided a very unwholesome education to his only
daughter. There is ground to suspect a good deal more, but I will leave it at that for now.
Thus, the narrator of “Morella” resembles the women-killers we have looked at before both
in his deeds and in the disingenuousness of his tone. This determines the reading of the biblical
image I mentioned earlier. The resemblance between the daughter and her mother tormented him: it
was “food” for that same “worm that would not die” that William the femicide used as an image of
remorse. This sense of the image is consistent with Scripture. It is not clear, however, in what sense
the narrator of “Morella” intended the metaphor. He certainly does not betray any signs of remorse
for what he did to his daughter. He feels that his daughter  was his dead wife, and that this fully
justified  his  acts.  However,  the  unusual  application  of  the  common  metaphor  highlights  the
enormity of his deed. He does not feel remorse or, if he does, is not aware of it. Yet, he had every
reason to feel guilty. In fact, in his situation, it would be very strange for him not to be tormented by
remorse. This shows us, of course, what kind of man the narrator really is.
Even before the Confessions, the image had already been used at least once by a male first-
person  narrator to express the suffering occasioned by a conscience burthened with murder and
femicide. Victor Frankenstein, the protagonist of Mary Shelley’s eponymous novel (1818), believed
that his unholy creation had been responsible for the murder of his younger brother William, for
which his cousin Justine was tried, convicted and sentenced to death by hanging. “I,” he writes, “not
in deed, but in effect, was the true murderer” (90). No one but Victor knew about the monster but,
with the argument that his tale would not be believed, he decided to keep silent during Justine’s
trial: “when (…) I heard the harsh, unfeeling reasons of these men, my purposed avowal died away
on my lips. Thus I might proclaim myself a madman, but not revoke the sentence passed upon my
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wretched victim” (86). She met her fate with resignation and a tranquil conscience. “But I,” Victor
writes, “the true murderer, felt the never-dying worm alive in my bosom, which allowed of no hope
or  consolation”  (85).  Here,  the  image  is  employed  according  to  the  biblical  sense.  After  her
execution, Victor declares himself “seized by remorse and the sense of guilt, which hurried me to a
hell  of  intense  tortures,  such  as  no  language  can  describe”  (87).  Thus,  Victor  feels himself  a
murderer and a femicide, and uses the worm as an emblem of his hellish suffering. The contrast
with “Morella” is eloquent. Victor feels remorse for being the indirect cause of Justine’s suffering;
the father of the second Morella, despite having imprisoned his daughter for a decade, claims not to
feel any remorse.
Yet,  while Victor’s decision to keep his story from the public,  and from the “men” that
accused and passed sentence on her, may be understandable, his decision to keep the truth from her
is not as easy to excuse. His silence, indeed, which added to Justine’s suffering, easily lends itself to
a gendered reading. “‘Ever since I was condemned,’” Justine recounts, “my confessor has besieged
me; he threatened and menaced, until I almost began to think that I was the monster that he said I
was”  (Shelley,  Frankenstein  84). Pressured by Victor’s silence and the priest’s promptings, his
victim, or rather the victim of the monster he had created, is told she is a monster, and almost thinks
of herself as one. One might say she is the victim of an unlikely male complot, which may easily be
read as a metaphor of the male conspiracy against which the author’s mother, Mary Wollstonecraft,
had fought—the conspiracy that silenced women.
Poe’s treacherous biblical allusion is  clearly associated,  in  the  kind  of  modern  Gothic
literature that inspired his work with femicide and, more broadly, the oppression of women by men,
and this has an obvious bearing on the story. At the same time, the character he creates resembles
the tyrants of the conventional Gothic much more closely than William or Victor Frankenstein. This
is also perfectly representative of Poe’s work of composition. He retained the image, omitting the
meaning which the characters in Frankenstein and Confessions explained, thus leaving his reader to
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find exactly what the “worm”  meant. In order to do  so, however, the reader must  reject  the
complicated, but ultimately absurd mystical thesis developed by the narrator. As usual in Poe’s tales,
the “thesis” underlying the tale provides the narrator with a justification for the inhuman treatment
to which he subjects the women in the tale, his wife and his child. In this particular tale, the narrator
never so much as intimates his remorse—except when he employs the image of the “worm,” but,
for reasons I explain below, I believe he was not aware of its meaning.
Indeed,  as in the tales  we have  looked at  earlier,  the complicated “metaphysics”  of the
narrator does not constitute, strictly speaking, an explanation, but rather an excuse not to attempt an
explanation. In other words, the “metaphysical” theory he develops both justifies and upholds his
blindness, which is both moral and intellectual. The narrator is particularly baffled by his wife’s
dying words, which he comes to understand as an announcement of her reincarnation in the child
she left behind her—his child. This curse deserves a detailed analysis, which, as I said, I will defer
to  the third chapter  of my text. But even the most perfunctory analysis will show that there is
something fishy about this narrator. Just as Egæus performed an unutterable “deed” on his mother,
the narrator of “Morella” evidently did something equally appalling to his daughter. And the thing is
not even hidden, but merely blurred.
He tells us “she was the perfect resemblance of her who had departed, and I loved her with a
love more fervent than I had believed it possible to feel for any denizen of earth” (Poe, “Morella”
233). This love was, he claims, soon tainted: “the heaven of this pure affection became darkened,
and gloom, and horror, and grief, swept over it in clouds. I said the child grew strangely in stature
and intelligence” (230). As his daughter grew, the father was filled with “terrible” and “tumultuous
thoughts:” “I daily discovered in the conceptions of the child the adult powers and faculties of the
woman;” “the lessons of experience fell from the lips of infancy;” “the wisdom or the passions of
maturity I found hourly gleaming from its full and speculative eye” (234). Could he be any clearer?
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The younger Morella was fast becoming a woman, and his choice of words clearly evokes
the idea of sexual maturity. But he slyly diverts attention from the unavoidable implications of his
discourse, by placing the emphasis on “her mental being” (Poe, “Morella” 234). Yet, he was equally
interested in, and disturbed by her physical development: “Strange indeed was her rapid increase in
bodily size,” he had told us earlier (233). He then sums up his feelings at the time: “all this,” by
which he means the intellectual as well as the physical growth of his daughter, “became evident to
my  appalled  senses;”  “I  could  no  longer  hide  it  from  my  soul,  nor  throw  it  off  from  those
perceptions which trembled to receive it” (234). Thus, after having spoken of her “passions,” which
he thought  were those of  a  “mature”  woman,  he now makes it  very clear  that  not  merely  his
intellect, but his senses were disturbed by his daughter’s growth.
It is impossible not to guess the nature of his terrible, “appalling” thoughts. He was starting
to feel for his daughter the same kind of love he had felt for her mother. This evidently suggests, of
course, that he was sexually attracted to his infant daughter. Yet, this is where things get really
confusing. He had told us earlier that he had never been sexually attracted to Morella—that is, at
least, what he appears to tell us in his usual roundabout way. He admits that “my soul, from our first
meeting,  burned  with  fires  it  had  never  before  known;  but  the  fires  were  not  of  Eros”  (Poe,
“Morella” 229).  Thus,  he had experienced “burning” desire  for Morella,  but  intimates that  this
desire was not sexual, but rather spiritual in nature.
Yet, the birth of the second Morella itself is evidence that the narrator had sexual intercourse
with the first. Indeed, Morella is categorical: it was his child. By his own admission, the possibility
of adultery can be ruled out: “She shunned society and attaching herself to me alone rendered me
happy” (Poe, “Morella” 225). Therefore, some of that “fire” must have been of “Eros” after all. But
that is precisely where the problem lies. His emphatic denial of “Eros” suggests that this was never
the  case,  hence,  that  the  pregnancy  was  a  miracle.  This  suggestion  is  then  reinforced  by  his
“metaphysical” rhetoric—we will look more closely at this rhetoric in the third chapter. Thus, in
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practice, the reader is presented with a choice. That is, the reader must decide whether or not to
credit the narrator’s statement. If true, the birth of the second Morella was indeed wonderful, and
we must accept also his other suggestion that she was all Morella. But the evidence is all against
him. Not only that, he betrays his unreliability in every line of the tale.
The narrator never acknowledges he was sexually attracted to the second Morella, but then,
he also asserts that he had “never spoke of passion, nor thought of love” while he lived with the first
(Poe, “Morella” 229).47 Yet, although he might not have spoken of love, or even thought about it, he
certainly  made love  to  her.  According to  his  own narrative,  then,  he “loved” both Morellas  in
exactly the same way—the idea is even reinforced by his claim that they were the same “person.”
Since his claim—or more precisely, his suggestion—that he was not sexually involved with Morella
the first is preposterous, and his “love” for her was not nearly as “pure” as he makes it out to be, we
are inevitably drawn to the conclusion that he felt an incestuous desire for his daughter. He desired
his daughter, therefore, in exactly the same way he had desired the mother. Which, of course, is
what he had been telling us all along.
And what does he do about the “appalling” thoughts he entertained about his daughter? Let
us hear the story in his own words: “as years rolled away, and I gazed, day after day, upon her holy,
and mild, and eloquent face, and pored over her maturing form, day after day did I discover new
points of resemblance in the child to her mother” (Poe, “Morella” 234). He locked her up, prevented
anyone else from seeing her, and spent every day “poring” over her “maturing form.” Now, at last,
he admits he was particularly interested, and disturbed, by her “form.” This, of course, practically
screams incest. The reader, however, is very apt to overlook the obvious implications of his words.
After all, we have been predisposed from the beginning to look for the “metaphysical” in his tale.
47 We find a similarly emphatic, and equally suspect denial of sexual activity in “Berenice:” “surely I had never loved 
her. (…) my passions always were of the mind. Through the gray of the early morning (…) I had seen her—(…) not
as a being of the earth, earthy, but as the abstraction of such a being (…); not as an object of love, but as a theme of 
the most abstruse although desultory speculation” (Poe, 214). Dawn Keetley has convincingly argued that Berenice 
was, like Morella, pregnant at the time of her death: “The marriage may be explained (…) by Berenice’s pregnancy,
for the narrator only mentions it after ‘bitterly lamenting her fallen and desolate condition’ and after having ‘called 
to mind that she ha[s] loved [him] long’” (Pregnant Women 5).
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But let us forget about metaphysics. The story, in its bare outline, is very simple. It is almost
like a fairy tale. I am thinking of one specific fairy tale which deals with a father that is similarly
tormented by a too perfect resemblance between a female daughter and her dead mother. Morella,
as I have already mentioned, makes a long and complicated death-bed speech to her husband—at
least, her husband finds it very complicated. The gist of this speech, however, is also very simple:
she informs her husband that she is about to die, and also that she will give birth to a child, adding
that “the hours of thy happiness are over, and joy is not gathered twice in a life” (Poe, “Morella”
233). She thus predicts that her husband will not remarry, or rather, she solemnly intimates him not
to. The resemblance with the dying queen’s speech of Perrault’s “Peau d’Ane” is remarkable: 
Arrivé à sa dernière heure
Elle dit au Roi son Époux:
‘Trouvez bon qu’avant que je meure
J’exige une chose de vous; 
C’est que s’il vous prenait envie
De vous remarier quand je n’y serais plus… (Contes 59)
At this point, the king interrupts her—much like the narrator of “Morella” interrupts his 
wife:
— Ah! dit le Roi, ces soins sont superflus,
Je n’y songerais de ma vie,
Soyez en repos là-dessus. (Perrault, Contes 59)
This reply manifests a premature wish to see the wife safely buried, which is a very unloving
thought for a husband to express at such a juncture. Incidentally, Poe’s narrator also confesses he
yearned for his pregnant wife’s death: “Shall I then say that I longed with an earnest and consuming
desire  for  the moment of  Morella’s  decease?  I  did” (Poe,  “Morella”  232). Unperturbed by the
interruption, Perrault’s queen resumes her speech:
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“Je le crois bien, reprit la Reine,
Si j’en prends à témoin votre amour véhément;
Mais pour m’en rendre plus certaine, 
Je veux avoir votre serment,
Adouci toutefois par ce tempérament
Que si vous rencontrez une femme plus belle,
Mieux faite et plus sage que moi,
Vous pourrez franchement lui donnez votre foi
Et vous marriez avec elle”
Sa confiance en ses attraits
Lui faisait regarder une telle promesse
Comme un serment surpris avec adresse,
De ne se marier jamais. (Perrault, Contes 60)
The husband promised her what she asked and mourned his loss very loudly. The shrewd
narrator cynically remarks: “A l’ouïr sangloter et les nuits et les jours, / On jugea que son deuil ne
lui durerait guère, / Et qu’il pleurait ses défuntes Amours / Comme un homme pressé qui veut sortir
d’affaire” (Perrault,  Contes 60). Sure enough, the king soon decided to remarry,  and looked about
him for a way to do it without breaking his oath: “Il fallait garder son serment / Et que la nouvelle
Épousée / Eût plus d’attraits et d’agrément / Que celle qu’on venait de mettre au monument” (60).
And he found only one woman that fulfilled the conditions that his wife had imposed on him.
His and the dead queen’s daughter “possédait certains tendres appas / Que la défunte n’avais
pas,” and the bereaved king felt himself “brûlant d’un amour extrême” for her. This, he thought,
was the only woman that could compare to her mother, and therefore he  proceeded to court her
forthwith.  The basic storyline runs perfectly parallel with “Morella,”  but its ending contrasts
eloquently with that of Poe’s tale. The incestuous father at length marries his daughter to a young
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prince from a nearby kingdom, and, if he does not forget his love, its “fires” are channelled to a
socially acceptable object: “le Père de l’Épousée, / Qui d’elle autrefois amoureux / Avait avec le
temps purifiés les feux / Dont son Âme était embrasée. / Il en avait banni tout désir criminel / Et de
cette odieuse flamme / Le peu qui restait dans son âme / N’en rendait que plus vif son amour
paternel” (Perrault, Contes 74). Significantly, the metaphor of “fire” is employed in both stories as a
metaphor for the love of the father for his daughter: for, as we have seen, the father in “Morella”
“loved” his  daughter  “with a  love more  fervent than I  had believed it  possible  to  feel  for any
denizen of earth” (Poe, “Morella” 233 emphasis mine). The word, of course, evokes the idea of fire,
thereby indicating that the “fires” were even more intense now than they had been while the first
Morella lived. But, while the king’s desire becomes paternal love, and is therefore “purified,” the
opposite seems to take place in “Morella.”
The corollary of the second Morella’s unwholesome upbringing in exclusive “intercourse”
with her father, is the scene of her baptism, at age ten, which symbolically re-enacts the narrator’s
wedding  with  her  mother. Indeed,  the  ceremony  is  the  ritual  consecration  of  the  narrator’s
perception that the child is her mother. The narrator, moreover, claims that the decision to name the
daughter after her mother was not the result of forethought, but of a sudden impulse, which he
regards as some sort of demoniacal epiphany, which is tacitly associated with Morella’s dealings
with evil supernatural powers. “What demon urged me to breathe that sound, which, in its very
recollection was wont to make ebb the purple blood in torrents from the temples to the heart? What
fiend spoke from the recesses of my soul, when, amid those dim aisles, and in the silence of the
night, I whispered within the ears of the holy man the syllables—Morella” (Poe, “Morella” 235).48
Thus,  he disavows all  responsibility  for  the  choice of  the name,  suggesting that  this  had been
ordained by a higher, unspeakably evil power that presided over his existence and determined his
48 This sentence throws additional  suspicion over the ceremony. It  was performed in the nighttime,  and in some
unspecified location referred to by the ambiguous phrase “dim aisles.” All this suggests that it was a clandestine
ceremony, a suggestion that is reinforced by the fact of the narrator’s “whispering” the name “within the ears of the
holy man.” Was this “holy man” a priest at all? I cannot help but wonder.
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acts. At the same time, of course, through the magical act of naming, his desire for his daughter is
justified,  and she officially takes the place of her mother  by her father’s side.  Incidentally,  the
narrator  himself  intimates  that  the real  purpose of  the  ceremony was to  legitimise  the  unusual
“intercourse” he maintained with his daughter: “at length the ceremony of baptism presented to my
mind (…) a present deliverance from the terrors of my destiny” (235).
The narrator makes it seem she died at the very moment when her father gave the unnamed
child the name that had been her mother’s—which  of  course  would  have  put  an  end  to  their
cohabitation. It looks that way, but as usual, the narrator does not exactly say so. This is yet another
notable instance of misdirection, or weasel-wording. As he called her by the name of her mother,
the child’s face turned “the hues of death” and she fell “prostrate on the black slabs of our ancestral
vault”  (“Morella”  235). The dark intimations of impending doom up to this point predispose the
reader  to  automatically  assume  that  the  girl  died,  but  the  sentence  also  admits  a  different
interpretation: she may have merely swooned. This is followed by the last paragraph of the tale,
which, instead of clarifying the matter, is even more ominously ambiguous:
And I kept no reckoning of time or place, and the stars of my fate faded from heaven,
and therefore the earth grew dark, and its figures passed by me, like flitting shadows,
and among them all I beheld only—Morella. The winds of the firmament breathed
but one sound within my ears, and the ripples upon the sea murmured evermore—
Morella. But she died; and with my own hands I bore her to the tomb; and I laughed
with a long and bitter laugh as I found no trace of the first, in the charnel where I laid
the second—Morella. (Poe, “Morella” 236)49
Everything in these last few sentences is ambiguous. It is impossible to say whether the
second Morella died soon after her baptism or years later: the narrator did not keep track of time.
49 There is some resemblance between this sentence and the line from “Peau d’Ane” I quoted above, not so much in
words, perhaps, but in feeling. The widowed king compares potential candidates to be his wife with “celle qu’on
venait de mettre au monument,” feeling that none but his daughter fulfilled the conditions his late wife had imposed
on him. In “Morella” the same comparison is implied.
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And if, as this seems to indicate, she survived her baptism, what was he doing during the time that
mediated between it and her death? Presumably, he kept passionately “poring” over her “maturing
form” and indulging his unutterable desire.
Finally, the very last sentence suggests that the corpse of the first Morella was gone from the
“charnel.” But this too is ambiguous. Mabbott rightly points out a resemblance between Poe’s tale
and  the “The Dead Daughter”  by Henry Glassford Bell, though it seems to me a manifest
overstatement to say that “Poe’s plot comes almost entirely from”  it (Tales  1:222). In any case,
Mabbott does not list the differences, which are equally significant. One major difference is that the
last sentence in Glassford’s tale is completely unambiguous: “the corpse was gone” (Poe, “Morella”
224). The narrator of Morella suggests that the same happened to him, but he is far from stating it.
He found no trace of the first in the tomb where he placed the corpse of the second Morella. The
reader will naturally assume that the corpses were deposited in the same place—but he will do so at
his own risk. In a tale like this, one can never be too careful. The narrator’s words can be given an
entirely different, indeed an opposite construal. He may simply be saying that afther she died, he did
not see that “perfect identity” between his daughter and her mother  which had him so worked-up
before. In other words, one may suppose the narrator recognised at that juncture that his daughter
was not her mother. This, of course, would surprise no one but the narrator. 
In  short,  not  one  aspect  of  the  yarn  that  exempts  the  narrator  from blame holds  up  to
scrutiny. The evidence that he maintained an incestuous relationship with his own daughter, on the
other hand, is virtually irrefutable. Indeed, the profound motivation of his rhetoric may be to free
him from the accusation of incest. He systematically erases his role in her birth, thereby suggesting
that she was not his daughter—she was Morella herself. Technically, then, his love for his daughter
could never be construed as incest. Even in a straight reading of the tale, he made her short life
miserable beyond conception, by treating her as if she were her mother.
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The comparison with Perrault’s fables is useful because it shows how simple and
straightforward the storyline in these tales is, and how it gets obscured by the narrator’s complicated
jargon. Like Macnish, Poe evidently tapped the same  gallery of horrors from which the Gothic
novelists had culled their villains, making them the narrators of their own tales: first the demented
dental surgeon, then the incestuous father, who adds incest to injury. Still, “Berenice” and “Morella”
are excessively nebulous affairs compared with “Ligeia,”  which  I  regard  as  the  crowning
achievement  of  the  genre.  By  the  time  he  wrote  his  devilishly  sophisticated  retelling  of  the
“bluebeard” myth, Poe had much perfected his technique of misdirection.
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6 – Modus Operandi: Poe’s Theory of the Mystery
Thus, in Poe’s covert femicides all adds up in the end. When the reader hits on the simple
story that makes all the apparent misfits in the plot fall into place, it imposes itself at once with all
the force of recognition. This is equally true of “Berenice,” “Morella,” and “Ligeia.” The reader
may argue, however, that the case against Poe’s narrators relies entirely on circumstantial evidence
and, therefore, that we could never pin the rap on them. As a further objection, the argument could
be made that things seldom add up so perfectly in real life. All this is true.
I admit that the prosecution’s case in these tales  is wholly circumstantial. Even worse, the
case is entirely based on what  we might  term “internal evidence.”  On the subject of “internal
evidence” in hoaxes Poe had a lot to say. In the March 1848 installment of the Marginalia (number
200 in Pollin’s edition), for example, he mocks the circular argument involved in “what people call
testing a thing by ‘internal evidence’” (Poe,  Brevities  333). The episode that occasioned this quip
was the publication of “Mesmeric Revelation”  by The Popular Record of Modern Science, a
London paper which claimed that the story was authentic. “The Record,” Poe writes,
insists upon the truth of the story because of certain facts—because ‘the initials of the
young men must be sufficient to establish their identity’—because ‘the nurses must
be  accessible  to  all  sorts  of  inquiries’—and  because  the  ‘angry  excitement  and
various rumors which at length rendered a public statement necessary, are sufficient
to show that something extraordinary must have taken place.
To be sure! The story is proved by these facts—the facts about the students,
the nurses, the excitement, the credence given the tale of New York. And now all we
have to do is to prove these facts. Ah!—they are proved by the story.
(Poe, Brevities 333)
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Analysis of “internal evidence” is, of course, no test of fact. The idea that one can decide of
the validity of a report concerning events in the physical world without reference to any sort of
empirical data rests on an obvious fallacy. No empirical test is required to rule out an inconsistent
theory,  that  is,  one  which  breaks  the  law of  non-contradiction.  Thus,  there  is  such  a  thing  as
“internal evidence” of inauthenticity. But one cannot infer from the fact that all authentic reports are
consistent  that  all  consistent  reports  are  authentic—this  is  a  classic  example of  non distributio
medii. Poe called the article of the Record: “One of the happiest examples, in a small way, of the
carrying-one’s-self-in-a-hand-basket logic” (Brevities 331). I say that “internal evidence” is no test
of fact in real life. And this because we cannot reasonably expect consistency from real life. But we
can and do expect it from fiction. This consistency is, in the final analysis, the substratum of Poe’s
mysteries. In other words, consistency is the basic assumption that underlies every single inference
leading to the solution of the mystery.
But some may still ask: if Poe wanted his reader to solve the mystery that baffled his
narrator, why did he not say so? I could answer that, while he did not exactly say so, Poe did throw
many hints that things were not what they seemed in his tales, and give the New World note about
“Ligeia” as an example. But that would be skirting the issue. I will provide two straight answers.
Poe did not say so, first, because he did not want the solution to the mystery to be revealed too soon,
as this would, according to his theory of the mystery, deprive it of its main interest; the other reason
why he did not give away the solution was because he thought that, strictly speaking, a writer could
not provide solutions for any of the tales he published. According to him, the solution had to be
there  in  latency.  This  not  being  the  case,  the  writer  could  not  impose  one  ex  cathedra.  If  the
solution, on the other hand, was indeed at the reach of analysis, he thought he would pay himself a
disservice by explaining it to his readers.
Poe developed his theory of the “mystery” story in criticism, most notably in the second of
two  reviews  of  Nathaniel  Hawthorne’s  Twice-Told  Tales,  and  in  his  two reviews  of  Dickens’s
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Barnaby Rudge, published in May 1841 in the Saturday Evening Post, and in Graham’s in February
1842. According to Poe, the expectations a mystery creates on a reader are invariably disappointed
by its solution:  “the  anticipation  must  surpass  the  reality;  (…)  no  matter  how  terrific  be  the
circumstances  which,  in  the  dénouement,  shall  appear  to  have  occasioned  the  expression  of
countenance worn habitually by Mrs. Rudge,” for example, “still they will not be able to satisfy the
mind of the reader. He will surely be disappointed” (Rev. of Barnaby Rudge [1842] 239). Moreover,
Dickens throws his reader off by hinting of supernatural agency. Poe does points out that, though
this may not be the main focus, the novel is a variation on the explained supernatural. In fact, the
error with which Poe taxes Dickens is the same Coleridge had accused Radcliffe of committing: 
the  same  mysterious  terrors  are  continually  exciting  in  the  mind  the  idea  of  a
supernatural appearance, keeping us, as it were, upon the very edge and confines of
the world of spirits, and yet are ingeniously explained by familiar causes; curiosity is
kept upon the stretch from page to page, and from volume to volume, and the secret,
which the reader thinks himself every instant on the point of penetrating, flies like a
phantom before him, and eludes his eagerness till the very last moment of protracted
expectation. (…) Curiosity is raised oftener than it is gratified; or rather, it is raised
so high that no adequate gratification can be given it.
(Coleridge, Rev. of The Mysteries of Udolpho 203-204)
Poe agreed  that  this was the great disadvantage of the explained mystery. In his tales,
however, Poe found a way to avoid disappointing the average reader, while rewarding the efforts of
the analytical: this was the unexplained mystery the possibility of which he slyly intimates. Though
they made sense enough for most of the public, his mysteries remained mysterious enough to keep
even those readers who could not find the solution curious, and therefore interested and entertained.
When the true story, which the author had cunningly obscured, was finally detected,  the joy of
discovery would hopefully effectively counterbalance the disappointment  of the diligent  reader.
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Thus, Poe appears to have thought that it was not convenient for a writer to clarify the meaning of a
mystery, either by having a character explain it, or by pointing out the solution, as it were, in person,
and history seems to have proven him right. Though many have questioned his place in the canon of
world literature, Poe has remained permanently in popular demand, and I suspect his mysteries have
much to do with that.
The reviews of  Barnaby Rudge  (both of  them) also clearly  express  Poe’s  view that  the
solution to a mystery, whether the author chose to reveal it to the reader or not, had to be implied by
the text, and a consequence of the plot. In other words, whether the solution was a consequence, or
more precisely the only possible consequence of the tale, and therefore within the reach of analysis,
albeit not apparent, or the tale was no mystery. For, as we will soon see, Poe thought that a mystery
with no solution—that is, a definite, intelligible solution—was a contradiction in terms. Not even
the author’s own authority could impose a solution on the reader that was not rigorously coded. Poe
forcibly demonstrated his point in the first of his reviews of Dickens’s novel by boldly predicting its
dénouement,  hence the solution to  the mystery,  when only a few chapters  had been published.
Indeed, Dickens first printed the novel as a serial in his own periodical, Master Humphrey’s Clock,
from February to November 1841; Poe’s solution was published in May 1841. Poe’s prophecy is
based on his assessment of the author’s intention, as manifested in the portion of the work that had
already been printed. In this sense, the question is, for Poe, strictly a matter of criticism, understood
as the analysis of the art of writing:
The design of Mr. Dickens is here two-fold—first that of increasing our anticipation
in regard to the deed committed—exaggerating our impression of its atrocity—and,
secondly, that of causing this horror of blood on the part of the idiot [the eponymous
character], to bring about, in consistence with poetical justice, the condemnation of
the murderer:—for it is a murder that has been committed. We say in accordance
with poetical justice—and, in fact, it will be seen hereafter that Barnaby, the idiot, is
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the murderer’s own son. The horror of blood which he feels is the mediate result of
the  atrocity,  since  this  atrocity  is  was  which  impressed  the  imagination  of  the
pregnant mother; and poetical justice will therefore be well fulfilled when this horror
shall urge on the son to the conviction of the father in the perpetrator of the deed.
(Rev. of Barnaby Rudge [1841] 219).
Poe goes on to reveal the identity of the victim, Ruben Haredale, the circumstances of his
murder, and of Mr. Rudge, Sr.’s disappearance.
Even if Dickens himself were to contradict the predictions Poe made from the first published
chapters of his novel, as he eventually did, in some minor details, he would be wrong, for Poe had
only brought out the solution that was latent in the text. In fact, Poe insists that, once the text is
published, the writer who created it has no more authority over it than the reader. And this applies
even to the published chapters of a serial. Thus, in a sense, Poe proclaimed the “death of the author”
more than a century before Roland Barthes popularised the idea.
But,  while  structuralist  and post-structuralist  conceptions  of  literature  have  brought  into
question  the  correlation  between  the  intentions  of  the  writer  and the  meaning  of  a  text,  Poe’s
conception of authorship relies on a very robust understanding of intention, and places great faith in
the writer’s ability to control the reader’s response to the text. These notions are involved in his
theory of the mystery. According to Poe, and he was adamant on this point, every self-respecting
artist tried his best to be as consistent as possible. Thus, the writer should start by establishing a
clear conception of the plot, from beginning to end, and then make sure that every detail, every
word, tended to the preestablished dénouement. Theoretically, therefore, the dénouement could be
omitted, and be inferred from the tale, provided, of course, the narrative was sufficiently consistent.
“Ligeia,” however, clearly lacks a formal dénouement; it ends with a climax which is not explicitly
resolved in the tale. Indeed, the climax, or crisis, is the point in which the accumulated tension of
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the plot reaches its peak; this tension seeks resolution and, in this sense, tends—or should tend,
according to the classical Aristotelian understanding of poetry—to the dénouement.
The theory of the mystery that I have been outlining is a paraphrase of statements contained
in Poe’s two reviews of Barnaby Rudge, in the first of which Poe had forcibly demonstrated that the
dénouement of a consistent plot could be omitted—by anticipating the ending of Dicken’s mystery.
In this sense, therefore, the mystery form was itself a demonstration of his theory of poetry. Thus, if,
in a sense, Poe broke literary etiquette by revealing the murder the author had intended to reveal
himself,  he  also  paid  the  English  writer  a  compliment,  albeit a very condescending one, for,
ultimately, Poe’s inferences must be traced to the fundamental assumption that the author had
decided on a particular dénouement before he started writing, and written with this always in view.
According to Poe, this was the only artistic way to write. 
However,  he follows this  implied compliment,  in  the second review of  Barnaby Rudge,
which appeared after the whole novel had been published, with the claim that Dickens had betrayed
his initial conception: “It is, perhaps, but one of a thousand instances of the disadvantages, both to
the author and the public, of the present absurd fashion of periodical novel-writing, that our author
had not sufficiently considered or determined upon any particular plot when he began the story now
under review”  (Rev. of  Barnaby Rudge  [1842] 236). He then instances this statement with many
inconsistencies in Dickens’s  plot, which he takes as evidence that Dickens had changed his mind
halfway  through  his  novel.  In  other  words,  according  to  Poe,  he  had  the  intention  of  writing
precisely the story Poe had deduced from his earlier chapters, and had succeeded in realizing that
intention,  thus  enabling  Poe  to  complete  the  story.  Then,  after  those  chapters  were  published,
Dickens changed the design.
Poe certainly has a point there. Poe’s deductions are, for the most part, borne out by Dickens
sequel. Rudge, Sr. is finally revealed as the murderer of Reuben Haredale. But not by the means Poe
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had predicted. He had predicted that his son’s “awe” of blood would ultimately lead to his father’s
apprehension. In the finished novel, however, 
this horror of blood is  inconsequential; and of this we complain. Strongly insisted
upon in the beginning of the narrative, it produces no adequate result. And here how
fine an opportunity Mr. Dickens has missed! The conviction of the assassin, after the
lapse of twenty-two years, might easily have been brought about through his son’s
mysterious awe of blood—an awe created in the unborn by the assassination itself—
and this would have been one of the finest possible embodiments of the idea which
we are accustomed to attach to “poetical justice.”
(Rev. of Barnaby Rudge (1842) 243)
And Poe is right. Whatever other merits the novel might have, Dickens appears to have
forgotten all about poor Barnaby’s horror of blood. Poe’s earlier deductions, as I said, presuppose
that the author had that degree of foresight necessary to the management of “plot,”  the defining
quality of which, according to his definition, is consistency. “Nothing is more clear,”  Poe wrote,
“than that every plot, worth the name, must be elaborated to its dénouement before any thing be
attempted with the pen. It is only with the dénouement constantly in view that we can give a plot its
indispensable air of consequence, or causation, by making the incidents, and especially the tone at
all points, tend to the development of the intention” (“Philosophy of Composition” 60). This is from
the second paragraph of “The Philosophy of Composition,”  originally published in 1846. In the
opening sentence of this essay, Poe explicitly identifies the essay as a restatement of the ideas he
had developed in his discussion of Barnaby Rudge:  “Charles Dickens, in a note now lying before
me, alluding to an examination I once made of the mechanism of ‘Barnaby Rudge,’ says, ‘By the
way, are you aware that Godwin wrote his ‘Caleb Williams’  backwards?’”  (“Philosophy of
Composition”  60). With “Philosophy,”  therefore,  Poe ostensibly  proposes to correct  Dickens’s
understanding of “plot.” However, though he places the emphasis, with the characteristic petulance
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of his critical persona, on pre-conception, the chief animus of his review is, I believe, that  of
satirizing the foolishness of “periodical novel writing.”
Poe’s two  reviews of Barnaby Rudge, like “Philosophy,” are of course more important as
statements of Poe’s ideas on mysteries, than as a criticism of Dickens’s  novel. The latter may or
may not have agreed with Poe’s views of the importance of consistency—like most writers, he may
well have thought that consistency could be sacrificed to maintain suspense. The reader certainly is
under no obligation to accept Poe’s critical standards—especially because they appear not to have
matched Dickens’s. It is my conviction that all  great works of art  in a sense contain their own
critical standard, and that the measure of the artists success is, at least in part, the extent to which he
was able to adhere to these unstated rules. Dickens perhaps did not value consistency as highly as
Poe.  And,  of  course,  some readers may even prefer Dickens’s inconsistencies over Poe’s
consistencies. On my part, I hope that I will never be called upon to choose between the two. But
that is not the point. It is only fair to suppose that Poe would do, as an author, what he expected
from Dickens; that he would himself abide by the rules to which he holds others.
His reviews of Barnaby Rudge show that Poe thought that mysteries in fiction should have a
solution, that this should not be beyond the means of an inquisitive reader, and that consistency was
the only way to guarantee this. Rudge contained, from its first chapters, clues to a hidden murder—
therefore, Poe thought, there had to be a hidden murder in the tale. Thus, Poe places himself in the
shoes of readers of tales like “Ligeia.” There is no manifest crime in that tale, it is true, yet no one
would deny—and no one ever did, I think—that there are many clues to murder in “Ligeia.” The
most conspicuous of these are some ghostly drops of poison falling from an “invisible spring” into
Rowena’s wine ("Ligeia" 325). Yet, very few critics have valued such indications. G. R. Thompson,
in his influential book Poe’s Fiction: Romantic Irony in the Gothic Tales (1973) attempted to put an
end to what he regarded as idle speculation, arguing that Poe intended the events in that tale, what I
called its “story,”  to be indeterminate. The  mystery  in  the  tale,  Thompson  thought,  was
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unfathomable,  and  its  solution  could  only  be  imperfectly  glimpsed,  never  clearly  defined  or
understood.
Some have even seen the following passage in Poe’s second criticism of Barnaby Rudge as a
statement of this view: “These intimations—these dark hints of some uncertain evil,” such as Poe
found in the first installments of Dickens’s novel, “are often rhetorically praised as effective but are
only justly so praised where there is no dénouement whatever—where the reader’s imagination is
left to clear up the mystery for itself—and, this, we suppose, is not the design of Mr. Dickens” (Rev.
of Barnaby Rudge [1841] 219).
For Bruce I. Weiner, “Poe is distinguishing those webs the mystery writer weaves for the
express purpose of unravelling and those mysteries of the human condition, those ‘dark hints of
some uncertain evil,’ which cannot be explained” (“Metaphysical Art” 44). A few years earlier, Elsa
Nettels  had  misinterpreted  this  passage  in  a  similar  way:  “Here  Poe  criticized  Dickens  for
attempting to explain mysterious events so portentous that even the most horrific circumstances
devised to account for them could not satisfy the reader. Dickens would have been well advised,
Poe argued, to attempt no explanation whatever and allow the reader’s imagination to satisfy itself”
(“Poe and James” 6). By this, as her comparison with Henry James’s fiction shows, Nettels means
to  say that  Poe was of  the  opinion that  “dark  hints” were only  artistic  when the  mystery was
unsolvable. Poe is in fact saying that they are only legitimate when the author is aware of a solution
he omits from his narrative. 
Indeed, the “dark hints of some uncertain evil” referred by Poe are the  clues to a murder
committed by the “idiot” Barnaby’s father, when his mother was pregnant. Poe is speaking of such
things as the birthmark in Barnaby’s wrist, his “awe of blood—an awe created in the unborn by the
assassination itself”  (Rev. of  Barnaby Rudge  [1841] 220), or some apparent incoherencies in his
ravings. As regards the last, Poe remarks that “almost every word spoken by him will be found to
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have an undercurrent of meaning, by paying strict attention to which, the enjoyment of the
imaginative reader will be infinitely heightened” (222). 
All these things darkly hint of murder, no question about it, and Poe had no problem with
that. What Poe questions is the adaptation of such clues  to Dickens’s design,  and this for a very
specific reason: such hints of murder are not suitable for tales where the author designs to reveal the
murder to the reader. Poe tells us—without any ambiguity—that such hints are only suitable for
tales with no dénouement—that is, in tales where the reader must deduce it. The “mystery” of the
tale, indeed, is clearly defined by the omission of this dénouement. And of course, where this cannot
be deduced, there is, according to Poe’s theory, no “plot.” This, however, was not “the design of Mr.
Dickens,” who intended to enact his  dénouement, sparing the reader the work of deducing it.  No,
this was a design peculiar to Poe. Indeed, it clearly follows from his argument that his tales, where
similar hints are present, and the dénouement absent, should be subjected to the same kind of
reading to which Poe subjected Dickens’s incomplete novel, to reveal the hidden crime that alone
can justify the artist’s hints. Poe’s success in discovering the crime really proves his point. For a
careful reader like himself, indeed, the explanation was in a matter superfluous.
In the second article he wrote on Barnaby Rudge, published in Graham’s in February 1842,
after the whole novel had been published, Poe elaborates on his theory of the management of the
“mystery.”  Some crucial facts in the story were “sedulously kept from the reader’s knowledge:”
“We say sedulously; for, the intention once known, the traces of the design can be found in every
page”  (Rev.  of  Barnaby Rudge  [1842] 232). As an illustration, Poe singles out an “ingenious”
passage in which, according to him, the author tricks the reader into believing Solomon Daisy saw a
ghost: “The impression here skillfully conveyed is, that the ghost seen is that of Reuben Haredale;
and the mind of the not-too-acute reader is at once averted from the true state of the case—from the
murderer, Rudge, living in the body” (233). The not-too-acute reader, of course, as opposed to the
“imaginative,” mentioned in a previous quotation, who is able to detect the author’s design before
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the solution is given, which, as may be surmised from Poe’s analysis, should be inherent to the text:
“if we did not rightly prophesy, yet, at least, our prophecy should have been right” (235).
When Poe says, therefore, that it is only legitimate for an author to hint of a crime when the
reader is given no dénouement, he is not saying, as Weiner supposes, that the mystery must be
unfathomable, but merely that the solution, although not apparent,  should be coded so that reader
may find it, like Poe did,  with a little effort. Whether the author intends to reveal the mystery
himself, in true Radcliffian fashion (or to let a character like Dupin make a dramatic revelation of
it), or prefers to leave the reader in the dark with no written dénouement—a possibility clearly
intimated by Poe—, he must take good care “that the secret be well kept” (Rev. of Barnaby Rudge
[1842] 234). That is, the writer must be reasonably sure that the not-so-acute readers will receive
the false impression he “sedulously”  conveys, not apprehending the hidden meaning before the
writer intended it to be discovered. That is, the solution must not emerge spontaneously from the
reading—it must be eked out by a deliberate exertion of the problem-solving faculties.
For example, the average reader should not be allowed to realise that Solomon Daisy did not
see a ghost. “If the mystery leak out, against the author’s will, his purposes are immediately at odds
and ends; for he proceeds upon the supposition that certain impressions do exist, which do not exist,
in the mind of his readers”  (Poe, Rev. of  Barnaby Rudge  [1842] 234). This places much more
confidence in the power of the writer to control the reader’s responses than was generally allowed
by Romanticism. Indeed, even in our post-Romantic times, most of us would no doubt be inclined
to reject such pretensions. Besides, judging from most critical portraits of Poe, one would say that
he, of all writers, was the least in control of his material. This evident challenge to some of those
basic notions which Poe is usually said to have  taken too far, however, perhaps because it was
overshadowed by the vicious stab at Dickens in the very next sentence, has gone mostly
unremarked:
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We are not prepared to say, so positively as we would wish, whether, by the public at
large, the whole mystery of the murder committed by Rudge (…) was fathomed at
any period previous to the period intended, or, if so, whether at a period so early as
materially to interfere with the interest designed; but we are forced, through sheer
modesty, to suppose this the case; since, by ourselves individually, the secret was
distinctly understood immediately upon the perusal of the story of Solomon Daisy,
which occurs at the seventh page of this volume of three hundred and twenty-three.
(Rev. of Barnaby Rudge [1842] 234)
Poe certainly is boasting—in fact, he is being a little obnoxious. But I think most critics have
not understood exactly what it is that he is boasting of. Poe’s point is that, in order to use “dark
hints,”  one must be able to keep his secret better than Dickens had, by ingenuity alone, that is,
tricking the reader into the wrong conclusions. But the writer must never assert falsities—as Poe’s
use  of  the  word  “sedulously,”  meaning  without  guile,  indicates. That would be most
unsportsmanlike. Poe calls it “a misdemeanor against Art” (Rev. of Barnaby Rudge [1842] 234). In
the matter of the ghost, however, Poe is enough of a gentleman to concede Dickens had not sinned
against art: “The writer has not asserted it in his own person, but ingeniously conveyed an idea
(false in itself, yet a belief in which is necessary for the effect of the tale) by the mouth of one of his
characters”  (Rev. of  Barnaby Rudge [1842] 234). By “the person of the author”  Poe means the
third-person, non-participant narrator, as opposed to the ostensibly fictional characters. This narrator
is invested by the reader with the authority of a mouthpiece of the writer. Poe scorns to convey false
impressions through it—this would be inartistic. Dickens, it is implied, took, in this particular case,
the  artistic  approach to  conveying a  false  impression.  Poe,  on  the  under  hand,  never  used  the
reassuringly authoritative voice a third-person non-participant narrator in his fiction.
The “Art” to which Poe is referring, then, is certainly not that of intimating “unfathomable”
mysteries, but rather that of keeping the reader from finding a solution that is contained, in latency,
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in the text. In this sense, Poe basically adhered to Radcliffe’s approach to the mystery in fiction,
which was described with great acumen in the review of  The Mysteries of Udolpho  commonly
attributed  to  Coleridge  which  I  have  quoted  earlier.  Radcliffe  had  developed,  the  reviewer
insightfully  remarks,  an  “art  of  escaping  the  guesses  of  the  reader,”  an  art  which  had  to  be
“improved and brought to perfection along with the reader’s sagacity; just as the various inventions
of locks, bolts, and private drawers, in order to secure, fasten, and hide, have always kept pace with
the ingenuity of the pickpocket and house breaker, whose profession is to unlock, unfasten, and lay
open what you have taken so much pains to conceal” (Coleridge, Rev. of The Mysteries of Udolpho
203).
This is precisely the kind of art Poe implies Dickens had attempted to master. The art of
keeping exactly  one step  ahead of  the  reader.  The writer should so manage the mystery as to
constantly exhibit the solution right in front of the reader’s nose, without ever letting it become too
obvious. Indeed, the “hints”  of which Poe speaks should be contrived so that their significance
eludes the reader unacquainted with the “key”  to the mystery, and yet be perfectly evident, in
retrospect, to the same reader when acquainted with it. “Let him [the reader] re-peruse “Barnaby
Rudge,” and, with a pre-comprehension of the mystery, these points of which we speak break out in
all directions like stars, and throw quadruple brilliance over the narrative—a brilliance which a
correct taste will at once declare unprofitably sacrificed to the keenest interest of mere mystery”
(Poe, Rev. of Barnaby Rudge [1842] 233). 
The last remark may appear to support the claim that Poe was against all but unfathomable
mysteries. If mystery is a good thing, provided the reader is not immediately aware of the solution,
would it not be enough for the writer to appear mysterious? This is precisely what Yvor Winters
thought Poe was doing. But that is not the meaning of Poe’s sentence at all. The “points”  with a
hidden meaning “are (…) deprived of all effect, and become null, through the impossibility of
comprehending them without the key,” and so, until the intended moment of revelation, the tale will
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be necessarily insipid, unless some other interest than “mere mystery” is provided, to balance that
insipidity (Poe, Rev. of  Barnaby Rudge (1842) 233). And there is plenty to interest the reader in
Poe’s tales, besides the mystery. Indeed, alternate sources of interest, like metaphysics and abstruse
lore, distract the reader from the fairy-tale-like simplicity of the mysterious storyline; that is, they
contribute to the atmosphere of mystery. By this system, Poe found a way to  navigate between
insipidity and an exaggerated perspicuity, both of which would alienate the public.
Intimating a murder when none had been committed would be no more artistic than lying to
the reader. It would be cheating. The key must be there, but unperceived—that is what Poe calls art.
Poe is not merely exhibiting his skill as a critical sleuth. He is making a point in poetics—a strictly
Aristotelian point. According to Aristotle, the dénouement, that is, the discovery or anagnorisis, is
“as the term itself implies, a change from ignorance to knowledge,” and it is “most effective when it
coincides with reversals;” a “reversal” (peripeteia), in turn, is defined as “a change of the situation
into the opposite”  (Poetics  1452a). A plot (mythos) is “complex,”  according to Aristotle, when
“discovery” and “reversal” are simultaneous. Both reversals and discoveries “should result from the
actual structure of the plot in such a way that what has already happened makes the result inevitable
or probable; for there is indeed a vast difference between what happens propter hoc and post hoc”
(1452a). Consequently, Aristotle decries “episodic” plots “in which the episodes do not follow each
other probably or inevitably,”  praising instead integrated plots in which the “incidents are
unexpected and yet one is a  consequence of the  other”  (Poetics  1452a). Hence, the  plot must
progress steadily and inevitably to its ending, which must be recognised as its consequence, but, at
the same time, the reader, or spectator, as the case may be, must be distracted from the inevitability
of the  dénouement. Tragedy, it also follows, must then convey a false impression to the reader in
order that the ending may be both unexpected and inherent to the plot.
Like Poe, Aristotle thought that arbitrary twists  of  plot,  though unexpected, were not
“artistic.”  Therefore,  the idea that the ending can be anticipated by critical analysis is a logical
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development from the  Aristotelian poetics of the tragedy. However, the idea of omitting the
“discovery,”  leaving it to the reader, is entirely Poe’s own. Indeed, in his reviews of Dickens’s
mystery novel,  as  well as the anonymous review of his own Tales and the mysterious note on
“Ligeia,” he indirectly claims priority for this idea. 
In his mysteries, then, Poe took the opportunity Dickens had missed. For these are oriented,
as I have attempted to demonstrate, to a discovery that is not enacted in the tale itself. The discovery
in “Berenice,” that the narrator killed his mother, for example, corresponds perfectly to Aristotle’s
“anagnorisis,” which may come in different forms. For example, “one may discover whether some
one has done something or not”  (Poetics 1452a). And this discovery also implies a “reversal,”
namely in the reader’s perception of the narrator’s character. The public knew he had done
something, but, the crucial deed, matricide, of which the whole plot is a consequence, and from
which all  incidents  flow, is  craftily withheld from view. This work of camouflage,  however,  is
achieved through purely “artistic” means, that is, without lies or reversals not inherent to the plot.
The moral of Poe’s review is that one must not idly hint of murder. If a writer hints of
murder, there must be a murder to be discovered. Not only must there be a murder, but this, when
discovered, must satisfactorily account for each and every one of those “dark hints” the writer had
scattered throughout the tale, and the meaning of which had not been obvious at first, otherwise the
tale will lack that consistency that is, according to Poe, the distinguishing feature of any artistically
construed plot. In other words, the “internal evidence” of the crime must be such that the murder
may be conclusively demonstrated. True artistry in this kind of writing, therefore, consists in fooling
the reader into drawing false conclusions without resorting to lying or false clues. The clues must be
made to point toward a false solution, and yet also support the true one.
Poe hints that he could keep a secret much better than Dickens had. A few months before his
review of the then incomplete Barnaby Rudge came out, Poe had of course published “The Murders
in the Rue Morgue,”  the first bona fide detective story, which was, like Dickens’s  novel, an
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explained mystery. But I agree with Susan Amper, that Poe’s real murder mysteries are not
detective stories, but stories with mysteries the reader was challenged to find for himself.50 The
possibility of a story being designed so that the moment of revelation comes after a first reading is,
as we have seen, clearly implied in Poe’s review. The reader of Barnaby Rudge can “re-peruse” the
novel, after he finished it, and see the “dark hints” light up. Poe, however, did it long before he read
the whole novel, thus demonstrating he did not need to be told how it would end. What is there to
prevent an enterprising and “imaginative” writer from conceiving a tale designed to let the reader
arrive at the revelation himself, and confirming it through “re-perusal?”
Nothing. Poe had already done precisely that more than once, but no one had noticed. And
so, Poe used Barnaby Rudge as a pretext to throw some more hints to his clever work of
camouflage. In “Berenice,” as we have seen, he had hidden a murder, just like Dickens did. There,
he too had employed “dark hints” to simultaneously hint of the crime and conceal it. What is more,
Poe used some of the exact same “dark hints” that his successor in crime would employ, namely, the
apparent incongruous ravings of a character, and a ghost. With that in mind, let us re-peruse the
following passage in the first review of Barnaby Rudge. “We may as well here observe,”  Poe
candidly remarks, “that the reader should note carefully the ravings of Barnaby, which are not put
into the mouth at random, as might be supposed, but are intended to convey indistinct glimmerings
of the events to be evolved,” and then comes a compliment that boomerangs right back at Poe, “and
in this   evident   design   of Mr. Dickens’ his ideality is strongly evinced” (Poe, Rev. of Barnaby Rudge
[1841] 221 emphasis mine).
The “ideality”  is manifested by the fact of the design being “evident.”  This is only
apparently, or partially a compliment on Dickens, of course. Poe had detected his design before the
novel had fairly begun, hence the basic premise of the novel, mystery, had not been effectually
50 In point of fact, the reader of “The Murders in the Rue Morgue,” as has already been noticed by many critics, is not
in a condition to anticipate in full the solution provided by Dupin, because some crucial facts are concealed from
him by the  narrator, just  as those same facts had been kept from the narrator by Dupin until  he delivered his
solution. Besides, the “murders” in the “Rue Morgue” are not, strictly speaking, “murders.” 
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preserved.  The implication is that the author could spare himself the trouble of plodding his way
through the rest of it. In fact, Poe’s  reasoning leads to the conclusion that he had better leave it
“unfinished,” like Poe did his murder mysteries. Only then would the “dark hints,” which we had
demonstrated were enough for the “acute” reader, be “artistic.” In fact, probably realizing that his
design was not sufficiently obscured, and that the revelation he intended to make would no longer
come as a surprise to his  reader,  Dickens was apparently forced to somewhat deviate from his
original design.
By the same reasoning, Poe evinced not only ideality, but his awareness of his own ideality,
in tales like “Berenice,”  and so, he is the one who truly deserves the compliment. In short, the
review is itself a “dark hint” to Poe’s “dark hints.” “It would be difficult to impress,” he continues,
“upon the mind of a merely general reader how vast a degree of interest may be given to the story
by such means;” that is, by darkly intimating a murder, “for in truth that interest, great as it may be
made, will not be, strictly speaking, of a popular cast” (Poe, Rev. of Barnaby Rudge [1841] 221). In
other words, the exquisite artistry that went into the writing of a mystery could never be appreciated
by the average reader. Therefore, in order to be read, the writer had to disguise his mystery, so that it
could be generally appreciated. Dickens, Poe implies, had not understood this. At the same time, he
had not managed his mystery artistically enough, and therefore also failed to produce a work that
could be appreciated by a sophisticated reader who had a correct appreciation of the principles of
art. Poe alone had stroke a balance between the demands of the average public and the interests of
art. Poe is basking in his triumph. Who could blame him? 
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7 – “Shadow of a Shade:” the Mystery of “Ligeia”
Poe had been intimating murder,  or more precisely femicide,  in his tales long before he
wrote his  review of  Barnaby Rudge.  However,  the crimes of his  narrators became increasingly
obvious over the years. In “Berenice,” the murder of the narrator’s mother was very obscurely, one
might say mystically, intimated conjointly by an unidentified ghost and by his re-enactment of the
crime he had forgotten all about. In “Morella,” the narrator’s crime, the sacrifice of the daughter
whom he forces to assume the place left vacant by her mother is no longer committed behind the
scenes,  in  the  dim  past,  but  right  before  our  eyes.  Only  a  thick  cloud  of  “mystical”
misunderstanding veils it from our sight. In “The Black Cat,” of course, Poe went so far as to have a
woman slaughtered on stage; still, he managed skillfully to conceal his narrator’s character.
In “Ligeia,” however, he had done an even more spectacular job of keeping a secret. There,
we have not one, but two femicides: one covert, or hidden, and of which the narrator unwittingly
offers a “phantasmagoric” reenactment, and another overt, which is actually obscured by the ghosts
that haunt him. The strange ghostly drama in Rowena’s wake evidently evokes that in the wake of
the femicide’s sister Eliza in Macnish’s  Confessions, but Poe apparently omits the crime, which
accounts for the wonders of his original, the killing of the dark lady, retaining only its consequence,
her apparition in the wake of the fair. Thus, “Ligeia,” despite having its roots in the femicide story,
has that “mystical” quality that is peculiar to Poe’s tales.
Indeed, there was nothing particularly “mystical” about Macnish’s tale, in the sense that the
narrator himself has no trouble understanding why he is haunted. The ghost itself makes no secret
of its purpose. “REPENT!,” it cries (Macnish, Confessions 17). In “Ligeia,” on the other hand, the
ghosts and the reanimation are not explicitly assigned to any particular cause. It is as though Poe
took the “wonders” in the second part of Confessions, and grafted them onto an otherwise entirely
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different story, about a man who pines for a prodigiously learned dead  wife that dabbled in
mysticism. In reality, however, Poe once again used “mysticism” as a decoy.
The murder of the dark lady Ligeia by the narrator is not suppressed from Poe’s imitation,
but merely concealed, very artistically, in plain sight. In other words, the crime is as inherent to the
plot in “Ligeia” as it is in Confessions, but Poe recreated the original story in the form of a murder
mystery, according to a formula he had himself created. The crime is the obvious consequence,
then, of the events that lead to Ligeia’s death, and also the origin of the “ghosts” by which the
narrator is subsequently haunted.  The crime also adequately accounts for some bizarre sentiments
expressed by her widower, which, though shockingly inadequate to the character of a bereaved
lover, are perfectly in keeping with that of a femicide. Far from being indeterminate, both story and
character are in fact clues to each other—that is, consistent with each other. And then, there is a
wealth of “internal evidence,”  the only kind of evidence suitable to be used by an “artist,”
corroborating the crime.
By 1845, when he added “The Conqueror Worm”  to the tale, and planted  the note about
“Ligeia” in the New World, Poe may have started to suspect he had made too good a job of hiding
the obvious—the obvious, in this case, being femicide. This was achieved chiefly by the same
device that Dickens would use in  Barnaby Rudge, that of having a character—in Poe’s tale, the
first-person narrator—conveying the impression that a ghost was about. The crucial clue to the
mystery of “Ligeia”  exactly meets the requirements Poe demands of a good “dark hint.”  Though
Poe ingeniously keeps his reader from perceiving its significance, once the solution to the riddle is
discovered—by the same means employed by Poe in discovering the solution to Dickens’s mystery
—the passage shines brightly, shedding a welcome light over all the gloomy business. Yet, at the
same time, the passage containing the clue is well calculated to entertain the reader who does not
possess the key. In fact, the reader will probably be so busy chasing the ghost of Ligeia that the key
will not even be missed.
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And yet, the key is there, as plain as daylight, in the very middle of the bridal chamber.
Rowena, unnerved by the dread her was husband was only too happy to inspire her and the
“phantasmagoric influences”  of the room where he kept her, wasted rapidly away during the first
month of their marriage (Poe, "Ligeia" 323). On his part, however, the narrator is almost certain,
though he is too cautious to assert anything, that terror did not kill her. He is apparently convinced
that a third mysterious presence intruded on the couple’s privacy and finished Rowena off. The first
intimation of this intrusion is a quaint “shadow” the narrator saw on the floor three nights before
Rowena died.
Our decision of whether to accept the narrator’s supernatural “thesis” is tied up with our
interpretation of  this  decisive “shadow.” Thus,  according to each critic’s particular take on the
question of the supernatural in “Ligeia,” the shadow has been regarded either as an external object,
a positive manifestation of the spirit of Ligeia, triumphantly returning, by degrees, from the nether
world to punish her rival,  or  as a mental picture, the first in a string of what  appear  to  be
hallucinations, what the narrator calls: “Wild visions, opium-engendered,” which “flitted, shadow-
like before” him (Poe, "Ligeia" 326). According to a third, intermediate position, to which G. R.
Thompson  has  given  currency,  it  is  impossible  to  decide  whether the “shadow”  is real or
hallucination.
In point of fact, it is neither. The narrator’s description leaves no room to doubt that it is
nothing but a shadow: “as I stepped beneath the light of the censer (…), I saw that there lay upon
the golden carpet, in the very middle of the rich lustre thrown from the censer, a shadow—a faint,
indefinite shadow of angelic aspect—such as might be fancied for the shadow of a shade”  (Poe,
"Ligeia" 325). The narrator suggests this is the ghost of his first wife Ligeia, and that it will proceed
to kill Rowena out of jealousy—Rowena whom he was unquestionably, inexorably terrorising to
death. This is, to be sure, the impression he conveys. But it is, as surely, a false impression. Poe has
had us all chasing the ghost of Ligeia. While under his spell, we the readers have been led to debate
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the ontological status of ghosts, generally considered, and, specifically, whether the author admitted
the positive supernatural into his tale. Meanwhile, we never conceive the possibility of the shadow
being a shadow.
Yet, the thing is clarity itself. Twice in the short passage transcribed above the narrator refers
to the “censer”  as a source of light. This is  a  “huge censer”  that was suspended from a chain
fastened to the “most central recess”  of the “melancholy vaulting,”  and from which issued a
“continual succession of parti-colored fires” (Poe, "Ligeia" 321). Passing directly beneath its light,
and looking down, it would by surprising indeed if the narrator did not see a shadow—his shadow.
As for it being “indefinite,”  it could hardly be otherwise, considering the “changing lights and
shadows of the chamber”  (Poe,  “Berenice”  216). The phrase is taken from the wake scene in
“Berenice,” but is an even fitter description of the scenario in Ligeia’s room, where “the writhing of
the parti-colored fires in the censer overhead”  was everywhere reflected by the cloth of gold
covered with “jetty” arabesques, which an artificial wind kept constantly in motion.
Indeed, however deceptive appearances may have been in the room, Poe makes it absolutely
clear that there is nothing unexpected, or even hard to explain, about that shadow. Four nights later,
the narrator “sat alone”  by Rowena’s corpse: “My eyes then fell, as I called to mind the
circumstances of a former night, to the spot beneath the glare of the censer where I had seen the
faint traces of the shadow. It was there, however, no longer; and breathing with greater freedom, I
turned my glances to the pallid and rigid figure upon the bed”  (Poe, "Ligeia" 326). No one but a
very deluded person would have dreamed of being surprised by this. The shadow was there when,
and only when his body passed under the censer. Now that he was seated in one of the “ottomans,”
instead of standing beneath the censer, he did not see the shadow. This was natural enough, there
being no one else in the room but him and the invalid, and then dead Rowena. At the time, she was
in her bed—in fact, she never once left her bed during the whole procedures. At the time, then, there
was  no body between the source of light and the carpet. For the second time in a few lines  the
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narrator is perplexed by seeing exactly what one would expect him to see: first a shadow, and then
no shadow.
An interesting article in Henry Nelson Coleridge’s Specimens of the Table Talk of the Late
Samuel Taylor Coleridge warns against precisely the sort of confusion Poe’s narrator makes. The
definition  of  a  “vulgar  ghost,”  the  editor  recalls  hearing  his  uncle  say,  “is  visibility  without
tangibility; which is also the definition of a shadow. Therefore, a vulgar ghost and a shadow would
be the same thing; because two different things cannot properly have the same definition” (1:15).
However,  Coleridge  thought  the  definition  absurd:  “Unless  there  be  an  external  substance,  the
bodily eye cannot see it; therefore, in all such cases, that which is supposed to be seen is, in fact, not
seen, but is an image of the brain,” that is, an hallucination; “if,” however, “the vulgar ghost be
really  a  shadow,  there  must  be  some  substance  of  which  it  is  the  shadow.  These  visible  and
intangible  shadows,  without  substances  to  cause  them,  are  absurd”  (1:15-16).  Evidently,  Poe’s
narrator could have used Coleridge’s advice, of which Poe was probably well aware.51
The recognition, by the reader, of the obvious fact that there is no mystery to the shadow on
which the whole story pivots causes a revolution in its interpretation—that is, the reader of the tale
must revise the assumptions on which his or her initial interpretation of the tale had been based.
This  highlights  some  crucial  aspects  about  the  very  nature  of  reading.  While  we  read,  we
necessarily establish working hypotheses about what is going on in the tale, drawing inferences as
we go along.  The mystery  story  is  designed in  such  a  way that  we are  forced  to  revise  such
inferences in light of further revelations—this is at the root of what is usually termed suspense.
Stories involving suspense exploit the fundamental inferential process that is inherent to reading,
thereby  bringing  that  process  into  visibility.  In  this  sense,  the  mystery  story  may  in  fact  be
conceived as an experimental demonstration of the existence of that process, in which the reader
conducts an experiment the protocol of which is the text itself. As Susan Amper remarks, though in
51 Coleridge was a spiritualist. However, he sought to separate the “vulgar ghosts,” of popular superstition, which
according to him were either illusions or delusions, from what he regarded as true spiritual entities.
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tales like “Ligeia” two competing interpretations are being elicited, “we need not view the stories as
seeking  to  elicit  different  reactions  from  different  readers:  disparate  reactions  are  typically
experienced  within  a  single  reader,”  making  for  what  she  styles  a  “schizophrenic  reaction”
(“Masters of Deceit” 107-8). More precisely, the reader cannot quite decide if the tale is to be taken
seriously or not. Most modern scholarship has assumed, with Thompson, that Poe intended to keep
the reader permanently in that state.
But this  assumption falls  to the ground once we realise the “shadow” has a simple and
straightforward solution. In her article on “The Black Cat,” Susan Amper said that the solution to
that tale’s mystery is “the ideal detective story solution: one that is simplicity itself in explaining all
the facts, yet so elusive it has taken a century and a half to be discovered” (“Masters of Deceit”
38).52 The same thing might be said of the solution of the mystery of the “shadow” in “Ligeia,”
which is the root of all the mysteries in the tale. When found, the solution is irrefusable, and brings
about the same kind of revolutionary reinterpretation that is produced, in Poe’s detective stories, by
Dupin’s explanations.
Like all revolutions, it is bound to be met with some resistance from the status quo. One will
even doubt one’s own senses, if the reader allows me the metaphor, before one relinquishes all that
one had previously been taking for granted, including those broad critical assumptions that underlie
almost every critical reading of Poe’s work ever made. And yet, the shadow cannot be dismissed. It
is not a possibility. It is an actuality—or as nearly an actuality as can be conceived in fiction. Before
it, our initial assessment of the story must be radically revised—which is what anagnorisis is all
about,  of course.  In a sense,  of all  the “tricks” Poe played on the public,  this  may be the best
expression of what Pollin termed Poe’s “frank disdain for the literary culture or perceptiveness of
his reading public” (Discoveries 26).
52 Amper’s  remark  is  in  reference  to  the  solution  of  “The Black  Cat.”  In  section  4  of  the  first  chapter  of  this
dissertation, which is dedicated to that tale, I have explained why I do not agree with some aspects of the solution
she presents for the mystery of that tale. However, as I have also stated before, I fully subscribe the view that these
tales are mysteries, that is, that the existence of a solution which is inherent to the text is fully intimated to the
reader.
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The crisis attendant on this revolution has far-reaching consequences that are not limited to
the reading of the tale but extend to our understanding of reading itself. Baudelaire was perhaps the
first, but by no means the only one of Poe’s readers to feel he was being  duped. This sneaking
suspicion lurks behind the general feeling of vague uneasiness before his work that prompts most
critics to make only the vaguest statements about his plots. To validate his own practice as a poet,
Baudelaire insisted that Poe’s unearthly visions of a supernal truth, or rather, those of his narrators,
were thoroughly serious, and did not partake of the farcical quality of what he regarded as his
lighter fiction, among which he included his more obvious hoaxes. Thus, Baudelaire originated the
idea of a double Poe, which has informed most Poe scholarship to this day. Poe had, Baudelaire
writes, “le plus ingénieusement fabriqué les  canards les plus flatteurs pour l’orgueil de l’homme
moderne,” and “fut toujours grand, non seulement dans ses conceptions nobles, mais encore comme
farceur,” passionately adding: “Car il ne fut jamais dupe!” (Baudelaire, “Notes Nouvelles” 622).
In this  statement,  taken from Baudelaire’s  preface  to  the  second of  his  two volumes of
translations of Poe’s tales (1857), it appears to me that the French writer is evidently exorcising an
anxiety concerning Poe’s sincerity. In the previous “Edgar Poe, sa vie et ses Œuvres” (1856), the
preface to  the first  volume of  Baudelaire’s  translations  from Poe,  the French poet  had already
developed his theory that the tone of Poe’s “serious” fiction constituted evidence of sincerity: 
Sa solennité surprend et tient l’esprit en éveil. On sent tout d’abord qu’il s’agit de
quelque chose de grave. Et lentement, peu à peu, se déroule une histoire dont tout
l’intérêt  repose  sur  une  imperceptible  déviation  de  l’intellect,  sur  une  hypothèse
audacieuse, sur un dosage imprudent de la nature dans l’amalgame des facultés. Le
lecteur,  lié  par  le  vertige,  est  contraint  de  suivre  l’auteur  dans  ses  entraînantes
déductions. (616)
This passage perfectly captures Baudelaire’s sense of the skill with which Poe took control
of his reader’s reactions. Yet, his point is incompatible with Poe’s theory of “earnestness.” For what
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Baudelaire  here  calls  “solennité”  is  precisely  that  “earnestness”  in  expressing  his  narrators’s
opinions on which Poe’s power of “simulation” depended, and which the French poet identifies with
sincerity: “L’ardeur même avec laquelle il se jette dans le grotesque pour l’amour du grotesque et
dans l’horrible pour l’amour de l’horrible me sert à verifier la sincerité de son oeuvre et l’accord de
l’homme avec le poète” (Baudelaire, “Edgar Poe” 617). Underlying this assertion is a complete
identification of Poe with the “earnest” narrator of the tales about dead women, which is made
explicit later in the same article: 
Les  personnages  de  Poe,  ou  plutôt  le  personnage  de  Poe,  l’homme aux  facultés
suraiguës, l’homme aux nerfs relâchés, l’homme dont la volonté ardente et patiente
jette un défi aux difficultés, celui dont le regard est tendu avec la roideur d’une epée
sur des objects qui grandissent à mesure qu’il les regard—c’est Poe lui-même. —Et
ses femmes, toutes lumineuses et malades, mourant de maux bizarres et parlant avec
une  voix  qui  resemble  à  une  musique,  c’est  encore  lui;  ou  du  moins,  par  leurs
aspirations  étranges,  par  leur  savoir,  par  leur  mélancolie  inguérissable,  elles
participent fortement de la nature de leur créateur. (Baudelaire, “Edgar Poe” 617-18)
Baudelaire  thus  clearly  projected  his  understanding  of  poetry  as  the  embodiment  of
indefinite visions on Poe, whose earliest poetry, according to him, had “l’accent extra-terrestre,” and
whose whole work, as a whole, he regarded as “extra ou suprahumaine” (“Edgar Poe” 601, 603).
His conception of the double Poe is predicated on the polar opposition between the materialism,
represented by democratic America, and the spirituality of the poet, as conceived by Baudelaire.
“L’activité matérielle, exagérée jusqu’aux proportions d’une manie nationale, laisse dans les esprits
bien peu de place pour les choses qui ne sont pas de la terre;” in the quest for which he supposed
Poe was fully and sincerily engaged: “Il ne croyait qu’à l’immuable, à l’éternel, au self same” (597-
98).
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Therefore, when Baudelaire later writes that Poe was never a dupe, he evidently means to
say that he himself had not been duped. In other words, he justifies his own perception that Poe was
not  simulating  the  opinions  of  his  solemn  narrator;  that  he  really  had  faith  in  the  latter’s
“transcendental” methods. Poe, of course, had also written tales that evinced “une aptitude des plus
remarquables pour les sciences physiques et mathématiques. (…) Mais j’ai des raisons de croire que
ce n’est pas à cet ordre de compositions qu’il attachait le plus d’importance, et que (….) il n’était
pas loin de les considérer comme de  faciles jongleries,  comparativement aux ouvrages de pure
imagination,”  which  Baudelaire  regarded  as  the  manifestation  of  a  sincere  striving  after  those
visions of ideal beauty that he valued above all (Baudelaire, “Edgar Poe” 600).
The character of the double Poe, the no-nonsense “farceur” and the reckless visionary, is one
of the greatest  creations of Baudelaire’s genius. But his  creation,  like the creations of all  great
writers, should be regarded as the embodiment of his conception of literature. They should not be
regarded, of course, as a document of Poe’s intentions. Baudelaire’s articles on Poe are literary
testaments of their author. They tell us how he would like to be read—just as Poe’s articles on
others were his way of telling us how he wished to be read. Yet, just as Poe’s narrators had captured
the  imagination  of  his  readers,  so  Baudelaire’s  fascinating  recreation  of  Poe  captured  the
imagination of many critics, who, sometimes unaware of Baudelaire’s influence, thought of Poe as a
visionary, and became convinced, even against the evidence of his own works, that the object of his
fiction was to impart some indefinite vision of an ungraspable truth. In order to accommodate this
preestablished  image  of  Poe,  they  had  to  disregard  the  fundamental  distinction  between
“earnestness” and “sincerity” that was central to his criticism.
This understanding of Poe’s character led to the conviction that his plots were indefinite—or
rather, had to be indefinite—, and this in turn led to the habit of attributing to Poe nothing but the
vaguest  of  intentions. But even noncommittalism, which has saved many a critic from similar
scrapes, is of no avail in this particular case. G. R. Thompson’s, for example, maintained that a
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“realistic  psychological  explanation”  is  as  valid  as  the  supernaturalistic  reading,  and  that  it  is
impossible to know for certain what actually happens in the tale (Poe’s Fiction 77). For Thompson,
indeed, the extraordinary events in the second part of “Ligeia” may be only in the narrator’s head:
“it is clear that we do not know anything the narrator has told us is ‘real,’ the whole tale and its
structures may be a fabrication of the completely deranged mind of the narrator” (97). But, as we
have seen, the supernatural “thesis” of the narrator is actually disproven. And the same clues that
enable  the  reader  to  reject  his  explanations  also  constitute  incontrovertible  evidence  that  the
wonders in Rowena’s room were not entirely in the narrator’s head, or, in other words, that a literal
naturalistic interpretation of the tale is possible.
Thompson further argued that “Poe’s Gothic tale developed from a satiric mode into an
ironic philosophical concern;” in it, “the form itself, even the plot, approaches an absurd hoax on
the character—just as existence may be God’s hoax on man” (Poe’s Fiction xii). Unlike regular
“satirical” hoaxes, that half-heartedly convey a false impression, these “absurd” cosmical hoaxes
were supposedly designed to show the absolute futility of all human pretensions to knowledge.
Thus, according to Thompson, in “Ligeia” nothing is certain: “we are led, first, into the world of
supernatural horror, and then out of that world into a world of mental horror, and then, out of that
purely mental world into a limbo region of ambiguity where we cannot be sure what did or did not
take place” (104).
Although recognising the basic unreliability of the narrator, therefore, Thompson argues that
he cannot be proven wrong, and, consequently, that his cluelessness was intended as a figuration of
the plight of humans in an absurd world:
it is not my intention to discredit all those readers who have responded seriously to
the sinister, occult element in Poe. Rather, I seek to show other levels of meaning in
addition to a surface level of the occult, arguing that a superficially literalist approach
to  Poe’s  dark  tales  in  terms  of  the  occult  obscures  the  true  complexity  of  his
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achievement. It is not so much that previous critics have been wrong, as it is that
their readings of Poe’s tales have been limited. (Thompson, Poe’s Fiction xii)
Again,  when  it  comes  to  the  interpretation  of  “Ligeia,”  there  simply  is  no  “right”  and
“wrong.”  Thompson  is  here  talking  of  the  most  basic  sense  of  the  word  interpretation:  the
determination of what really happens in the tale. This, he argues, cannot be established with any
degree of certainty, therefore, all guesses are equally valid. But, since supernaturalistic readings of
the tale are based on the narrator’s interpretations of what goes on in Rowena’s room, and these
interpretations are demonstrably false, Thompson’s theory of the ambiguity of the tale is itself false.
Thus,  Poe duped not only the “not-so-acute reader,”  but even the most trained eyes. The only
gracious thing to do is to smile at our own ingenuousness—the ingenuousness, that is, of the reader,
which is as helpless before the skilled artisan of fiction as Poe claimed. Poe was clearly not trying
to lead us into contemplating the folly of reason, as Thompson supposes. The moral of the joke he
makes at our expense—at the expense of all his readers—is, in fact, quite the opposite of what
Thompson supposed it to be.
Once detected, Poe’s hoax is designed to make the reader realise just how deliberately, how
cynically,  how cleverly,  the author  has  charmed us into  not  thinking.  This  in  turn forces us to
question those hasty assumptions we make while reading, which usually go unnoticed, and without
which, in fact, as Michael Riffaterre has argued, reading would not be possible. According to this
critic, the “analysis” of literature, which he distinguishes from traditional literary studies, consisted
in the explanation of these assumptions, which invariably tend toward generalisation: “Le texte est
toujours unique en son genre. Et cette  unicité  est, me semble-t-il, la définition la plus simple que
nous poussions donner de la literalité” (“L’Explication” 8). 
This “uniqueness,” however, meets what Riffaterre calls “la résistance naturelle du lecteur
au texte:  le lecteur résiste de toutes les forces de son humeur personelle, de ses tabous, de ses
habitudes. Il résiste en rationalisant; rationalisation qui ramène ce qu’on trouve d’étrange dans le
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texte au connu, au familier” (“L’Explication” 8). The analysis of literature would consist in: “la
description des composantes de l’énoncé qui provoquent des rationalisations” and the verification of
the validity of each rationalization: “La confirmer consistera à montrer que les mots l’imposent.
L’infirmer, à montrer que les mots ne l’imposent pas. Qu’elle soit une erreur sur le plan des choses
importe peu, si cette erreur est realité sur le plan de la représentation” (9).
Riffaterre used a description in Rabelais to demonstrate that the reader was compelled by an
irresistible impulse to assume the “reference” of any description, even when, as was demonstrably
the case, an object could not be conceived that fitted that description—which was therefore, strictly
speaking,  not  a  description,  but  a  pseudo-description.  Riffaterre showed that even professional
commentators formed a mental picture of the impossible giant “described”  in the passage under
analysis, ironing out the strangeness from the text to accommodate it.
In Poe’s tale,  however,  the rationalisation works in an opposite direction, preventing the
reader from recognizing that the phenomenon the narrator describes is commonplace, and perfectly
agrees with the accumulated experience of mankind, as an empiricist would say. This also applies to
the rest of the tale which turns out to be a covert, but otherwise perfect example of the explained
supernatural of Ann Radcliffe. Poe’s text, that is, invites the reader to reconcile its strangeness to
what he knows, in this case, to a general understanding of Romanticism which entails the idea of the
supernatural.
This is,  I  think,  a perfect,  but also,  in a sense,  an unexpected illustration of Riffaterre’s
concept of rationalisation: “le propre de l’expérience littéraire,  c’est  d’être  un dépaysement,  un
exercise d’aliénation, un bouleversement de nos pensées, de nos perceptions, de nos expressions
habituelles.  Tel est le sens de la réplique d’André Breton à Paul Valéry: ‘Le poème doit être une
dêbâcle de l’intellect. Il ne peut être autre chose’” (“L’Explication” 8). This is, of course, the kind of
statement about literature that can ultimately be traced to Baudelaire,  who in turn projected his
conception of poetic intuition on Poe. Poe, however, as it turns out, was suggesting, precisely, that
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this  sort  of Romantic  creed could cause alienation,  even from one’s  own perception.  The only
difference between Poe’s and Radcliffe’s version of the explained supernatural is that his reader is
never told that the protagonist misconstrues what he sees.
But let us return to Rowena’s room and attempt to trace the implications of our discovery for
the other mysteries of the tale. The shadow is only the beginning. The dense mist that surrounds the
“story”  suddenly  vanishes  before  the  “quadruple  brilliancy”  of  Poe’s  “dark  hints,”  to  use  the
vocabulary he himself employs in the review of Barnaby Rudge. The ghost that the narrator has us
chase did not kill Rowena—he did. There never was anyone else. It was always him. The ghost is
his cover. If it had not been for the “ghost,” the narrator would have killed Rowena—that much, at
least, was always perfectly clear. Once this “ghost” vanishes, or more precisely, is resolved into his
“shadow,” the crime appears, vividly and clearly before us. He killed Rowena, like the madman in
Dickens’s tale, without ever laying a hand on her. Indeed, nothing could be more obvious than that
he deliberately terrorised her to death. After all, this is a man who marries a woman he hates for the
sole purpose of confining her in a “phantasmagoria.”53
This in turn leads us to the equally decisive realisation that the “dark hints” in Rowena’s
room, which actually prevented us from recognising what the narrator had done, are not clues to her
53 The story of Rowena, specifically, reminds one of another of Perrault’s fairy tales, “Griselidis.”  The male
protagonist of the tale—which, like Poe’s, is named after a woman—utterly despises women. This prince vowed
never to marry, and for the following reasons: “Dans la diversité des routes qu’elles tienent, / Il n’est qu’une chose
où je voi / Qu’enfin toutes elles [women, he means] conviennent, / C’est de vouloir donner la loi” (Perrault, Contes
20).
This the prince cannot accept: “Or je suis convaincu que dans le marriage / On ne peut jamais vivre heureux, /
Quand on y commande tous deux” (Perrault, Contes 20). And so, he describes to his subjects the ideal woman who
has everything he required of a wife, convinced that no such woman existed in reality: “Si donc vous souhaitez
que’à l’hymen je m’engage, / Cherchez une jeune Beauté / (…) qui n’ait point de volonté” (20).
He finds just what he desired, of course, when he least expected. But, after he marries, he realises that he
cannot be sure of his wife’s “virtue” unless he tests it: “Pour guérir les chagrins dont son âme est atteinte, / Il la suit,
il l’observe, il l’aime troubler / Par les ennuis de la contrainte, / Par les alarmes de la crainte” (Perrault, Contes 32).
Like the narrator of “Ligeia,” then, the prince loves to be feared by his passive wife; and he also likes to subject her
to “Les traitements les plus insupportables;” he even locks her up in a place that corresponds to the description of
the “bridal chamber” in “Ligeia:” “Dans son Palais il la tient resserrée, / Loin de tous les plaisirs qui naissent à la
Cour, / Et dans sa chambre, où seule elle vit retirée, / A peine il laisse entrer le jour” (33). This tell-tale detail shows
us that Rowena’s room was equally unwholesome: “the sole window—an unbroken sheet of unbroken glass from
Venice—a single pane, and tinted of a leaden hue, so that the rays of either the sun or moon, passing through it, fell
with a ghastly lustre on the objects within” (Poe, "Ligeia" 321).
The character of the decoration is, therefore, very  similar, and so is the character of the woman-hating
decorators.
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death, as has always been supposed even by the few who realised the narrator was a killer, but to the
murder of her predecessor. The “shadow” is the first and decisive hint which contributes to implant
the belief that Ligeia was about. Indeed, metonymy provides  a strong inducement to identify  the
“shadow” of “angelic aspect” with Ligeia, for, in the first part of the narrative—which is so vague
as almost not to deserve that name—,  the narrator told us she “came and departed as a shadow”
(Poe, "Ligeia" 311). There is, however, another, seldom noticed, shadowy, angelic, third presence in
his account of the rise and fall of Ligeia. At first, however, the reader does not pay much mind to
this other shadow, which he is bound to regard as an allegorical figure. I am speaking of the Great
Shadow that kills Ligeia. “Words are impotent to convey any just idea of the fierceness with which
she wrestled with the Shadow” (317).
While the wife wrestled with this solemnly capitalised “Shadow,” her husband “would have
soothed,” he “would have reasoned,” but did neither; instead, he “groaned in anguish at the pitiable
spectacle” of her struggle for life  (Poe, "Ligeia" 317). Is this not what any loving husband thus
circumstanced would be expected to do? I should hardly think so. Yet, the narrator, tacitly pleading
his reader’s sympathy, certainly speaks as if this was all perfectly natural. But what does he mean
by “pitiable spectacle?” “There had been much in her stern nature to impress me with the belief
that, to her, death would have come without its terrors—but not so” (316-17). How unphilosophical
of her.54 At the time, the disgust for his wife’s vain, as he calls it, resistance to the catastrophe he
thought was inevitable evidently outweighed his sorrow.
In  fact,  at  the  time,  the  narrator  betrayed  no sign  of  sorrow.  He was already perfectly
reconciled with her death even before it happened. After some years of marriage, the narrator had
remarked a “change” in Ligeia. “I saw that she must die,” he recalls, “and I struggled desperately in
spirit with the grim Azrael” (Poe, "Ligeia" 316). Azrael is, of course, the Muslim angel of death—
another name for the Shadow (with a capital S). But what does the narrator mean by saying he
54 Thompson, completely taken in by the narrator’s rhetoric, echoes his disappointment: “Ligeia seems to love life
itself  without  any  concern  for  the  ultimate  principles  of  philosophy  and  ethics  which  her  studies  of
transcendentalism would suggest were prominent traits in her” (Poe’s Fiction, 86).
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“struggled”—and desperately—with it “in spirit?”  The next sentence can help to  answer that
question: “And the struggles of the passionate wife were, to my astonishment, even more energetic
than my own” (317).
The narrator describes Ligeia’s agony as a contest of strength between husband and wife,
mediated by the Shadow/Angel. The narrator’s struggle, however, was internal, which would be a
very good allegory for the psychological process of decision-making—the decision being, in this
case, that  of killing Ligeia. But, in all fairness, the narrator, unlike Ligeia, did not put much of a
fight: he had already “seen” that she would have to die. However, this would remain no more than a
suspicion were it  not for the narrator’s strange inability to see clearly  in Rowena’s room, which
leads him unwittingly to reveal that he is the “shadow”  that killed Ligeia—for it is Ligeia,  not
Rowena, who he “sees” dying, once again, during what he calls the “drama of revivification” in
Rowena’s room (Poe, “Ligeia” 328). It was him all along.55
This is perfectly consistent, incidentally, with the indeterminateness of his words on that
latter occasion. Again, once we find the key to the mystery, each new reading reveals some hitherto
unnoticed clue.  When he looked for the shadow under the censer, as we have seen,  he “called to
mind the circumstances of a former night.”  We assume he is talking about the night when he had
seen his own shadow under the censer. But he leaves room for doubt. Everything suggests he was
thinking, as was his wont, about Ligeia—he was always thinking about her. Indeed, he admits that
at the  sight of the “enshrouded” Rowena “rushed upon me a thousand memories of Ligeia—and
then came back upon my heart, with the turbulent violence of a flood, the whole of that unutterable
wo with which I had regarded her thus enshrouded;”  and again, that “with a bosom full of bitter
thoughts of the one and only supremely beloved, I remained gazing upon the body of Rowena”
(Poe, "Ligeia" 326). He could not make it any clearer that he was thinking not of the night when
Rowena’s condition worsened, as we had first assumed, but of the night in which he had watched by
55 Similarly, Egæus mentioned the “destroyer”  of the “victim”  that was not Berenice without realizing that he was
talking of himself. 
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Ligeia’s similarly “enshrouded” body. And, indeed, it was her, not Rowena, that he “saw” coming
back to life.
We can no longer ignore the obvious inference to be drawn from all this. At the sight of the
“enshrouded” body of his second wife, the narrator recalls how he had seen his first wife “thus
enshrouded” coming back to life after he had given her the “drops”—for it was to her that he had
administered the “drops” he had  not  given Rowena. More precisely, his imagination presents the
scene to him with such vividness that he confuses it with reality.  Like Egæus did in the original
version of “Berenice,” then, the narrator of “Ligeia” is projecting the reminiscences of the crime
that haunts him on the wake of his new victim. Ironically, he himself cannot understand that the
“ghosts” of which he speaks are “dark hints” that reveal to the reader what he intended to conceal:
his  involvement  in  Ligeia’s  death.  Thus,  he  resumes, among the “shadows,”  the role he had
performed in the drama of Ligeia’s death, in  a  sort  of  waking dream,  and as  though he  were
sleepwalking.
This  tale,  however,  differs  in  many  important  respects  from  “Berenice.”  The  narrator
ostensibly omits from his description of Ligeia’s agony details he himself admits were significant,
most notably certain words she then told him. This suggests that, unlike Egæus, he was aware that
he  had  killed  before,  but  wanted  to  conceal  the  fact,  either  from fear  of  being  apprehended,
superstitious  terror,  or  both—shame seems quite  out  of  the question.  But  he  saw no reason to
deprive the reader from a full account of all he thinks he saw and heard in Rowena’s room, or rather
of his interpretation of what he saw and heard, both before and after her death. And this because he
never realised he was reliving his first crime in imagination. 
The narrator had really seen the “enshrouded” Ligeia come back to life—this is one of the
things he chooses not to tell us. He never did see, of course, Rowena come back to life. At a given
point, however, he believed she might. And this for an obvious reason. He believed she had taken
the same “drops” he had given Ligeia: and she did not stay dead. For all his visions are connected
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with Ligeia’s death. He keeps coming back, in fancy, to that memorable occasion, and relives the
whole dreadful scene, complete with all the details he had omitted. He admits, indeed, he had been
filled with thoughts of Ligeia long before Rowena’s wake, and even before the “drops” appeared.
This confusion between past and present had been going on ever since he brought Rowena to his
abbey: “My memory flew back, (oh, with what intensity of regret!)  to Ligeia,  the beloved, the
august, the beautiful, the entombed. I revelled in recollections of her purity, of her wisdom, of her
lofty, her ethereal nature, of her passionate, her idolatrous love” (Poe, “Ligeia” 323).
The narrator, then, did not see the “drops” fall into Rowena’s wine—he dreamed about the
“drops” that had fallen into Ligeia’s. Still, he really believes that they were the cause of the former’s
death: “I cannot conceal from my own perception that, immediately subsequent to the fall of the
ruby-drops, a rapid change for the worse took place in the disorder of my wife”  ("Ligeia" 326).
Although he later came to integrate both the “shadow” and the “drops” into a supernatural narrative,
at the time he felt very differently about them. Indeed, the contrast in the way he presents these two
“facts” to the reader is highly significant. There is no hesitation in his statement about the latter: “I
saw that there lay upon the carpet (...) a shadow” (Poe, “Ligeia” 325). He is certain, therefore, that
the “shadow” was there. As we have seen, it must have been. It is an entirely different matter with
the “drops:”  “I saw, or may have dreamed    that    I   saw  , fall within the goblet, as if from some
invisible spring in the atmosphere of the room, three or four large drops of a brilliant and ruby
colored fluid. If    this    I   saw  —not so Rowena”  (325 emphasis mine). Just as surely as he saw the
“shadow,” then, he did not see the drops, but dreamed them. For the fall of the drops was not merely
impossible—it felt unreal even to the narrator. The supreme irony in all this is that the only thing he
is certain of having seen, and which he does not distort, his shadow, should prove the decisive clue
that ultimately delivers him to the reader. Indeed, the literal meaning of his statements is always
compatible with a natural explanation.
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Some critics thought that the “drops” were poison. This is clearly suggested by the narrator
—at  least  at  first.  However,  the  supposedly  suppernatural  events  that  ensue,  as  well  as  the
mysterious shadow that preceeds it, suggest that the drops were a sign of Ligeia’s presence. This
Mabbott supposed to be the correct interpretation: “Such good a critic as Vincent Buranelli (…)
supposed the drops to be poison, but they are rather a primary corporeal form attained by Ligeia’s
spirit; and in themselves the elixir of life” (Tales 1:334n31). I think neither was precisely right. The
drops evidently constitute  a covert allusion to The Monk. For the “drops” in “Ligeia” and those
employed by the monk in Matthew Lewis’s novel apparently have the same virtues: the person who
takes them apparently dies, but then comes back to life. I have already mentioned how the learned
Matilda suggested to Ambrosio that he drugged the blonde and virtuous Antonia, so she might be
buried in the monastery’s crypt. “She will then be,” Matilda had told  him, “absolutely in your
power: She will find all resistance unavailing, and necessity will compel her to receive you in her
arms”  (M. Lewis,  The Monk 330). Following his accomplice’s  instructions, the monk filled “his
phial”  with an unspecified “soporific liquor”  and proceeded  to  his  new love’s  quarters (330).
Antonia was then recovering  from the shock occasioned by the visit of the ghost of her mother
Elvira, who had frightened her almost to death. The unscrupulous monk had done away with Elvira
himself (who as it turns out was also his own long-lost mother) after she had discovered he was
making sexual advances on Antonia, to prevent his sexual exploits from being known... it is a long
and complicated story. Suffice it to say, that Ambrosio found her more or less in the same position
in which Rowena was placed in the night of the “drops.”
While the physician “was employed in questioning her Patient,” Ambrosio stealthily “moved
towards the Table, on which stood Antonia’s medicine,” “drew out the fatal Phial, and let a few
drops fall into the medicine” (M. Lewis, The Monk 332). This wine had been prescribed to Antonia
by  her  physician—Rowena’s  physicians,  of  course,  had  prescribed  the  same  medicine  for  her
nervous complaints. Soon, the maid Flora, suspecting nothing, served Antonia a cup of the spiked
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beverage. After that, her condition, like Rowena’s, took a turn for the worse, and she was
prematurely pronounced dead later that same night—only to revive in the tomb about twenty-four
hours later. The “drops” the narrator thinks he may have seen in Rowena’s room apparently had the
same effect. But only apparently. Poe could not make it clearer that they were not there.
Indeed, the narrator was not even close to the “goblet” when he “dreamed” them. But then,
he also did not see the “enshrouded” Rowena come back to life; he “saw,” or may have dreamed
that he saw, Ligeia coming back to life. For we have already established that her apparition is the
probable effect of the “phantasmagoria” on the narrator’s mind. Thus, we are inexorably led to the
conclusion that both the “drops” and the reanimation are reminiscences from his past. This perfectly
accounts, incidentally, for the narrator’s conviction that Ligeia was immortal.
For  the  narrator  of  “Ligeia”  was  evidently  every  bit  as  superstitious  and  ignorant  as
Ambrosio—compared  to  their  super-learned  female  guides,  at  least,  they  are  both  positively
clueless. The monk only knew that the inanimate Antonia was not, and had never really been gone,
because “Matilda had taught him the means of ascertaining, that life was not extinct forever” (M.
Lewis,  The Monk 336). In “Ligeia,” however, the protagonist’s guide and his victim become one:
when he kills Ligeia, therefore, the narrator also destroys his chances of ever making sense of her
reanimation, or the “drops.” Indeed, in “Ligeia,” the narrator’s superstition itself indicates that he
was intimately convinced she had really risen from the dead.
When  he  thought  that  Rowena  was  coming  back  to  life,  he  surmised  she  had  been
prematurely buried because he had caused Ligeia to be prematurely buried by mixing Ambrosio’s
fateful “soporific” into her wine—the same liquid he believed he had later miraculously fallen into
Rowena’s wine. But he never could bring himself to believe that Ligeia was only sleeping. She
appeared dead to him. And he prepared a phantasmagoric confirmation of this belief in Rowena’s
room. When he saw, as he thought, that it was the Lady Ligeia that was coming back to life, he
remarked that, each time, she recovered from “a sterner and apparently more irredeemable death”
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(Poe, “Ligeia” 328).  The idea that death varies in degree, indeed, is very peculiar. It suggests, of
course,  that he could not accurately identify death—as we will  see in the next chapter,  he had
indeed only a very imperfect understanding of such matters.
As  I  said,  in  Rowena’s  room  the  narrator  recollected,  with  great  vividness,  what  had
happened to Ligeia—is this not what he had been telling us all along? Like Antonia, she had been
taken  for  dead,  “enshrouded,”  and  entombed.  Later,  in  her  tomb,  the  narrator  awaited  her
reanimation.  This  explains  why Rowena’s  room was decorated like a  crypt—everything in  that
room reminded her husband of the final scenes of Ligeia’s life, or more precisely, carried him back
to that time. When his victim—I mean Ligeia—had begun to stir, he had “struggled” with her—like
Ambrosio had done. This is the “struggle” he obscurely intimates in his narrative of her death, and
of which the “ghostly” drama in Rowena’s room is evidently a recapitulation. Remember “how each
agony” of Ligeia-Rowena “wore the aspect of a struggle with some invisible foe” (Poe, "Ligeia"
29)? The woman he “saw” struggling with this “foe,” of course, was not Rowena—but Ligeia.
Likewise, the “invisible foe” who struggled with Ligeia while the narrator attempted to reanimate
Rowena was, of course, the “Great Shadow,” a.k.a., the man himself. Both were “ghosts” from the
past.
This indicates that the narrator had struggled long and hard with the reanimated Ligeia,
which gives a new meaning to his remark that he had been surprised to find that the “struggles of
the passionate wife were (…) even more energetic than my own” (Poe, “Ligeia” 316). He had
before  admitted,  of  course,  that  she was fighting  for  her  life,  and also,  indirectly,  that  he  was
“struggling” to break her resistance.  Apparently,  he had more than once left  her for dead. This
circumstance added to his conviction that she would keep on returning.
The parallel with The Monk further indicates that the primary object of this “struggle” was
probably the same in both cases, that is, to force the “dead-alive” woman into sexual submission. In
both cases, the “struggle” ended with the death of the woman. Ligeia was hard to subdue, but man
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eventually prevailed, or as he put it in an early version of the tale (Mabbott’s text A): “The giant will
succumbed  to  a  power  more  stern”  (Poe,  “Ligeia”  318n).56 This  sentence  is  but  too  clear  an
intimation of rape. But, while in  The Monk rape and murder succeeded each other, in “Ligeia” it
appears to be the other way around. This is indicated by the narrator’s sly statement that he had
been “impressed” with Ligeia’s love “in death only” (317). The statement also clearly intimates, of
course, that she had not “loved” him before, which, as I have already remarked, provides him with a
motive for murder. In addition, it also provides him with a motive for plotting her premature burial,
as the monk had done.
These events haunted the narrator ever since—and this is the solution of the mystery. That is,
this satisfactorily explains all the narrator’s peculiar behavior in the second part of the tale. He had
been so pleased with Ligeia “in death” that he became obsessed with reliving the experience. He
procured himself a new wife, therefore, so that he might once again indulge both his sadistic urges
and the taste for dead women he had imbibed—that he had a taste for dead women, I think, was
obvious from the start. Accordingly, he arranged matters so that he would not be disturbed while he
“performed,” as William the femicide put it,  Rowena’s wake—indeed, the fact  that  he was not
disturbed during the whole ghastly scene proves that he had been very careful. At the same time,
however, he was also obsessed with the idea that Ligeia might not be “irredeemably” dead. In fact,
like the original femicide and Ambrosio the monk, he was haunted by his deed,  but could not
acknowledge his guilt. When he finally found himself alone with Rowena’s corpse, then, the ghost
of his first victim—or rather, the ghost of his first crime itself, came back and turned his pleasure
into horror.
Thus, even after the narrator’s crimes are revealed, “Ligeia” continues not to conform to
strict notions of didacticism, which would require the criminal to be exposed and punished. The
56 See note 28. If Rowena is reminiscent of Griselidis, the woman with “no will” in Perrault’s fable, Ligeia is quite the
opposite. According to her husband, she is all will. This uncovers his motive for killing her. Through a sort of
poetic justice, however, Poe also makes her will one of the main sources of the narrator’s superstition. That is, her
“giant will,” on a man that shares the superstition of the femicide, results inevitably in a belief that she was a witch.
I will develop all these ideas below.
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same could be said of Macnish’s Confessions, but, unlike Poe’s narrator, the femicide is detected,
although ultimately not convicted, and universally recognised as a murderer. In this sense, “Ligeia”
is even farther removed from any idea of retribution. Not only does the criminal there survive to tell
his tale, he lives to kill again. Worse of all, he fools his readers much more effectively than William
could. The fact that such a repulsive character is permitted to evade punishment, however, conveys
a moral, but not the kind of reassuring faith that “crime does not pay” that we get from fables—
either  the  old-fashioned  fables  of  Perrault,  or  their  modern  counterparts,  television  police-
procedurals. In fact, the implied moral of the hidden story is, I think, that one should never trust
men like Ligeia’s husband.
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8 – The Rhetoric of Femicide
Since the author chose not to be represented by a third-person narrator, Poe’s  covert-
femicide could not be detected unless he incriminated himself, but the writer would have to be very
discreet about it, of course, otherwise he would not be “covert”  at all, but merely another
“unexecuted”  femicide. Likewise, this narrator would also have to convey the false impression
himself, while also providing clues by which the reader would be allowed to perceive that it was a
false impression. Considering they were the reader’s only form of access to the “story,” Poe could
not afford to put downright lies into their mouths, because this would jeopardise the consistency of
the text—without which murder would never out.
Susan Amper, one of only three scholars that seriously accused Ligeia’s widower of killing
her (the others are Donald Koster and Terrence Matheson), attributed all the ambiguity in the tale to
“weasel wording,” that is, “the practice of devising statements that leave a false impression, but are
literally true” (Amper, “Masters of Deceit” 24). But this presupposes a deliberate intention on the
speaker’s part to deceive. I agree that Poe frequently employed this device throughout his work,
notably in his criticism. However, it appears to me that weasel wording only partially accounts for
the false impression left by “Ligeia.”  The narrator’s statements in the first part of the tale, about
Ligeia and his involvement in her death,  seem, indeed, deliberately misleading.  The use of the
“shadow” metaphor to describe Ligeia’s “struggle” with death, for example, may be described as a
form of weasel wording. However, in the second part of the tale, which deals with the supposedly
miraculous return of Ligeia, the narrator is himself evidently unaware of the literal meaning of his
statement about the “shadow” on the floor. Thus, that statement is literally true, but conveys a false
impression, and one which plays a decisive role in establishing the idea that supernatural agency
was  involved.  Strictly  speaking,  however,  this  cannot  be  described as  weasel  wording,  for  the
narrator, in that particular instance, appears not to have had the intention of deceiving the reader. On
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the contrary, the blunder that blows his cover appears to be an honest mistake. The only alternative
would be to suppose the narrator only pretended he did not recognise his own shadow—which
makes no sense, however we look at it.
This peculiar blindness, or more precisely this inability to recognise what he sees is one of
the defining traits of the narrator. It also defines the tale.  If he knew what the shadow was, the
reader would have identified it at once. But then, if he could see it for what it was, he would have
grasped what was really going on, and therefore his tale would be very different. This blindness is
both  a  symptom  and  a  metaphor  of  a  more  fundamental  cognitive  impairment  which  is  the
distinctive trait of the femicide character. If he knew who he really was, the reader would reject his
rhetoric at once. This blindness, then, is what makes the femicide dangerous. In Macnish’s tale,
William’s confession constitutes a threat to the public not because there is any real risk of it being
confused with a true story, but because there is a  real risk of the public being taken in by his
rhetoric. The femicide is sorry for what he has done but claims to have mended his ways. He is, of
course, against femicide, and chums up with the implicitly male reader, seeking empathy. After all,
he suggests, we are all on the same side.
William is truly convinced that his deed could not be explained. He clearly suggests his acts
were prompted by some innate psychological imbalance. Later, in Bulwer-Lytton’s and Dickens’s
femicide  stories,  the  femicide  was  represented  explicitly  as  a  “madman.”  Poe  adopted  an
intermediate position. While his narrators were not certified lunatics, most suggested that they were,
somehow, not quite sane:  Egæus had his strange obsession; the narrator of “The Black Cat” denies
that he is not mad, thus effectively suggesting that he is; the narrator of “Ligeia” speaks of his
“incipient madness” and moments of “mental alienation” (Poe, “Ligeia” 320-21). They all agree,
therefore, that the killings were entirely unmotivated, and therefore unavoidable. And, in the sense
that they are permitted to present their stories in their own way without contest this is the official
explanation.
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And so, though the femicide story is not, like she supposed, a true crime story, the fiction
itself appears to represent the masculinist perspective Russell strived to displace. In other words, it
would appear that the fact of its being a fiction makes little practical difference. Indeed, the
argument Jane Caputi and Russell make about the real-life Canadian femicide Mark Lépine appears
to apply to William the Femicide: 
Whether such a killer is ‘demented’ is beside the point. Fixation on the pathology of
perpetrators of violence against women only obscures the social control function of
these acts. In a racist and sexist society, psychotic as well as supposedly normal men
frequently act out the ubiquitous racist, misogynist, and homophobic attitudes with
which they are raised and which they repeatedly see legitimized”
(“Sexist Terrorism” 14-15)
Femicide, like rape, then, is “a form of terrorism that serves to preserve gender status quo,”
and neither should be regarded as “products of some inexplicable deviance”  (Caputi and Russell,
“Sexist Terrorism” 14-15). This is above discussion. To say that the femicide is a freak is to deny
the existence of femicide, considered as a culturally and politically determined phenomenon.
To pathologise may, indeed, be a way of dodging the political implications of these crimes.
It all depends on how “inexplicable” one is willing to regard the deviance. If one regards the deviate
as a person that performs non-motivated actions, or actions the motives of which are in no way
determined by his environment, then a “mad”  criminal is no one’s responsibility. But that is the
femicide’s opinion. The  author,  on  the  other  hand,  while  he  was  completely  “earnest”  in  his
simulation of his character’s feelings and opinions, employed all means compatible with the air of
truth he intended to confer to his tale to suggest that the crimes were not unexplainable, but the
inevitable result of William’s ideological background and upbringing. That is, Macnish signals to
the  kind  of  reader  that  was  used  to  the  ruses  of  Blackwood’s magazine  that  William’s  sexual
preferences were the inevitable result of his views on women. Indeed, he makes it very clear that the
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femicide’s  hostility  to  Mary  is  determined  by  the  same  propensities  that  prevented  him  from
“loving” no one but “pure,” or chaste women like his sister. Necrophilia appears to be the only
conceivable solution to his dilemma. In other words, Macnish makes it as obvious as possible that
no one  but a  femicide  could think and feel  as  his  character  does  about  women.  This  effect  is
achieved through an irony which depends on the fictional structure of the tale. Russell, of course,
being unaware that the tale was a fiction, did not detect this irony.
Macnish discredits not only the femicide’s character, but even the femicide’s interpretation
of himself, by making the evidence he presents in support of his theory manifestly inadequate for
that  purpose.  The femicide, it is true, ultimately traces his crime to an unexplainable, inborn
principle of evil, referring his own story to the contemporary debate over the relative importance of
heredity and environment in the development of personality: 
There are those who say that man is the child of circumstances, and that the evil or
the  good qualities he possesses are attributable to external events, and are not
implanted into him by nature at his birth. There are those who impute all these things
to education, and make the human mind an impassive machine, fit only for receiving
impressions and having no positive agency of its own. If there was ever a being
whose progress through life gave contradiction to such ideas, it is the writer of these
“Confessions.” I was brought up by the hands of virtue, and its heavenly precepts
were early instilled into my mind—and what has been the result of such cultivation?
Despair and sorrow to my parents—shame and mysery to myself.
(Macnish, Confessions 5)
The femicide sees no connection, therefore, between his education and his crime. But the
author clearly saw it, and meant  the  painstaking reader to  perceive  it  too. In the passage just
transcribed, for example, the reference to “heavenly precepts”  imbibed from early  evinces  a
blindness  that  is  comparable  to  tragic  irony,  in  the  sense  that  it  foreshadows  the  narrator’s
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irresistible tendency to idealise women as celestial beings, as well as his hostility toward sexuality.
There are other, even more compelling signs that his education was, if not the origin, at least a
factor in the development of the “inhuman” propensities of the narrator. He says of his mother, who
died when he was sixteen: “She was not made for this world, either in frame or mind” (Macnish,
Confessions 7). As for his father: 
When I recall from other years his noble and manly virtues, I shrink at the sense of
my own worthlessness. (…) I was going to say that  he died broken-spirited for her
departure—but no, the soul of man is not so easily bowed down. It sustains such
losses with triumphant force, while the sensitive heart of woman sinks beneath them.
(…) My father did not pine, and weep, and sigh, like a love-sick girl. He triumphed
apparently over his loss. (Macnish, Confessions 7-8).
 One would say this is precisely the kind of thinking that befits a femicide.
Upon the death of his father, William inherited the family estate, and assumed the patriarchal
authority in the family. He becomes the head of a family of two, constituted by him and his sister.
This, as will later become apparent, was what he intimately desired. Indeed, he describes this period
of his life in terms that suggest that he should have liked to make the situation permanent—as
permanent as a marriage. “Few places were so retired,” he recalls, “and here, if my miserable tone
of mind had permitted, I must have been happy. I had no companion but an only sister,” (Macnish,
Confessions 8). But sex—what else?—ruins William’s pre-lapsarian idyll. He seduces Mary, which
he tacitly  represents  as  an intruder  in  this  scene  of  domestic  bliss  with his  sister,  and thereby
renounces the child-like perfection of his supposedly sexless attachment to the latter. But the cause
of this fall from grace was, he implies, Mary’s own “taint” of humanity. None of these peculiarities
allay the suspicions that his education played a part in the development of his “demented” character.
The femicide seems to regard the period of his cohabitation with his sister, indeed, as a
realisation of his extremely idealised conception of the intercourse between the sexes. Sexual desire,
211
personified by Mary Elliston, however, which could not be denied, seduced him from the path of
virtue. Thus, we are given to understand what the narrator himself never even imagined: that his
hostility for Mary was a projection of his hostility towards sexuality itself. The author evidently
does not share William’s enthusiasm for “pure” attachments, although the double effect at which he
aims prevents him from saying so. The real distinction is not between those who believe that the
story is real and those who recognise it as fiction, but between those who detect the irony in the tale,
and those who do not.
In other words, the femicide story has two morals—this is true of all femicide stories, and it
is  what  fundamentally  distinguishes  them from stories  like  “La Barbe  Bleue.”  One of  them is
implied in the femicide’s rhetoric, which depends on his theory of predestination. The other implied
moral is supported by an alternate authority which is coded in the text. This flows not from the
narrator’s explicit rhetoric, but from the rhetoric of fiction. This authority should, as a matter of
principle, be regarded as distinct from the outlook of the characters. It roughly corresponds to what
Wayne C. Booth and  Michael  Riffaterre  called respectively  the “implied author”  and  “style.”
According to the former, “[o]ur picture of” the author “is built (…) only partly by the narrator’s
explicit commentary; it is even more derived from the kind of tale he chooses to tell” (Rhetoric 73).
This picture, Booth argues, must be distinguished from the narrative voice: 
It is a curious fact that we have no terms either for this created ‘second self’ or for
our relationship with him. None of our terms for various aspects of the narrator is
quite accurate. “Persona,” “mask,” and “narrator” are sometimes used, but they more
commonly refer to the speaker in the work who is after all only one of the elements
created by the implied author and who may be separated from him by large ironies.
“Narrator” is usually taken to mean the “I” of a work, but the “I” is seldom if ever
identical with the implied image of the artist. (73)
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Booth’s notion of “implied author” is comparable to Riffaterre’s notion of “style:” “Le texte
fonctionne  comme  le  program d’un  ordinateur  pour  nous  faire  faire  l’expérience  de  l’unique.
Unique  auquel  on  donne  le  nom  de  style,  et  qu’on  a  longtemps  confondu  avec  l’individu
hypothétique appelé auteur: en fait, le style, c’est le texte même” (Riffaterre, “L’Explication” 8).
Indeed, the concepts of “implied author” and “style” reflect the authors’ view that the voice
that speaks in a work of fiction must not be identified as a matter of course with the author, as
represented in the text by the “I” that speaks. As Riffaterre puts it, the presence of the author may or
may not be explicitly coded in the text: “Dans le premier cas, la présence de l’auteur est encodé (par
ex., cas d’un récit autobiographique à la première personne), le je de l’écrivain n’étant alors qu’un
cas particulier de la représentation des personnages. (…) Dans le second cas, l’auteur n’est pas dans
le text, mais le lecteur l’imagine sans peine et l’y replace” (Riffaterre, “L’Explication” 10). Thus,
for the purposes of literary analysis, the author is coextensive with the text, and therefore must be
distinguished both from any fictional “I,” even when this is a third-person non-participant narrator,
and from the individual who wrote the text.
I  bring  these  problematisations  of  narrative  authority  to  the  discussion  not  so  much  as
models  of  my  analysis,  but  because  they  are  classic  statements  of  a  fundamental  theoretical
distinction which I believe is essential to understanding the femicide story. These stories are always
told from an “I” point of view, which nominally represents the author. This identification with an
ostensibly fictional narrator, who participates in the events narrated, is always problematic, for it
entails a fundamental irony. But, aside from this basic irony, these tales abound with “large ironies,”
as Booth puts it, that further disturb the identification. In fact, the ironies counteract the apparently
undisputed  authority  of  the  narrator  over  his  narrative  to  such  an  extent  that  they  make  the
identification impossible in almost every sense.
The irony in these stories is so radical that they have more than one implied reader. Indeed,
we may distinguish three kinds of implied readers in Macnish’s original hoax: first,  those who
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believe the narrative is factual—if nothing else, this group is a textual fact, as, in Macnish’s time at
least, most readers must have gathered it was fiction; secondly, those who, although identifying the
narrative  as  fiction,  are  persuaded  by  the  femicide’s  rhetoric,  and  are  thereby  left  in  the
uncomfortable position of not being able to reject the offer of friendship of a man who committed a
terrible crime, or fathom the author’s intentions—this is the class of readers Macnish hoped would
“stare” at Confessions, for he must have realised, of course, that the “no fiction” disclaimer would
not convince; a third group is constituted by the crafty readers who can extricate themselves from
William and get at the “implied author,” or “style,”  which, in this case, can be safely regarded as
representing the actual author’s moral take on his character.
In order to obtain this complex effect, however, Macnish had to strike a very difficult
balance. First of all, his character would have to be absolutely “earnest,” in the sense Poe gives to
the word, that is, Macnish would have to state the opinions of his narrator as if he truly believed
them, making them his own. Secondly, the feelings and the opinions of the femicide would have to
be believable. They could not be too absurd, so as not to prevent the reader from accepting them as
something someone might honestly believe, but neither should  they appear too reasonable. If the
femicide was to produce a sensation he had to appear reasonable and balanced in all but that which
is directly connected with his mania. Poe’s practice, as well as his theory, shows us that he
understood perfectly the techniques that enabled Macnish to realise this effect, and in “Ligeia” he
perfected them to such a degree that he kept people staring much harder, and this in despite of his
having acknowledged authorship from the start. The exquisite terror of his tale arguably flowed
from the sense that there was something wrong with the narrator, and perhaps with the author. But,
though intrinsically repulsive, the femicide is disturbingly similar to other men of his time, and this
is what makes him as dangerous as a narrator as he had been as a criminal. In short, the secret of the
femicide story is camouflage. And Poe’s femicides in “Berenice,” “Morella,” and “Ligeia” are even
better camouflaged than Macnish’s, Dickens’s, or Bulwer-Lytton’s. None of them tells the reader he
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is a femicide. Some of them do not even realise they have killed (this appears to be, indeed, the case
of Egæus, in the first of these tales)!
The femicide story is therefore inherently political, in the broadest sense of the word. If real-
life femicides were as consummate dissemblers as William, they might live among us without our
knowing. Thus, Macnish forces the reader to consider the nicer political implications of femicide of
which the femicide himself is unaware—this, incidentally, was precisely Russell’s point. William
pushes—or more precisely, Macnish pushes—the sentimental love cliché of the angel-woman to
absurd lengths. Evidently, Macnish intended to target specifically, albeit indirectly, the sentimental
ideology that dehumanises women, by associating it with the most abject character of seducer that
his time could conceive. Thus, the femicide story poses an implied challenge to the reader. We must
either deny the femicide, if we can, or accept the story in his own terms. William, of course, saw
nothing wrong in the way he conceived of women.
In  fact,  William’s  views,  in  themselves,  are  perfectly  conventional—were  it  not  for  the
crucial fact, femicide, we might imagine Macnish was not only “earnest,” but sincere. The same
applies  to  Poe.  Indeed,  critics  have  long been aware  of  the femicidal  tendency of  the extreme
sentimentalism of Poe’s narrators, but this has mostly been attributed directly to Poe, through the
conventional identification of the author with the “I” of the tale. One of Poe’s most famous critical
statements,  from  “The  Philosophy  of  Composition,”  is  habitually  taken  as  proof  of  this
identification. When he conceived the poem that would become “The Raven,” Poe writes:
I  asked  myself—  “Of  all  melancholy  topics,  what,  according  to  the  universal
understanding of mankind, is the most melancholy?” Death—was the obvious reply.
“And when,” I said, “is this most melancholy of topics most poetical?’ From what I
have already explained at some length, the answer, here also, is obvious—“When it
most  closely  allies  itself  to  Beauty:  the  death,  then,  of  a  beautiful  woman  is,
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unquestionably, the most poetical topic in the world—and equally is it beyond doubt
that the lips best suited for such topic are those of a bereaved lover.” (65)
Poe cleverly avoids commitment by speaking of the “universal understanding of mankind.”
Gender is significant in the context. Women, for obvious reasons, might not appreciate the poetry of
the topic quite as much as men. It has been generally assumed that Poe was peculiarly obsessed
with dead or dying women, and psychoanalytical readings of his work have done much to promote
this view. However, Poe is here making a statement about the general taste of the male public of his
day, to the effect that they found dead women beautiful, without committing himself to that view.
Indeed, he here emphasises that a writer is obliged to cater the taste of the majority of his readers,
not his own.
In his letter to T. W. White, which I have quoted earlier (April 8, 1835, Letter 42), regarding
the scandalous “Berenice,” Poe had made the same point. There he made it clear that all writers, and
not just those who lived by their pens, were obliged to meet the expectations of the public. “To be
appreciated,” he explained, 
you must be read, and these things are invariably sought after with avidity. They are,
if you will take notice, the articles which find their way into other periodicals, and
into the papers, and in this manner, taking hold upon the public mind they augment
the reputation of the source where they originated. Such articles are the “M.S. found
in a Madhouse” and the “Moinos and Daimonos” of the London New Monthly—the
“Confessions of an Opium-Eater” and the “Man in the Bell” of Blackwood. The two
first were written by no less a man than Bulwer—the Confessions [being] universally
attributed to Coleridge—although unjustly. Thus the first men in [England] have not
thought writings of this nature unworthy of their talents.
(Letters 85 conjectural additions by the editors)
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This  general  endorsement  of  sensationalist  literature  is  significantly  prompted  by
“Berenice,” the first of Poe’s tales to openly depict extreme violence against women. Indeed, Poe’s
tales about what was regarded as the “most poetic of topics” either openly depict or imply some act
of violence perpetrated by the male “lover” on his “beloved” female.  Poe’s tales and poems in
which femicide is blended with the sentimental commonplaces of his day, were, I believe, intended
as parodies of the kind of morbid sentimentality the best expression of which was the common idea
that death became women.
Indeed, the femicide deploys the rhetoric of the “male ‘angelographers,’” to use Gilbert and
Gubar’s phrase (Madwoman 25). These authors remark that the “moral cult of the angel-woman”
was associated with “the  aesthetic  cult  of  ladylike  fragility  and delicate  beauty”  (25).  Echoing
Wollstonecraft’s critique of the extreme patriarchal ideology that underlies such representations,
they  add that  women were in  fact  being encouraged to  “feign morbid weakness  or  actually  to
‘decline’ into real illness” (25). Thus, the social expression of the rhetoric of the “angelographers”
was what Barbara Ehrenreich and Deirdre English called “‘the cult of female invalidism’” (qtd. in
Gilbert and Gubar,  Madwoman 54). Wollstonecraft herself already suggested that men, at least in
the upper and middle classes, were sexually attracted to sick or apparently sick women.
Gilbert and Gubar, of course, regard Poe as the most extreme representative of this kind of
patriarchal  sensibility;  as  the  paradigm  of  the  “angelographer”  whose  works  depicted  that
“emblematic ‘beautiful woman’ whose death, thought Edgar Allan Poe, ‘is unquestionably the most
poetic  topic  in  the  world’”  (Madwoman  25).  This,  of  course,  is  one  of  Poe’s  most  famous
statements, from “The Philosophy of Composition.” I think, however, that this reading of Poe is
impaired by the same kind of misjudgment that Russell made in Macnish’s case, that of confusing
the author with his narrator.  
This sort of sensibility was, indeed, as prevalent in Poe’s day as he suggests in “Philosophy.”
Countless examples spring to mind,  but I  will  instance here only one:  the novel  Eugene Aram
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(1832), by Bulwer-Lytton himself. This novel appears to me to be a particularly clear expression of
precisely the kind of implicit prejudice against women that Macnish had projected on his femicide,
and  also  one  of  the  most  perfect  statements  of  the  cult  of  female  invalidism.  The  novel  is  a
fictionalisation of the true story of the self-taught scholar, and pioneer philologist of the same name
who in 1759 had been sentenced to death for the murder of Daniel Clark, presumed to have been
committed in 1744. Aram’s trial attracted considerable attention at the time. In the early 1830s there
was a resurgence of interest in his story which resulted in the publication of two popular works of
literature: Thomas Hood’s ballad “The Dream of Eugene Aram” (1831) and Bulwer-Lytton’s novel
(1832).
Aram’s  case  remained  a  source  of  enduring  perplexity  because  it  challenged  common
notions  of  criminal  psychology.  How could this  well-liked,  well-spoken,  intelligent,  and highly
educated man be capable of murder? Both Hood’s ballad and Bulwer-Lytton’s novel are attempts to
explain  this  perplexing  case  that  brought  into  question  the  reassuring  fiction  that  there  was  a
“criminal  type,”  that  is,  that  murderers  had a  peculiar  behavior  by which  they could  be easily
distinguished from, and identified by honest people. Thus, these authors treated Aram as a problem
in psychology, and therefore naturally relied heavily on a subjective perspective. During the trial, it
surfaced that he had the peculiar habit of talking to himself, which, of course, provided an excellent
pretext  to  represent  the  inner  workings  of  his  mind.  The  writers  therefore  imagined  Aram’s
soliloquies, projecting in them their interpretation of his character.
At  their  hands,  Aram  becomes  a  Romantic  hero.  Yet,  while  in  Hood’s  ballad  he  is
unequivocally represented as the murderer of Daniel Clark, Bulwer-Lytton, through a conviction
that the crime of which he had been convicted was incompatible with his character, takes some
liberties  with  the  facts  to  render  him  more  agreeable  to  his  public.  One  of  these  changes  is
particularly  significant,  I  think,  to  our  purposes.  The  real-life  Aram  was  married—his  wife,
incidentally, was one of the key witnesses for the accusation. Bulwer-Lytton, however, seems to
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have thought that this woman was not a suitable romantic interest for a man like Aram. Apparently,
he thought that only an “ideal” woman would be right for his hero.
In  the  novel,  Aram  falls  in  love  with  Madeline  Lester,  a  lofty-minded  and  exquisitely
sensitive girl, who performs the conventionally sentimental role of saving the hero from himself,
and more particularly, from the solipsism into which his reflective and earnest disposition, and his
studious habits had plunged him. Madeline, in other words, tempers Aram’s cold reason with some
“feminine” feeling.
At the time of his arrest, the real Aram was a schoolteacher—in fact, he was arrested in the
school  that  employed  him at  the  time.  Bulwer-Lytton’s  Aram,  however,  was  a  sort  of  austere
dillettante  who  studied  solely  for  the  sake  of  knowledge,  and  was  wealthy  enough  to  lead  a
comfortable life without having to worry about his next meal. In the novel, he is arrested in the day
in  which  his  marriage  to  Madeline  Lester  was  to  take  place.  Thus,  the  author  of  the  novel
manipulates the facts in order to provide Aram with a bride that is the perfect embodiment of the
patriarchal stereotype of the virgin who was too good for this corrupt world.
Indeed, after Aram’s arrest, Madeline suffers a sudden change of appearance. Her relatives
and future husband alike regard this change as a sure sign of imminent death. This change is very
similar to those that Morella and Ligeia suffer—particularly the latter—, as are the feelings this
change excite in the narrators:
About the end of the second month the effect upon her health grew visible. Her color,
naturally delicate as the hues of the pink shell or the youngest rose, faded into one
marble  whiteness,  which  again,  as  time  proceeded,  flushed  into  that  red  and
preternatural  hectic, which once settled, rarely yields its place but to the colours of
the grave.  Her flesh sunk from its  rounded and noble proportions.  Deep hollows
traced themselves beneath eyes which yet grew even more lovely as they grew less
serenely bright. (Bulwer-Lytton, Eugene Aram 3: 165-66)
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Again, on the eve of Aram’s trial, Madeline got worse, and yet, according to the narrator,
which in this fully agrees with the characters of the narrative, more lovely still. On her face,
nothing  of  herself,  save  the  divine  and  unearthly  expression  which  had  always
characterized her loveliness, was left. (…) hushed in a death-like and solemn repose,
the parted  lips  moving inaudibly;  the  eye  fixed  on vacancy;  the wan transparent
hands, crossed upon her bosom; the light shone with a more softened and tender ray
upon the faded but all-angelic form and countenance of her, for whom Heaven was
already preparing its eternal recompense for the ills of Earth!
(Bulwer-Lytton, Eugene Aram 3:188)
The latent morbid eroticism of these passages reaches a climax on the morning of the trial:
“And when Madeline was dressed, though the robe sat loose in large folds over her shrunken form,
yet, as she stood erect, (…) perhaps her beauty never seemed of a more striking and lofty character,
—she looked, indeed, a bride, but the bride of no earthly nuptials” (Bulwer-Lytton,  Eugene Aram
3:188).
Thus, the kind of female beauty that Bulwer-Lytton valued most highly is clearly equated
with  sickness  and death,  as  well  as  chastity.  He evidently  feels  that  “marble  whiteness,”  “wan
fingers,” an unhealthy flush, and an emaciated body become women. Significantly, the narrator of
“Ligeia” uses similar terms to describe his wife: he speaks of “her lofty, her ethereal nature;” even
in health, he tells us, she had a “marble hand;” after her change, her “pale fingers (…) became the
transparent waxen hue of the grave” (Poe, “Ligeia” 311-316). And then, of course, he only truly
loved her in death. Furthermore, he is also convinced that her expression, which he, like Bulwer-
Lytton, invests with a transcendent significance, was the token of her true, purely spiritual identity,
and therefore purely womanly, which is here contrasted with the “impure” physical appearance she
had  displayed  in  health.  This  sort  of  language  certainly  appears  to  justify  Wollstonecraft’s
contention that man preferred unhealthy women—or women who affected debility 
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Nature has given woman a weaker frame than man; but, to ensure her husband’s
affections, must a wife, who by the exercise of her mind and body whilst she was
discharging the duties of a daughter, wife, and mother, has allowed her constitution to
retain its natural strength, and her nerves a healthy tone, is she, I say, to condescend
to use art  and feign a sickly delicacy in order to secure her husband’s affection?
(Vindication 98)
Wollstonecraft  argues  that  man’s  morbid  taste  for  women  in  ill  health  had  actually
contributed to make them sick: “sedentary employments render the majority of women sickly—and
false notions of female excellence make them proud of this delicacy, though it be another fetter”
(Vindication  145).  One  must  admit,  at  least,  that  Bulwer-Lytton’s  portrayal  of  Madeline  raises
serious suspicions that this might indeed have been the case. 
Evidently, the author thought that the death of a beautiful woman was a very poetical subject
indeed. More precisely, he gives his reader the distinct impression that woman is most beautiful
when closer to death; that death becomes her. The male figures of authority in the novel, Madeline’s
father and husband to be, take this logic one step further. They both articulate the desire that she
might  die  as  quickly  as  possible,  rather  than  have  her  pure  “spiritual”  nature  spoiled  by  the
corruption of the world. “If the innocent is to perish, the sooner she joins him [Aram] the better,”
says  the  former;  “let  her  die,”  the  latter  said,  “let  her  die;  she  at  least  is  certain  of  Heaven!”
(Bulwer-Lytton Eugene Aram 3:178). The moral of such remarks is that it better for a woman to die
than to lose her innocence. Madeline could not survive the dishonourable death of the man she
loved. What is more, there is a consensus in the novel that she should not outlive him. Hers is the
perfect illustration of the ideal of self-sacrificing “womanly” love the femicide reveres.  This,  I
would argue, forms a sort of latent femicidal feeling that, although particularly extreme in this case,
is perfectly typical of much of the literature of the period, and would remain so throughout the
Victorian age.
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In a sense, Bulwer-Lytton’s novel is not only implicitly femicidal—one might say that he
actually committed femicide by deletion. As I have before stated, the real Eugene Aram had a wife,
who testified against him, but Bulwer-Lytton saw fit  to strike her off of the story.  She appears
transfigured, as it were, in the novel, as Aram’s “landlady”—the woman in whose house he lodged
during  his  stay  in  Knaresborough,  the  place  where  Daniel  Clark,  the  man  he  was  accused  of
murdering, had last been seen. In the novel, the landlady tells the court that, in the night of his
disappearance, Clark had left her house with Houseman and Aram—he was never seen alive after
this. In reality, Aram lived at the time with his wife. When he fled Knaresborough, he left her there.
The testimony Bulwer-Lytton attributes to the landlady is actually based on Anna Aram’s statement.
The scholar’s  real-life  wife appears  in  the  novel,  then,  as  a  doting  old  woman,  so  the  role  of
romantic interest could be taken over by the starry-eyed, well-read Madeline, who, as I said earlier,
existed only in Bulwer-Lytton’s imagination.
This suggests, as I have before said, that Bulwer-Lytton thought Aram’s real wife was not fit
for an intellectual—and so, since she was not convenient for his purposes, he did away with her.
This, then, is what I have earlier called femicide by deletion. But Bulwer-Lytton also concealed
another significant fact. Aram’s real wife, aside from providing the testimony that ultimately led to
the conviction of Aram and Houseman, as an accomplice, for the murder of Daniel Clark, claimed
to  have  heard  them  plotting  her  murder.  I  find  Bulwer-Lytton’s  omission  of  this  fact  very
significant, especially considering the exact words of Anna Aram’s testimony, as reported in  The
Genuine Account of the Trial of Eugene Aram,57 the often-reprinted and widely-available account of
the case, from which Bulwer-Lytton himself probably took much of the information for his novel.58
57 The book also contained a transcription of Aram’s defense, the short autobiography he wrote at the biding of the
clergyman who attended him in prison before he was executed, fragments of his unfinished philological treatise,
and his suicide note. Indeed, Aram made an unsuccessful attempt to kill himself by cutting his wrists with a razor
on the eve of his execution.
I have used the “tenth edition,” dated 1810. The book was originally published in 1759 (this is confirmed by
the catalogue of the Bodleian Library, which has a record for a copy of the second edition of that year).
58 In the Preface to the slightly revised 1840 edition of the novel, Bulwer-Lytton writes he “endeavoured to collect
such anecdotes of Aram’s life and manners as tradition and hearsay still kept afloat. (…) His personal and moral
peculiarities, as described in these pages, are such as were related to me by many who had heard him described by
his contemporaries” (“Preface to the Present Edition” x). These inquiries, however, were not pursued with a view to
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She told the court that, in the night in which the crime allegedly occurred, Houseman and Clark had
visited Aram at the couple’s home, and that all three had left together. Some hours later, Aram and
Houseman returned, without Clark, who was never seen again. Aram then dismissed his wife, and
locked  himself  up  with  Houseman.  She,  however,  “being  desirous  to  know what”  they  “were
doing,” eavesdropped on the pair: 
she heard Houseman say to Aram, She is coming. Her husband replied, We’ll not let
her. Houseman then said, If she does, she’ll tell. What can she tell? Replies Aram,
poor simple thing!  (…) Houseman said,  Something must  be done to prevent  her
telling, and pressed him to it very much; and said, If she does not tell now, she may
at some other time. No, said her husband, We will coax her a little until her passion
be off, and then take an opportunity to shoot her” (Genuine Account 7-6).
Aram himself, according to the same published account of his case, would, in the morning of
his execution, confess the crime, alleging that his wife had been the cause of his misfortunes. He is
reported to also have said then that he had found out that she and Clark were lovers. Neither Aram
nor any of the other witnesses had mentioned this suspicion during the trial. But then, Clark was
known to have come into possession of some valuable jewelry, which provided the accusation with
a probable motive.  In  any event,  Bulwer-Lytton,  perhaps  because he considered the confession
apocryphal, omitted it altogether, along with the motive Aram there assigned to his crime and the
wife herself. In any case, Bulwer-Lytton could not believe Aram was a cold-blooded murderer. In
the first edition of his novel, the actual crime is committed by Houseman, Aram becoming only his
accomplice; in later revisions, Aram is the murderer, but the crime is described in terms that evoke
the Faustian myth, so central to Romantic mythology, and therefore its guilt is somewhat mitigated.
It is impossible to know for certain what happened, of course. But one thing at least is clear:
Bulwer-Lytton concurred with the Aram of the Genuine Account that his wife Anna was a “simple
clarify the circumstances of the crime for which Aram was convicted or his trial, but rather to attempt to confirm his
idea that the case involved “a contradiction of one deed at war with a whole life” (xv).
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thing” who was not worthy of her husband. He suppressed her for sentimental reasons, replacing her
with the unrealistic Madeline, on which he projected all the clichés of ideal womanhood that the
femicides project on their beloved dead women. Madeline represents the ideal woman that is too
“good” for this world. The irony, of course, is that Bulwer-Lytton had to make her up.
But this is clearly an unintended irony. The same male sentimental ideology underlies both
Eugene Aram and the femicide story, but there are significant differences in the way it is handled.
What particularly distinguishes the two is precisely the absence of any shred of anything that may
be even vaguely construed as intended irony in Bulwer-Lytton’s statement of this ideology, and also
the absence of actual acts of violence against women. To put it another way, the difference between
the femicide and the narrator of Bulwer-Lytton’s novel is that the latter does not kill or mistreat any
women. Thus, the novel leaves no room in the reader’s mind that these were the sentiments of the
author. It is an entirely different matter with the femicide story.
There, the ideology which Bulwer-Lytton conveys with sincerity, is associated, implicitly or
explicitly, with femicide. Thus, the implied, unseen sexist aggression of the kind of rhetoric Bulwer-
Lytton used is brought out and realised in a deed of actual violence. Bulwer-Lytton’s sympathetic
treatment  of  Aram  even  leads  him  to  suppress  the  suspicion  of  meditated  femicide  from  his
account.59 But this is done in a way that actually confirms, as we have seen, the unworthiness of the
“simple” real wife, and consequently reiterates the cult of the angel-woman. That is, Aram was
provided with an utterly unreal “worthy” bride, devoted to the point of sacrifice. The femicide story,
of course, implies that the sentimentalism that prompts this substitution is perverse. And this is at
the root of the effect Macnish aimed to create. Inasmuch as the reader may conceivably share some
views with the femicide, the reader may be, he  suggests, an accomplice to femicide, or worse, a
potential femicide. 
59 Bulwer-Lytton also tacitly disqualifies Anna Aram’s testimony in his preface to the 1840 edition of the novel by 
stating that “the legal evidence against” Eugene Aram “is extremely deficient—and furnished almost entirely by 
one (Houseman) confessdly an accomplice to the crime, and a partner in the booty” (“Preface to the Present 
Edition” xiii).
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But this is not to say that Macnish was anything approaching what we would now call a
feminist, or even that he sympathised with the incipient movement for the emancipation of women
in his epoch. So far from it, he actually regarded women intellectuals with scorn. “I see those
masculine-feminines,” he writes Moir, “the * * * * damsels, have brought out a couple of volumes.
What an itch for writing these ladies have!;” adding insult to injury, he adds: “I should not like to
marry one of them:—confirmed blue-stockings” (Moir, The Modern Pythagorean 1:202-203). 
Macnish conceived female authorship as a breach of gender roles;  as  an  illegitimate
encroachment on male privilege. The purpose of a woman’s life, he further implies, is to become a
wife, a state he thinks is incompatible with an intellectual career. That is why, according to him, the
women of Edinburgh compare unfavorably to those of Glasgow. The first evince “blue-stocking
propensities. They have a tremendous opinion of themselves, which accounts for there being so
many old maids in the Modern Athens;” whereas the latter “are nice and ignorant, and do not plague
one with learning. On this account I greatly prefer them to the self-conceited damsels of the
metropolis [meaning Edinburgh]. Women should never be as wise as man”  (Moir,  The Modern
Pythagorean 1:203). The women of Glasgow, then, make the best wives.
I have no intention of extenuating, much less justify, Macnish’s misogyny. But he certainly
was no femicide—not literally. On the contrary, he indirectly holds society as a whole responsible
for  nurturing people like William, who preyed on women. But his critique is rooted on a strictly
conservative position on gender relationships. This may seem strange to a modern reader, but in this
Macnish  is  a  perfect  representative  of  his  time.  Politically  conservative  writers  in  those  days
typically  thought  that  women should not  lead public  lives,  and should be concerned only with
managing their households and raising their children. However, they seldom idealised them. This
idealisation  was  much  more  common  among  the  political  left  in  those  days.  Indeed,
Wollstonecraft’s  A Vindication of the Rights of Woman specifically targeted equalitarian writers,
such as Rousseau, who left women out of their project of political emancipation.
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Macnish,  then,  did not question bourgeois family values.  He  was  not  pushing  for  the
abolition of the segregated spheres of male and female activity, nor did he see any need for a radical
revision of the way people looked at conjugality. But  he  also  did  not  endorse  the  kind  of
enthusiastic,  unrealistic  idealisation  of  womanhood  which  writers  like  Bulwer-Lytton  were
promoting, and of which his femicide story is, I think, an implied critique. It is harder to ascertain
Poe’s  position  relative  to  the  political  trends  of  his  time.  His  unreliable  narrators  kill  learned
women, and this distinguishes them from all previous femicides, because in his time conservative
and radical writers were, for the most part, equally hostile to female intellectuals. 
We  find  the  same  extreme  idealisation  of  women  and  the  concomitant  exaltation  of
“spiritual” love in some of the writers who, in those days, had advocated radical changes in the
structure of the family. Godwin, for example, one of the leading radical figures proposed, in his
Political Justice (1793), to replace traditional forms of conjugality with a new rational plan for the
relation between the sexes. This emphasised intellectual communion, and an idealised, “spiritual”
affection, at the expense of erotic bonds, which Godwin condemned as “irrational.” These projects
generally entailed a very negative outlook on sexual intercourse.
Such revolutionary theories provided an easy target for satire. Washington Irving’s “The
Adventure of the German Student” (1824) is a good example. The tale, which is significantly set in
revolutionary France, is a satire on the ideal of “rational” cohabitation between the sexes promoted,
among others, by Godwin. The protagonist is a German student who combines the mystical leanings
then associated with his native country with a fascination with violent political change. One night,
while taking his daily stroll—as might be expected, he only came out at night—, this revolutionary
visionary meets a fascinating and sophisticated woman. Agreeing that the ceremony of marriage had
no meaning, the couple decide to sleep together without ceremony.  How little Irving sympathised
with the couple’s morals is indicated by the fact that the student finds out the next morning that he
had slept with a dead, beheaded woman—a victim of the Guillotine. 
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In the 1990 article “Poe’s ‘Ligeia:’ Poe’s Debt to Irving and Emerson,” Jerry A. Herndon
wrote that “Poe may have imitated elements” of this tale in “Ligeia,” “in order to produce a sharply
focused satire of Emerson’s transcendental thought, as formulated in  Nature,  published two years
before” (113). Although Poe could, and probably had Emerson in mind, I do not think that he was
interested in ridiculing him specifically, but rather the loosely defined idealism that he referred to as
“transcendentalism,” and which, for him, was a by-word for silliness.
I think Irving’s tale is not so much a direct influence, but more an indirect one—but one of
which nonetheless Poe,  who knew Irving’s work very well,  must have been aware.  Indeed, the
parallel identified by Herndon is rather unspecific. Irving’s narrator declares that he had the story
from the mouth of the protagonist, who was confined in a madhouse, and Poe’s narrator is also
suspected  of  being  a  madman.  According  to  Herndon,  “the  two  stories  share  this  significant
characteristic, and another as well: a hint of necrophilia. In Irving’s it is more than a hint. Did the
guillotined corpse ever had a head at all?” (Herndon, “Poe’s ‘Ligeia’” 117). These characteristics,
however, were shared by a number of other short fictions, notably Macnish’s  Confessions, with
which Poe’s “Ligeia” has even more striking similarities, and whose authors may themselves have
been influenced by Irving.
Nevertheless, “The Adventure of the German Student” is important because it shows us that
some writers in conservative quarters  were in the habit of ridiculing  the radicals for what they
perceived as  an excessive, unrealistic idealisation of love that precluded a  healthy sex-life. The
bookish student spent so much time dreaming of the  ideal  woman,  and  in  fact,  indulging  his
onanism fantasies in silent reclusion, that he became alienated from real-life women. In fact, Irving
clearly implies that no living woman could ever live up to his fantasies.60 Hence—this is the ghastly
60  The onanism of the student is clearly hinted in the following passage, of which, incidentally, there may be an
echo in Dickens’s “A Madman’s Manuscript:” “He was too shy and ignorant of the world to make any advances to the
fair, but he was a passionate admirer of female beauty, and in his lonely chamber would often lose himself in reveries on
forms and faces which he had seen, and his fancy would deck out images of loveliness far surpassing the reality” (Irving
22).  Dickens’s  madman, as we have seen,  says:  “I  don’t  remember forms of faces,  now, but I  know the girl  was
beautiful” (Dickens, “Madman” 141).
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innuendo—, for him, the only good woman was a dead woman. Irving’s caricature was therefore
only a step away from femicide—and a small one at that.
The student’s dissatisfaction with all existing women is, after all, an implied form of
misogyny that could easily degenerate into hostility. I am convinced that Macnish, whose
Confessions appeared  scarcely three years after Irving’s tale, intended to exploit this very
implication. But his character, unlike Irving’s, was the narrator of his own story, and was therefore
allowed to present himself as a reformed femicide. But the same blindness that saved him also
makes him betray himself, in the end, to the attentive reader of his confessions. And then Poe’s
narrator, the most effective dissembler of all, because the most self-deluded, came along.
Coded along with his  crime, is the indisputable evidence of Poe’s unoriginality. Yet, who
can deny that he improved on the already impressive feat of simulation of his predecessor? Macnish
wrote a tale that no reader acquainted with the literary conventions of  Blackwood’s  could believe
was “no fiction.” Poe took the basic storyline, the risqué theme, the character of the fictional writer-
protagonist, the strictly subjective perspective that determined the characteristic form of the tale,
and, most of all, the earnest tone. He only changed what he called the “thesis,”  and proceeded to
perform what no one would believe was possible. He wrote an ostensible fiction that has been, to
this day, mostly taken as a true story about Poe.
No one believes, of course, that the story happened to Poe. But neither could many readers
bring themselves to believe it did not, such is the air of truth of his stories. As George Gilfillan put it
as early as 1855, in Third Gallery of Literary Portraits, Poe “tells fiction so minutely, and with such
apparent simplicity and sincerity, that you almost believe it true” (“Edgar Allan Poe” 334). Indeed,
criticism of his work has always been dominated by the feeling that Poe was fundamentally sincere,
and that his work, and “Ligeia” in particular, expressed profound aspects of his character of which
he himself was unaware. In fact, in practice, it has been assumed that Poe wrote, in a sense, from
experience. There is perhaps no better illustration of this than the following passage in Mabbott’s
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introduction to “Ligeia:” “We cannot doubt that the author intended a story of real magic, as the
pentagonal room would suggest. Of course, he did not expect readers to believe the story after they
put it down; he wanted temporary suspension of disbelief during its perusal” (Tales 307). The very
fact that Mabbott  felt  the necessity  of stating what no reader  of fiction should forget is  hardly
reassuring.
Poe, of course, had systematically promoted this confusion between reality and fiction: he
provided an important clue to the purpose of this sort of ruse in a small note published in December
13, 1845 in the Broadway Journal in which he quoted an article in The Tribune about the sensation
his hoaxes had caused, going on to state: “For our parts, we find it difficult to understand how any
dispassionate transcendentalist can doubt the facts as we state them” (Poe, Writings in the Broadway
Journal 340).
Despite all this, many critics have believed Poe was somehow writing from experience, and
this  made him a perfect subject for psychoanalysis; it also resulted in the suspicion of psychiatric
imbalance, which provided critics with a simple explanation for the perplexing idiosyncrasies of his
work. One of Poe’s many biographers, Edward Wagenknecht, has remarked, many years ago, that
there was no real evidence to support that explanation: “if there ever was a life to illustrate the truth
that there are many more questions in the world than answers, this is that life. The mind hates
incompleteness, and it is not surprising that so many have sought for a formula which will explain
everything. Poe was an epileptic. Poe was a manic depressive. Poe was a necrophiliac.61 Poe was
impotent. Poe was syphilitic. And so on, ad infinitum and ad nauseam. If Poe was any one of these,
it might indeed give us a clue to his nature. But we have no reason to suppose that he was” (13).
61 In a note to this passage, Wagenknecht quotes David M. Rein, who, in “Poe’s Introduction, 31-4,” a commentary to
those lines in the introductory poem of Poems (1831), later retitled “Romance,” makes the very interesting point
that, of all the women Poe is said to have loved before he published this poem, “he loved the woman while she was
alive and apparently well. In no case did his love depend upon the woman’s dying; in no case did he know the
woman and fail to love her until death appeared” (qtd. in Wagenknecht 227n18). Even after, “and until the very end
of his life, “Poe loved women who were healthy” (227n18). Although most of his romantic attachments have never
amounted to much, Rein stresses an important difference between Poe and the narrator of “Ligeia,” for example,
who certainly loved women only after they were death.
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But admirers  and detractors alike have  agreed, with very few exceptions, that Poe did not
know what he was doing, but he could not help himself; that is, that his work was essentially the
product of subconscious elaboration, and therefore manifested the dark side of his psyche. Thus,
most Poe criticism has been, for many years, more or less explicitly psychoanalytical, in that it sees
Poe’s work as something akin to a dream, in the psychoanalytical sense of the word—incidentally,
this is also true of most modern readings of Gothic fiction in general. The problem with such views,
as Susan Amper points out, is that they lose sight of the decisive difference between dreams and
works of literature: “But while dreams may be the products of the dreamer’s unconscious, is not a
short  story  largely  a  conscious  creation?  (How  to  Write  44).  Because  they  fail  to  make  due
allowance for the author’s intention, these readings also naturally tend to take Poe, and even his
irony, seriously: “Whether the conflict was construed as superego versus id or imagination versus
reason,  these  discussions  share  a  common  assumption  that  the  tales  present  their  conflicts
essentially in earnest” (Amper, How to Write 44).
This resulted in  the tacit agreement that all of Poe’s serious narrators are Poe himself in
disguise. In a limited sense, of course, they are. But the “shadow of a shade” fiasco is designed to
teach the reader that the affinity that most have supposed to exist between Poe and his narrator is a
ruse. In order to catch Poe, we must first catch his narrator, lest we confuse subconscious urges with
design. Poe was a professional writer at a time when people expected literary works to reflect their
author’s sentiments  in a very direct way—they had grown used to that. Poe, who understood this
perfectly, projected a “false impression”  of himself;  in  other  words,  he  created a persona that
reflected the expectations of his public. He also understood that this public had been persuaded that
sincerity had a stamp of truth about it, that it could be recognised intuitively, even in fiction, and
exploited the credulity which the spirit of the age promoted by simulating the tone readers were
used to equate with sincerity. In this sense, most of his stories are hoaxes.
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Poe regarded fiction essentially as an effort  of depersonalisation,  and this  separated him
from the Romantics, who thought that fiction was a way, indeed the only way, of embodying and
expressing the self; that is, that feigning was the only real way of being sincere. Poe’s conception of
fiction is implied in his reading of Shakespeare: “He wrote of Hamlet as if Hamlet he were” (Rev.
of  The Characters of Shakespeare  212 emphasis mine).  The “as if” is crucial,  and marks Poe’s
divergence from the traditional  Romantic  reading of  Shakespeare:  he  was not  Hamlet,  he  only
pretended to be. Poe’s  narrators, who love women only after they are dead; who pull their teeth;
who marry them so they can lock them up in phantasmagoric towers; who love in the child the
mother they  say  they  never loved—these men are not Poe—that is, they cannot be directly
identified with the author, considered as a textual fact, much less with Poe the man.  This much is
clear: the author—the author as represented in the tale itself—disliked the femicide. Yet, he  had
reasons to believe most readers would like him, or at least excuse him. And he was right.
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II – Poe’s Method of Composition and the Sources of “Ligeia”
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1 — “Chemistry of Intellect:” Poe’s Theory of the Imagination
In the previous chapter I have attempted a definition and survey of the femicide story, and a
description of its  particular  rhetoric.  In my individual  readings of Poe’s “Berenice,”  “Morella,”
“Ligeia,” and “The Black Cat,” I have argued that Poe took the basic duplicity of the genre to a new
level, creating what I have designated the covert femicide story, which I regard as a particular case
of the mystery, as Poe himself had defined it, for example in his reviews of Dickens’s  Barnaby
Rudge.  This  entailed  a  revision  of  the  common  critical  representation  of  Poe  as  an  extreme
Romanticist, in which I tried to show results from an undue identification of his opinions with those
of the narrators of his tales, as well as from an ingenuous reading of his criticism.
In this chapter, I will be focusing on Poe’s work and attempt a description of his style and
method. The single most important characteristic of this style, shared by his fiction and criticism, is
an  ambiguous  tone,  which  constitutes  a  special  form of  irony.  This  has  commonly  been  seen,
especially after G. R. Thompson’s Poe’s Fiction (1973) as a form of Romantic irony. I will argue,
however, that Poe is not a “Romantic ironist,” but ironically Romantic. I will try to show, then, that
in  his  criticism  Poe  systematically  and  unequivocally  rejected  precisely  the  sort  of  extreme
Romanticism represented by the narrators of the tales we looked at in the previous chapter. That is,
that  those  narrators  are  perfect  illustrations  of  the  “transcendentalism”  Poe  denounced  in  his
criticism as the peculiar  superstition of his  age.  I  will  also try to show that his  criticism itself
displays the same kind of duplicity that we found in his fiction, and, therefore, that the same kind of
close reading that we applied to the tales is usually required to get past the apparent Romanticism of
his  critical  statements,  which,  when  taken  at  face  value,  are  invariably  absurd.  Indeed,  these
statements often appear self-contradictory—but this is, I believe, an effect of the deceitful rhetoric
he employed, as a sort of trap to the reader, to which the common idea that Poe was a Romantic in
despite of himself may be traced.
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The analysis of Poe’s irony I propose also involves a study of his sources. But, as Poe’s
handling of his sources partakes of the irony that characterises his approach, this study demands a
special concept of source, which I have derived from Burton R. Pollin’s pioneering work in the
field. The actual meaning of Poe’s criticism, as opposed to the apparent gist of his reviews, usually
depends on what may be termed his covert allusions—this is, I insist, the same mechanism we see at
play in Poe’s fiction. Specifically, though he sometimes appears to praise the “transcendentalism”
he constantly and quite ostensibly derides, such praise is always undermined by an “undercurrent of
meaning,” just like the ravings of his narrators are exposed by the subterranean meanings Poe coded
in his fiction. I believe, therefore, that much of his criticism is inherently satirical. I will argue,
specifically, that Poe’s theory of imagination, is in fact a theory of the mystery. To put it another
way, the mystery, in the sense of a fictional work in which the events depicted are obscured, but can
be deduced by the reader, is implied by Poe’s theory of poetry as a whole, and not just the review of
Barnaby Rudge. 
I will also attempt to show that “Ligeia” is the perfect embodiment of Poe’s theory, and the
finest  product  of  his  art  of  composition,  as  he himself  defined it;  that  it  is  not  an instance  of
Romantic irony, but, like his criticism itself, rather an ironical statement of Romanticism. This time
around, however, my approach to the tale will be more scholarly than in the first chapter. First, I
will discuss what I regard as the most relevant solutions critics have proposed for the mysteries of
the tale. This has not been attempted in the first chapter, in which my purpose has been to present,
as clearly and simply as possible, my own solution. I felt that the side-arguments the discussion of
the most relevant scholarship inevitably entail would obscure my argument by adding confusion to
an  already perplexing  problem.  I  will  now attempt  to  make  up for  this  omission.  I  have  also
sacrficed some details in the plot for clarity, which I will analyse now, along with the interpretations
of other critics.
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I will also attempt a more comprehensive analysis of Poe’s sources than was required for the
purposes of my first chapter. There, my aim has been to show that “Ligeia” was a femicide story.
Here,  I  will  use it  as an illustration of Poe’s conception of the “imaginative” work of art.  My
principal concern, therefore, will be articulating his critical statements with his practice, and, in
order to understand his method, as opposed to his narrator’s method, one must first trace his buried
allusions to the sources of the tale. His handling of these sources is such that, in describing the
meaningful connection his text establishes with them, one inevitably ends up clarifying some of the
most mysterious details of the story. Thus, these two lines of argument will enable us, I think, to get
at a more comprehensive view of Poe’s complex plot.
I have before maintained that the mechanism of semantic camouflage that allows Poe to
conceal, and yet at the same time ensure, the ultimate discovery of the femicide, which is the form
Poe’s particular brand of irony takes in “Ligeia,” is the basic premise of the tale, which I regard as a
“mystery” in the special sense Susan Amper gives to the term: “it is axiomatic that a mystery must
provide  means  for  its  solution,  or  more  generally,  that  texts  must  provide  the  means  for  their
construction”  (“Masters  of  Deceit”  59).  This  definition  articulates  the  same  conception  of  the
mystery as a virtuosic display of the author’s mastery in constructing a plot that we have seen in
Poe’s reviews of Barnaby Rudge.
Although his ideas on the subject are scattered throughout many different texts, owing to the
haphazard nature of his journalistic criticism, Poe is remarkably consistent. Item six (in Pollin’s
numbering) of his “Chapter of Suggestions,” published in The Opal in 1845, contains perhaps his
most straightforward definition of plot, but this is only a systematisation of ideas that had been
implied in his criticism at least since his reviews of Barnaby Rudge: 
Where plot forms a portion of the contemplated interest, too much preconsideration
cannot  be  had.  Plot  is  very  imperfectly  understood,  and  has  never  been  rightly
defined. Many persons regard it as mere complexity of incident. In its most rigorous
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acceptation, it is that from which no component atom can be removed, and in which
none  of  the  component  atoms  can be  displaced,  without  ruin  to  the  whole;  and
although a sufficiently good plot may be constructed, without attention to the whole
rigor of this definition, still it is the definition which the true artist should always
keep in view, and always endeavor to consummate in his works.
(Poe, Brevities 1:469)
Evidently, this is a declaration of artistic principle. Poe had, of course, tried to create the
most artistic plots, that is, he had tried to make them as consistent as humanly possible. However,
he also tells us that plot had “never been rightly defined,” thus, in effect, he once again claims
priority for his approach to fiction. A writer could, Poe grants, get by without a consistent plot,
especially when it was not an important part of the “contemplated interest.” Plot, however, as Poe
understood it, formed the principal interest of the mystery story, as he himself had made very clear
before.  For,  unlike  other  writers  of  fiction,  the  mystery  writer  was  absolutely  required  to  be
consistent.  He  defines  the  mystery  as  a  form  of  fiction  where  the  reader  has  to  guess  the
dénouement; without plot the dénouement would not be strictly a consequence of the text, therefore,
many conceivable solutions, each equally valid, could be arrived at and, if this was so, in Poe’s
terms, the mystery would be no mystery at all.
Poe’s notions of plot and of mystery are, therefore, intimately connected, and inseparable.
This relationship, incidentally, is indicated in the Marginalia article by his presenting Dickens as an
example of an author who was “totally deficient in constructiveness:” “His ‘Barnaby Rudge’ shows
not the least ability to adapt’” (Poe, Brevities 469). Thus, since a well-constructed plot was the mark
of the true artist, and the mystery the form that absolutely required it, it follows that for Poe it was
the  most  artistic  form  of  fiction,  or,  at  least,  that  in  which  an  author  could  display  his
“constructiveness,” hence his artistry, the most effectively.
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Later, in  Eureka  (1849), Poe restated his rigorous conception of plot—indeed,  Eureka  is
arguably an extended meditation on Poe’s concept of plot: 
Had an end [to the universe] been demonstrated, however, from so purely collateral a
cause as an ether, Man’s instinct of the divine capacity to adapt, would have rebelled
against the demonstration. We should have been forced to regard the Universe with
some  such  sense  of  dissatisfaction  as  we  experience  in  contemplating  an
unnecessarily complex work of human art. Creation would have affected us as an
imperfect plot in a romance, where the dénoûement is awkwardly brought about by
interposed incidents external and foreign to the main subject; instead of springing out
of the bosom of the thesis—out of the heart of the ruling idea—instead of arising as a
result of the primary proposition—as inseparable and inevitable part and parcel of the
fundamental conception of the book. (Poe, Eureka 99)
As I see it, such declarations provide theoretical support for Susan Amper’s claim that: “The
narrator’s statements [in a mystery story such as “Ligeia”] should (...) refer to something, which it
should be possible for us to guess” (“Masters of Deceit” 59). In other words, it should be possible
for the reader to make sense of the tale, that is, to form a clear, distinct picture of its story, reducing
it to an intelligible chain of causality, thus providing a satisfactory resolution for all the narrative
threads that the author deliberately left unresolved.
Most critics of Poe’s work, however, have maintained that Poe’s “serious” tales simply could
not be reduced to sense. This idea ties in with the widely accepted view, shared by admirers and
detractors alike, that Poe was unintelligible, and, indeed, that he believed that poetry consisted in
deliberately blocking meaning, in order to hint of an ungraspable, unintelligible absolute Truth. All
this  critical  edifice,  however,  crumbles  before  the  bedrock  of  ascertainable  fact:  the  narrator’s
shadow on Rowena’s floor, for example. I keep returning to this shadow because it appears to me
that its importance cannot be overstated. It fits the description Poe had made of the perfect hint in
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his review of Barnaby Rudge: although evident, this clue is so well camouflaged that it eludes the
reader’s attention completely on a first reading. Furthermore, unlike Dickens, Poe succeeds in the
ruse without ascertaining falsehoods, either in his  own person, or in the person of his narrator,
which, as we have seen, he regarded as the only artistic way of deceiving the reader. Thus, Poe lives
up to his own standard of artistry—which is precisely what most critics of his work thought he had
never been able to do.
As  Coleridge  astutely  remarked,  sometimes a  shadow is  only a  shadow. This  particular
shadow signals the split between the apparent story and the real story; between what the narrator
thinks happened and what really happened. This split resolves into a clean-cut opposition between
superstition  and  rationality,  which  topples  the  fiction  of  undecidability  on  which  the  current
dominant reading of the tale, and indeed of Poe’s entire literary production, is predicated. In the
ghostly “drama,” past and present, reality and dream become one; the vivid “reminiscences” of the
deed the narrator wanted to conceal from the reader, the murder of Ligeia, are merged with the
spectacle  of  Rowena’s  illness,  death,  and,  finally,  with  the  sight  of  her  dead  body.  But  the
impression of simultaneity is evidently illusory.
The shadow is only the prelude. All over the fabric of the narrator’s vision there are other
seams, small inconsistencies, which mark, like the shadow, the intersection of reality and dreams,
and these allow the reader to trace the vision entirely to the “effect of confused time” (Fisher,
“Dickens and Poe” 14)62. As we pull the thread, the solutions to all the mysteries that haunt the
narrator appear, and all those nagging obscurities and perplexing mysteries vanish before the picture
into which they arrange themselves. No matter how “earnest” the narrator is, the question we must
ask ourselves is whether the author permits him to be right, or, in other words, if his experience
must  be  considered  a  legitimate  insight  into  extra-rational  supernal  Truth.  And Poe  denies  his
62 Benjamin Franklin Fisher IV uses the expression in his article about the influence of Dickens’s “A Madman’s MS.”
on Poe’s “Ligeia.” His understanding, however, is that dream and reality are hopelessly confused in the Poe’s tale. I
discuss this question more fully below.
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character that luxury in the most dramatic fashion. His narrator is simply confused, or mad, in the
classic sense of losing the ability to distinguish mental pictures from reality.
Of  course,  the  narrator  questions  the  validity  of  such  a  distinction,  at  least  in  such
“wonderful” circumstances as he saw himself involved in. Indeed, he tacitly challenges the reader to
gainsay him; to play the detective and try to make sense of his story, implying that this endeavour is
doomed to failure. Once one accepts his thesis, therefore, one has already granted one’s agreement
to his fundamental assumption: that his experience is not just unexplained, but unexplainable. The
narrator’s thesis, of course, is blatantly, shamelessly inconsistent, with itself and with the evidence
he produces  to  support  it,  but  the  condition  of  its  acceptance is  precisely the  exclusion  of  the
possibility of verification by empirical test or internal consistency, and indeed the recognition that
rational criteria of validity do not apply to such events as he reports.
In all fairness, he never said he would explain anything. He proposed to  show us, instead,
that there was nothing to explain, and, we must take his suggestions on his own terms or not at all.
We agree, then, while under his spell, not to undertake the effort required to make sense of each of
the apparent wonders (the shadow, the drops, the wind, the hair rushing through the atmosphere,
etc.). In this sense, the narrator’s “metaphysical” discourse, inasmuch at it discourages the reader
from attempting  to  understand,  arguably  constitutes  a  part—perhaps  the  principal  part—of  the
narrator’s cover. As Susan Amper points out, this determines the fundamental ambiguity of the tale:
“the narrators” of Poe’s serious tales “themselves beckon us to sink into the wild and terrifying
world of things incomprehensible, while the lapses in their narratives invite us to poke holes in their
stories, and expose them as hacks, phonies and (…) worse” (“Masters of Deceit” 110).
Indeed, the narrator in “Ligeia” is wrong—there is no other way to put it. For there is a
perfectly reasonable explanation for what he reports—he simply could not see it. He was a victim of
delusion. I here employ this term in the sense in which it is used in modern psychiatry. Indeed, it is
important to distinguish the narrator’s visions, including the shadow, the drops, the apparition of
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Ligeia, and also the strange noises he mentions, from hallucination. According to the “Glossary of
Technical  Terms” included in  DSM-5,  hallucination is  characterised by the absence of a  “real”
stimulus,  whereas  illusion  consists  is  a  “misperception  or  misinterpretation  of  a  real  external
stimulus,  such as hearing the rustling of leaves  as the sound of  voices” (American Psychiatric
Association). This is obviously what happened to the narrator in the case of the shadow. The effects
produced  by  the  spectacle  known  as  phantasmagoria,  generally  speaking,  involve  the  same
mechanism. Likewise, the “wonders” mentioned by the narrator can, more or less obviously, be
traced to the “real” stimuli afforded by his phantasmagoria.
 The narrator  himself  accurately  states  the  real  explanation  of  the  supposed wonder  that
originally sent him on a ghost hunt, the shadow. This explanation corresponds to the literal meaning
of his words, just like the secret of Egæus was the literal import of his. What the latter “saw” in the
library were not teeth, but ideas; conversely, what the narrator of “Ligeia” saw on the floor was not
seemingly, but actually a “shadow”—a shadow that, he says, “could be fancied for a shadow of a
shade”  (Poe,  “Ligeia”  325).  This  is  precisely  what  happened:  he  imagined  the  shadow was  a
“shadow of a shade,” because he did not perceive  he was the substance of the shadow. We can
always rely on a straight, literal reading of these narrators’ words to dissipate the confusion. Of
course, in a sense, his shadow was a “shadow of a shade:” it was the shadow of that “great Shadow”
that he tells us killed Ligeia, and whose presence is betrayed by the trail of death he leaves behind
him. Yet, he misses the explanation a second time in his own text, as he writes it. His inability to
acknowledge  literal  meaning,  therefore,  is  a  manifestation  of  the  same peculiar  blindness  that
prevented him from recognising what he saw in the first place.
In  order  to  make  the  reader  share  the  illusion;  in  order  to  make,  that  is,  the  reader
misinterpret the evidence and overlook the literal meaning of the sentence that describes it like the
narrator does, the author is required to perform a feat of literary sleight of hand, or misdirection. In
theatrical magic, the object of which is to create an illusion, in the sense defined above, this term
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denotes the practice of misleading the audience by drawing their attention away from the means by
which  that  illusion  is  produced,  or,  to  be  more  precise,  by  which  the  spectator  is  induced  to
misinterpret real stimuli. In a classic work in the field of modern magic theory, Our Magic (1911),
Nevil Maskelyne and David Devant state that: “Magic consists in creating, by misdirection of the
senses, the mental impression of supernatural agency at work” (176). The authors are careful to
distinguish this technique from lying: “The misdirection which forms the groundwork of magic
does not consist in telling lies, with the object of deceiving the spectator’s intelligence. It consists,
admittedly, in misleading the spectator’s senses, in order to screen from detection certain details for
which secrecy is required. It militates against the spectator’s faculties of observation, not against his
understanding” (189).  Maskelyne and Devant distinguish three kinds of misdirection: “distraction,”
“disguise,” and “simulation.”
The ruses perpetrated by Poe in “Berenice” and “Ligeia,” and “phantasmagoric” effects in
general, would fall on the latter category, which is thus defined: “Simulation is a form of pretence.
In disguise, we have the principle of making one thing look like another and entirely different thing.
In the misdirection of sense by means of simulation,  we have the principle of giving apparent
existence to things that do not exist, or presence to things that are absent” (Maskelyne and Devant
195). It appears to me that the concept of misdirection may be applied, more broadly, to the peculiar
strain of irony that characterises most of Poe’s work.
Some mention must be made here of what has remained, for many years, the leading theory
of Poe’s irony, developed by G. R. Thompson, who attempted to reconcile the irony of Poe’s serious
tales,  and the  evident  unreliability  of  his  narrators  with  Romantic  idealism.  “When the  satirist
makes  use  of  irony,”  he  writes,  “he  pretends  to  take  his  opponents  seriously,  accepting  their
premises and values and methods of reasoning in order eventually to expose their absurdity” (Poe’s
Fiction  9). But, according to Thompson, this was not what Poe was trying to do in his so-called
serious work. His was a different variety of irony, which Thompson terms “Romantic irony,” and
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which  he  thought  Poe  had  learned  from  German  Romantic  idealists,  particularly  the  brothers
Friedrich  and August  Wilhelm Schlegel.  For  Thompson,  then,  Poe  was  “[a]t  once  a  Romantic
idealist devoted to ‘transcendental’ vision and yet also a satirist;” or “a skeptical ironist at the same
time that he was a Romantic, an idealist, and even a mystic” (Thompson, Poe’s Fiction xi, 11-12).
The  argument  is  that  Poe  had  “borrowed,”  among  other  things,  a  technique  of  “‘mystical’
indirection”  and  used  it,  as  his  German  predecessors  had  done,  to  manifest  his  “belief  in  the
illusiveness of truth, in human alienation from actuality, and in the ‘one-sidedness’ of all serious
statements” (34). In other words, Poe was only pretending to deride the “transcendentalism” he
thought could only be enforced through “indirection,” that hinting of intelligible meaning when
none was viable.
The  aim  of  Poe’s  irony,  then,  was  to  lead  the  reader  to  realise  not  that  his  ostensibly
Romantic narrator was wrong, but rather the general futility of any attempt to make sense of an
absurd world. Indeed, Thompson depicts Poe as a sort of existentialist  avant la lettre. As regards
Poe’s fiction, the critic concedes that the narrator of tales like “Ligeia” is absurd, but the point
Thompson believes Poe was trying to make was that the absurdities of his leading man were no less
absurd than any other attempt to make sense of “an ultimately incomprehensible,  disconnected,
absurd, or at best probably decaying and possibly malevolent universe” (Poe’s Fiction 13).
According to this view, in “Ligeia” Poe had appealed to the explained supernatural only to
ridicule  not  only  the  explanations  of  apparently  supernatural  phenomena,  but  any  attempts  to
explain anything: “his Gothic mode is that of the ambiguously explained supernatural, in which
clues to the real psychological action are patterned much like those of a detective story. Moreover,
we shall see that the vision of the human mind that emerges from this complex of literary technique
and philosophy is one of despair over the ability of the mind to know anything” (Thompson, Poe’s
Fiction 69). The key words in this passage are “ambiguously” and “psychological,” which qualify
Thompson’s statement that the tales should be read as detective stories. Thompson tells us, then,
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that, unlike Radcliffe’s, Poe’s explained supernatural is “ambiguous,” that is, that the explanations
brought out by analysis are never enough to rule out supernatural agency, thus effectually implying
that they are only pseudo-explanations.63 Secondly, he implies that these explanations are strictly
“psychological,” meaning that, despite the narrator being obviously deluded, the actual events in the
tale are irretrievably unsettled, in the sense that the reader is supposed not to be able to decide at
any given point what is real and what is hallucination. In other words, Thompson tells us nothing at
all may have really and actually happened; that the narrator may have hallucinated the whole thing.
But this is evidently contradicted by the text, for the shadow and the phantasmagoria were certainly
real.  In  effect,  Thompson  uses  the  detective  as  a  metaphor  for  an  approach  to  the  tale  that
presupposes the unviability of any natural explanation and is, in fact, the exact opposite of actual
detective work, and of the kind of approach illustrated in Poe’s “The Murders in the Rue Morgue,”
Auguste C. Dupin.  Thompson, in short, supposes that Poe’s narrator was not wrong, and that the
idea was to lead the reader to come to accept that we can never be right about anything.
This view pivots on the idea that there are two “levels” of interpretation in the tale, none of
which prevails over the other: 
This  primary structure  is  the objective synthesis  generated by our  perceiving  the
double  aspects  of  the  tale  as  simultaneously  supernaturalistic  (symbolic  of  deep
structures in the human mind or not) and yet also realistic in a conventional sense.
This multiple perception of the simultaneous or parallel levels of the tale derives
principally from our perception of the subjectivity of the narrator. (...) in ‘Ligeia,’ we
experience a series of ‘supernatural’ events (…) through the mind of a narrator whom
we recognize as disturbed—so that we simultaneously are subjectively involved in
and detached from these experiences. The whole system of interpenetrating levels or
structures (…) leads ultimately to Poe’s ironic mockery of the ability of the human
63 As the following makes clear: “In their intricacy of design, Poe’s Gothic tales contain tell-tale evidences for rational
psychological explanation, yet rarely so obtrusive as to destroy the uncanny supernatural effect” (Thompson, Poe’s
Fiction 77).
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mind ever to know anything with certainty, whether about the external reality of the
world or about the internal reality of the mind. (Thompson, Poe’s Fiction 89)
The problem with the foregoing theory is that it ignores the clues that prove conclusively
that the narrator is misconstruing reality. Therefore, what Thompson describes as a technique of
Romantic  indirection,  designed to  demonstrate  the  impossibility  of  knowing anything with any
degree of certainty, is in fact a technique of misdirection, designed to lead the reader away from the
truth about Ligeia. The shadow on the floor is an actuality. There is no ambiguity there. It evidently
belongs  to  the  narrator.  With  his  narrator’s  mistake,  Poe  effectively  demonstrates  that  some
statements about reality are valid, and others false, and this flatly contradicts Thompson’s claim that
he meant  to  show his  reader  that  nothing could be known. The facts  in  “Ligeia” are  skillfully
obfuscated  by  a  distinctly  Romantic  rhetoric  that,  by  inviting  generalization,  makes  the  reader
overlook the literal meaning of the narrator’s statements.
Thus, Thompson’s response is still very much determined by Poe’s text, but only in the sense
that  he fell  into Poe’s  “Romantic” trap.  Indeed,  the chief  reason why most  readers,  Thompson
included,  agree to  the narrator’s  terms is  the  fact  that,  though his  yarn may be  incredible,  the
opinions he expresses in all earnestness are perfectly convincing. That is, he expresses beliefs one
assumes a poet of the first half of the nineteenth century might endorse. By suggesting that the most
important truths, or more precisely, that all-important total and absolute Truth which true poets were
supposed to  convey through “indirection,”  Romanticism promoted the view,  which still  obtains
today, that poetry is strictly incomprehensible, hence that all attempts to understand it are futile and
misguided. Indirectly, of course, this implied the idea that that all attempts to understand the world
are,  in  a  sense,  themselves  futile,  inasmuch  as  the  whole,  total  Truth  could  not  be  grasped
intellectually, but only obscurely intimated through a certain kind of poetry, based on “indirection.”
In  practice,  Romanticism  encouraged  readers  to  mistrust,  and  even  to  ignore  literal
meanings. This is precisely the function the narrator’s Romanticism performs in the tale. Readers
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have indeed overlooked its intelligible meaning. And, since it has generally been thought that the
dénouement  is  not  only  unstated,  but  inexistent,  the  tale  has  been  regarded,  for  all  practical
purposes, as open-ended, and this has always formed a stimulus for symbolical interpretations. The
meaning of such a tale, it was thought, was not precisely coded in the text; it had to be meditated, as
it were, by the extra-rational, analogical thought and the kind of emotional engagement with its
mystery illustrated by the narrator’s “circle of analogies” (Poe, “Ligeia” 314). Indeed, expressing
himself in the mystical mode typical of Romanticism, he tells us that “subsequently to the period
when Ligeia’s beauty passed into my spirit,  there dwelling as in a shrine, I derived from many
existences in the material world, a sentiment such as I felt always aroused within me by her large
and luminous orbs” (314). Thompson supposed Poe meant his readers to follow in his narrator’s
steps, and embrace the awful transcendence of Ligeia’s eyes.
Under Romanticism, the poet was no longer, or not necessarily, someone who wrote poems.
“Poet” became a byword for the “creative” mind, that is, the intuitive mind which could glimpse
synthetic truths that were beyond the reach of “narrow” analytical reasoning. Thus understood, the
poet  was  not  a  craftsman,  or  artist,  but  a  medium:  a  peculiarly  sensitive  individual—a  man,
according to most descriptions—which was able to establish an incomplete and transient transit
between this physical existence and the great beyond, the world of Supernal Truth and Beauty, and
who embodied his unintelligible and intransitive experience in a creation (not necessarily a poem)
which had the power to induce a similar trance on a receptive subject.
Thus, Romanticism replaced the Augustan ideal of perspicuity with a distinctly mystical cult
of  vagueness  and  sensibility.  The  Augustans  had  despised  obscurity,  and  believed  that  even
emotions could be understood, or at least that an effort should be made to understand them. On the
contrary,  the  Romantics,  generally  speaking,  mistrusted  the  understanding,  and in  particular  its
ability to capture what they regarded as the essence of human experience, and had, therefore, a
corresponding contempt for particular truths—that is for plain meaning. True poetry bypassed the
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understanding,  as  it  were,  and  was  supposed  to  excite  the  Imagination,  inducing  transcendent,
shared  intuitions,  that  exceeded  local  meanings,  historical  contingencies,  and  definite  forms,
propelling the mind of the reader into the realm of abstract, ideal Truth and Beauty. Therefore, the
Romantic outlook rejected the modalities of thought grounded in logic, favouring instead analogical
thinking. In this sense, then, Poe’s narrator is typically Romantic.
Romanticism,  especially  in  the peculiar  form it  acquired in  the United States  known as
Transcendentalism, as we have seen, also taught readers to expect a “meaning” beyond meaning. In
this sense, Romantic poetry was not conceived so much as the vehicle of meaning, but as a promise
of  an  absolute  truth,  which  could  never  be  understood,  or  even  expressed,  but  only  vaguely
intimated. This transcendental “meaning” was the unrealised, unattainable unity of the individual
mind and the universe. Although it could not be attained, this identification with the universe was
glimpsed by the poet, which thus became, as it were, the analogue of God. In fact, the Romantic
attitude develops, somewhat paradoxically, from the perception that all meaning is relative—to a set
of notions, to a shared experience, or to some circumscribed aspect of reality. The Romantic poet
rebels against this relativity, as it were, by rejecting, in theory at least, intelligible meaning. Thus
understood,  poetry  was  a  mystical  re-enactment  of  the  divine  act  of  creation,  and  therefore
fundamentally unintelligible.
Thus, in practice, Romanticism replaced meaning with the promise of a “meaning” which
was  not  really  a  meaning,  as  it  could  never  be  grasped.  To  experience  the  incomprehensible
universal  Truth that  was thought  to  be indirectly  represented by poetry through a technique of
“indirection”—as Thompson calls it—that renders all definite meaning impossible, one needed the
“broader”  perspective  of  transcendent  intuition.  True  “meaning”  (in  the  idealist  vocabulary
Thompson employs, the word is a metaphor) then, was not expressed—it was not meant—but rather
presupposed; it was not contained in or by the text, but beyond, or behind it.
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Hence arose the common perception that “mere” intellect was not enough to get, for lack of
a better word, the essence of poetry, and the complementary notion that the poet himself had very
little conscious control over his material. Therefore, Romanticism did not conceive of the poet as an
artist, in the aristotelian sense of the word. At the same time, poetry was no longer seen primarily as
the expression of thought, but rather as an experience, that was “felt” rather than grasped by the
intellect. Thus, poetry became a touchstone for readers. If one thought, or rather “felt,” one could
understand it, this could only mean that one had not been able to get past the “literal” level, and
consequently, that one lacked sensibility. These notions are the background and the spring of the
rhetoric ot the narrator of “Ligeia.”
Because  these  notions  were  mostly  taken  for  granted  in  Poe’s  time,  we  have,  in  ours,
assumed  Poe’s  Romanticism  as  a  matter  of  course—we  may  term  this  attitude  historical
determinism. Thus, Yvor Winters wrote that Poe “was largely formed by the same influences that
formed other men, both better and worse, Coleridge as well as Chivers;”64 (“Edgar Allan Poe” 260).
This is the idea most critics still have of Poe. He was a Romantic by influence—he had to be—, but
his psychological idiosyncrasies, which bordered on insanity, made him go too far. For Winters,
Poe’s  work had no artistic  value,  but  only a  “clinical  value  [that]  resides  in  the  fact  that  as  a
specimen of late romantic theory and practice he is at once extreme and typical” (260).
Poe’s earnest narrator was then considered, and still is by most critics, the embodiment of
Poe’s  ideal  of  the  poet.  And so,  the  “transcendentalism” of  his  narrator,  although it  represents
exactly  the  stance  that  Poe  systematically  contested,  and  even  ridiculed  in  his  criticism,  was
attributed to him. Although some other hoaxes contributed to set this critical dogma in place, I
believe that this portrayal is derived chiefly from “Ligeia” and “Morella.” Specifically, the common
representation of Poe the poet results from a straight reading of these tales as allegories of the quest
of the Romantic poet for unattainable ideal Truth and Beauty.  In great measure,  indeed, Poe is
64 Poe’s friend Thomas Holley Chivers (1809-1858).
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regarded  as  a  “transcendentalist”  because “transcendentalism”  is  endorsed  by  his  narrator,  and
despite his criticism. If we were speaking of any other author but Poe, the contradiction between the
opinions expressed by the author and the opinions of his character would be taken as an indication
of satire. But Poe is special—in fact, he has been regarded as positively singular.
The paradoxical  notion  that  Poe  did  not  mean what  he  actually  expressed,  and did  not
express  what  he  really  “meant”  has  long  become  an  article  of  faith  in  Poe’s  studies.  While
conventional  Romantics  intimated  the  insufficiency  of  meaning  and  sought  to  block  it  and
destabilise it in their works, Poe went too far, crossing over the into the realm of nonsense. Winters,
although he never suspected Poe of being insincere—because all Romantics were sincere, and Poe
had to be, and certainly appeared a Romantic—, clearly saw that Poe made no sense at all. In fact,
Winters thought that Poe had simply decided to stop making sense. Unlike conventional, moderate
Romantics,  then,  Poe  “endeavors  as  far  as  may  be  to  escape  from a  paraphrasable  theme;  he
recognizes no obligation to understand the meaning of the theme from which he cannot escape—in
fact, he seems to recognize an obligation not to understand it” (Winters, “Edgar Allan Poe” 244).
Meanwhile, Winters suggests that Poe was an uneducated writer with a plebeian taste: he could not
write  accurately  and  precisely,  and  his  opinions  on  poetry  were  rationalisations  of  his  own
shortcomings.
This irritated Winters. Besides, he regarded Poe as a deluded mystic, and this irritated him
even further. For Winters had a genuine admiration for mysticism. He sought to distinguish the true
and  sincere  mysticism  of  writers  like  Very  and  Emily  Dickinson,  who  sincerely  “seek  to
understand” and fail, from what he regards as the misguided imitations of true mysticism of Poe,
who  “seeks  a  justification  for  refusing  to  understand”  (Winters,  “Edgar  Allan  Poe”  245).
Supposedly, Poe’s theory of poetry is that justification. Here is how Winters paraphrased it: 
the subject matter of poetry, properly considered, is by definition incomprehensible
and unattainable; the poet, in dealing with something else, toward which he has no
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intellectual  or  moral  responsibilities  whatever  (…)  should  merely  endeavor  to
suggest that a higher meaning exists—in other words, should endeavor to suggest the
presence of a meaning when he is aware of none. The poet has only to write a good
description of something physically  impressive,  with an air  of  mystery,  an air  of
meaning concealed. (245)
But  the  attitude  Winters  so  accurately  describes  is,  as  he  himself  indirectly  admits,  a
potential development of those very “romantic notions” everyone was supposed to share—although
no one would seriously think of taking Romanticism  that far. He thought that Poe’s theory was
absurd, and that it determined the absurdities of expression of which he found so many examples in
Poe. He impatiently remarks that “it is a matter for astonishment that mature men can be found to
take this kind of thing seriously” (Winters, “Edgar Allan Poe” 258-59). The irony is that Winters
himself did not realise the importance of his insight. This stuff was not meant to be taken seriously.
Romanticism told us that “mere” understanding was not enough—Poe tells us that, in order to share
the ineffable transcendent experience of the Romantic poet, one must not think at all. In fact, and
this is another irony, one suspects Winters meant to criticise through Poe Romanticism itself, and
particularly  the  form it  assumed  in  the  United  States.  Winters  implies  that  Poe’s  project  was
fundamentally akin to that of Emerson and what is known as “American Transcendentalism,” which
Winters regarded as a perversion of what he regarded as the “true” understanding of poetry, that had
developed from the spirit of Coleridge. Indeed, he thought that Coleridge, despite being influenced
by the same spirit that produced Chivers was still a poet, because he was still striving to understand
poetry. Chivers, he implies, was too far gone—and so, he thought, was Poe, which Winters thought
perfectly illustrated the consequences of taking Romantic too seriously.65
But no reasonable person could take “transcendentalism” to such obviously absurd extremes
—unless,  of  course,  that  person  meant  to  ridicule  it.  The  animus  of  Poe’s  extreme  Romantic
65 For a discussion of the New Critics mostly negative response to Poe, see Gato, “Edgar Allan Poe” 157-59.
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statements, therefore, appears to have been akin to that which underlies Winters’s criticism, with the
difference that Poe expressed his critique through satire. Yet, despite widely varying estimates of
Poe’s literary merits, the critical consensus has always been that Poe’s “transcendentalism” was
sincere, and so most critics have focused on accommodating Poe’s practice with the opinions he
ostensibly rejected. The first one to really break this consensus was Susan Amper. In the chapter of
her dissertation dedicated to “The Fall of the House of Usher,” commenting the widely-held critical
conception, promoted by T. S. Eliot, “that Poe had an immature mind, that he merely entertained
ideas, without integrating them into a consistent belief system,” she remarks that: “The complaint is
valid, providing one adopts certain assumptions about intellectual maturity and art.  It is equally
valid,  however,  and perhaps more  stimulating,  to  consider  how that  which  seems immature  or
jarring in Poe may reflect a different set of assumptions or purposes” (Amper, “Masters of Deceit”
148). She is, of course, merely stating a rule of sound criticism, which is in blatant contradiction
with the unstated rule of mainstream criticism of Poe’s work: if ever Poe made any sense, we should
disregard  it;  Poe’s  characters  do  not  even  try  to  make  sense,  therefore  should  be  regarded  as
mouthpieces of the author.
An extreme illustration of this attitude is Floyd Stovall’s reading of a passage of Poe’s article
on his former associate N. P. Willis, published in the  Broadway Journal  in January 18, 1845, in
which Poe denies the quintessentially Romantic distinction between the “reproductive” Fancy and
the “creative” Imagination. “’Fancy,’ says the author of ‘Aids to Reflection’ (who aided Reflection
to much better purpose in his ‘Genevieve’)— ‘Fancy combines—Imagination creates.’ This was
intended,” Poe remarks, “and has been received, as a distinction; but it is a distinction without a
difference—without even a difference of degree. The Fancy as nearly creates as the Imagination,
and neither at all” (“American Prose Writers,” 16).66 In many other instances, Poe had insisted,
66 The passages I here quote from Poe’s article on N. P. Willis are slightly altered from Poe’s January 1840 review of
Thomas Moore’s  Alciphron, A Poem, where the quotation from Coleridge is more precisely identified: “says the
author of the ‘Auncient Mariner,’ in his Biographia Literaria” (334).
Poe would twice quote his own discussion of fancy and imagination, first in the N. P. Willis article in his
review of Thomas Hood’s  Prose and Verse, published in the  Broadway Journal  for August 9, 1845, portions of
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against  the  predominant  Romantic  values,  that  art  consisted  in  the  “combination”  of  existing
elements—themselves  combinations  of  pre-existing  materials—into  a  harmonious  whole,  thus
openly  challenging  the  prevailing  conception  of  poetry  as  the  precarious  embodiment  of
“transcendent”  insights.  In  fact,  Poe  reduced  to  naught  the  theoretical  ground  on  which  the
Romantic myths of inspiration and originality rested.
But Poe, we are told, is special. Stovall flatly asserts that he and Coleridge “differ, or seem
to  differ,  in  one  point  only:  the  meaning  of  the  word  ‘create.’ (…)  in  reality,  Poe  means  by
combination exactly what Coleridge means by creation” (“Poe’s Debt” 794). In other words, Poe
did  not  mean  what  he said—he “meant”  what  Coleridge said.  Thus,  the  suggestiveness  of  his
language is suffered to prevail over his meaning, which we are constantly instructed to disregard.
But this suggestiveness itself is, I think, an example of the sort of misdirection which he had so
dexterously used in his tales. Through it, Poe manages to  appear  Romantic even while rejecting
Coleridge’s theory.
The  influence  of  Coleridge  on  Poe’s  theory  of  fiction  and  poetry  is,  incidentally,
indisputable. He paraphrased the definition of poetry given in  Biographia Literaria (1817) in his
first published critical essay, the preface to the Poems of 1831; Poe evidently derived his conception
of imagination as the faculty that allows the artist to combine his materials into an harmonious,
consistent whole, as well as his psychological theory of reader’s response from Coleridge. In fact,
the influence of this author on Poe’s critical and theoretical pronouncements is so palpable, and so
well-documented, that it would be superfluous to argue the point here. Incidentally, it appears to me
that Poe got from Coleridge many of the ideas Thompson attributes to the direct influence of the
German Romantic idealists mentioned in “Morella,” Schelling, Fichte, and the brothers Schlegel.
After all, Coleridge, unlike Poe, was an accomplished Germanist whose debt to those authors, not to
mention Kant, was already well-known in Poe’s time.
which are discussed below, and then in an installment (number 220 in Pollin’s edition) of his  Marginalia  series
published in May 1849 in the Southern Literary Messenger shortly before his death.
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Coleridge  attempted  to  reconcile  empiricism and  associationism with  transcendentalism.
Hartley’s mechanical laws of association explained the fancy, he thought, but not the imagination,
which represented a sort of loophole that safeguarded the possibility of transcendent, quasi-religious
intuition.  Not  surprisingly,  Coleridge  maintained  that  the  best  poetry  could  not  be  precisely
understood and strove, in his own poetry, to keep the reader in a sort of epistemological suspense. “I
can understand,” Coleridge said,
and allow for an effort of the mind, when it would describe what it cannot satisfy
itself  with  the  description  of,  to  reconcile  opposites  and  qualify  contradictions,
leaving a middle state of mind more strictly appropriate to the imagination than any
other, when it is, as it were, hovering between images. As soon as it is fixed on one
image, it becomes understanding; but while it is unfixed and wavering between them,
attaching itself permanently to none, it is imagination. (Lectures 495)67
This effect, then, is precisely what Wilbur, Thompson, Stovall, and many others, thought Poe
was  trying  to  achieve  in  his  serious  tales  and  poems.  They  also  supposed  that  Poe  had,  like
Coleridge, regarded the depiction of supernatural “incidents and agents” as the peculiar province of
the imagination. In writing the supernatural narratives included in  Lyrical Ballads, Coleridge had
sought to “transfer from our inward nature a human interest and a semblance of truth sufficient to
procure for these shadows of imagination that willing suspension of disbelief for the moment that
constitutes poetic faith” (Biographia Literaria 2: 6). This idea implies, of course, that “poetic faith”
had the same relationship with real faith as the “secondary imagination” had with the “primary:”
“The  primary  IMAGINATION  I  hold  to  be  the  living  Power  and  prime  Agent  of  all  human
Perception, and as a representation in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the finite I AM.
The secondary I consider as an echo of the former” (2:304).
67 This comes from John Payne Collier’s 1856 reconstruction of the text of the last of seven lectures Coleridge gave
on Shakespeare and Milton in 1811-1812. The modern editor, R. A. Foakes, remarks that the text “is a radically
revised version of the notes he took at the lectures,” and therefore, must not be regarded as authoritative. In any
case, the passage in question is certainly representative of Coleridge’s thought, and, as such, is quoted by Engell
and Bates in a footnote to Chapter XIII of Biographia Literaria (see 301n2).
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In managing the supernatural, that is, strictly inexplicable subjects which Coleridge terms
“shadows  of  imagination,”  then,  the  writer  should  take  care  to  maintain  a  special  kind  of
verisimilitude. In the chapter of the Biographia dedicated to the “Defects of Wordsworth’s Poetry,”
Coleridge offers  some practical  explanation of  his  approach:  “That  illusion,  contradistinguished
from delusion, that negative faith, which simply permits the images presented to work by their own
force,  without  either  denial  or  affirmation  of  their  real  existence  by the  judgment,  is  rendered
impossible  by their immediate neighbourhood to words and facts of known and absolute truth”
(2:134). The error consisted, according to Coleridge, in calling the reader’s beliefs to task, thus
allowing them to “put out” the “mere poetic Analogon of faith,” that is, “poetic faith,” and causing
“[w]hat would otherwise have been yielded to as a pleasing fiction” to be “repelled as revolting
falsehood” (2:134).
 In  “Ligeia,”  Poe  quite  deliberately  did  exactly  what  Coleridge  advised  writers  of
supernatural stories never to do. By placing his “shadows” in the vicinity of indisputable truths, he
forced readers to reject them as falsehoods. Thus, tales like “Morella,” “Berenice,” and “Ligeia” do
not feature actual supernatural events, but only phantasmagoric effects which are confused with
actual supernatural manifestations by the protagonist-narrrators. In fact, one might say that this sort
of confusion is the covert theme of most of his fiction. But, the fact that the tales masquerade as
tales of the supernatural, corrodes Coleridge’s distinction between “illusion” and “delusion.” For, in
a sense, the reader who does not recognise the facts that force us to reject the narrator’s “thesis” are
themselves, in a sense, deluded, as it were, by proxy, and this was an effect Poe took great pains to
achieve, and which can only be realised through misdirection. Thus, unlike poems like “The Rime
of the Ancient Mariner,” Poe’s “Ligeia” is not really a story of the positive supernatural, but a story
of delusion.
This is emblematical of Poe’s relationship with Coleridge. He accepted the acuteness of his
intellectual analyses of literary processes, but rejected all his transcendental philosophy. This had
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been clearly indicated in Poe’s first published critical piece, the aforementioned “Letter to B——,”
to which I will return in the third chapter: “Of Coleridge I cannot speak but with reverence. His
towering intellect! His gigantic power! (...) It is lamentable to think that such a mind should be
buried in metaphysics” (10). In that same article, Poe also famously argued that the object of poetry
was not truth, thus implying from the outset that its object was to convey a false impression of
“transcendence.”  Accordingly,  what  he  rejected  specifically  in  Coleridge  was  the  idea  that  the
imagination  differed  essentially  from  the  fancy,  and  consequently,  that  the  “shadows  of  the
imagination” mentioned by Coleridge had any transcendental value. And then, faithful to his theory,
he set out to create “transcendental” hoaxes that illustrated the dangers of being, as he put it, “buried
in metaphysics.”
The belief that Poe shared his narrator’s convictions and condoned his methods is predicated
on  the  supposition  that  the  experience  he,  the  narrator,  relates  is  an  authentic  instance  of  the
unexplainable; that it admits no straightforward, coherent explanation, and therefore was intended
by Poe as a representation of the experience of the “imaginative” Romantic poet,  as Coleridge
conceived  it.  The  viability  of  such  an  explanation,  on  the  other  hand,  exposes  the  narrator  to
ridicule,  disfranchising  him  along  with  the  views  he  represents.  One  thing  is  to  probe  the
unexplainable, to go one step beyond this physical existence; but it is an altogether different thing to
overlook  the  simple  explanation  of  trivial  phenomena  to  embark  in  pseudo-metaphysical
speculation.
This is not to say that Poe did not intend to elicit a “transcendentalist” response, and to
induce people to trust his Romanticism. On the contrary, he counted on it. By a few well-placed
Romantic cues, Poe induces his reader to demonstrate performatively that a public who does not
expect  to  understand  and  hopes  for  something  other  than  meaning  is  bound to  miss  the  most
superficial explanations, and therefore makes an easy target for humbugs like Poe’s narrator. Thus,
he intimates that Coleridge’s method, or rather the theory that supported it,  had the potential to
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create not only pleasing illusions, as that writer reassuringly maintained, but actual delusion, such as
the  narrator  of  “Ligeia”  experiences.  Inasmuch as  it  corroded the faith  in  rational  inquiry,  and
replaced it with intuition, Coleridge’s “metaphysicianism,” and other similar theories, created an
intellectual climate in which deliriums could pass for legitimate intuitions. Poe evidently thought,
therefore, that the obscurantism of which Winters accuses him was the inevitable result of those
very “essential Romantic notions” he had deliberately stretched to absurdity (Winters, “Edgar Allan
Poe” 260).
Instead of  stimulating the effort  to  understand,  Romanticism rewarded incomprehension,
thereby  unintentionally  empowering  ignorance,  illiteracy,  and  arrogance—empowering,  that  is,
people like Poe’s narrator. This, I believe, is the point Poe was trying to make in “Ligeia,” and also
in his criticism. Of course, “metaphysicianism” were combined in Coleridge with habits of rigorous
logical thinking and a healthy dose of scepticism. As we have seen, he was dismissive of common
ghost lore and very much aware of the distinction between hallucinations and shadows. But Poe
implies through his tales that he could only deny the mystical value of such experiments at the
expense of consistency. Indeed, as Winters himself recognises, the theory of Poe’s narrator, despite
its extremism, is typically Romantic. 
This is the true significance of the shadow. Its true meaning finally severs the bond between
Poe and his narrator that precious few have dared to question, showing conclusively that Poe did not
endorse the “typical” Romanticism the former represents.  This projection of himself was itself a
false impression—a phantasm. The reader will probably receive the claim that such a delusion could
resist critical scrutiny for over one and a half centuries with justified scepticism.  Yet, the shadow,
the evidence of an even more astounding oversight on the narrator’s part,  is what can never be
dismissed: it shows us that Poe himself promoted the error of his readers. Thus, this seemingly
trivial evidence shakes the foundations on which Poe’s scholarship was built. Whenever someone
felt  inclined  to  dismiss  the  theoretical  phantasm  of  Poe’s  mad  mysticism,  “Ligeia,”  or  more
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precisely,  that  intriguing  “angelic”  shadow,  appeared  to  pose  an  insurmountable  obstacle;
conversely, the supposed mysticism of Poe’s criticism prevented us from questioning the idea that
the shadow was a sign of Ligeia’s “transcendent” presence. Yet, both are decoys. The unrealised
catastrophe of Poe’s apparently incomplete tale is the debunking, by the reader, of the narrator’s
pretensions to intuitive “metaphysical” knowledge. In short, “Ligeia” is not designed to demonstrate
the futility of human statements, but rather the absurdity of pretensions to any but relative truths—
which, of course, is a strictly rationalist point.
The narrator was a victim of suggestion, and was then able to pass on his delusion by a
process that is a caricature of the communication of intuitions that some poets we usually group
under the heading of Romanticism thought was involved in poetry. That is, he is able to produce on
the unsuspecting reader an effect that is the poetical analogue of that which the “phantasmagoria”
had produced on him. This poetical effect, of course, is similar to that Coleridge hoped to produce
with  his  treatment  of  supernatural  subjects,  for  he  too  hoped  that  the  reader  might  suspend
reasonable doubt, and adhere, if only temporarily, to the illusion. But, in Coleridge’s supernatural
romances, it is impossible to decide whether the characters were deluded.
In  “Ligeia,”  the  situation  is  very  different.  The narrator  demonstrably  confuses  his
phantasmagoric tricks with real magic. It is no coincidence that this is more or less what Winters
thought had happened to Poe. Through his extreme formalism, he thought, Poe communicated the
impression that poetry was the verbal equivalent of sleight of hand, but appeared to have confused
the illusion he had artificially created by his misguided attempts of imitating his supposed Romantic
masters with the real deal. For this critic believes that there is indeed a sort of magical quality in
true  mystical  poetry;  he  has  faith  in  its  ability  to  embody  a  sort  of  intuition  that,  in  a  sense,
transcends the understanding. These are qualities he does not recognise in Poe’s poetry, who, he
thought,  had  no  feeling  for  poetry,  and  this  because  he  was  no  longer  making  an  attempt  to
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understand it. He might be right, but that is wholly beside the point. The point, I think, is that Poe
had no sympathy for the kind of poetry that Winters preferred.
The very characteristics that have led most critics to identify Poe’s narrator as a typical
representative of the Romantic myth of the poet, once his delusion is revealed, show that Poe never
had any faith in the Romantic method. Therefore, the contradiction between his theory and practice
is only apparent. Indeed, in his criticism he consistently rejected the Romantic distinction between
true intuitive poetry, and false artificial pseudo-poetry. For Poe, all poetry was artificial, that is, art.
In fact, Poe implies that the typical Romantic poet was confusing art with magic. And, just
as in his fiction he ridicules the expectation of intuitive “poetic” knowledge, Poe also denied in his
criticism  the  crucial  distinction  that  supported  it,  between  the  “creative”  imagination  and  the
“reproductive”  fancy.  For  him,  truly  “imaginative”  works  were  those  that  gave  the  reader  the
impression  that  the  obvious  meaning  was  not  all  there  was  to  them.  With  this  definition  Poe
naturalises the concept of imagination, and by implication, mysticism itself: 
The truth is  that  the just  distinction between the fancy and the imagination (and
which is  still  but  a  distinction  of degree)  is  involved in  the consideration  of  the
mystic. We give this as an idea of our own, altogether. We have no authority for our
opinion — but do not the less firmly hold it. The term mystic is here employed in the
sense of Augustus William Schlegel, and of most other German critics. It is applied
by them to that class of composition in which there lies beneath the transparent upper
current of meaning, an under or suggestive one. What we vaguely term the moral of
any  sentiment  is  its  mystic  or  secondary  expression.  It  has  the  vast  force  of  an
accompaniment  in  music.  This  vivifies  the  air;  that  spiritualizes  the  fanciful
conception, and lifts it into the ideal. (Poe, Rev. of Alciphron 337)
As we have seen, G. R. Thompson contended that Poe used the sort of Romantic irony that
Raymond  Immerwahr  defined  as  follows:  “The  Romantic  Ironist  ‘does  not  mean  simply  the
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opposite of what he says’; instead, ‘he is likely to mean at the same time both what he seems to be
saying and its opposite’” (qtd. in Thompson, Poe’s Fiction 21). Thompson maintains that Poe had
derived his understanding of irony specifically from Friedrich Schlegel, who, “[a]round 1800, (…)
had conjoined the terms irony and transcendentalism. Irony was the process of transcending both
the illusions of the world and the delusions of one’s own limited mind. Such transcendence of the
visible world and of the self was, for Schlegel, achieved through a sense of the comic and the
absurd in the serious” (Thompson, Poe’s Fiction 27). Thompson supposes that Poe got Friedrich’s
ideas chiefly from his brother, August Wilhelm Schlegel. Yet, although Poe mentions his name in
his writings several times, the definition of “the mystic” I quote above is the only specific reference
Poe ever made to the writings of the brothers Schlegel.
But this reference is more than a little mischievous. Poe’s definition of “the mystic” does not
presuppose “Romantic irony,” or any kind of transcendence for that matter, for he does not qualify
the ulterior meaning to be conveyed. Thus, in effect, and according to this definition, all irony is
“mystic,” that is, any work is “mystic” in which some half-concealed meaning can be glimpsed.
Poe then proceeds to state that all
those poems, or portions of poems, or those prose romances, which mankind have
been accustomed to designate as imaginative (…) are remarkable for the suggestive
character which we have discussed. They are strongly mystic—in the proper sense of
the word. (…) With each note of the lyre is heard a ghostly, and not always a distinct,
but an august and soul-exalting echo. In every glimpse of beauty presented, we catch,
through long and wild vistas, dim bewildering visions of a far more ethereal beauty
beyond.  But  not  so  in  poems  which  the  world  has  always  persisted  in  terming
fanciful. Here the upper current is often exceedingly brilliant and beautiful; but then
men feel that this upper current  is all. No Naiad voice addresses them from below.
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The notes  of the air  of the song do not  tremble with the according tones  of  the
accompaniment. (Poe, Rev. of Alciphron 256)
In short, imaginative texts are distinguished by their “transparency.” They give the reader the
sensation that something important lies beneath the surface. But the vision is “dim.” When this
underlying idea can be clearly perceived, of course, the poem or romance is not truly imaginative.
Poe was indeed suggesting, as Winters remarked, that a writer had only to write “with an air of
meaning concealed.” But, in a passage like this, Poe does this with full deliberation. He effectively
appeals,  indeed,  to  the  original  etymological  meaning  of  the  word  “mystic,”  which  did  not
necessarily involve transcendence, but only secrecy.
Incidentally, this is precisely how Poe describes the effect of Shelley’s fairy in Queen Mab,
which he compares unfavourably with what he terms Drake’s “puerile abortion, ‘The Culprit Fay’”
(Rev. of  Alciphron 334). Drake’s fairy tale belonged to the “class of the pseudo-ideal,” whereas
Shelley’s was truly ideal:
It  will  be seen that  the fairy of Shelley is  not a mere compound of incongruous
natural objects, inartificially put together, an unaccompanied by any moral sentiment
—but a being, in the illustration of whose nature some physical elements are used
collaterally  as  adjuncts,  while  the  main  conception  springs  immediately,  or  thus
apparently springs, from the brain of the poet, enveloped in the moral sentiments of
grace, of color, of motion—of the beautiful, of the mystical, of the august—in short,
of the ideal.
(Poe, Rev. of Alciphron 336-37)
This has commonly been taken as an endorsement of Coleridge’s distinction, but this is a
reading not borne out by the text. This passage makes it absolutely clear that the difference between
the true and the false “ideal” is only a matter of  appearance. Although  all conceptions are “re-
soluble into the old,” Shelley was able to make it appear that his fairy was entirely original, hence,
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an absolute, “ideal” creation. The keyword in this case is “inartificially.” Poe takes it for granted
that Shelley’s “creation” was, just like Drake’s, a “compound of incongruous natural objects,” but
the English poet had put them together “artificially” to convey the impression that no artifice had
been involved.  Thus,  the impression of  “inartificiality” is  the mark of the highest  art.  In other
words, true art conceals its nature, presenting as spontaneous what is in fact the product of careful
elaboration.
Thus, the difference between the fancy and the imagination becomes not even a distinction
of degree, but itself a matter of  seeming: “We might make a distinction,  of degree, between the
fancy and the imagination, in saying that the latter is the former  loftily employed. But experience
proves this distinction to be unsatisfactory. What we feel and know to be fancy, will be found still
only fanciful, whatever be the theme which engages it. (…) No subject exalts it into the ideal” (Poe,
Rev. of Alciphron 334).
Poe’s analysis of Shelley illustrates his point. His poetry is  felt to be truly imaginative not
because it deals with any intrinsically ineffable subject. For Poe any idea, concrete or ideal, definite
or indefinite, can be conveyed through suggestion. What distinguishes Shelley is the “suggestive
character” of his poetry itself, which gives the reader the illusion of transcendence—that is, it makes
the reader  feel the presence of an idea beyond the text, which defies expression. The griffin is an
evident compound of known creatures, and therefore illustrates “fanciful” combination. The reader
cannot but decompose it into its constituent elements and, therefore, has no such feeling. Shelley, on
the other hand, contrives to give his reader the impression that his fay is a spontaneous creation of
his genius.  Through his technique of suggestion, in other words, the poet makes the reader feel that
he has intuitively transcended both the world of the senses and his own self, and hit on an entirely
unprecedented idea by transcendent intuition.
Yet, for Poe this is an illusion studiously effected by the “imaginative” artist, as Poe would
later make clear in his article on N. P. Willis: 
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in general, the richness or force of the matters combined—the facility of discovering
combinable novelties  worth combining—and the absolute  ‘chemical  combination’
and proportion  of  the completed mass—are the particulars  to  be regarded in  our
estimate of Imagination. It is this thorough harmony of an imaginative work which so
often causes it to be undervalued by the undiscriminating, through the character of
obviousness which is superinduced. We are apt to find ourselves asking “why is it
that these combinations have never been imagined before?” (Poe, “American Prose
Writers” 17).68
Poe once again emphasises that the fancy and the imagination both “combine” (Poe could
not make this any more clear in this passage, where he employs the word and its cognates five
times). He thought that the imagination combined known elements so harmoniously as to give the
reader  the  impression  that  the  novel  combination  is  an  absolute  creation,  that  is,  a  radically
unprecedented conception, which could never be decomposed. This impression reinforces, in turn,
the perception that the poet transcended earthly reality. Indeed, according to Poe, the difference
between the fancy and the imagination pertains solely to the mode in which such combinations are
accomplished: the products of the first impress us as artificial, contrived; those of the latter appear
natural, and even obvious. Still, Poe admits no miracles: “the wildest effort of the mind,” he had
already told us, “cannot stand the test of the analysis” (Poe, “American Prose Writers” 16). Thus,
originality itself becomes an effect, a ruse, rather than an intrinsic quality of the work of art. This
purely  technical  definition of  imagination,  of  course,  deprives  the  term of  the “transcendental”
overtones with which Coleridge had invested it.
68 This is one of the passages, to which I have already alluded, that Poe would later quote on two occasions: his
review of Thomas Hood’s Poetry and Prose, and the Marginalia, M220, in Pollin’s edition. In his annotations to the
latter,  this critic remarks:  “The passage here is  seminal to Poe’s theory of aesthetics,  with its  inclusion of the
grotesque; the chemical analogy does not serve to clarify” (Poe,  Brevities 370). Pollin thus manifests the same
perplexity that  we have seen Stovall  express  regarding Poe’s  discussion of  the distinction between Fancy and
Imagination. He too was convinced that Poe’s metaphor betrayed his true sense. On the contrary, the analogy, which
is impossible be accommodate to Coleridge’s theory, is perfectly consonant with Poe’s meaning.
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The  article  on  Willis  from which  I  have  been  quoting  was  published  in  the  Broadway
Journal in January 18, 1845. Poe’s appraisal of Shelley in this article complements what he had said
of him the previous week, on the second and last part of his review of Elizabeth Barrett Barrett’s
The Drama of Exile, where he had argued that Shelley, inasmuch as he did not understand his own
method, was not an artist in the proper sense of the word: 
If ever mortal ‘wreaked his thoughts upon expression’ it was Shelley. If ever poet
sang  (as  a  bird  sings)—impulsively—earnestly—with  utter  abandonment—to
himself solely—and for the mere joy of his own song—that poet was the author of
the Sensitive Plant. Of Art—beyond that which is the inalienable instinct of Genius
—he either had little or disdained all.  He  really  disdained that Rule which is the
emanation from Law, because his own soul was law in itself. (…) With such a man,
to imitate was out of the question; it would have answered no purpose—for he spoke
to his own spirit alone, which would have comprehended no alien tongue; — he was,
therefore, profoundly original. His quaintness arose from intuitive perception of that
truth to which Lord Verulam alone has given distinct voice: — “There is no exquisite
beauty  which  has  not  some strangeness  in  its  proportion.”  But  whether  obscure,
original, or quaint, he was at all times sincere. He had no affectations.
(Rev. of The Drama of Exile 14)
This has been taken as a compliment on Shelley’s manner, but the compliment is undercut
by Poe’s conception of poetry as art. In Poe’s terms, Shelley produced the illusion of transcendence,
and the concomitant illusion of absolute originality, without understanding the means by which this
illusion was produced—in other words, he did not understand the principles of his art; in fact, Poe
implies he did not even know poetry was an art. Poe, on the other hand, achieved a similar effect in
a hoax. His cynical use of Romantic conventions was so convincing, that most readers doubted his
sanity before they doubted his sincerity—again, unwittingly illustrating Poe’s point. By using the
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same lines from Bacon he had previously used in “Ligeia” in his review, he signals to the reader that
the narrator of that tale, aside from being, like Coleridge, “buried in metaphysics,” also represents
the “instinctive” transcendentalism he attributed to Shelley himself.69 Thus, through a complicated
jigsaw  of  cross-references,  Poe  traces  the  superstition  depicted  in  his  tales  to  the  combined
influence  of  two  of  the  leading  figures  in  English  letters  who,  paradoxically,  have  almost
unanimously been regarded as his masters.
Poe’s understanding of the “intuitive” poetry of poets like Shelley implies the idea that the
sense of transcendence it conveys is an illusion. Thus, in effect, he treats Romantic poetry much like
Maskelyne and Devant treat magic:
“magic” was once a term used to denote the cause of any event  or achievement
beyond the explanation of  popular  intelligence.  (…) at  the  present  day,  the  term
‘magic’ must  have  a  meaning  very  different  from that  assigned  to  it  in  bygone
centuries.  The only meaning it  can now possess must relate  to  the  apparent,  not
actual defiance of natural laws. 
Modern  magic,  therefore,  deals  exclusively  with  the  creation  of  mental
impressions. We cannot perform real miracles, as everybody is well aware. We can
only perform feats which  look like miracles, because the means whereby they are
performed have been skilfully screened from observation.
(Our Magic 175-76)
Poe was convinced that the apparent miracle of Romantic poetry was performed by artificial
means. To demonstrate his theory, he set out to produce similar effects in his own work, but always
leaving hints that enabled the reader to apprehend the means whereby the illusion had been created.
Romantic poets, however, were usually either unwilling or incapable of explaining the effects they
69 The narrator uses the same sentence in reference to Ligeia’s “beauty:” “her features were not of that regular mould 
which we have been falsely taught to worship in the classical labors of the heathen. ‘There is no exquisite beauty,’ 
says Bacon, Lord Verulam, speaking truly of all the forms and genera of beauty, ‘without some strangeness in the 
proportion’” (Poe, “Ligeia” 311-12).
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had wrought. Inasmuch as he treated poetry as a form of misdirection, the difference Poe establishes
between  himself  and  the  true  Romantic  poet  can  be  described  in  the  terms  of  Maskelyne’s
distinction between illusionists, who only aim to deceive the senses, and charlatans, who
often refrain from committing themselves to any definite statement on the subject of
their powers. In effect, they say to their spectators. “We leave you to decide upon the
nature of our feats. If you can explain the methods we employ, you will know that
what we do is not miraculous. If, on the other hand, you cannot explain our methods
you  will,  of  course,  know  that  we  have  the  power  to  work  miracles.  (…)
Consequently, the mere reticence of the charlatan suffices to convince many people
that “there is something in it.” (Maskelyne and Devant 177)
Shelley, of course, though he did not attempt to explain his feats, was no charlatan. He is,
Poe tells us, sincere. This means that he is himself convinced that “there is something in it,” or in
other words, that he was deceived by his own illusion—just like Poe’s narrator was deceived by his
phantasmagoria. This, however, is only the most superficial aspect of Poe’s sly satire. The really
important point, I think, is that, by treating poetry not as an art, but rather as a mystical discipline,
Coleridge  and  Shelley  had  allowed  the  public  to  believe  that  it  was  a  miracle.  Poe  evidently
disagreed.
Incidentally, the reader’s awe before the bewilderingly mysterious imaginative work of art,
as described by Poe in the review of  Alciphron  I quoted some pages below, has an obvious and
significant  resemblance  with  the  enthusiasm  Ligeia’s  husband  felt  in  the  first  period  of  their
marriage, when he abandoned himself to her teachings: 
With how vast a triumph — with how vivid a delight — with how much of all that is
ethereal in hope — did I feel, as she bent over me in studies but little sought — but
less  known — that  delicious  vista  by  slow degrees  expanding  before  me,  down
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whose long, gorgeous, and all untrodden path, I might at length pass onward to the
goal of a wisdom too divinely precious not to be forbidden! (Poe, "Ligeia" 316).
This anticipation of a sublime knowledge that keeps eluding him sets the tone of the whole
story.  Here  the  narrator  expresses  the  same faith  in  an  ulterior  meaning,  imperfectly  glimpsed
through the surface of things which Poe himself had described in his criticism as the peculiar effect
of the “mystic.” In fact, the “vista” mentioned by Ligeia’s husband clearly evokes those “long and
wild vistas, dim bewildering visions of a far more ethereal beauty  beyond” Poe mentioned in his
review of Alciphron.
And then, through a mysterious sympathy, the reader of “Ligeia” gets the distinct feeling
that there is some hidden meaning in the passage, just as there was supposed to be a hidden meaning
to the mysterious texts Ligeia read with him, and which he could not decipher alone. There is,
indeed, a definite “undercurrent” of meaning to the passage that responds to the narrator’s appeal to
look under the surface, but this is not the kind of “transcendental” content he makes us expect. In
fact, his suggestions actually make it difficult to recognise the particular undercurrent to which I
allude.
One assumes, of course, the narrator is speaking of the texts he studied under Ligeia, but
another  interpretation  is  possible.  The  narrator  is  speaking  specifically  of  something  he  dimly
distinguished only when “she bent over me.” Is he really talking about “metaphysics?” After all, he
admits he was particularly fascinated with Ligeia’s “person;” this was the “one dear topic (…) on
which my memory fails me not” (Poe, "Ligeia" 311). The long, allusive description that follows this
statement makes it clear that by “person” he means body. It is only reasonable to assume that this
topic was already getting his almost undivided attention during their “intercourse,” which would
explain why he profited so little from her lessons. He seems to have been more interested in the
teacher than in her teachings. Indeed, the hints were clear from the start: the student’s mind was not
on his book; he only had eyes for Ligeia.
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The narrator’s interest in Ligeia’s “person” is what renders the viable literal interpretation of
his words relevant. It is very easy to picture the “vista” that was exposed to the narrator’s view as
his wife “bent” over him—the reference is, in itself, a little too specific for allegory—, and then the
nature of his “feelings” at the time, and the reason why he found the sight so “delicious,” also
become obvious. It would appear that the pupil was sneaking a peak into the mistress’s cleavage.
The suggestion of latent unsatisfied sexual desire carries a note of resentment which affects other
mysterious passages in the tale: “in a bosom such as hers, love would have reigned no ordinary
passion. But in death only was I fully impressed with the strength of her affection” (Poe, "Ligeia"
317).
If works of imagination are defined by their “mystical” effect, that is, by the presence of
hints of some ulterior meaning that is not immediately attainable, then “Ligeia” is most assuredly
imaginative. But this “mystical” effect is conditional on the reader’s agreement not to analyse his
initial response. The tale will then communicate the same hope of “ethereal” knowledge beyond the
grasp of the understanding that the “vista” offered by Ligeia as she bent over him gave her husband.
However, whenever one attempts a literal-minded paraphrase of the narrator’s sense, a joke results:
the present example is a perfect illustration of this. In this case, the joke shows that the narrator had
not sublimated his sexual desire, but merely glossed it over with his phony “transcendentalism.”
The true nature of the “feelings” Ligeia inspired in him, however, is still clearly recognisable under
the varnish—on the surface.  Thus, in all  cases,  the suggested meaning overthrows the apparent
“thesis,” dramatically denying the hope of transcendence. In other words, the path to that glorious
Idea for which the narrator yearned is always blocked.
The presupposition that Poe himself was, in fact that he had to be, a “transcendentalist” is,
therefore,  a  superstition.  As  regards  the  interpretation  of  “Ligeia,”  this  conviction  certainly
functioned as such. It prevented first Benjamin Franklin Fisher IV and then Mabbott, for example,
from recognising in Dickens’s “A Madman’s Manuscript,” which both identified as a source of
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“Ligeia,” the explanation of the “phantasmagoria” in Poe’s tale, even as they were enumerating
Poe’s borrowings from it.  The madman well remembers how happy he was after his wife died,
“though it’s one of the last things,” he says, 
I can remember: for now I mix up realities with my dreams, and having so much to
do,  and being always hurried here [incidentally,  nineteenth-century  mental  health
institutions are not reported to have provided much in the way of occupation to their
inmates; either this was an uncommonly busy madhouse, or, as seems more likely,
the narrator’s delirium was keeping him busy], have no time to separate the two,
from some  strange  confusion  in  which  they  get  involved”  (Dickens,  “Madman”
143).
The narrator of “Ligeia” evidently experiences a more severe form of the same condition. As
he goes about committing his second femicide, and later, when he watches alone by the corpse of
his victim, he is reminded of his first crime, and the two get hopelessly entangled in his mind—and
also in the mind of the reader, who, influenced by his half-baked theories, prematurely despairs of
literal interpretations and seeks instead some profound universal insight in the tale. Yet, unlike the
narrator, the reader needs not hurry. By rereading the tale carefully, as we have seen, it is possible to
separate dreams from realities.
Yet, I must insist,  in a sense, Yvor Winters was absolutely right. Although Poe carefully
ensured that it was possible to separate dreams from realities, and therefore that the wonders in
Rowena’s room could be shown, beyond any reasonable doubt, to be phantasmagoric effects, he
employed all artistic means to keep the reader from doing so—in other words, he took pains to
conceal  his  art,  and  to  make  his  carefully  planned  hoax  look  a  spontaneous  production  of  an
ingenuous “poet,” his narrator.
As we have seen, Coleridge thought that the purpose of using the supernatural in literature
was to keep the reader, as he puts it, “hovering between images” that were logically incompatible
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with each other, without being able to settle on any definite idea. He thought that this unsettling
state of epistemological hesitation in which the understanding was, as it were, paralysed, called into
action the imagination, to which he recognised the power to somehow transcend empirical reality by
reconciling contradictions, thus arriving at a distant glimmering of a total,  strictly unintelligible
Truth. Thus, he admitted his poetry was designed to give the reader a feeling similar to that which
Ligeia inspired in her husband, who felt an ecstatic anticipation of the ultimate knowledge he felt
was very close at hand, but could never grasp. This was precisely what Coleridge regarded as the
end of poetry: intimate an ultimate, sublime knowledge, which tantalised us but could never truly be
possessed. The only thing that poetry could aim to achieve, was to produce the conviction that this
ultimate Truth existed.
Indeed,  Coleridge  treated  the  supernatural  much  as  mystics  treat  symbols.  Commenting
Kant’s philosophy in the Biographia Literaria, he remarks: 
An IDEA, in the  highest  sense of the word, cannot be conveyed but by a symbol;
and, except in geometry, all symbols of necessity involve an apparent contradiction.
(…) Veracity does not consist in  saying,  but in the intention of communicating the
truth; and the philosopher who can utter the whole truth without conveying falsehood
(…) is constrained to express himself either mythically or equivocally.
(1:156-57). 
Such declarations  express  an  impatience  with relative  truths  that  is  arguably  one of  the
distinctive features of Romanticism. It is also a classic statement of the idea that poetry should not
convey definite meanings, but only the promise of a meaning. This, one suspects, is what Poe was
alluding to when he spoke of Coleridge’s “metaphysicianism.”
As Coleridge saw it,  the supernatural poem was characterised by the coexistence of two
competing layers of meaning which were not susceptible of rational synthesis, but were nonetheless
placed in semantic co-dependence. The only way to achieve such a synthesis was the imagination,
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as indicated by Coleridge’s use of his coinage “esemplastic” to qualify its operation (Biographia
1:168).  Poe,  as  we  have  seen,  often  employs  the  same  type  of  language,  but  never  fails  to
completely subvert it.
Thus, for Coleridge, the two “images” in a supernatural poem cannot be reduced to sense,
hence, the “mystery” of a supernatural plot must have no solution, in order that the reader may be
compelled to assume an “imaginative” attitude, and thereby achieve a sense of the fundamental
unity  of  opposites,  and  through  it  a  glimpse  of  the  fundamental  wholeness  of  nature;  of  the
fundamental  but  inapprehensible  unity  of  the  various  aspects  of  nature.  Poe’s  theory  of  the
imagination, on the other hand, is a method to create the same peculiar feeling by misdirection.
Whereas Coleridge speaks of the mystical “unity” of opposite ideas,  in Poe’s theory of fiction,
“unity” has no longer any mystical value,  and is  presented merely as an effect of certain very
definite formal characteristics of the literary work of art. More specifically, “unity” designates in
Poe’s criticism the effect of the technique that allows the writer of fiction to prevent the reader from
analysing the two “currents of meaning,” the upper and the submerged one, thus conveying the false
impression that there is no rational solution to a mystery. This “unity” is thus put at the service of
the chief design of the writer of the Gothic thriller, and of which Egæus provides an apt definition:
“horror more horrible from being vague, and terror more terrible from ambiguity” (Poe, “Berenice”
217).
The most complete statement of Poe’s theory of the short story can be found in his three
reviews of Nathaniel Hawthorne’s  Twice-Told Tales.  In the second of these reviews, published in
Graham’s Magazine  in  May 1842, in  particular,  Poe expounds what  may be termed a reader’s
response theory revolving around the notion of “unity of effect or impression,” which Poe describes
in very practical fashion (Rev. of  Twice-Told Tales  [1842] 571). Only the “short prose narrative,
requiring from a half-hour to one or two hours in its perusal” could produce that impression of unity
which was a necessary condition for the display of “high genius”: “Worldly interests intervening
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during  the  pauses  of  perusal,  modify,  annul,  or  counteract,  in  a  greater  or  less  degree,  the
impressions of the book. But simple cessation in reading would, of itself, be sufficient to destroy the
true unity. (…) During the hour of perusal,” the time it takes to read a short story through, on the
other hand, “the soul of the reader is at the writer’s control,” provided, that is, that the reader does
not get distracted (Poe, Rev. of Twice-Told Tales [1842] 572).
Poe  is  effectively  presenting  literature  as  a  form  of  psychological  conditioning.  By
completely capturing and holding the reader’s attention,  from start  to  finish,  the writer  obtains
complete control over his or her reactions.  But this unity, which enables the writer to keep the
reader in that state of doubt that Coleridge regarded as the ultimate aim of supernatural poetry, does
not depend, here,  on any intrinsic quality of the material employed, but merely on the reader’s
artificial confinement; on the writer’s ability, that is, to alienate the reader from reality. While some
short stories may fail to interest the reader for even the short period it takes to read them, novels,
and  all  longer  compositions,  are  necessarily  deprived  of  “the  immense  force  derivable  from
totality,” for the very simple reason that “unity (…) cannot be thoroughly preserved in productions
whose perusal cannot be completed at one sitting” (Poe, Rev. of Twice-Told Tales [1842] 572, 571).
Here “unity” is  no longer,  as in Coleridge,  a  transcendent  idea,  but only an impression,
which depends on the artist’s ability completely to monopolise the reader’s attention. As we have
seen,  Poe  had  an  equally  practical  definition  of  imagination.  A tale  could  only  be  termed
“imaginative,” in Poe’s terms, when the reader got the feeling that there was more to it than the
superficial, immediately accessible narrative content, that is, when the reader was given a sense of
mystery.  According  to  Poe,  Irving’s  sketches  never  failed  to  be  only  “fanciful:”  they  were  all
surface. In Hawthorne, on the other hand, “a strong undercurrent of  suggestion runs continuously
beneath the upper stream of the tranquil thesis,” which marks his work as “the product of a truly
imaginative intellect” (Poe, Rev. of  Twice-Told Tales  [1842] 571). But imagination represented a
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challenge  for  writers,  for  there  was  the  risk  of  the  “undercurrent”  interfering  with  what  Poe
regarded as the chief object of fiction, and indeed of all poetry: unity of effect.
In the second part of Poe’s review of  Twice-Told Tales, Poe distinguishes two methods to
bind together an “upper-” and an “undercurrent” of meaning: allegory and what he calls  “deep
suggestion.” He argues that the former, like an interruption in reading, effectively prevents unity, by
creating a double effect, and inducing a sort of reflective mood in which the reader is always aware
of two distinct and definite levels of meaning:
One thing is clear, that if allegory ever establishes a fact, it is by dint of overturning a
fiction.  Where  the  suggested  meaning  runs  through  the  obvious  one  in  a  very
profound undercurrent, so as never to interfere with the upper one without our own
volition, so as never to show itself unless  called  to the surface, there only, for the
proper uses of fictitious narrative is it available at all. Under the best circumstances,
it [allegory] must always interfere with that unity of effect which, to the artist, is
worth all the allegory in the world. Its vital injury, however, is rendered to the most
vitally important point in fiction—that of earnestness or verisimilitude. 
(Rev. of Twice-Told Tales [1847] 582-83 emphasis mine)
The interests of allegory, therefore, are seen as competing with the interests of fiction. The
purpose of the latter is to achieve an illusion of reality, and this is furthered by what Poe calls “unity
of impression.” Poe’s idea of “verisimilitude” is in fundamental agreement with Coleridge’s theory
of fiction. Both agree that the chief object of fiction is to create an illusion, and make the reader
forget that it is an illusion. But, while Coleridge speaks of “willing suspension of disbelief,” Poe
implies  that  the  best  poets  do  not  ask,  but  forcefully  constrain  readers  to  suspend  doubt,  by
confining them to a unified impression. Allegory inevitably diverts attention from that impression,
and therefore, is detrimental to fiction. The reader knows, at every given point, what each element
of the plot “means” in terms of the allegory, and this correspondence disrupts the dramatic illusion.
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To put it simply, allegory does “vital injury” to verisimilitude because it reminds the reader that the
story is fiction; that it is an art product, which is, according to Poe, precisely what the author should
spare no effort to make the reader forget. Finally, Poe intimates the potential of the “undercurrent”
to establish “facts” by displacing “fictions,” a conclusion the importance of which soon becomes
apparent.
Poe argues that Hawthorne’s penchant for allegory has ruined most of his sketches. For Poe,
as  we have  seen,  the  more  artistic  form of  fiction  is  the  “imaginative”  mystery,  in  which  the
“undercurrent of meaning” was not immediately perceivable. Hawthorne was, Poe implies, enough
of an artist to realise this, but he further argues that the “suggested meaning” of his mysteries was
too close to the surface—this, of course, is the same error with which he had charged Dickens. That
meaning, being too obvious, comes unbidden to the reader’s mind, diverting his attention from the
vague impression of mystery it was the author’s design to convey. Indeed, if the solution is obvious,
the tale will not convey the impression of mystery at all. At the same time, it will also fail to meet
the minimal requirements for fiction, in the strict sense Poe attaches to the word, which depend on
that all-important “unity of impression.”
Hawthorne,  then,  has  sacrificed  fiction  to  the  “undercurrent  of  meaning,”  that  is,  to
imagination.  The  imaginative  writer  must  only  intimate  the  presence  of  a  secondary  meaning,
guaranteeing that this meaning will not present itself spontaneously to the reader’s mind, as this
would bring about the collapse of the fiction—as Poe puts it, it would “overturn” the fiction. This,
he thought, had to be avoided at all costs. The ready availability of the “undercurrent,” then, implies
a further distinction within the group of “imaginative” fiction: the allegorical tale where the deeper
meaning is  immediately accessible;  and what  may be termed the “mystery,”  where that  deeper
meaning must be dug out.
Statements such as the one I have just transcribed appear to corroborate Winters’s contention
that for Poe a writer had only to “write with an air of meaning concealed,” regardless of being
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aware of any such meaning (“Edgar Allan Poe” 245). However, Poe goes on to clarify that this was
not the idea. Hawthorne, though he left the “undercurrent” too close to the surface in most of his
tales, was guilty of the opposite mistake in others. In these tales Hawthorne, had buried his secret
too deep. For, as becomes apparent in the next pages of the review, Poe thought that Hawthorne had
intended his mystery to be solved—only not on a first reading.
Poe’s  review  is  itself  a  fine  example  of  misdirection,  as  it  illustrates  the  kind  of
“suggestiveness” it describes. The “undercurrent” must be buried somewhat deeper than allegory, so
as not to “interfere” with the ostensible “thesis” unless the narrator makes a deliberate effort to call
it to the surface. That is the only “proper use” of an “undercurrent” of meaning in fiction. Thus, he
maintains,  “The Minister’s  Black Veil”  is  much to be preferred to  The Pilgrim’s  Progress,  the
classical example of the use of allegory in English fiction, which gets dismissed as a “ludicrously
over-rated book:” “the pleasure derivable from it, in any sense, will be found in the direct ratio of
the reader’s capacity to smother its true purpose, in the direct ratio of his ability to keep the allegory
out of sight, or of his inability to comprehend it” (Rev. of Twice-Told Tales [1847] 583). 
The reader will get no pleasure from an “imaginative” work of literary art unless he or she
does not understand the suggested, or submerged meaning: for one cannot really pretend to know
what one does know. Unlike Coleridge, however, Poe does in no way imply that the mystery should
be insoluble, only that it would be preferable to keep the reader from “comprehending” it. Indeed,
Poe clearly states that the most artistic use of an “undercurrent of meaning” is to ensure the reader
cannot  grasp  it  unless  an  effort  is  made  to  understand. And  then,  of  course,  Poe’s  fiction
demonstrates  conclusively  that,  by  enshrouding  the  incidents  in  a  tale  in  a  phantasmagoric
atmosphere, the reader could be kept from grasping the solution to the most obvious “mysteries.”
In other  words,  the author’s awareness of any definite meaning is  not irrelevant for the
purposes of fiction. “Truth,” he writes, “is often, and in very great degree, the aim of the tale. Some
of the finest tales are tales of ratiocination” (Rev. of Twice-Told Tales [1842] 573). Poe tells us that
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some of Hawthorne’s tales—which incidentally are the reviewer’s favourites—belong precisely to
that category, or rather, Poe implies, they  should have belonged, if their author had had a correct
understanding of his art. The surprising application of the term “tale of ratiocination” to some of
Hawthorne’s sketches contradicts the common assumption that it was Poe’s term for the detective
story—Hawthorne, of course, did not write detective fiction. Poe presents “The Minister’s Black
Veil” as an illustration of the concept. It is, he writes,
a masterly composition of which the sole defect is that to the rabble its exquisite skill
will be  caviare.  The  obvious meaning of this article will  be found to smother its
insinuated one. The moral put into the mouth of the dying minister will be supposed
to convey the  true import of the narrative; and that a crime of dark dye, (having
reference to  the ‘young lady’)  has  been committed,  is  a  point  which only minds
congenial with that of the author will perceive. (Rev. of Twice-Told Tales [1842] 575)
Another tale in the collection, “The White Old Maid,” Poe regards as “objectionable, even
more than the ‘Minister’s Black Veil,’ on the score of its mysticism. Even with the thoughtful and
analytic,  there will  be much trouble in  penetrating its  entire  import”  (Rev.  of  Twice-Told Tales
[1842] 575). That is, these tales illustrate what a tale of ratiocination  is not, in the sense that the
solution cannot be arrived at by ratiocination alone—yet, Poe assures us that the author had meant
the reader to guess this solution. Whether he was right about Hawthorne’s intentions is immaterial
to our purposes. The passage embodies Poe’s own peculiar understanding of how mysteries should
be handled in fiction. Again, the term “mysticism” is used to denote not a transcendent intuition, but
the writer’s ability to obscure a definite, intelligible meaning which, according to Poe, the writer
designed to convey, as is indicated by his providing a solution to “The Minister’s Black Veil.”
Poe thereby places these two tales by Hawthorne in the same category in which he had
included Barnaby Rudge: the “mystery,” for which he had meanwhile created the new designation
of “tale of ratiocination.” According to Poe, then, the reader of a “mystery” is supposed to replace
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the false impression with the true story. What is remarkable about the Hawthorne review is that Poe
applies the term “tale of ratiocination” to tales where the truth is not delivered to the reader by the
end of the tale.  More importantly,  Poe clearly presents “The Minister’s Black Veil” as a crime
mystery.  Theoretically,  then,  Hawthorne’s is  precisely the kind of tale  he had mentioned in his
previous reviews of Dickens’ novel, but of which he had supplied no example, in which it was
legitimate to employ “dark hints of some uncertain evil”  (Rev. of Barnaby Rudge [1841] 219). As
we have seen,  he said these “hints” were only artistically  employed where the  dénouement,  or
recognition,  was omitted,  to be recovered by the reader—as Poe did with Dickens’s unfinished
novel.
Following these hints, as the reader will recall, Poe anticipated the solution to the mystery
long before Dickens revealed it. This, Poe said, was not supposed to happen. The ulterior meaning,
the true story, overturned the fiction, that is, the obvious but false impression, and thus the effect
intended by the author, mystery, was destroyed—at least, it would be destroyed to a reader who paid
attention to the details. The reader was not supposed to recognise the “truth” until the writer was
ready to reveal it. In any event, whenever the revelation was made in the course of the reading, the
reader would be disillusioned by it, and would have no interest in rereading the story. And that is
precisely why, said Poe, the solution should not be intimated by means of mysterious clues unless
the reader was supposed to play the detective.70
In any case, by an effective and adroit use of such clues, Dickens had made it possible for
the “thoughtful and analytical” Poe to discover the solution to the mystery. Poe implies that he erred
only in making his clues a little too obvious. Hawthorne, on the other hand, had apparently made
what Poe regarded as a legitimate use of “dark hints,” for he designed—at least Poe thought this
was his  design—to let  the reader  surmise the solution to  his  mystery.  However,  while  Dickens
70 It  is  interesting to note the complementary conclusion that  flows from this reasoning: that,  in tales where the
solution of the mystery is to be revealed to the reader—such as detective stories—the reader should not be allowed
to anticipate the solution by ratiocination, which is indeed the case with Poe’s Dupin stories, where the reader is
always kept in ignorance of some crucial detail that effectively prevents him or her from anticipating the solution.
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risked premature revelation, the solution to Hawthorne’s mysteries ran the risk of remaining buried
for  all  eternity.  The  “truth”  he  wished  to  convey,  Poe  implied,  was  beyond  the  reach  of
“ratiocination,” and therefore even the most “thoughtful and analytic” of readers might not perceive
it. Poe also implies, of course, that “ratiocination” should be enough to decipher the mystery. The
solution  to  Hawthorne’s  mysteries,  however,  depended rather  on  “congeniality,”  that  is,  on the
reader’s sympathy with the author, or, in other words, on his previous knowledge of his methods
and opinions.  The implication is  that  the meaning of  the  tale  was not  inherent  to  its  plot,  but
depended on previous knowledge of the author, necessarily derived from external sources. Thus,
when he accuses Hawthorne of “mysticism,” he means by that word more or less the same thing
Yvor Winters meant by “obscurantism.” In other words, Poe makes it very clear that mysteries, as
he conceived them, were not exempted from the general rule he formulated in 1845 in his review of
Elizabeth Oakes Smith’s Poetical Writings: “Every work of art should contain within itself all that is
required for its own comprehension” (912). Thus, in the final analysis, Poe tells us that Hawthorne’s
mysteries were not, but should have been “tales of ratiocination.”
In his article, revealingly titled “A Crisis in the History of American Obscurantism,” Winters
compares the styles of Hawthorne and Henry James with Poe’s. According to him, whereas the
former  had  been  accidentally  obscurantist,  because  they  had had what  Winters  regarded as  an
imperfect understanding of their art, Poe had been an obscurantist by design, and adhered to the
practice quite systematically, which this critic found unacceptable: 
Poe is, in brief, an explicit obscurantist. Hawthorne, in his four last and unfinished
romances gives us the physical embodiment of allegory without the meaning to be
embodied, but he appears to hope for a meaning, to be, somehow, pathetically and
unsuccessfully  in  search  of  one.  (…) But  in  Poe,  obscurantism has  ceased to  be
merely an accident of inadequate understanding, it has become the explicit aim of
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writing and has become the generation of a method. Poe’s aesthetic is an aesthetic of
obscurantism. (“Edgar Allan Poe” 246)
Thus, Winters effectively identifies Hawthorne with his ideal of “mystical” Romanticism.
He thought that “inadequate understanding” was a legitimate excuse for obscurantism, but here
paradoxically suggests that Poe understood what he was doing, and that this disqualified him to be
mystic. Again, I think he is absolutely right.
In effect, Poe quite ostensibly accuses Hawthorne of “transcendentalism,” which for him
consisted precisely in “hoping” for a meaning when one was aware of none, which was precisely
what  Winters thought  distinguished the legitimate Romanticism of Hawthorne from Poe’s  false
Romanticism. This becomes very clear by the end of his last review of Twice-Told Tales. Hawthorne
has the purest style, the finest taste, the most available scholarship, the most delicate
humor,  the  most  touching  pathos,  the  most  radiant  imagination,  the  most
consummate ingenuity; and with these he has done well as a mystic. But is there any
one of these qualities which should prevent his doing doubly as well in a career of
honest, upright, sensible, prehensible and comprehensible things? Let him mend his
pen, get a bottle of visible ink, come out of the Old Manse, cut Mr. Alcott, hang (if
possible) the editor of ‘The Dial,’ and throw out of the window to the pigs all his odd
numbers of ‘The North American Review.’ (Rev. of Twice-Told Tales [1847] 587-88)
But then, Poe appears to be condemning Hawthorne for doing the same thing he himself had
done in “Ligeia,” “Berenice,” and “Morella,” all of which appear to be every bit as “mystical” as
Hawthorne’s mysterious tales. But the resemblance between those tales and “The Minister’s Black
Veil,” in particular,  is  the smoking gun. The “obvious” meaning, or “upper thesis,” of that tale
corresponds to the “moral” put in the mouth of his protagonist. But Poe argues that this obvious
thesis  was not the “true import” of the tale,  which was really about a secret crime, committed
against a “young lady,” which must be brought to the surface by the reader. In other words, the
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“moral” the protagonist attaches, or imposes on his story, enforces a cover story, a fiction within the
fiction, which the suggested meaning must overturn.
Poe,  then,  draws attention to a tale  that  is  remarkably similar to some of his  tales,  and
compares it unfavourably with a solve-it-yourself mystery, thereby indirectly implying that his tales
belonged to that elusive category. Very few people noticed how original this idea was. Poe does not
supply a single example of the sort of fiction that, he writes, Hawthorne should have written, had he
not been so dreadfully “transcendentalist.” But he does imply he could have written a mystery much
better than either Dickens or Hawthorne. Evidently, he did unto Dickens and Hawthorne what he
would have liked his reader to do unto him. The absence of a dénouement and the dark hints that
disturbed, in tales like “Ligeia,” the superficial “thesis” with seemingly impertinent “suggestions”
were there to prompt the reader to go back to the tale, displace the narrator’s fiction with the true
story, and review the critical verdict.
Poe complained that Hawthorne’s secret was beyond the reach of analysis, and his practice
was consistent with the theory that underlies this statement. Nothing but analysis could displace the
first impression a tale like “Ligeia” makes on the reader—and that is the beauty of this boldest of
hoaxes. Poe spares no effort to keep his reader on the edge of his or her seat; in fact, on that first
sitting, the reader is, as Poe told us, completely under his control, and susceptible to all impressions
he may wish to convey. It  is very unlikely that a reader thus circumstanced will be capable of
analysis, or indeed, any structured thought. Besides, why should the reader even bother to make an
effort to understand when the narrator tells us not to try, and the very spirit of the age is hostile to
analysis. Therefore, there is an obvious and immediate egotistical reward for assuming an uncritical
stance. The rewards of discovery, on the other hand, are too remote and uncertain to be alluring.
Poe did warn us, but his warnings are like that shadow on the floor, we just could not see at
first. Reviewing Dickens’s Pickwick Papers  in 1836, Poe singles out “A Madman’s Manuscript,”
actually  appending  good  part  of  the  tale  to  his  uncommonly  short  review,  with  the  following
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commentary. “The writer is supposed (…), by a strong effort of the will, to have preserved his secret
from the eye of even his most intimate friends” (“Pickwick Club” 319).71 I omitted the middle of the
sentence: the “writer,” of course, is the “madman,” not Dickens, and his madness is the “secret.”
Again, Poe chooses to draw attention to a tale about a crafty dissembler who had managed to keep
his crime, the murder of his wife, from being detected. Of course, in one sense, I believe he does
intend  obliquely  to  point  out  the  similarity  between  his  narrator  in  “Ligeia”  and  Dickens’s
“madman.” At the same time, however, by referring to the first-person narrator as “the writer,” Poe
highlights the fact that the real author simulated the madness of his narrator. This, he said, was the
best in the whole book. Poe always paid more attention to the tales that most resembled his own, but
kept insisting that these tales were not quite all that they could have been, by holding them to
criteria which, he admits, were entirely of his own devising. And he felt particularly attracted to
tales of hidden murder and femicide, in which, he insisted, the mystery was either too obvious or
altogether impenetrable. Thus, of course, he indirectly prompts us to seek the undeveloped solution
to the mysteries of “Berenice,” Morella,” and “Ligeia.” After all, it is only reasonable to suppose
Poe attempted to do what he advised others to do. Upon inquiry, we find this was exactly what he
had been doing.
Thus, Poe’s theory of fiction is indeed an “aesthetic of obscurantism,” as Winters wrote. But,
inasmuch as  the  writer  is  explicitly  required to  draw the reader’s  attention from some definite
“truth,” it is also a poetics of misdirection, that is, a poetics of the hoax. The trick, as he repeatedly
stated,  consisted  in  confining  the  reader  to  a  unified  impression.  That  is,  by  conferring  the
appearance of irreducible  unity to  what is  in  fact  an unstable,  inconsistent  mixture of fact and
delusion, the writer kept the reader from understanding there was something to be understood. In
the abstract, one might say that the false impression to be conveyed is unity itself. For Poe clearly
71 Poe’s very short notice appeared in the Southern Literary Messenger in November 1836.
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implies that this artificial effect is the basis of the Romantic mode of “transcendent” expression,
which he inexorably leads us to conclude is itself an artifice. 
Thus, at a time when the leading figures in Romanticism were saying that the poet was
under no strict obligation to make sense, and in fact valuing those tales and poems who could not be
reduced to plain sense, Poe was saying the opposite: that there had to be some meaning, but the poet
should be able to obscure it so that it would not interfere with the “mystical” effect. In other words,
the poet had to make it appear there was no meaning. The best way to do this, as implied by the
examples he chose to illustrate his point, like “The Minister’s Black Veil” or Barnaby Rudge, is to
speak through the mouth of characters who really and honestly believe the events in the tale make
no sense. Meanwhile, both in his theory and in the practice that illustrates it, Poe intimates that by
turning  off  the  understanding,  as  it  were,  poets  and  readers  did  not  get  any  valuable
“transcendental” insights, they could only get deluded. Thus, Poe’s  meaning constitutes a radical
departure from the typical Romantic attitude of his narrator. This is, I think, the key aspect of Poe’s
method that  most  criticism has  failed  to  acknowledge.  In  this  sense,  then,  I  regard  Poe as  an
aesthetical  iconoclast  who sought  to displace the Romantic myth of the creative “genius” from
within.
In fact, his subversion of Romantic tropes affects the understanding of the creative process
itself. Just as the vision of the narrator is a monstrous, incoherent hodge-podge of fact and fiction,
of scraps of memories, phantasmagoric effects, and shadows that resolves into an intelligible chain
of natural causes and effects which belies his pretensions to mystical insight, so the tale itself, is a
patchwork of “reminiscences” from an ever-expanding list of sensationalist narratives, mostly but
not exclusively fictional, that Poe had skilfully woven together into what appears a spontaneous,
inartificial unified creation. Once the Romantic cover is blown, however, the true face of the author
—of the implied author, if you will—is revealed, by contrast with the narrator’s. The same quaint
turns of phrase and weird unaccountable details that ultimately reveal the narrator’s dirty secret,
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also reveal the sources of Poe’s “inspiration,” and with it the true history of the composition of
“Ligeia.”
The Romantic myth of spontaneity is then displaced by the painstaking work of combination
that  went  into  the  composition  of  “Ligeia.”  Each  of  the  constituent  elements  of  that  myth,
specifically, are exposed as fictions, or effects: originality, inspiration, even an authority based on
the display of esoteric ancient lore—which was habitually used in both the Gothic and the Romantic
approaches to story-telling as a throwback at pre-scientific thinking; in Poe, it becomes a means of
misdirection, a fact which I think speaks for itself. Poe, as I said before, wanted to ensure that the
analytical  reader  could  discover  not  only  how unoriginal  he  was,  but  also  to  bring  about  the
recognition that  the reader’s perception of authority and originality is  itself  based on deceptive
appearances. The moral of the tale—as opposed to the moral of the apparent story—is that one
should  never  take  fiction  too  seriously.  For  fiction  is  only  make-belief  or,  in  other  words,  a
deception—this is what Poe keeps reminding his readers of. Thus, the identification of the narrator
with the Romantic genius, and, by implication,  with the author,  depends itself  on that arbitrary
“unity of effect” that was, Poe thought, the soul of the illusion.
Through the narrator’s downfall, fiction and poetry are reduced to natural proportions along
with his supposedly transcendent intuitions, and the apparent contradiction between Poe’s theory
and his practice resolves into a joke. Indeed, Stovall was driven to the conclusion that Poe could not
possibly mean to deny the Romantic distinction between Fancy and Imagination—even though he
did—by the impression that Poe’s practice, as a poet and a writer of prose fiction, implied that very
distinction and, in fact, something like Coleridge’s theory of poetry. In other words, he assumed Poe
was what  he  seemed,  or  more  precisely  the  characters  he  chose to  assume in  his  fiction.  The
discovery of the true substance of the shadow entails the revelation of his method of manipulating
Romantic  expectations  for  the  purpose  of  discrediting  them  as  a  particular  instance  of  the
“transcendentalism”  and  “metaphysicisanism”  he  constantly  ridiculed.  “Ligeia”  is  a  hoax
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perpetrated  through  a  clever  parody  of  ideas  Poe  found  lying  around  in  the  writings  of  his
contemporaries, and which, having become almost second nature to his public, were the least likely
to  be  questioned.  The common denominator  of  these  ideas  was  the  blurring  of  the  distinction
between the formal cohesiveness of a work of art and a mystical idea of cosmic totality, which had
been articulated with particular vigor by Coleridge.
Although the solution to “Ligeia” is implied in the plot, it  is reinforced by Poe’s buried
allusions to the true sources of his inspiration, which are never mentioned by name in the tale.
Indeed, the comparison between source and model that, through those very allusions, Poe invites us
to make, illumines and reiterates the apparently impertinent suggestions that arise from his text, and
which run contrary to its obvious import, or “thesis.” Usually that comparison has a double effect,
of highlighting the unreliability, indeed the absurdity, of the narrator’s conclusions, and intimating
the probable explanation of some of the many mysterious circumstances in Poe’s tale. Sometimes
those narratives contain a version of the same supernatural or improbable phenomenon the narrator
thinks  took place in his  case,  but,  on closer  inspection,  we find that,  while  in the original  the
absence of an alternative explanation forced us to accept the reality of that phenomenon, in Poe’s
imitation,  everything forces us to reject it.  In other  cases,  extraordinary events  similar  to those
reported by Poe’s narrator are given a natural explanation that fits the evidence in “Ligeia” much
better than the narrator’s supernatural hypothesis. Thus, Poe surreptitiously reinstates the distinction
between  superstition  and  reason  which  had  been  studiously  blurred  by  Romanticism  by  a
combination of internal evidence and intertextual echoes. Concomitantly, the identification of Poe’s
sources contributes to dispel the misleading unity of effect that played a decisive role in creating the
illusion of the supernatural.
And this is why I say that traditional source studies are inadequate to the study of Poe’s
fiction, and even of his criticism. “Rarely,” Pollin remarks, “does Poe bluntly state the sources of
the many borrowings and adaptations of ‘hints’ in  The Brevities, and yet he manages to lead the
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alert and knowing reader to almost every author; the relationship often becomes one of a clever
miscreant or impish trickster versus a hard-working detective or spy” (“Sources and Borrowings”
xxxiii-iv).  Indeed,  Pollin  demonstrated  conclusively  that  the  small  articles  that  make  up  the
Pinakidia  and  Marginalia series  (published respectively  in  the  Southern Literary Messenger  in
1836,  and in several  magazines between November 1844 and September 1849),  as well  as  the
shorter “Chapter of Suggestions” and “Fifty Suggestions” (published respectively in the annual The
Opal for 1845 and in the May-June 1849 issue of Graham’s Magazine) were literary puzzles. These
were  very  short,  sometimes  even  telegraphic  commentaries  in  which  the  author  displays  what
appears to be an enviable domain over very obscure ancient or modern lore.
This sort of brevity was very popular at the time. Such articles, which in those days were
used as fillers by many magazines, were modelled on Isaac D’Israeli’s  Curiosities of Literature
(1791-1823)  and  other  similar  works.  They  projected  an  image  of  literary  competence,  of
“learning,”  which  was  highly  marketable.  These  short  notes,  Poe  slyly  remarked  in  the
“Introduction” to the Pinakidia, were
the result, in some cases, of much thought and more research, expended, however, at
a  manifest  disadvantage,  if  we  regard  merely  the  estimate  which  the  public  are
willing to set upon such articles. It sometimes occurs that in papers of this nature
may be found a collective mass of general, but more usually of classical erudition,
which,  if  dexterously  besprinkled  over  a  proper  surface  of  narrative,  would  be
sufficient to make the fortunes of one or two hundred ordinary novelists in these our
good  days,  when  all  heroes  and  heroines  are  necessarily  men  and  women  of
‘extensive  acquirements.’ But,  for  the  most  part,  these  ‘Brevities,’ &c. are  either
piecemeal cullings at second hand, from a variety of sources hidden, or supposed to
be hidden, or more audacious pilferings from those vast storehouses of brief facts,
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memoranda,  and opinions  in  general  literature,  which  are  so  abundant  in  all  the
principal libraries of Germany and France. (Brevities 1)
Let the reader beware. Displays of erudition in this vein are not always what they seem.
There are many upstart writers who do not scruple to take advantage of the research of others. Some
of  the  more  well-known repositories  of  recondite  lore,  such  as  Isaac  D’Israeli’s  Curiosities  of
Literature  itself,  “have,  of  late  years,  proved  exceedingly  convenient  to  some  little  American
pilferers in that line, but are now becoming too generally known to allow much hope of their good
things being any longer appropriated with impunity” (Poe,  Brevities 2). Yet, Pollin found out that
Poe was precisely one such “pilferer”—and what is  more,  he found out that he had plundered
precisely the  Curiosities for the  Pinakidia, and that his pilferings had gone, despite his preface,
practically unnoticed:
The  tone  of  Poe’s  Introduction  [to  Pinakidia]  matches  well  that  of  the  first
installment of the  Marginalia, in its irony, banter, and factitious erudition. It must
have been intended to pique the curiosity of the ‘classical and general reader’ [this
comes from Poe’s Introduction] of the Southern Literary Messenger and set him to
the schoolboy game of searching for the sources of unidentified ‘cullings.’ That Poe
himself is one of the ‘audacious pilferers’ whom he mocks in paragraph I is part of
the joke. (Introduction xii)
The joke rewards the “schoolboy” for following the “‘clues’ playfully scattered by Poe” and
which, according to Pollin,  “would enable him to disclaim concealment if  arraigned by critics”
(Introduction xii). But there is more to it than that, I think. Poe’s strategy draws attention to the
grounds on which the reader will decide whether an author is “learned.” In fact, once we realise
what Poe is really doing, we recognise that his introduction is actually an ironical advertising of his
own pilferings, as well as a satire on the idea of learning itself.
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This is perfectly in keeping with Poe’s conceptualisation of imitation and plagiarism which,
incidentally, is fully developed in one of the small articles that comprise the Marginalia, numbered
160 in Pollin’s edition: “Imitators,” Poe writes, 
are  not,  necessarily,  unoriginal—except  at  the  exact  points  of  the  imitation.  Mr.
Longfellow, decidedly the most audacious imitator in America, is markedly original,
or, in other words, imaginative upon the whole; and many persons have, from the
latter branch of the fact, been at a loss to comprehend, and therefore, to believe, the
former.  Keen  sensibility  of  appreciation—that  is  to  say,  the  poetic  sentiment (in
distinction from the poetic power) leads almost inevitably to imitation. Thus all the
great poets have been gross imitators. It is, however, a mere  non distributio medii
hence to infer, that all great imitators are poets. Still, what I mean to say is, that Mr.
Aldrich’s  penchant  for imitation does not show him to be incapable of poetry—as
some have asserted. (Brevities 269)
Poe argues, from similarities between some verses by this little-known American poet and a
poem by Thomas Hood that the former “imitated” the latter. This was, Poe says, “plagiarism” in the
first degree. But Poe’s views on the subject are at odds with the notion of plagiarism current in his
time. Indeed, it  was then generally thought that the writer’s unawareness that he was imitating
excused the imitation, which was thus distinguished from plagiarism, which was in turn commonly
conceived as a voluntary imitation—this, it was thought, constituted an innexcusable literary crime.
Poe,  on  the  other  hand,  identified  another  “imitation”  by  Aldrich,  arguing  that  it  was  not
“plagiarism” because, contrary to his first example, “there seems scarcely any design of concealing
the  source;”  indeed,  Poe  quotes  Aldrich’s  poem  “as  evidence”  of  his  “aptitude  at  imitation”
(Brevities 269). 
Not only does Poe construe “imitation” as a legitimate device, he assures that all the best
poets do it. For no poet creates, in the proper sense of the word. Truly imaginative poets achieve
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novel combinations which appear uncontrived and spontaneous, but are, nonetheless, necessarily
“re-soluble  into  the  old.”  Moreover,  he  adds  that  legitimate  imitation  consists  in  borrowing
deliberately from a relatively obscure source without attempting to conceal the borrowing. In effect,
Poe tells us that, in an epoch in which the concept of plagiarism was broad enough to encompass
virtually all imitation, the writer had to misdirect the public—that is, to make his writing appear
absolutely original. Again, we cannot honestly say Poe did not try to tip us off to what he really was
doing. But one can understand why so few critics heeded the warning. None of the common critical
terms in this passage is employed in its current Romantic acceptation. “Imitation,” “imagination,”
“originality,” and “poetry:” all these terms depend on Poe’s theory—not Coleridge’s.
Pollin perceived that Poe’s puzzles brought out the limitations of an approach based on an
unsophisticated and uniform understanding of the relationship between the source and the imitation,
which places the emphasis entirely on the former, downplaying the active role of the imitator, and
disregarding the peculiar ends to which the source material is adapted. In other words, the novelty
in  Pollin’s  approach  was  that  of  regarding  Poe’s  borrowings  as  objects,  rather  than  means  of
interpretation.
Thus, he distinguished two types of allusion in Poe’s brevities. On the one hand, there were
ostensible allusions to the texts on the margins of which the writer was supposed to have hastily
jotted down his impressions. Pollin found out that these were generally red-herrings—that is, that
the bibliography named in the text was seldom the real source of Poe’s witticism. Most of the
erudition Poe displayed came from “unnamed intermediary sources,” or “buried sources,” to which
the scholarly reader was directed by another kind of allusions, which were covert rather than overt
(Introduction xii-xiii). Through them, scholars have been able to trace most of Poe’s lore to some of
the most popular collections of literary “curiosities,” or, in one notable case, a book so obscure and
elusive that many doubted its existence prior to 1929, when it was finally located by Mabbott.72
72 Poe directly quotes “the anonymous and very rare Antediluvians Antiquities. Fragments of the Age of Methuselah.
Translated  by  an  American  Traveler  in  the  East (1829)  in  Pinakidia  2,  which  in  his  note  to  the  text  Pollin
conjectures was “perhaps the germ of Poe’s material-spiritual  view of the universe as  developed into  Eureka”
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Above all, Pollin’s approach is informed by the sense that Poe’s brevities are not what they
seem, that is, pedantic, sometimes seemingly arbitrary displays of recondite learning, but riddles,
the solution of which entailed the displacement of the rhetoric underlying such displays. The true
meaning of those notes,  therefore,  was not the relationship they established with the ostensible
pseudo-source; on the contrary, the meaning of those little notes was, precisely, the relationship they
established  with  their  unnamed  “secondary”  source,  which  was  in  fact  the  principal  source.
Therefore,  according to  Pollin,  it  was  not  enough to detect  the true source;  the scholar  should
describe  the  nature  of  the  meaningful  relationship  Poe’s  text  established  with  that  source.
Accordingly, his list of sources for the brevities:
interprets  ‘sources’ as does Poe,  who doted on the topic in  his  reviews and who
would justify presenting this set of ‘leads’ as helping to analyze the link between the
literary stimuli or ideas and his brief essays in the Brevities. Most of the sources are
close and pertain to the main subject, with Poe’s wording being an echo or a virtual
duplicate. For some, however, the connection is more inferential, and several use the
source for only a portion of the article. Outright quotation of a passage on which Poe
writes  comments  as  the  gist  of  the  article  does  not  constitute  a  ‘source’ for  this
enumeration. It is chiefly when the wording and the viewpoint of the original author
is taken over by Poe, usually without his indicating the specific work or the extension
of the adaptation that it is included here. (“Sources and Borrowings” xxxiv)
In other words, “outright quotations” cannot be trusted—they often prove to be dead ends.
Undeclared quotations from “buried sources” alone are significant for the solution of the riddle.
These come in two different varieties, the “virtual duplicate,” and another, special kind of quotation,
which appears in “adapted” form, and whose connection with Poe’s text is not immediately apparent
but must be “inferred.” In those cases, instead of borrowing the words, Poe assumes the general
(1849) (Poe, Brevities 11n).
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“viewpoint”  of  the  original.   Pollin  applied  the  same  procedure  to  Poe’s  fiction,  unearthing
borrowings from Victor Hugo’s  Notre-Dame de Paris  in several tales and in both of Poe’s longer
narratives, for example, or identifying significant secondary sources for the motto of “Eleanora”
(see chs. 2 and 3 in Discoveries in Poe). Unfortunately, these studies had very little impact on the
scholarship of Poe’s fiction and poetry. In fact, it appears to me that even Pollin failed to realise the
importance of his fiding.
In  his  introduction  to  the  Pinakidia,  Poe warned  readers  precisely  against  the  kind  of
pilfering he was about to perform—there too, as usual, he was hiding the crime in plain sight, where
it was least likely to be sought. However, he also slyly implied that such pilferings would be much
more advantageous to the writer’s reputation if “dexterously besprinkled over a proper surface of
narrative,” to adorn the speech of a “hero or heroine” of “’extensive acquirements,’” such as were
then in demand (Brevities 1). This, of course, is precisely what Poe was doing in his fiction, most
notably in “Ligeia.” In the introduction, Poe further acknowledges that the function of such displays
of learning was merely that of making an impression, that would be enough to intimidate most
readers into submission. After all, the reader would probably surmise the writer possessed technical
and  literary  expertise  that  enabled  him to  tackle  texts  that  were  inaccessible  to  the  unlearned
majority.
 The strategy that combined ostensibly learned allusions and covert quotations, and which
enabled Poe to conceal his true sources, his meaning, and his satire, from the “general public,”
without pushing it beyond the reach of analysis, is certainly present in “Ligeia,” but has remained
mostly  unnoticed.  Mabbott,  for  example,  clearly  felt  that  Poe’s  borrowings had no meaning in
themselves.  Thus,  when he found that one passage in the tale was lifted whole from Dickens's
“Madman’s Manuscript,” while the learned allusion to “the daughters of Delos” had been lifted
almost verbatim from Bulwer-Lytton’s “Manuscript Found in a Madhouse,” he did not think these
were facts requiring interpretation (Mabbott, Tales 1:331n3). Yet, these borrowings, which may be
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filed under Pollin’s “virtual duplicate” heading, are, as I have attempted to show, highly significant.
And then, there are the many “inferential connections” which I have been tracing, and will continue
to do so in the next chapters, in which Poe assumes the “point of view” of a character, real or
imaginary, which inspired some trait of his narrator, but uses, except for the borrowing of some tell-
tale unusual phrase, different words. These sources, however, are never named.
The narrator’s flashy allusions, on the other hand, while they lead us away from the true
sources of Poe’s inspiration, being themselves often borrowed, sometimes function as clues to some
buried intermediary source, which is itself a hint to Poe’s true purposes. The problem is further
complicated by the fact that the narrator’s ostensible allusions, despite being usually wrong, still
indirectly lead to some real source of Poe’s tale. A perfect example of this is the motto the narrator
erroneously attributes to Glanvill, in a way that implies his acquaintance with some of the texts the
seventeenth-century  divine  did  write,  and  which  establish  very  meaningful  and  illuminating
connections with some of the most bizarre aspects of the apparent “thesis.”
Indeed, upon inspection,  one finds that the abstruse allusions of the narrator  are  always
botched;  that  they  are  all  show,  and  invariably  belie  the  narrator’s  pretensions  to  literary
competence—in this chapter I will provide several examples of this. Yet, since the “learning” to
which they allude is always very obscure, they effectively obscure the solution to the mystery. Thus,
I think “Ligeia” may be described as a double mystery: a murder mystery, and a bibliographical
riddle the solution of which requires the kind of approach Pollin introduced. In fact, like “Ligeia,”
the articles included in Pinakidia and Marginalia have a false “thesis,” which is suggested by the
ostensible allusions, and a true meaning, which depends on the buried allusions.
I have attempted to demonstrate that the narrator’s “thesis” is a false, or cover story, based
on erroneous premises and logically unsound inferences. Although there is no way of paraphrasing
the apparent narrative with any degree of preciseness, such is its inconsistency, most readers will
probably agree that the following is more or less what appears to have happened: the narrator’s first
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wife came back from the grave to poison her successor because she could not bear to see him in
another’s  arms,  and  briefly  took  her  place.  This,  the  resulting  impression  of  the  narrator’s
suggestions, is evidently the collage of at least two fictional sources: one supernatural tale about a
revenant vampire wife who comes back from the grave, banishing her successor to resume in death
the position she had occupied in life, “Wake Not the Dead;” and a weird, albeit perfectly natural
anonymous story entitled “The Somnambulist,” published in Tait’s Edinburgh Magazine in February
1838,  about  a  gentleman  whose wife  is  poisoned  by  his  plebeian  quondam  sweetheart.  The
resurrection of Ligeia-Rowena itself seems to have been inspired by an obscure biography of the
Rev. William Tennent, Jr. (1705-1777), pastor of Freehold, New Jersey. Some elements of Poe’s
story, namely the tell-tale phrase “shadow of a shade,” appear to have come from Ann Radcliffe’s
The Italian. Other sources I have been able to identify include such disparate works as Glanvill’s
Essays, Sterne’s Tristram Shandy, and Hogg’s The Private Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified
Sinner (1824). These  sources  are  added  to  the  others  hitherto  mentioned,  some  of  which,  for
example The Monk, will be revisited in this chapter.
As I have before said, Poe alludes to all this sources in a way that shows, I think, that he was
not trying to conceal his borrowings any more than he had tried to conceal the sources of Pinakidia
—he merely obscures the hints that make their identification possible by the same technique that he
used to  makes  us  miss  the  true  story  in  “Ligeia:”  misdirection,  or  literary  sleight  of  hand.  In
“Ligeia,” this is mostly done by borrowing not from one, but from many different sources. The
pieces of the elaborated jigsaw thus created do not quite fit together, which I believe is entirely
deliberate  on  Poe’s  part.  Indeed,  the  inconsistencies  in  the  narrator’s  “thesis”  often  mark  the
intersection of the radically incompatible stories Poe stitched together, and thus serve the double
purpose of revealing the crime and Poe’s  artistry.  In other words,  the solutions  to the both the
mystery  of  the  story  itself  and  of  its  composition  are  revealed  by  decomposing  the  “unified
impression” one derived from that first sitting, and subjecting the tale to several rereadings.
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In the article on N. P. Willis I quote above, Poe writes:
The  pure  imagination  chooses,  from  either  beauty  or  deformity,  only  the  most
combinable things hitherto uncombined;—the compound, as a general rule, partaking
(in character) of sublimity or beauty, in the ratio of the respective sublimity or beauty
of the things combined—which are themselves still to be considered as atomic—that
is to say, as previous combinations. But, as often analogously happens in physical
chemistry, so not unfrequently does it occur in this chemistry of the intellect, that the
admixture of two elements will result in a something that shall have nothing of the
quality of one of them—or even nothing of the qualities of either.
(“American Prose Writers” 17)
By employing the same kind of Romantic jargon he put in the mouth of the narrator of
“Ligeia,”  Poe insensibly leads  a  reader  whose tastes  have been determined by Romanticism to
conclude that his text presupposes the basic Romantic assumptions that are associated with that
jargon,  namely  that  the  “sources”  of  poetry  are  unfathomable.  Poe  is,  of  course,  ostensibly
confuting those very notions, but this will not necessarily pose a problem for such a reader. Stovall,
as we have seen, completely dismissed Poe’s meaning. Accordingly, he sees Poe’s chemical analogy
as an illustration of Coleridge’s theory—the very theory that Poe explicitly rejected:
if one asks how small these combinable parts may be, the reply is obviously that they
may be as small  in their  world,  the ideal,  as the atom in the physical world.  He
actually mentions physical chemistry as an aid to the understanding of imaginative
creation, which he calls ‘the chemistry of the intellect.’ In the light of this analogy his
example of the griffin as an object created imaginatively is absurd. As a matter of
fact, I feel confident that he agreed with Coleridge in every respect; but, impelled by
the desire to be original, and painfully conscious of his obligation to Coleridge, he
sought to avoid that obligation by opposing him. (…) he began to quibble over the
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words ‘creation’ and ‘combination.’ He often used the word ‘create’ in Coleridge’s
sense, and undoubtedly applied Coleridge’s theory, not his own, in all his best poems.
(Stovall, “Poe’s Debt” 794)
Yet, although it makes no sense as a metaphor of Coleridge’s theory of poetic creation, the
griffin makes perfect sense as an illustration of Poe’s theory. “Novel conceptions,” Poe writes:
are merely unusual combinations. The mind of man can imagine nothing which does
not exist—if it could, it would create not only ideally, but substantially—as do the
thoughts of God. It may be said— “We imagine a griffin, yet a griffin does not exist.”
Not the griffin, certainly, but its component parts. It is no more than a collation of
known  limbs—features—qualities.  Thus  with  all  that  claims  to  be  new—which
appears to be a  creation of the intellect: —it is re-soluble into the old. The wildest
effort of the mind cannot stand the test of analysis. (Poe, “American Prose Writers”
16)
Poe is not here talking of abstract ideal conceptions obscurely intuited in a state of half-
consciousness. He is talking of concrete, recognizable conceptions imitated from his peers. And he
did apply  his  theory to his own work. Just like a griffin is part lion, part eagle, so “Ligeia” is a
combination of many preexistent literary conceptions, hence “re-soluble into the old.” Of course,
for Poe, all literary productions are a recapitulation of the literature that precedes them—in a sense,
therefore, one might say that his theory suggests the idea that all imaginative works of art develop
an idea of literature—, but, according to him, not all writers are aware of this. I certainly think that
Poe was much more aware of his debt to his predecessors than any other writer I know, and this
sensibility is part of what makes “Ligeia” such a remarkable work of art.
Nothing in his tale was new. Everything about it would be vaguely familiar to the public,
although it would take the reader a great effort, which he knew most readers would not make, to
trace that  feeling of familiarity  to  specific sources.  The general public  seeks entertainment and
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would not, and as Poe saw it should not, be bothered with research and analysis. Thus, the reader
not yet acquainted with the solution to the mystery of the tale reenacted the position of the narrator,
who felt the mystery of his wife had some connection with certain “passages from books,” but could
not define that connection (Poe, “Ligeia” 314).
This, then, is Poe’s secret. He had found a method to reconcile the apparently conflicting
demands of familiarity and novelty. Indeed, all truly popular writers must find methods to deliver
what the public expects in an unexpected way, and this was Poe’s way to do it. Indeed, I suspect
great works of art are distinguished by the paradoxical feeling they inspire, which is perhaps best
expressed by the word “uncanny:” they appear wholly new and original, but also so obvious and
natural that we almost cannot bring ourselves to believe that they have not always been around. This
is the feeling that informs the hackneyed adage that true poetry is eternal. In “The Poet” (1844),
Emerson gives it a more elegant expression: “poetry was all written before time was” (552). But, as
usual, Poe understood originality in a sense peculiar to himself. Many “regard as original in letters,
only such combinations of thought, of incident, and so forth, as are, in fact, absolutely novel. It is
clear, however, not only that it is the novelty of effect alone which is worth consideration, but that
this effect is  best  wrought, for the end of all fictitious composition, pleasure, by shunning rather
than by seeking the absolute novelty of combination” (Rev. of Twice-Told Tales [1847] 580).
Thus, Poe understood originality, for the purposes of literature, also as an effect that was
relative to the reader’s experience, not as an absolute quality: “the element of literary originality is
novelty. The element of its appreciation by the reader is the reader’s sense of the new. Whatever
gives  him  a  new  and  insomuch  a  pleasurable  emotion,  he  considers  original,  and  whoever
frequently gives him such emotion, he considers original” (Rev. of  Twice-Told Tales  [1847] 579).
Thus, Thomas Moore’s  Lalla Rookh is not original: “the effect, originality, is not produced by it”
(580). For Poe, “true originality—true in respect of its purposes—is that which, in bringing out the
half-formed, the reluctant, or the unexpressed fancies of mankind, or in exciting the more delicate
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impulses of the heart’s passion, or in giving birth to some universal sentiment or instinct in embryo,
thus combines with the pleasurable effect of apparent novelty, a real egotistic delight” (581).
This  passage  involves  an  insightful  and  sophisticated  assessment  of  the  psychology  of
reading.  Absolute  novelty  humiliates  the  reader,  by  confronting  him  with  the  overwhelming
superiority of the author’s inventiveness. This is a very painful sensation that Poe thought never
failed to inspire in the reader a repulsion for the work that produces it. Originality, however, in the
peculiar sense Poe gave to the word, communicated the illusion of distinction, for the reader “feels
and intensely enjoys the seeming novelty of the thought, enjoys it as really novel, as absolutely
original with the writer—and himself. They two, he fancies, have, alone of all men, thought thus.
They two have, together, created this thing. Henceforward there is a bond of sympathy between
them, a sympathy which irradiates every subsequent page of the book” (581). These considerations
on originality come from Poe’s second review of Twice-Told Tales, written in 1847, by which time
his theory had reached full maturity. In my estimation, these are some of the most extraordinary
passages in Poe’s work. They are also totally alien to the spirit of Romanticism. In a sense, indeed,
Romantic theory allowed the reader to believe that the poem was, in a sense, his own creation—
Poe, once again deflating the illusion, tells us that this feeling was an illusion.
Here  Poe  also  offers  a  complete  justification  of  his  method.  According  to  him,  all  art
combines. Now, he follows up on that idea with the even bolder proposition that the “original”
writer  does  not  even  present  truly  new  combinations.  The  only  reason  why  Hawthorne  was
considered original  by many,  was that  “he differs  in  his  manner  or  tone,  and in  his  choice  of
subjects, from any author of their acquaintance—their acquaintance not extending to the German
Tieck, whose manner, in some of his works, is absolutely identical with that habitual to Hawthorne”
(Rev.  of  Twice-Told  Tales  [1847]  579).  In  the  terms  of  his  article,  this  is  not  derogatory  to
Hawthorne. Poe himself had, as we have seen, borrowed extensively from many different sources,
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including a tale that many have supposed to be a translation from Tieck—the trick was to borrow
from obscure sources, to obscure the borrowing, or do both things at once.
But  to  let  the  general  public  realise  that  the  effect  “originality”  was  obtained  through
imitation, of course, was out of the question. To acknowledge imitation would be to defraud the
public of the expectations created by years of Romantic theory. A writer cannot afford to openly
ridicule the idols of his readership. Hopefully, Poe’s inadmissible “superficial” meaning would be
too superficial for that public; it would be as safe as the shadow in Rowena’s room. The inevitable
recognition by the “analytical” would always come too late, and so would the identification of the
many disparate stories of femicide, resurrection, and self-incrimination Poe had jumbled together
into a seemingly “unified” but wonderfully absurd story. 
Yet, at the same time, all his writing shows, I think, that he had no intention of letting his
trick go permanently unnoticed. The roster of buried allusions is “Ligeia,” which is perhaps the
most ostensibly “Romantic” of all his tales, makes it impossible to suppose Poe came up with his
stories in a state of frenzy. They show us, instead, that he was what he understood by the word poet:
a dissembler, a simulator, a trickster. I believe that throughout his entire career Poe staged what may
be termed a Gothic conspiracy to expose the Romantic assumption of sincerity. Indeed, “Ligeia,”
like most of his work, is a sort of literary Trojan horse. This is the point I will try to make in the rest
of  this  chapter,  in  which  I  will  attempt  to  clarify  the  most  perplexing points  of  Poe’s  plot  by
confronting them with Poe’s sources.
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2— The Idea of Poison in “Ligeia”
One of the pillars of the false impression conveyed by “Ligeia” is the idea of poison. Yet, the
critics who have argued before me that the narrator had killed one or both of his wives have always
supposed this was one of the facts of the story. All these critics agreed that it was possible to sieve
fact from delusion, or deliberate distortion. What makes this task so difficult, of course, is that our
only source, the narrator, is remarkably unreliable. However, despite this, the narrator scrupulously
adheres to the facts, and this is what makes it possible to detect his crime. The solution to this
apparent  contradiction  is,  again,  involved  in  the  matter  of  the  shadow.  Although  the  narrator
deceives us, he never commits himself to what may be termed the “apparent thesis” of the tale, but
induces the reader to make fallacious inferences that he never actually spells out. This is what Susan
Amper called “weasel wording.” The literal meaning of those statements corresponds to the facts,
and femicide—double femicide, to be more precise, is, I believe, the only story that fits those facts.
But one cannot be too careful in parsing the literal meaning of the narrator’s statements, as opposed
to what he gives the reader to understand. Therefore, even such deviations from strict literalness as
would be insignificant in most contexts, lead, in “Ligeia,” to important misapprehensions.
In the 1944 article “The Interpretation of ‘Ligeia,’” Roy P. Basler was the first to argue that
the narrator had killed Rowena. His account of her death as resulting from poisoning was then
picked up, with slight revisions, by Donald N. Koster, Terrence Matheson, and Susan Amper, who
argued that the narrator had  also  poisoned Ligeia. The greatest merit of Basler’s reading, in my
opinion,  is  that  it  acknowledges  the  most  important  formal  trait  of  the tale:  the  absence of  an
explicit  dénouement.  He  remarks  that  the  tale  ends  with  a  climax,  which  leaves  everything
unresolved, and from which the reader derives no sense of closure: “If (…) the story is taken to be a
rational narrative of the quasi-supernatural told by a man in his right mind, the conclusion is not a
conclusion but a climax, the proper denouement of which would be the corpse’s reassumption of
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Rowena’s lineaments and its final lapse into certain death, recognized this time as complete and
final by the mind of the hero,” which is the conclusion Poe himself indicated to Cooke in his letter
on “Ligeia” (Basler, “The Interpretation” 370). Basler argues that this should be taken as a sign that
the  reader  must  find  by  his  or  her  means  the  hidden  consistency  to  which  the  ominous
inconsistencies of the narrator’s tale add up. Poe himself, as we have seen, had stated in his review
of Barnaby Rudge that it was only artistically legitimate for a writer to intimate a crime when the
object was to let the reader discover it. But Basler’s explanation is not much more satisfactory than
the narrator’s. This is perhaps owing to his overriding conviction, which he shares with most other
critics, that Poe was an instinctive writer: “Perhaps the intention in the story was not entirely clear
and rationalized in his [Poe’s] own mind, preoccupied as he was with the very ideas and obsessions
which motivate the hero of the story” (371). I have already argued that this conviction results from
the kind of circular reasoning that prompts critics to dismiss the evidence that Poe did not take his
narrator seriously. Since he was not entirely convinced that Poe was not unconsciously sympathetic
with  his  narrator,  therefore,  Basler’s  thesis  presents  his  solution  to  the  mystery in  a  somewhat
hesitant, even apologetic fashion.
Despite his misgivings, he was one of, if not the first, to present a natural solution to the
mystery of the tale. His hypothesis is that the narrator poisoned his second wife with a view to use
her “deserted quarters,” as Philip Pendleton Cooke put it, to house the spirit of his Ligeia (Cooke).
Basler supposes, however, that, as indicated by Poe’s letter, the narrator had not been successful in
his  attempt  to  bring  back  Ligeia,  and  therefore  that  the  ghosts  in  the  bridal  chamber  were
hallucinations, more exactly, “wish-projections arising from the narrator’s obsession with the idea
of resurrecting Ligeia in the body of Rowena” (Basler, “The Interpretation” 368).
This theory perpetuates a common misconception.  The conventional interpretation of the
tale regarded the return of Ligeia as a case of actual, Basler of apparent metempsychosis. But this
irons out one of the most singular aspects of the case. The narrator may have had metempsychosis
298
on  his  mind—his  idea  of  “the  spirit  still  hovering”  about  Rowena’s  corpse  shows  that  it  was
consistent  with  his  views  on  the  subject—;  he  may  even  have  desired  it;  but  what  he  thinks
happened can in no way be described as metempsychosis—apparent or actual (Poe, “Ligeia” 327).
The narrator is convinced that the body of Rowena magically transformed into the entombed
Ligeia. That is not metempsychosis, but transmutation.73 Whatever it was, he could not explain it,
and neither  could Philip  Pendleton Cooke,  who called it,  as  we have seen,  a  “violation of  the
ghostly proprieties” (Cooke). Poe himself, in his reply to Cooke’s letter dated September 21, 1839,
stated that the “gradual perception of the fact that Ligeia lives again in the person of Rowena, is a
far  loftier  and more  thrilling idea than  the one  I  have embodied,”  pointing out  the differences
between “Ligeia” and “Morella:” “Do you remember, there, the gradual conviction on the part of
the parent that the spirit of the first Morella tenants the person of the second? (Letters 193, Letter
82). Poe’s statement is important in that it points out that the emphasis of fiction, or at least his
fiction, is the representation of a character’s convictions, as distinct from the actual events. In other
words, he depicts the character’s peculiar relationship with the facts of his story. This is arguably
the theme of virtually all his fiction. 
But  the  highlighting  of  the  word  “gradual”  is  misleading—that  is  not  the  point  of
comparison. The narrators of these tales both gradually form the conviction that their dead wives
have taken the place of their successors; what differs is the particular aspect this conviction assumes
in  each  of  the  two  tales.  In  “Morella,”  the  narrator  believes  he  witnessed  a  phenomenon  of
metempsychosis,  the  definition  of  which  is  contained in  Poe’s  sentence  regarding that  tale.  In
“Ligeia,” on the other hand, Poe points out the incontrovertible fact that, unlike his predecessor, the
narrator of that tale does  not believe that Ligeia “lives again in  the person of Rowena;” on the
contrary, he believes she appeared in her own person (emphasis mine). Thereby, Poe slyly points out
73 R. C. De Prospo has stressed the singularity of  Ligeia’s supposed transformation in his article “Whose/Who’s
Ligeia?:” “the narrator’s and  Ligeia’s mutual efforts to will her eternal reincarnation yield (…) not just a body-host
—Poe could easily have had the spirit of Ligeia metempsychose itself, “Metzengerstein”-fashion, into Rowena’s
flesh, rather than re-embody Ligeia cell-by-cell at the end—but carrion, the dead meat of Rowena metabolized by
Ligeia’s spirit as the condition of Ligeia’s return” (61).
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to Cooke that the “violation of the ghostly proprieties” is integral to his conception, and that it
constitutes the peculiarity that distinguishes it from the earlier tale.  
By overlooking this “violation,” which is the whole point of the tale, Basler obscures the
cause of the narrator’s perplexity. Besides, though the apparition of Ligeia in the end of the tale may
not have been totally unexpected to him, it was evidently not, as Basler implies, what he had wished
for. The narrator reacts rather as if he had “seen” his worst fears come true. There is also another
minor imprecision—but one which will also prove very significant—in Basler’s terminology. He
refers to the “ghosts” in Rowena’s room as “hallucinations,” not illusions, thereby tacitly ruling out
the phantasmagoria in the room as a possible explanation.
In fact, by treating the wonders in Rowena’s room as “hallucinations,” Basler completely
discredits the evidence he produces in support of the thesis that Rowena had been poisoned. This
evidence was very feeble to begin with:  some “drops” the narrator himself is not sure he saw. The
narrator claims the drops appeared magically from an invisible source in the atmosphere of the
room—this  is  undoubtedly  the best  available  evidence that  the  narrator  was delirious.  In  other
words, if the drops are not an “hallucination”—as Basler puts it—than, surely, nothing is. Even the
narrator thought at the time that he might have been hallucinating: “I saw, or may have dreamed that
I  saw,  fall  within  the  goblet  (…) three  of  four  large  drops”  (Poe,  “Ligeia”  325).  Surprisingly,
however, this is the one point on which Basler doubts the narrator’s testimony. The only time he
actually admits he may have been hallucinating we are told he was either lying  or adapting the
poison “into the pattern of hallucination” (Basler, “The Interpretation” 69). Thus, Basler cripples his
own argument to mistrust the narrator’s perceptions by admitting an exception, while at the same
time allowing that argument to corrode the credibility of the only evidence of poisoning. As a result,
he effectively defeats his own case.
 Besides, the “drops” are the culmination of a scene described in great detail, all of which is
entirely inconsistent with Basler’s explanation. Suffice it to say, at this point, that the narrator was
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sitting on a nearby ottoman when he noticed the ghostly drops. If, as Basler supposes, the narrator
poured that liquid himself, then he must be wrong, or lying, not just about those elusive drops, but
about everything else. And if he was just making stuff up, how can we ever hope to make any sense
of what he says.  Susan Amper would later maintain that the narrator deliberately lied to divert
suspicion—but surely, if this was his purpose, he could have come up with something a little more
convincing.
Indeed,  Amper  counts  “Ligeia”  among  the  examples  of  “Poe’s  use  of  lying  narrators,”
although, in effect, she actually portrays him as consciously attempting to convey a false impression
through what she calls “weasel wording,” which is, of course, a strategy that allows one to mislead
without  actually  lying  (Amper,  “Masters  of  Deceit”  110).  Furthermore,  despite  including  the
narrator of “Ligeia” in this group, Amper actually hints that, in this particular case, a conscious
intent to deceive may not account for all of the narrator’s inaccuracies. “The narrator,” she writes,
“is trying to hide from us and perhaps from himself the truth about his relationship with” Ligeia
(122). Her claim that “Poe’s method” was akin to that employed by authors of Gothic parodies,
particularly “[Thomas Love] Peacock’s strategy in  Nightmare Abbey, in which the characters, in
narrating their own stories of horror and sensation, actually succeed in spooking themselves” has
the same tendency (101). The way I see it, despite having the intention of misleading the reader, the
narrator  never  actually  lies.  He  deliberately  omits,  weasel-words,  or  unwittingly  misinterprets
reality. But his statements appear to be almost always literally valid, which allows the reader to
reconstruct the actual circumstances which the narrator was either hiding or unable to perceive. In
any event, Amper does not explicitly address the “ruby drops” that fall on Rowena’s wine, though,
as  we shall  see,  she  indirectly  acknowledges  that  these  are  connected  with  Ligeia,  whom she
maintains was poisoned.
The drops are, I think, the second most decisive detail to the understanding of the narrator’s
frame of mind after he had seen the shadow. But, in this as in all other instances, in order accurately
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to describe what goes on in his head, one must be very careful not to distort his statements, or put
words  in  his  mouth.  The  narrator  himself  recognises  that  these  drops  did  not  feel real  but  is
convinced that  their  reality  had to  be  inferred from their  supposed effect,  that  is,  the  death of
Rowena.  Basler  accepts  this  argument—after  all,  something must  have  killed Rowena.  But  the
inference would only be valid where no other cause of death could be admitted, which is not the
case at all.
The victim had been slowly languishing under the unwholesome phantasmagoric influence
of the chamber in which her husband had placed her. In fact, the narrator upbraids her family for
having “permitted to pass the threshold of an apartment so bedecked, a maiden and a daughter so
beloved,” thus indirectly acknowledging that the room would be the death of her, and that this
would have been obvious to her relatives, had their judgement not been clouded by the prospect of
finantial gain (Poe, "Ligeia" 321). It appears to have been pretty obvious to him, at least, and that I
suppose is what really counts. Basler himself indirectly admits that the “drops” were not needed to
explain Rowena’s death because the narrator was terrorising her to death: “Impatient for results and
fearful that the apparent progress of Rowena’s hysteria and physical collapse will not suffice, (…)
he has resorted to actual poison” (369). Thus, despite the fact that the evidence about which the
narrator is certain would have been enough to convict him for the murder of his wife, if not in a
court  of  law  at  least  in  the  reader’s  eyes,  Basler  chooses  to  uphold  his  only  defense,  the
preposterous drops, about which the narrator is himself uncertain, actually making his whole case
rest on that flimsiest of evidences when he had a wealth of incontrovertible fact that would serve his
purpose much more effectively. To put it more simply, instead of attempting to prove the obvious
crime, that the narrator was killing Rowena, he attempts instead to prove he poisoned her.
Basler, of course, thought that he had no choice but to involve his thesis in contradiction. He
felt,  like I  do,  that there was some hidden consistency to be discovered in  the apparent chaos.
Consistency being, at the same time, his axiom and his hypothesis, he could not afford to leave the
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“drops” out of the picture. Indeed, by definition—by Poe’s definition that is—, they must perform
some function in the plot, understood as “that from which no component atom can be removed,” or
even  so  much  as  “displaced,  without  ruin  to  the  whole”  (Poe,  Brevities 1:469).74 Therefore,
explaining  the  drops  became  his  priority.  Paradoxically,  then,  Basler’s  strikingly  inconsistent
hypothesis was advanced in the name of consistency.
I  think Basler’s  reasoning was sound, but  his  formulation of the problem was incorrect
because he missed a crucial bit of information: there are two murders in the tale, one hidden, the
other manifest. Having never questioned the narrator’s love for Ligeia, nor her idolatrous devotion
to her weird husband, he never suspected him of killing her too. Therefore, in order to justify his
intuition, Basler had to fit the “drops” into the story of Rowena’s death if he had to force them into
place—which he ultimately did. He treated the obvious crime as if it had  been hidden because he
did not realise that the ghostly clues were pointing to another crime; he exculpated the narrator from
this obvious crime, by upholding his cover—the ghostly drops—because he saw no other way to
account for them.
In 2005, in “Poe’s Visual Tricks,” Barbara Cantalupo recovered Basler’s basic reading of the
tale, correcting many of its most obvious shortcomings. Cantalupo describes the “transformation” of
Rowena into Ligeia as an optical illusion, “the result of an aerial projection put in place by the
narrator himself, but ‘forgotten’ due to his opium-enhanced state,” a “re-imaging of her [Ligeia’s]
triumph over  death by using a  device  of  ‘natural  magic’” similar  to  those described by David
Brewster in Letters on Natural Magic (1832) (“Poe’s Visual Tricks” 58, 59). Cantalupo, however,
did not accept the thesis, proposed by Koster, Matheson, and Amper, that the narrator had killed
Ligeia, and therefore describes the final tableau in the tale as a “scene of mourning,” remarking that
“the layering of a loved one’s loss unto the death of another often takes place, whether or not the
mourner consciously wishes this to happen. (…) As the plot unfolds, the narrator sees, much to his
74 See p. 236 above.
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despair, that even with her admirable store of esoteric knowledge, Ligeia cannot conjure the willful
resistance to death that the epigraph promises” (60-61). This reading takes for granted the narrator’s
love for Ligeia, thus indirectly validating his depiction of her as a witch.
Cantalupo also avoids commitment on the subject of the reality of the “mysterious” drops: 
The narrator ascribes to the mystical appearance of the ‘ruby-drops’ that fall into her
wine goblet.  (…) the  narrator’s  depiction of  his  sudden horror  at  seing the  final
transformation makes the means of Rowena’s death and Ligeia’s ascension appear
fantastic. Yet this uncertainty is itself illusory, based on our forgetting (or not seeing)
the narrator’s role in producing ‘the phantasmagoric chamber’ with its anamorphic
potential. (“Poe’s Visual Tricks” 60)
This  passage  seems  to  suggest,  indeed,  that  the  illusion  the  narrator  created  was  itself
instrumental in bringing about Rowena’s death, but this is never directly stated in Cantalupo’s text.
Moreover,  no  specific  explanation  for  the  presence  of  the  “drops”  is  provided.  As  all  other
“phantasmagoric”  effects,  they  are  attributed  to  a  supposed  “anamorphic”  effect.  The  most
important contribution of this article to the discussion is, in my view, the emphasis it places on the
“narrator’s role  as both agent and recipient of these delusional  perceptions” (Cantalupo, “Poe’s
Visual Tricks” 60).
Donald N. Koster,  Terrence Matheson, and more recently Susan Amper, infered that the
narrator killed both his wives. This, of course, provided an alternate explanation for the ruby liquid.
Indeed, all these authors admitted its connection with the death of Ligeia. Surprisingly, however,
their  explanation  of  the  second crime remained basically  that  of  Basler.  They insisted  that  the
“drops” were both real and imaginary; based on this conviction, they did not doubt that Rowena had
been poisoned, but added that Ligeia had probably been poisoned too, thus adding an extra layer of
inconsistency to their interpretations.
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Donald N. Koster, who in 1973 first advanced the double murder thesis in “Poe, Romance
and Reality,” indeed, still felt perfectly confident that Rowena had been poisoned to make room for
the spirit of Ligeia: 
Whether he [the narrator] has embarked on a calculated course of poison by means of
a drug difficult to detect (his knowledge of drugs may be inferred from his direct
statement that he has done ‘no little medical reading’) or has planned a slower but
even more horrifying course of breaking her down by increasing doses of terror is not
clear. But that he finally succumbs to impatience and ends her life with a massive
potion of poison appears evident from the episode of the ruby drops in the wine
prescribed by her physicians” (12). 
Underlying this passage is the same circular, self-confirming argument to which Basler’s—
and the narrator’s—interpretation boils down. The drops were there because Rowena was poisoned
—although she was already dying; Rowena was poisoned because the drops were there. As regards
Koster’s secondary argument, the narrator does indeed claim he is well-read in medicine, but in
another context,  to  show he was qualified to  perform restorative manoeuvres on the seemingly
reviving Rowena. In any event, Koster failed to realise that immediately after his boast the narrator
demonstrates the falsity of his claim by making a major medical blunder, as we shall see below—a
blunder which his own appeal to medical literature makes significant. In any case, the narrator’s
boast  was  not  what  convinced  Koster  that  Rowena  had  been  poisoned—this  was  only  an
afterthought.  The only real evidence was,  as always,  the “evident” drops,  which Koster was as
anxious to explain as Basler had been.
In 1982, Terrence J. Matheson recovered the double murder thesis in “The Multiple Murders
in ‘Ligeia:’ A New Look at Poe’s Narrator,” basically recapping Basler’s and Koster’s argument.
Rowena must have been poisoned, “how else do we explain those ruby drops that  go into her
wine?” (Matheson, “Multiple Murders” 286). Like his predecessors, Matheson is more certain about
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those drops than the narrator himself, who admits he may have imagined them. Indeed, before the
drops can be of any use for the purpose of explaining Rowena’s death, one must first establish that
they are not imaginary.  Indeed, since there is  a perfectly plausible explanation for the death of
Rowena, the fact of the narrator “seeing” or “dreaming” that he had seen those drops, in itself, does
not allow the inference that poison was involved.
Koster and Matheson, of course, had at their disposal an alternative explanation for the drops
that had not been available to Basler—they could have had something to do with the hidden murder
of Ligeia, a subject about which the narrator is less than forthcoming. But these writers thought the
evidence for this was somehow weaker. As Koster put it, “the exact cause of Ligeia’s death is less
certain, probably because the narrator is unwilling to admit it even to himself, just as he will not
admit that he killed Rowena by poisoning her wine” (“Poe, Romance and Reality” 11). I find this a
very  unconvincing  argument.  It  relies  on  an  inconsistent,  and  psychologically  implausible
representation of the narrator’s character. This is a man who does not scruple to confess that he
hated his second wife, and even that he was killing her by degrees, yet, Koster wants us to believe
he could not bear to tell us he had poisoned her. His “probably,” however, shows that he did not
have much confidence in the thesis himself. 
Koster also relies on Basler for his interpretation of the climax of the tale, as the following
passage makes apparent: 
The conclusion is,  of course,  inevitable.  That the narrator,  mad even by his own
confession (…) should find his desire fulfilled by Ligeia’s seeming return to life in
the body of the dead Rowena is to be wondered at no more than is his transference of
the achievement of the whole ‘miracle’ from himself to Ligeia. Only thus can he be
absolved of the guilt in the murder of Rowena; only thus can he expiate his crime
against Ligeia. (Koster, “Poe, Romance and Reality” 12) 
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But, as I have before noted, Ligeia did not come back in the body of Rowena. The rest of the
quotation, however, highlights a fact that had been obscured by Basler’s argumentation. The drops
perform, even in the straight reading of the tale, a very specific function: they absolve the narrator
of the guilt of killing Rowena. This idea would later be developed by Susan Amper: “His wife lies
dead, poisoned. He says he did not do it: he thinks perhaps his former wife, come back from the
dead, did it, but he cannot be sure, poor soul, because he is an opium addict and not in control of his
faculties. ‘Ligeia,’ then, is this man’s cover story” (“Masters of Decei” 117). However, if it were not
for the idea of poison, nothing could have prevented us from screaming murder right from the start.
Her husband was terrorising Rowena to death and all indicates that she could not long survive the
influences  of  the  chamber.  Ever  since  she entered  the fateful  room,  she had been getting ever
weaker, and more nervous. In fact, she had already narrowly survived an attack from which “her
frame, at all times feeble, never altogether recovered” (Poe, "Ligeia" 324). All indicates that her
justified terror aggravated her disease—that this was, in fact, her disease. For we know she feared
her husband, and with good reason.
The miraculous appearance of the drops seems to save the narrator from actually killing this
woman, whom he hated and kept in an indoors tomb. Or should we say that it  spared him the
trouble of having to go through with his plan? In any case, she certainly would not be missed. This
story—the story of visionary poison—is, of course, as implausible as Rowena’s death by terror is
plausible (on this score, let  us recall  that the wife of Dickens’ “madman,” whose life parallel’s
Rowena in so many important respects, died of a nervous breakdown, caused by her surprising her
husband as he was about to stab her, and exacerbated by his successful campaign to convince her
doctors that  she, the victim of the “madman,” was herself going mad). The narrator’s cover is, in
short, preposterous—but, come to think of it, so is the accusation that he poisoned Rowena.
It appears to me that Koster, Matheson, and Amper were too impressed with the idea of
poison to realise exactly how right they were. Diverting our attention is what Poe does best. The
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secret to creating a good puzzle is intimating a complicated solution when the answer is simplicity
itself. It is not easier to prove that the narrator poisoned Rowena than it was to prove that Ligeia did
it. The evidence for poison is as “ghostly” as the evidence for the return of Ligeia itself—for the
most part, it is exactly the same evidence. On the other hand, the narrator was evidently, in fact
admittedly, terrorising Rowena to death. If the narrator was killing Rowena and had killed Ligeia
too, why should we persist in “proving” his cover? The thing could not be more obvious, but, again,
Poe manages to channel our conjectures in an unprofitable direction. No one poisoned Rowena! It
was Ligeia that the narrator poisoned. Well, he did not exactly poison her either, but then he never
actually said the “drops” were poison—we just assumed it, from their connection with the death of
Rowena, though, according to the narrator, she did not exactly die.
Considered in connection with death of Rowena, then, the “drops” are a supererogatory clue
to an inexistent mystery. This is why the poison thesis never stuck. Ligeia’s death, not Rowena’s, is
what requires explanation. And, if the plot is what Poe said it should be, we may be certain that the
phantasmagoric hints in Rowena’s room are there to explain what needs explaining. They will fill
the huge gaps in the first part of the tale. Of course, we could never jump to this conclusion in the
real world. Unlike the real world, however, a tale is, or should be, according to Poe, a well-defined
organised and intelligible whole, with clearly perceptible boundaries, a beginning and an end. The
beauty of such a unified system is that our axiom is also a hypothesis, which can be tested and
proved. If it is at all possible to obtain a consistent literal interpretation by referring the “wonders”
in Rowena’s room to the death of Ligeia, then, that interpretation will be the true story of “Ligeia,”
no matter what the narrator says.
Indeed,  the  consistency  of  the  poetical  work  of  art—what  Poe  calls  the  “plot”—is  the
characteristic that enabled “transcendentalist” thinkers like Emerson to use it as a symbol of Nature
itself, which they believed was as consistent as a poem. Indeed, in his first published book, Nature
(1836), Emerson wrote: “All science has one aim, namely, to find a theory of nature. (…) Whenever
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a true theory appears, it will be its own evidence. Its test is, that it will explain all phenomena”
(Emerson,  Nature  493). Whether this holds true of Nature must remain a matter of conjecture, or
rather faith, as no single individual can ever hope to get the whole picture; but this is demonstrably
true of a consistent “plot:” the theory that leaves nothing unexplained proves itself—for,  if  the
writer’s design is sound, there can be only one way of explaining all that needs explaining. What I
am trying to provide here is a sketch of that total theory of Ligeia, that is, a sketch of the true story.
J. Gerald Kennedy’s article “Poe, ‘Ligeia,’ and the Problem of Dying Women” deserves a
final mention here. Though concurring with Thompson’s widely accepted theory that the tale was
undecidable,  this  critic  almost  hit  on  what  I  believe  is  the  truth  about  Ligeia.  Regarding  the
narrator’s behaviour after her death, and during his second marriage, he writes: 
Rowena is from the outset a sacrificial figure, a random victim of the narrator’s own
confused need to prove his devotion to Ligeia while avenging his abandonment by
her. (…) Displacing the outrage he feels for the dead woman who has left him to
languish, he projects on Rowena all his unconscious resentment of Ligeia. (…) If the
“(…) drops (…)” which fall into Rowena’s goblet actually represent the man’s effort
to poison his wife, as Basler has argued, we witness here a confused attempt to kill
two  women  at  once:  the  perfidious  Ligeia  and  her  unworthy  successor.  (…)
Simultaneously longing for his dead first wife and wishing to avenge her rejection,
he watches over the “corpse” of Rowena with a “turbulent violence” of emotion,
recalling  “the  whole  of  that  unutterable  wo  (…)  with  which  [he]  had  regarded
[Ligeia] thus enshrouded.” Since the second “death” is a willed reenactment of the
first, he gazes on Rowena’s body with “a bosom full of bitter thoughts of the one
only and supremely beloved.” (“Poe, ‘Ligeia’” 124)
Kennedy thus addresses some important issues that had been wholly ignored by previous
criticism of the tale. I believe, however, that the key to the problem is the “effect of confused time,”
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to use Benjamin Franklin Fisher’s phrase (“Dickens and Poe” 14). The seemingly extraordinary
events in Rowena’s room are a ghostly re-enactment of the actual murder of Ligeia by the narrator
—this is, I think, the only solution that satisfactorily accounts for all that which does not quite add
up in the tale. In fact, all those “ghostly” phenomena that cannot quite be fitted into the story of
Rowena, are easily referable to the death of Ligeia. And, once the wonders are out of the way, it
becomes  absolutely  clear  that  the  narrator  wilfully  murdered  Rowena,  not  by  poison,  but  by
phantasmagoria. This, then, is what I call the obvious crime in the tale, for it is committed, as it
were, in plain sight, but obscured by a mass of inadmissible phantasmagoric evidence.
310
3 — An Obvious Crime: The Murder of Rowena
No matter how we look at them, the “wonders” in Rowena’s room cannot be fitted into the
natural explanation of her death to which the rest of the evidence—the natural facts with no hint of
the  supernatural  about  them—point.  Yet,  according  to  the  narrator,  the  “wonders”  cannot  be
dismissed from the picture either. To him, they are also facts. Facts that admit no explanation. But
this conclusion is marred by a methodological error. The narrator confuses his interpretation of the
facts with the facts themselves.
The ruby liquid is, without doubt, the pivot of the narrator’s theory. All subsequent events
will be interpreted by him by reference to that particular detail, which, paradoxically, is the only
thing about that night about which he was initially uncertain. Indeed, at the time, they had not felt
real to him and he therefore initially dismissed them as a figment of his imagination. Incidentally,
this is his justification for never having mentioned the mysterious drops to Rowena. On the face of
it, this does not look good for his theory.
In reality, the narrator actually renders his narrative more credible by employing a strategy
typical of real-life humbugs. By reporting his doubts about one of the crucial “facts” on which his
thesis  rests,  the  narrator  comes  across  as  a  methodical,  rational,  and  altogether  trustworthy
individual. This makes it seem that he was not the kind of gullible visionary that would be easily
deceived  by  appearances,  or  worse,  a  charlatan.  Making  a  great  show  of  scrupulousness,  he
concedes that his theory could not be proven, of course, but claims to have adopted it only after
having thoroughly satisfied himself that the phenomena he witnessed could not be explained. He
was, of course, sadly mistaken, but, because he appears both honest and cautious, the reader is
likely to take him at his word. Meanwhile, as I have said before, he appears to scrupulously adhere
to the facts, and this is what enables us ultimately to deconstruct his theory. Once the core of fact is
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extracted  from  the  narrator’s  statements,  we  realise  there  is  nothing  unexplainable  about  his
experience.
Even before the fall of the drops, the narrator was misinterpreting what went on around him.
He claims, indeed, that that wonderful fact—for he takes it as such—was announced by what he
regarded as three equally wonderful signs. As he “hastened across the chamber to procure” his new
wife some wine, he was delayed by “two circumstances of a startling nature:” “I had felt that some
palpable although invisible object had passed lightly by my person; and I saw that there lay upon
the golden carpet (…) a shadow;” then, he gave Rowena her wine, and resumed his seat, he tells us,
in “an ottoman near me, with my eyes fastened upon her person” (Poe, "Ligeia" 325). Just as she
was about to drink her wine, before the fluid supposedly materialised out of thin air into the glass,
he “became distinctly aware of a gentle foot-fall upon the carpet, and near the couch” (Poe, "Ligeia"
325).  Trifling  in  themselves,  in  the  aggregate  these  three  details,  which  the  narrator  found so
“startling,” are strongly suggestive of the reality of the supernatural drops. 
However, his doubts about the latter contrast with the certainty he attaches to the other three
circumstances. The irony is, of course, that there is no reason to doubt them because they are not
unexpected in the least, but exactly what was to be expected. In fact, taken individually, the three
signs can be explained away very easily. The narrator is absolutely certain of having seen a shadow
under the censer, and he is sure his senses did not deceive him. He must have seen it—this is that
shadow of which my reader has already heard so much about, the absence of which would be a
violation of the laws of physics. He is equally certain of having felt some “palpable but invisible
object” passing him by. If this were a riddle, the answer would be obvious. Could it be the wind the
narrator felt? Perhaps “that strong continual current of wind behind the draperies” which gave “a
hideous and uneasy animation to the whole,” often mentioned by the narrator, and to which he
refers Rowena’s illusions (Poe, "Ligeia" 323)? I can see no reason not to refer his own perception to
the same cause. Evidently, the reason why he did not adopt this hypothesis was that his mind was
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already strongly predisposed to the supernatural. In the very last paragraph of the tale, he practically
confirms our suspicion by carelessly alluding to “the rushing atmosphere of the chamber,” but, by
the time we read this, we are too busy chasing the ghost of Ligeia to notice the significance of this
information (330). The circumstance, then, of feeling an invisible object passing lightly by him
might have been unexpected in another scenario—but not in the phantasmagoria the narrator had
prepared.
A  “gentle  foot-fall”  is  scarcely  more  unexpected.  It  appears  to  be  another  typical
phantasmagoric effect. The narrator was “distinctly aware” of the sound, and we have no reason to
doubt he heard some noise. He construed it as a step, but he knew that was impossible—hence his
alarm. There was no one but the ailing Rowena and himself in the room, and both were motionless
at the time. In any case, he saw no one in the region from which the sound had apparently issued.
Yet,  he was  evidently  convinced that  it  was  a  footstep—therefore,  he  suggests,  some invisible
person must have been about—and who could this be but Ligeia? This, at least, is the impression he
conveys to the reader.
This time, however,  the testimony of the narrator is corroborated by Rowena’s—another
seldom noticed fact. That is, she does not confirm the presence of that particular sound, but, since
the beginning of her so-called illness, Rowena “spoke of sounds, and of motions, in and about the
chamber of the turret,” which she evidently could not explain; the narrator, however, dismissed her
complaints, concluding they “had no origin save in the distemper of her fancy, or perhaps in the
phantasmagoric influences of the chamber itself” (Poe, "Ligeia" 323-24). The only extraordinary
thing about this passage is the narrator’s reluctance to explain away his own disturbing impressions
by the same reasoning. He goes on to report that, after a brief recovery, the “disease” took once
again hold of his wife: “She spoke again, and now more frequently and pertinaciously, of the sounds
— of the slight  sounds — and of the unusual  motions  among the tapestries  to  which she had
formerly  alluded”   (324).  Finally,  just  before  the  narrator  saw but  his  own  shadow  without
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recognising it, his wife mentioned for the last time those sights and sounds which he “could not all
believe” were “the natural effects of that customary rushing of the wind” (325).
Why not? Rowena could not have known that the sights and sounds she mentioned  could
have been the “natural effects” of a phantasmagoric machinery the existence of which she must
have ignored. Evidently, the narrator decided not to tell her, or her doctors, about that machinery,
which afforded a natural explanation for the strange goings-on in the room. Indeed, his description
of  her  condition  as  “excitability  by  trivial  causes  of  fear”  is,  under  the  circumstances,  simply
preposterous (Poe, “Ligeia” 324). He must mean the phantasmagoria itself. But, although this might
have been a “trivial cause of fear” to him, it would have not been so to Rowena, who evidently did
not know what was causing the curtains to wave and the slight noises in the room. 
But what is the narrator’s excuse to reject in his own case an explanation which he admits is
both probably and sufficient? He prepared a “phantasmagoric effect,” and that is precisely what he
and Rowena experience. They  both  speak of sounds and motions that suggest the presence of a
disembodied  spirit.  This,  of  course,  is  the  very  object  of  a  phantasmagoria.  Therefore,  their
impressions  are  not  only  what  was  to  be  expected,  but  the  end  towards  which  the  narrator
admittedly directed his efforts as a decorator.  If Rowena had confirmed his report—if, that is, she
had heard the  same “foot-fall,”  and seen the  same drops—we might  have had some reason to
suspect that these things were not illusions. Their diverging testimonies, however, agree on one
point only: they heard and saw strange things that suggested the room was haunted. This fact, of
course, strengthens the supposition that they were, indeed, suffering the “influence” of the chamber.
Yet, the narrator appears to be fooled by his own trick. 
Even before Rowena’s decline supposedly proved to him the reality of the drops, indeed
even before the ruby liquid presented itself to his consciousness—for this is the factual truth beyond
which he is careful not to state anything—, he was already under the impression that the three
“startling circumstances” that preceded it were not illusions. But, unlike Rowena, he had strong
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reasons to believe that was exactly what they were. Yet, though he dismissed her complaints on that
account, it never even occurred to him that his mind was playing tricks on him. He already half-
believed that Ligeia might return, and this idée fixe made him jumble the shadow, the wind, and a
muffled sound that resembled a step into a unified impression. Overlooking the obvious natural
explanations for each of these occurrences, he imagined something, or someone was there with him
that was palpable, yet visible only to the extent that it projected a shadow. When he heard the “foot-
fall,” he immediately associated it with that certain something, or someone—who or what could this
be but Ligeia? Indeed, his contention that it was a “foot-fall” is itself evidently conjectural, for he
did not actually see anyone  walking. Besides he must have had very sensitive hears if he could
distinguish a “gentle foot-fall,” on a carpeted floor, with all that rustling going on around him (Poe,
“Ligeia” 325 emphasis mine).
In short, the narrator’s thesis rests on the flimsiest of evidences. It could not have convinced,
I think, anyone who was not already a believer in the supernatural. And, by a few well-placed hints,
the narrator has, by that point, already infected the reader with his superstition, or predisposition to
believe  that  supernatural  intervention  was  the  only  way  to  account  for  the  circumstances  he
describes. The motto of the tale, repeated by Ligeia in her death bed, for example, is suggestive of
immortality. Besides this, there are other small details that intimate that Ligeia was, as it were, more
than  mortal.  She  had,  for  example,  the  ghost-like  ability  of  getting  into  closed  rooms without
making a noise: “I would in vain attempt to portray the majesty, the quiet ease, of her demeanor, or
the incomprehensible lightness and elasticity of her footfall. She came and departed as a shadow. I
was never made aware of her entrance into my closed study save by the dear music of her low sweet
voice, as she placed her marble hand upon my shoulder” ("Ligeia" 311).
Appealing  to  a  conventional  sentimental  trope,  the  narrator  suggests  that  the  idealised
woman’s material presence was slight. Even in life, she was so delicate that it appeared to him that
she was precariously poised between the world of spirits and the world of flesh. She had been like a
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shadow, and, by metonymical association, the narrator immediately thought of her when he saw a
shadow, forgetting himself in the process. And, by having us chase a ghost from the start, he makes
us forget all about him too.
The  shadow  is,  it  must  be  granted,  very  suggestive.  So  much  so,  indeed,  that  we  get
sidetracked. Once again, Poe deftly diverts our attention from what really matters. In other words,
he successfully confines the reader to a unified supernatural impression that precludes analysis of
specific details. The ghost-like Ligeia “came and departed as a shadow;” and that is precisely why it
could not have been her in Rowena’s room. A “footfall” had never before betrayed to the narrator
the approach of Ligeia, so incomprehensibly stealthy was she. This, then, would have been the first
time he heard her coming. Perhaps she who had been so spare in person in her living days had put
on some weight since her death? Thus, the very fact that suggested to the narrator that Ligeia was
not of this world, should have showed him that her ghost was not in Rowena’s room. This is another
notable instance of the tragi-comical functional blindness of the narrator.
The blindness  of  the  reader,  like  that  of  the  narrator,  results  from the  powerful  unified
impression that those three “startling circumstances” make. The narrator’s overriding superstition
determined his interpretation; likewise, the reader is made to expect something extraordinary, and,
for that reason, overlooks the huge holes in the theory he gently leads us to adopt. It is in this spirit
of credulity that we receive the ruby drops. We are ready to admit the impossible.
But the narrator’s instincts were right about those other “wonders;” perhaps he was correct
in distrusting the drops too. Perhaps he saw something that could be confused with ruby liquid?
This is certainly a plausible hypothesis. Here I must appeal to the reader’s imagination. The huge
censer that illuminated the room had “many perforations, so contrived that there writhed in and out
of them, as if endued with a serpent vitality, a continual succession of parti-colored fires” (Poe,
"Ligeia"  321).  The reflections  produced by this  capricious,  constantly changing lighting on the
golden background of the fabric that was virtually everywhere in the room, and which was itself
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permanently in motion, could, I think, very easily have been confused with drops of liquid. In any
event, in that scenario, the narrator could not be certain that what he “saw” was not another natural
effect of the phantasmagoric machinery. Basler, as we have seen, claims that the narrator “adapted”
the liquid “into the pattern of hallucination;” on the contrary, it appears to me that he projected his
dream into the phantasmagoria (“Interpretation” 369). I suppose that at  this point the aggregate
impression was too strong to be resisted and the narrator combined the idea of the ruby fluid with
the palpable but invisible presence,  without realising his interpretations of the facts  were being
suggested by his imagination which, as we all know, was constantly taking him back to Ligeia. In
all  likelihood,  then,  the  narrator’s  predisposition  to  “see”  Ligeia  return  shaped  the  individual
phantasmagoric effects of the chamber into her semblance—Rowena, of course, never mentioned
Ligeia. It must be granted, at the very least, that this possibility cannot be ruled out, and therefore,
we are not constrained to admit the impossible.
On his part, the narrator thought the phantasmagoria might have been inspiring supernatural
apprehensions on his wife, but never seriously believed this could be happening to him too. Like
Basler, he assesses the situation in terms of a simple alternative between “seeing” and “dreaming;”
or  between  reality  and  hallucination.  But  this  alternative  takes  the  phantasmagoria  out  of  the
equation, and with it the only viable natural explanation of all the seemingly wonderful occurrences
that  the narrator  found so disturbing.  The  DSM-V  defines  “hallucination”  as  a  “perception-like
experience with the clarity and impact of a true perception but without the external stimulation of
the relevant sensory organ” (American Psychiatric Association). The narrator’s impressions, on the
other hand, may all be referred to some real sensory stimulus and, therefore, should be regarded as
illusions.
But, once the idea of supernatural intervention was established in the narrator’s mind, each
succeeding  circumstance  he  could  not  explain  appeared  to  confirm the  reality  of  the  previous
“wonders.” But this impression was, like his inability to recognise what really was happening to
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him, actually  the result  of a process of self-delusion that  continues  even after  Rowena’s death.
When he finally became convinced that Rowena’s body was coming back to life, he was already too
far gone to realise this had been suggested by his quaint renovation work.
His impression that she was alive, of course, was contradicted when he touched the corpse.
Each examination returned the same result: she was dead. But even this was no longer enough to
convince him that his imagination, assisted by his phantasmagoria, was evoking vivid images from
the past. Rowena, of course, never did revive. At the end of the tale, at the culmination of what he
terms a “hideous drama of revivification,” the narrator becomes convinced that something did at last
rise from the bed—but that was not Rowena, he is quite certain of that ("Ligeia" 327). His exact
words  are,  as  usual,  very  confusing.  In  the straight  reading of  the  tale,  this  confusion is  often
dismissed as a symptom of sorrow—but there is more to it than that: 
The corpse, I repeat, stirred, and now more vigorously than before. The hues of life
flushed up with unwonted  energy into  the countenance—the limbs relaxed—and,
save that the eyelids were yet pressed heavily together, and that the bandages and
draperies of the grave still imparted their charnel character to the figure, I might have
dreamed that Rowena had indeed shaken off, utterly, the fetters of Death. But if this
idea was not, even then, altogether adopted, I could at least doubt no longer, when,
arising from the bed,  tottering,  with feeble steps,  with closed eyes,  and with the
manner  of  one  bewildered  in  a  dream,  the  thing  that  was  enshrouded  advanced
palpably and bodily into the middle of the apartment. ("Ligeia" 329)
Let us pause to reconsider this passage, part of which we have already encountered in the
first chapter of this dissertation. He saw an “enshrouded” figure rising from the bed—why, may we
ask, was the idea that Rowena was alive not “altogether adopted” then? Who or what else could this
be? Here it becomes clearer than ever before that the “apparition” of Ligeia did not convince the
narrator that she had returned: evidently, he was already intimately convinced that she would come.
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His pre-established belief—or rather, his faith—that Ligeia would come back appears rather to have
engendered  its  own  imaginary  confirmation.  The  figure  that  advances  to  the  “middle  of  the
apartment”—that is, to that spot where the censer projected its “rich lustre,” and where the narrator
had earlier in that night searched in vain for what could only have been his own shadow—will soon
reveal itself. It was all Ligeia. The passage, however, betrays the narrator by the same kind of irony
that we find all over Ligeia, and also in “Berenice.” He might have dreamed that Rowena had come
back to life, but he did not. Of course not, he “dreamed,” with a little help from the decoration, that
Ligeia came back to life. Once again, the guilt-ridden, confused narrator unwittingly delivers to the
reader the solution to the riddle he himself could not solve.
When he “saw” the “enshrouded” Ligeia rising from the bed instead of the “shrouded body”
of Rowena, being already fully convinced of supernatural intervention, he never suspected it might
be an illusion. Yet, all indicates that the apparition was a “dream,” in the same sense that the drops
of ruby liquid had been a “dream.” As we have seen, the narrator tells us that the hair of the figure
“streamed forth, into the rushing atmosphere of the room,” thereby implying that it was agitated by
that “customary rushing of the wind” he had contrived ("Ligeia" 324, 330).  This in turn suggests
that the apparition had, like the other “wonders, also been prompted by a real external stimulus; that
he was confusing the jetty-black arabesques of the curtain that covered the walls and furniture, and
to which the artificial wind imparted a “hideous animation,” with Ligeia’s raven hair. Finally losing
what little was left of his ability to separate dreams from reality, as Dickens’s madman would say,
Poe’s narrator believed the illusion he had created.
The wind,  incidentally,  also  explains,  at  least  in  part,  the  narrator’s  impression  that  the
apparition had a body. He “saw” the figure and apparently knew that it was advancing “bodily” and
“palpably” before he ever touched it, which was the only way of being sure. However, as usual, the
conjecture is apparently supported by a real perception. Three nights earlier, the narrator had felt, as
he was himself passing through the middle of the apartment, a “palpable although invisible object”
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rushing by him ("Ligeia" 325). When Ligeia appeared to him, it would appear, his overwrought
imagination associated the two circumstances—after all, he only needed a little push to completely
lose his precarious grasp on reality, and this might well have been it.
The artificial wind is also the key to understanding the nature of the connection “Ligeia”
establishes with Dickens’s “A Madman’s Manuscript.” I have already mentioned briefly this tale in
the first chapter as one of the sources of “Ligeia,” but this influence is more extensive than was
previously indicated. Indeed, Mabbott called this tale one of “two obvious literary inspirations” of
“Ligeia” ("Ligeia" 306). The resemblance between the two tales, however, is most intriguing. The
story  of  the  madman’s  wife,  who was  sacrificed  to  her  family’s  financial  interests  through an
arranged  marriage  with  a  wealthy  madman,  as  Mabbott  noticed,  resembles  that  of  Rowena.
However, physically, the madman’s wife is nothing like the blonde bride in Poe’s tale—she looks, in
fact,  exactly  like  Ligeia.  Or  rather,  the  ghost  of  the  murdered  wife  in  Dickens’s  tale  looks
remarkably like the image of the enshrouded Ligeia in the end of Poe’s tale. Mabbott even points
out what he calls an “extreme parallelism” between the passages that describe the two apparitions
(307). The madman imagines he sees, “standing still and motionless in one corner (…), a slight and
wasted figure with long black hair, which streaming down her back, stirs with no earthly wind, and
eyes that fix their gaze on me, and never wink or close” (Dickens, “A Madman’s” 141). Although he
does not remember “forms or faces,” the madman, like Poe’s narrator, recognises the apparition by
the dark hair  and eyes  (141). And then, as the narrator of “Ligeia” concludes—or rather lets the
reader conclude—from the “charnel character” of the “figure,” that the “tenant of the tomb” had
returned; so Dickens’ madman knows that his dead wife “comes fresh from the grave,” because it is
“so very death-like” (141).75
Mabbott, however, did not find it suspicious in the least that the man who treated Rowena
much like the “madman” did his wife should be visited by a female figure that looks almost exactly
75 There is an important difference. The narrator of “Ligeia” does not realise that the figure he describes could not
have been “for many days, a tenant of the tomb” ("Ligeia" 328). I discuss the narrator’s mistake more fully below.
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like the latter’s ghost. This parallelism suggests the apparition in “Ligeia” is, like her predecessor in
Dickens’s tale, an accusing ghost. The critic and editor of Poe’s work, however, continued to regard
the narrator of “Ligeia” as a sincere mourner, who just happened to marry a witch—an unconscious
error that was the indirect cause of all his misfortunes. But then, he also overlooked the small detail
that breaks what would otherwise have been a perfect parallelism: the wind. The hair of the ghost in
“A Madman’s  Manuscript”  stirred,  as  we  have  seen,  “with  no  earthly  wind.”  Underlying  this
statement is the suggestion of an inferential process. The narrator, it would appear, “saw” the hair
move, but did not perceive any “earthly” draught. This intimates to the reader, as it appears to have
intimated to the mad narrator, that the visitor was not of this world. A logical enough deduction
under the circumstances.
In Rowena’s room, however, the situation was very different. The wind that animated the
black arabesques was certainly “earthly,” although it might not have appeared so—that is precisely
what defines a true phantasmagoric effect. This wind proceeds not from an open window, but from
an unseen aperture, and this was the basis of the illusion. And then, of course, as I have pointed out,
the decoration itself evoked Ligeia’s hair.  The “mourner” admits that when he first came to his
abbey: “my labors and my orders had taken a coloring from my dreams;” yet, he claims “there was
no system, no keeping” in the decoration of the bridal chamber “to take hold upon the memory”
("Ligeia"  320-21).  He does not seem to realise why he had chosen that singular fabric  for the
curtains, but the reason appears obvious.
Evidently, prompted by an unconscious urge, he chose it so the black arabesques might be
confused with Ligeia’s hair. Had he been any less excited, he might have perceived that he had
unconsciously created the illusion he experienced, superimposing the hair-like black arabesques on
a golden background, and then animating the whole through the introduction of an all too earthly
wind (it  might  be  said  that  Poe  had his  narrator  stage  a  phantasmagoric  representation  of  the
hallucination of William the femicide in Macnish’s tale). In fact, just as the arabesques appear to
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have been confused with Ligeia’s hair, so Rowena’s hair must, as it were, have vanished into the
background. In this sense, the decoration foreshadowed the climax of the tale by optical illusion. In
this sense, the “ghosts” in “Ligeia” and “A Madman’s Manuscript” illustrate the distinction I have
made between illusion and hallucination.
The direct inspiration for the flowing hair of the spectre of Ligeia—for there is, contrary to
the narrator’s suggestions, no reason to suppose that it was anything else—was evidently the ghost
in Dickens’s tale. However, Mabbott missed, in my opinion, the point of the parallelism. The mad
narrator in Dickens’s tale could not distinguish “dreams from realities,” which the reader was led to
infer was a consequence of his mental alienation, which in turn was caused by guilt. But the reader
did  not  experience  any such  difficulty.  The  reader  of  Ligeia,  however,  must  discover  why the
narrator is haunted by such visions—in his case, illusions. The parallelism between the tales, being
the sign of a deeper kinship between the narrators of the two tales, is one of the clues to the mystery.
They share similar visions because they have committed the same crime: both are femicides.
Benjamin Franklin Fisher IV, who in his 1973 article “Dickens and Poe” detailed the parallel
between the two tales that Mabbott had first pointed out, also overlooked the hints of femicide, the
decisive difference in the character of the “wind,” and the all-important fact that the narrator had
loved Ligeia but in death. Regarding the passage to which Mabbott alludes, he writes:
One might think that Dickens’ and Poe’s copy for the printer had gotten shuffled
(…). In both works the men continue to be particularly affected by their wives’ eyes,
Dickens’ narrator’s reaction of hatred modified by Poe into irresistible and passionate
love, certainly an improvement over Dickens’ fairly flat statement of the matter. The
effect  of  confused  time  is  also  more  elaborate  in  Poe’s  handling,  which  is
considerably longer than Dickens’, thus intensifying the dreaminess. (14)
Like G. R. Thompson, whose  Poe’s Fiction also appeared in 1973, and Mabbott himself,
Fisher is convinced that the reader of “Ligeia” is not supposed to be able to overcome the narrator’s
322
confusion between dreams and realities, and that this was what particularly distinguished it from “A
Madman’s MS.”
Although the  apparition of  Ligeia  itself  was clearly  inspired,  or  perhaps  more  precisely
designed to evoke the ghost in Dickens’s femicide story, the signs that precede this apparition in
Poe’s  tale,  however,  and which gave  its  narrator  the  impression that  it  was  not  a  ghost,  but  a
palpable  “reality”  are  a  clear  parody  of  a  burlesque  episode  involving  a  counterfeit  ghost  in
Matthew Lewis’s The Monk, in which the title character’s superstitious terror of being visited by the
ghost of the first woman he murdered, Elvira, who he later finds was also his mother, is seemingly
confirmed by the sound of a footstep, an unseen object passing by him, and the waving of a curtain:
very nearly the same “signs” that gave to the narrator of “Ligeia” the impression that his entombed
wife might be about.
In reality, the monk had adapted those signs, which had a natural cause, to his expectations,
and is ultimately exposed to ridicule, when the supposed ghost is found to be in fact Flora, the maid,
attired in a white sleeping-gown. The monk’s plight has other equally decisive similarities with that
of Poe’s narrator, for this scene takes place while he waited for some drops of soporific he had
poured into Elvira’s daughter, Antonia, to produce their effect.
In the first chapter of this dissertation I have already mentioned how Ambrosio raped and
then murdered his sister Antonia in the tomb, according to a plan devised by the witch Matilda,
among the mouldering corpses of deceased nuns, and how the scene bears a distinct resemblance
with the final  tableau in “Ligeia.” Sometime before this, Ambrosio had killed Antonia’s mother,
Elvira, smothering her with a pillow, after she discovered his underhand attempts to seduce her
daughter.  Sometime  after  her  burial,  Antonia  was  in  Elvira’s  room,  absorbed  in  mournful
remembrance, when she was visited by her ghost, who prophesied she, Antonia, would die within
three  days.  The shock occasioned by this  terrible  visitation  plunged her  into  a  life-threatening
nervous illness from which she was still recovering when Ambrosio paid her a visit, under pretext of
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inquiring  after  her  health,  and  spiked  her  medicinal  wine  when  no  one  was  watching.  After
accomplishing  his  sinister  purpose,  the  monk  was  ready  to  leave  the  premises  but,  having  a
reputation for exorcism, was asked, much to his chagrin, to spend the night in Elvira’s room, where
her ghost was said to have appeared.
At the time, of course, no one but Matilda and Ambrosio himself knew Elvira had been
murdered. Yet, though safe from suspicion, his “enormous crime” had filled him with superstitious
terror ever since he had committed it: “The murdered Elvira was continually before his eyes, and is
guilt was already punished by the agonies of his conscience” (M. Lewis, The Monk 304). Here is,
incidentally, another curious coincidence, for the narrator of “Ligeia” admits the mere mention of
his first wife’s name was enough to “bring before mine eyes in fancy the image of her who is no
more” ("Ligeia" 311). Finding himself alone in the scene of his crime, the monk felt certain that his
victim would appear to him too, “In spite of Matilda’s assurances that the Spectre was a mere
creation of fancy” (M. Lewis, The Monk 336). 
At the same time, he could not stop thinking about the woman in the next room, his victim’s
daughter, and the “drops” he had put in her medicine. Now it occurred to him for the first time that
his former lover Matilda, whom he had repulsed, could have betrayed him out of spite. He had been
told that  the soporific  would induce terrible  convulsions,  and that  these would be followed by
apparent death, but all was quiet in the next room. He tranquillised himself with the thought “that
the drops had not begun to operate,” and resigned himself to the wait (336). 
The monk was torn between fear and desire: “the chamber (...), the recollection which it
brought with it of the murdered Elvira, and his incertitude respecting the nature of the drops given
by him to Antonia, made him feel uneasy at the present situation” (M. Lewis, The Monk 336). In a
frustrated attempt to beguile the wait,  he opened a book, but “Antonia’s image and that of the
murdered Elvira  persisted to  force themselves before his  imagination” (336).  His attention was
divided, therefore, between the image of the woman he had killed, and the image of the woman he
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intended to rape upon revival, but whom he feared might not revive at all. I need hardly point out to
the reader how closely his feelings match those of Poe’s narrator: on the one hand, Rowena’s room
reminded him of the entombed,  whose image was constantly before him,  on the other,  he was
anxious about some drops, which resemble those in The Monk even in their ambiguity.
Ambrosio  was  still  gazing  uncomprehendingly  at  his  book  when  two  unexpected
circumstances revived his terrors. First, “He fancied that he heard a foot-step” where “nobody was
to be seen;” then,  a  “few minutes  after  the same sound was repeated,  this  time followed by a
rustling noise close behind him” (M. Lewis, The Monk 337). This proved too suggestive. Ambrosio
immediately associated these “signs” with his fears. Elvira, he thought, was coming. At this point,
however, the monk hears a groan in the next room, and his attention is shifted to his other concerns.
He surmised “that the drops” had finally “began to take effect” (337). By yet another wonderful
coincidence, Poe’s narrator is also convinced that  his drops began to take effect after he heard a
“footstep” and felt  something rushing by him: “immediately subsequent to the fall of the ruby-
drops,” which he either saw or dreamed, “a rapid change for the worse took place in the disorder of
my wife” ("Ligeia" 326). Yes, he is certain of the change, though he exaggerates its “rapidity.” It
took Rowena three days to die. Antonia, on the other hand, apparently died about an hour after the
effects of what must have been a particularly powerful Mickey Finn first manifested themselves.
Meanwhile, back in  Elvira’s  room, the monk’s anxiety mounted. Completely unhinged, he
started talking to himself:
“That Bed,” said He in a low voice, “That Bed was Elvira’s! There has she past many
a quiet night, for She was good and innocent. How sound must have been her sleep!
And yet now She sleeps sounder! Does She indeed sleep? Oh! God grant, that She
may! What if She rose from her Grave at this sad and silent hour? What if She broke
the bonds of the Tomb, and glided angrily before my blasted eyes? Oh! I never could
support  the  sight!  Again  to  see  her  form distorted  by  dying  agonies,  her  blood-
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swollen veins, her livid countenance, her eyes bursting from their sockets with pain!
To hear her speak of future punishment, menace me with Heaven’s vengeance, tax
me with the crimes I have committed, with those I am going to commit . . . . . Great
God! What is that?” (337-38)
The picture conjured by the monk is very vivid. He imagines Elvira rising from her grave
and seems about ready to project this image on his surroundings. Another suggestive circumstance
almost pushes him over the edge of sanity: “His eyes were fixed upon the Bed” when “he saw the
curtain shaken gently backwards and forwards (…). The Apparition was recalled to his mind, and
He almost fancied that He beheld Elvira’s visionary form reclining upon the Bed” (338). Still, he
knew the image was not real. “‘It was only the wind,’ said He, recovering himself” (337).
But somehow, he could not  all  believe it was an illusion. After a while he finally nerved
himself up to inspect the bed. As he approached,
a  Figure  drest  in  white  started  from the  Alcove,  and gliding  by him made  with
precipitation towards the closet. Madness and despair now supplied the Monk with
that  courage,  of  which  He  had  till  then  been  destitute.  He  (…)  pursued  the
Apparition, and attempted to grasp it.
‘Ghost, or Devil, I hold you!’ He exclaimed, and seized the Spectre by the
arm.
‘Oh! Christ Jesus!’ cried a shrill voice; ‘Holy Father, how you gripe me! I
protest that I mean no harm!’
This address, as well as the arm which He held, convinced the Abbot that the
supposed Ghost was substantial flesh and blood. (M. Lewis, The Monk 338)
With this inglorious catastrophe, the monk’s ordeal resolves into a joke.76 And another joke
results from the comparison of this scene with the episodes of the “ruby-drops” and the apparition
76  He was comprehensibly “Incensed at having been betrayed by this trifling cause into fears so ridiculous” (M. 
Lewis, The Monk 338-339).
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of Ligeia in Poe’s tale. Overall, the contrast with The Monk highlights how absurd and unjustified
Poe’s narrator’s conclusions are. The monk heard a step; felt something rushing past him; saw the
curtain of the bed move. He thought Elvira had come to punish him. And from the look of it, she
had returned under the form of some weird manifestation that hovered weirdly between spirit and
matter, which led him to conclude that he was not dealing with a mere ghost, but that his victim had
actually “broke the bonds of the Tomb.”
At first Ambrosio tried to convince himself that it was only the wind, before he grasped,
quite literally, the real solution. Ironically, the monk’s initial hypothesis would have made perfect
sense  in  Rowena’s  room,  which  was  alive  with  mysterious  draughts.  Indeed,  this  explanation
perfectly  fits  the  facts  reported  by  the  narrator  of  “Ligeia,”  who nevertheless  appears  to  have
decided his apparition was palpable before he ever touched it.
Equally telling are the diverging outcomes of  these parallel  stories.  The monk earnestly
wished the entombed Elvira would never wake up, but ardently desired that the body of the ailing
woman in the next room, who had taken the drops of soporific, would wake from a death-like sleep
in her tomb, so he could rape her. As the reader knows, his fears on both scores proved unfounded.
In  “Ligeia,”  however,  the  exact  opposite  apparently  happens:  her  husband believes  that  Ligeia
broke “the bonds of the tomb,” to his unutterable horror, but Rowena never actually rose from her
bed,  as  the  narrator,  who  believed  she  had  taken  the  drops,  at  first  thought  she  might.  The
conclusion is inevitable. The drops and the returned Ligeia were made of the same stuff: the stuff
dreams are made of. This particular illusion, however, was not prompted by desire, but by guilt.
And here is another irony. Although the drops could not have been there, imaginary poison
may have been the real cause of Rowena’s death. Basler, as we have seen, was convinced that the
drops had been adapted “into the pattern of hallucination,” but, in order to do this, the narrator
would have had to distort many other details, for, according to his account, he could not possibly
have dropped the  fluid  himself.  We know this  because  Rowena refused to  drink  the  wine  her
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husband “held to the lips of the fainting lady;” “she took the vessel herself,” he admits, “while I sat
on an ottoman near me, with my eyes fastened upon her person” (Poe, "Ligeia" 325). It would
appear that Rowena was so mortally afraid of her husband that she would not drink until he was
sitting away from her. Still, had the drops really issued, as he claimed, from an “invisible spring in
the atmosphere of the room,” Rowena, who was still alert enough to fear him, would certainly have
seen them, but this was not the case: “If this I saw—not so Rowena” (325). Rowena’s terror of her
husband might well have suggested to her that she was being poisoned, and her refusal to drink
from his hands suggests the idea had indeed crossed her mind. Considering she had been trusted to
the care of a man who hated her, and was glad to show it, this would have seemed plausible to her.
She  could,  then,  like  her  husband,  have  adapted  her  own illusions  to  her  expectations.  Thus,
although the evidence clearly indicates she was not actually poisoned, imaginary poison may well
have been the proximate cause of her demise.
The circumstances that so disturbed the narrator, especially the drops of red liquid, should
have indicated to him,  of course,  that  his  initial  impression was correct,  that  is,  that  Rowena’s
illness was the natural result of the “phantasmagoric effect” and of the terror he himself admittedly
inspired in her. However, when he “saw” them, he allowed himself all the excuses he denies her,
claiming he did not believe they were real  until she died. “She swallowed the wine,” he grants,
“unhesitatingly,” which she certainly would not have done had she seen those fabulous drops, “and I
forbore to speak to her of a circumstance which must, after all, I considered, have been but the
suggestion of a vivid imagination, rendered morbidly active by the terror of the lady, by the opium,
and by the hour” (Poe, "Ligeia" 325).
The radical misogyny of the narrator is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in the double
standard he applies to female and male testimony under identical circumstances. He had told us that
Rowena “dreaded the fierce moodiness of my temper,” and that this gave this sensitive man “rather
pleasure than otherwise” (Poe, "Ligeia" 323). Yet, her more than reasonable terror excuses the man
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who inspired it, but not the woman he tortures. Nothing but the preconceived idea of the extreme
“sensibility” of women could,  I  think,  justify  the judgment of the narrator.  But  the ambiguous
sentence in which the narrator reports his thoughts at the time is marked by that special kind of
tragi-comical irony that so often turns the sayings of the femicide against the speaker. He mentions
the “terror of the lady.” The question is, which lady. He evidently meant the terror experienced by
Rowena—Rowena’s  fear,  that  is,  of  her  husband—but  the  phrase  could  as  easily  be  read  as  a
reference to his terror of the lady Ligeia. The climatic last paragraph of the tale exploits precisely
this confusion, which is in fact one of the structural traits of the second part of his tale: “these might
indeed be the fair cheeks of the living Lady of Tremaine,” the narrator thought, but the eyes were
definitely those “of the lady—of the LADY LIGEIA!” (330).
His mixed feelings of desire for and terror of the lady Ligeia evidently determined the very
specific way in which he reacted to the phantasmagoria, just as Rowena’s terror of him was the
cause  of  the  “nervous  illness”  to  which  she  eventually  succumbed.  In  view  of  this  fact,  the
narrator’s silence is itself murderous. He assures the reader that “he wished to show her [Rowena]
(what, let me confess it, I could not all believe) that those almost inarticulate breathings, and those
very gentle variations of the figures upon the wall, [mentioned by her] were but the natural effects
of that customary rushing of the wind” (Poe, "Ligeia" 324). He wished to show her this, but he
decided not to, effectively encouraging Rowena to assign her perceptions to supernatural causes.
Why? Because a “deadly pallor, over-spreading her face, had proved to me that my exertions to
reassure her  would  be fruitless”  (325).  Three days  later,  however,  her  “deadly pallor” was not
enough to convince him that she was past reanimation. Meanwhile, she lingered for three more
days, during which her husband kept his silence. He never told her the figures really were moving,
or that the wind really was rushing about. He just watched her die.
The very avowal that he too was seeing and hearing things that were not there might have
persuaded Rowena that she was not going crazy, and allayed her nervous suffering. It might even
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have saved her life.  But we will  never know. Deciding against reason she was nervous  for no
reason, her unloving husband decided not to tell her they both had reasons to be nervous. Instead, he
gives her some more wine. Every decision he makes, indeed, betrays his secret desire to kill her, so
he might indulge the secret taste for dead women he had imbibed during his struggle to “fathom”
Ligeia. A taste which is manifested from the start in the perverse decoration of the chamber he
prepared for his bride.
The narrator also claims that Rowena’s “illnesses” defied “alike the knowledge and the great
exertions of his physicians” (Poe, "Ligeia" 324). This suggests that they were not told the secret of
the decoration either, and also that they did not suspect him of being the chief cause of Rowena’s
apprehensions. Again, the parallel with Dickens’ “A Madman’s Manuscript” is striking. Indeed, I
have before stated that the wife of the “madman” was killed by the shock occasioned by surprising
her  husband as he was about to stab her,  but  that is  not strictly true.  Afterwards,  the madman
managed  to  mislead  her  doctors,  and  distort  their  diagnosis,  thereby  precluding  her  recovery.
Therefore, her husband’s silence was what actually killed the “madman’s” wife:
Doctors were called in—great men who rolled up to my door in easy carriages, with
fine horses and gaudy servants (…) One, the cleverest and most celebrated among
them,  took  me  aside,  and  bidding  me  prepare  for  the  worst,  told  me—me,  the
madman!—that my wife was mad. (…) A few days after, they told me I must place
her under some restraint: I must provide a keeper for her.  I!   I went into the open
fields  where  no  one  could  hear  me,  and laughed  till  the  air  resounded with  my
shouts! (Dickens, “Madman” 142)
Poe’s narrator obviously thinks he too is much cleverer than his wife’s physicians. This is
indicated by his boast about “no little medical reading;” but even more clearly by his claim that
“much even of incipient madness might have been discovered” in the decoration of the chamber
(Poe,  "Ligeia"  328,  320).  The  evidence  that  the  narrator  was  mad  was,  therefore,  plain,  but
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Rowena’s doctors, overlooking the evidence afforded by the decoration of Rowena’s room itself,
instead concluded that she was the one going mad.
This mistake was, in both tales, clearly intended as a representation of the kind of patriarchal
prejudice that made it possible, in those days, for abusive man to get rid of an inconvenient spouse
by confining her to a madhouse on the slightest signs of “nervousness.” This possibility was enacted
in  both  Mary Wollstonecraft’s  Mary:  Or,  The  Wrongs  of  Woman (1798)  and  Matthew Lewis’s
scandalous phantasmagoric monologue,  The Captive (1802).77 Both stories manifested an anxiety
that was rooted on the perception that doctors were seldom inclined to inquire whether a female
patient had reason to be nervous. In any event, the diagnosis of the doctors in “Ligeia” and “The
Madman’s MS.” are  evidently biased.  On the one hand,  they are blind to  the obvious signs of
madness on the part of the husband, and, on the other, they jump to the seemingly pre-established
conclusion that the women in the tale are hysterical. This is explicit in Dickens’s tale, and only
implied in Poe’s. The change Poe introduced to the pattern has the advantage of making the readers
accomplices to the male complot against Rowena. Thus, when the murders are brought to light, the
conventional interpretation is itself indirectly denounced as a manifestation of the same wide-spread
prejudice that had allowed the plots of these mad narrators to succeed.
77 Lewis “monodrama,” which proved too terrifying for the audience and was withdrawn after the first presentation in
Covent Garden, bears some striking similarities with Rowena’s story. The protagonist is a sane woman confined by
her husband to a madhouse. The drama depicts her slow descent into madness. In a letter to his mother, Lewis gives
an account of the matter: “The papers will have already informed you that the monodrama has failed. It proved
much too terrible for representation, and two people went into hysterics during the performance, and two more after
the curtain dropped. It was given out again with a mixture of applause and disapprobation; but I  immediately
withdrew the piece” (qtd. in Baron-Wilson, Life and Correspondence of M. G. Lewis 1:234).
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4 — Ligeia’s Struggle
In the previous section I have argued that the murder of Rowena is acted out before our very
eyes,  and in  that  sense is  an obvious  crime.  The murder  of  Ligeia,  on the other  hand,  is  only
obliquely intimated, and, in that sense, may be regarded as a hidden crime. Yet, this crime is in fact
not much less evident than the assassination of Rowena. Indeed, the conclusion that the narrator
killed Ligeia flows inevitably from each and every one of his statements—it flows, that is, from the
plot. Particularly, the idea that the narrator loved her before her death, very effectually suggested by
the narrator’s tone of “mournful and never-ending remembrance,” as Kenneth Silverman famously
put it in the title of his biography of Poe, is, in reality, contradicted explicitly by the text. 78 Again,
Poe’s buried allusions to another fundamental text of the Gothic tradition from which the femicide
story developed makes this inevitable conclusion even more evident.
We have seen how Poe drew inspiration for the drops and the ghost of Ligeia from  The
Monk and “A Madman’s Manuscript,” respectively, but where did the narrator got these ideas? The
answer to this had also been staring us in the face. He had committed a bizarre crime similar to that
committed by Lewis’s “hero,” and then, with his first wife’s money, proceeded to do to Rowena
pretty  much  what  Dickens’s  femicide  had  done  to  his  wife.  The  drops  and  the  image  of  the
enshrouded Ligeia  rising  from her  deathbed he  projected  into  the  phantasmagoria  are,  in  fact,
reminiscences of that first crime. They are also a perfect fit for the gaps the narrator leaves in his
account of his first marriage.
78 Indeed,  Silverman’s  Edgar  Allan  Poe:  Mournful  and  Never-Ending  Remembrance (New  York:  Harper,  1991)
reflects the common notion that Poe was as obsessed with dead women as the narrators of some of his tales.
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But it  takes  some effort  to  recognise this.  We must  emancipate  ourselves from the first
impression we get from the narrator. He keeps wailing about how much he misses Ligeia right from
the start. In fact, that is all he ever does. So, how could he possibly have killed her? At first sight the
hypothesis seems preposterous. But the elegiacal tone of the tale is misleading. This tone makes the
reader overlook the fact that the behavior of the narrator at the time of Ligeia’s death is entirely
inconsistent with affection. In fact, he did not treat her any better than he did Rowena. This, I insist,
is  not  a  guess,  but  a  necessary  inference  from his  own words,  which  the  reader  is  lured  into
overlooking.
Let us, then, return to the narrator’s notoriously vague account of the last days of Ligeia. For
the narrator, the sexless intercourse with his wife was a promise of forbidden delights. The sexual
innuendo is,  in this  case,  reinforced by an obvious allusion to  the double taboo in the biblical
account of creation. Ligeia is cast as an Eve-like creature, tempting her partner simultaneously with
her body and knowledge not meant for mortals. Yet, after several years of marriage, the promise
remained unfulfilled: “How poignant, then, must have been the grief with which, after some years, I
beheld my well-grounded expectations take wings to  themselves and fly away!” (Poe,  "Ligeia"
316).
These few sentences are full of ominous incongruities. He should have been grieved, and he
supposes he must have been, but somehow he does not recall having felt regret when she passed
away. In fact, it is as if he was speaking of someone else. And there is something else that does not
quite add up. Since he speaks  of losing Ligeia,  even employing the term “grief,”  we naturally
assume he is referring to his reaction to his first wife’s death. He cannot remember his grief, but,
naturally, we think nothing of it. Surely, a man who loved his wife as he appears to have loved the
“entombed” could have blotted all memory of the trauma of losing her—such things happen. As he
proceeds, however, we realise that she was still very much alive when he started “grieving:”
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And now those eyes shone less and less frequently upon the pages over which I
pored. Ligeia grew ill. The wild eyes blazed with a too—too glorious effulgence; the
pale fingers became of the transparent waxen hue of the grave and the blue veins
upon the lofty forehead swelled and sank impetuously with the tides of the most
gentle emotion. I saw that she must die—and I struggled desperately in spirit with the
grim Azrael. (Poe, "Ligeia" 316)
The narrator, then, regarded Ligeia’s death as an accomplished fact before she actually died.
It seems to me that this changes everything. One thing would be for him to be distracted by her
death, but the narrator had evidently given up on Ligeia, which explains why he cannot recall any
feelings of “grief.” Indeed, he places the emphasis on his “well-grounded expectations;” on the loss
of something which he felt he had a right to expect. When Ligeia became ill, he lost the hope of
achieving that mysterious “goal” he glimpsed when she bent over him, and, therefore, she was lost
to her husband. Indeed, he effectively conveys the impression that he regarded Ligeia as a means to
an end; that her value to him was contingent on her usefulness and on her willingness to satisfy his
desire. This, it must be granted, is a very unloving thought.
What immediately follows—we are still on the same paragraph—is that “struggle” between
Ligeia and the “Shadow” about which I have written at some length in the final section of the first
chapter  of  my  dissertation.  There,  I  argued  that  Ligeia’s  opponent,  also  known  as  the  “great
Shadow,” was the narrator himself. But even in an ingenuous reading the narrator’s responses are all
wrong for a loving husband. This is why I say that the murder of Ligeia was, in a sense, very
obvious from the start—as obvious as that shadow on the floor. While Ligeia was still struggling for
her life, he wished she would get on with her dying. Indeed, he actually admits he “struggled” to
make her see what he saw: that she would have to die. Of course, at first, the reader will naturally
assume this is only a metaphor:
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the struggles of the passionate wife were, to my astonishment, even more energetic
than my own. I groaned in anguish at the pitiable spectacle. I would have soothed—I
would have reasoned; but, in the intensity of her wild desire for life, —for life—but
for life—solace and reason were alike the uttermost of folly. Yet, not until the last
instance,  amid the most  convulsive writhings of her fierce spirit,  was shaken the
external placidity of her demeanor. Her voice grew more gentle—grew more low—
yet I would not wish to dwell upon the wild meaning of the quietly uttered words.
My  brain  reeled  as  I  hearkened,  entranced,  to  a  melody  more  than  mortal—to
assumptions and aspirations which mortality had never before known.
(Poe, "Ligeia" 316)
Once we try to make sense of this  passage,  against  the narrator’s instructions,  the truth
imposes itself. The narrator did not regret Ligeia’s death, which he regarded as inevitable. He only
regretted that she could not see things his way. Indeed, he makes it very clear that he and his wife
were in fundamental disagreement. She wanted to live, but he wanted her to die. More precisely, he
wanted her to consent to die; to abandon herself to the “shadow.” He was “struggling,” that is, to
keep her from “struggling.” As I said, we assume this to be a metaphorical “struggle.” Still, if he did
not “sooth” nor “reason” with Ligeia, exactly how, may we ask, did he “struggle” against her will to
keep on living? All this suggests, of course, that the struggle was not metaphorical.
The evident parallel with Poe’s earlier tale, “Morella,” is enlightening. The narrator of that
tale also felt a reversal of his feelings towards his wife. Indeed, Morella underwent a change very
similar to that described by the narrator of “Ligeia:” the “blue veins upon” Morella’s “pale forehead
became prominent,” and when he looked into her eyes, he too felt “dizzy;” however, unlike his
successor, this narrator openly acknowledges that he “ longed with an earnest and consuming desire
for the moment of Morella’s decease” (Poe,  “Morella” 227).  In “Ligeia” the narrator  evidently
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experienced the same feeling. He too felt a sort of dizziness when he gazed into his wife’s eyes, and,
albeit in a more oblique way, he also expresses a desire for her speedy demise.
Another decisive clue is the narrator’s refusal to “dwell” on the “meaning” of the words
pronounced by Ligeia when this mysterious “struggle” took place. It apears to me that Susan Amper
was the first to grasp the significance of this fact, which even Koster and Matheson had overlooked.
The latter, she writes:
omits what is perhaps the most compelling evidence: Ligeia’s own realization that
her husband was killing her. Describing her surprising fight for life, the narrator says
he ‘would not wish to dwell on the wild meaning’ of the words she directs at him.
What does he wish to avoid, unless it is the accusation that he is poisoning her? Were
she voicing merely the dream of revivification, as he would like us to infer, he would
not hesitate to dwell on it. It is his favorite topic. (“Masters of Deceit” 130)
According to Amper, Ligeia was actually threatening her husband, in a first unsuccessful
attempt to save herself. This appears to me indisputable. However, there are some minor points on
which I differ from her interpretation.  Most of all,  it  appears to me that there is overwhelming
evidence to the effect that an actual struggle occurred. Indeed, the ruby-drops—though, for reasons
I have explained earlier, I believe these were not exactly poison—are probably the cause of Ligeia’s
“illness”—which, incidentally, the narrator never refers to by that word, just as he never refers to
the drops as “poison”—, but not of her actual death. Besides, from the perpetrator’s point of view,
stealth  is  the  great  advantage  of  poison.  It  is  an  insidious  weapon.  Its  administration  can  be
disguised, and there is a lapse between it and the death of the victim. Thus, the victim may never
realise the plot against  his  or her life.  This, then,  is  the great advantage poison has over other
murder weapons. It would seem, then, that Ligeia was responding to a more immediate, physical
threat.
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The narrator’s feelings at the time, I insist, are another decisive clue. Not only did he not
regret the death of Ligeia, he talks obscurely of sublime “assumptions and aspirations” that made
his “brain reel” while he witnessed her “struggle” for life, which he regarded at the time as futile.
This language suggests euphoria. According to the official interpretation, of course, the narrator felt
elated because he obscurely intuited Ligeia’s resurrection, hence the reference to a “melody more
than mortal.” Only a few lines later, in reporting his feelings when Ligeia finally died, the narrator
shows us that his euphoria at her impending death may have had a far more prosaic explanation than
he had earlier intimated: “She died; —and I, crushed into the very dust with sorrow, could no longer
endure the lonely desolation in the dim and decaying [and never named] city by the Rhine. I had no
lack of what the world calls wealth. Ligeia had brought me far more, very far more than ordinarily
falls to the lot of mortals.” (Poe, "Ligeia" 320 emphasis mine)
This is a remarkably unfeeling, even indecorous remark. He rushes over his sorrow as a
matter  of  course,  and  in  the  next  breath—metaphorically  speaking—mentions  her  money.
Moreover, the phrase I underlined is reminiscent of his earlier phrase “aspirations which mortality
had never before known.” This reveals us that he had had a financial motive for murder. She was, he
only now tells us, fabulously rich—the verbal echo suggests that this is what made his “brain reel.”
Incidentally, in these few pregnant sentences, the narrator also informs us that he hastily left the
country immediately after his wife died. This too is suspicious.
With Ligeia dead and he safely retired to the English countryside—he had lived with her in a
“dim and decaying city by the Rhine”—he was free to spend her immense fortune as he pleased
(Poe,  “Ligeia”  320).  This  he  proceeded  to  do  with  the  utmost  expediency,  his  “sorrow”
notwithstanding. In fact, Ligeia’s “removal” provided him with the means to realise a childhood
dream: he decorated the abbey he acquired with the money she left him in a style “for which, even
in  childhood,  I  had imbibed a  taste” (320).  Now the wilful  wife,  which we may presume had
hitherto objected to his squandering her money on his morbid fantasies, could no longer thwart his
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plans.  But he had other motives for murder, for Ligeia’s death afforded him a more immediate
satisfaction.
“In death,” at last, Ligeia behaved like the “passionate wife” he had always wanted. In fact,
she appears to have told him then all that he had been longing to hear:
That she loved me I should not have doubted; and I might have been easily aware
that, in a bosom such as hers, love would have reigned no ordinary passion. But in
death only was I fully impressed with the strength of her affection. For long hours,
detaining my hand, would she pour out before me the overflowing of a heart whose
more than passionate devotion amounted to idolatry. How had I deserved to be so
blessed by such confessions? — how had I deserved to be so cursed with the removal
of my beloved in the hour of her making them? But upon this subject I cannot bear to
dilate. Let me say only, that in Ligeia’s more than womanly abandonment to a love,
alas! all unmerited, all unworthily bestowed, I at length recognized the principle of
her longing with so wildly earnest a desire for the life which was now fleeing so
rapidly away. It is this wild longing—it is this eager vehemence of desire for life—
but for life—that I have no power to portray—no utterance capable of expressing.
(Poe, "Ligeia" 317-18) 
He “should not have doubted” that Ligeia loved him, but he did.  In life,  she had never
displayed that “ordinary passion” which he construes, by implication, as “womanly.” He obviously
means sexual submission.  But he guesses he had made a wrong judgment about her. With the
benefit of hindsight, he recognises he should have known that “in a bosom such as hers, love would
have reigned no ordinary passion.” Which means, of course, that he did not know this. Thus, in his
characteristic roundabout way, he informs us that he had expected some “ordinary” loving from her.
In fact, that is at least in part what he meant by “well-grounded expectations.” After all, they were
married. Not surprisingly, however, Ligeia did not comply to his wishes. He insists she had a will of
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her own. However, he contends that “in death” Ligeia more than made up for his disappointment by
displaying an intense love such as he had never  even dreamed was possible.  We assume he is
speaking of spiritual love, but the sexual undertones I have mentioned in the opening section of this
chapter (see p. 266), as well as the numerous intimations of necrophilia in the tale labour against
this interpretation.
The impression of Ligeia’s ethereality itself largely depends on the confused chronology of
the narrator’s disingenuous account of her last days. But the timeline can be reconstituted and is, as
everything else the narrator tells us, consistent with femicide and with nothing else I can think of.
Why, the narrator wonders, had Ligeia been taken away from him precisely when she finally proved
her  love  for  him,  and  made  up  for  all  the  disappointment  he  had  felt  in  her.  “How”  had  he
“deserved” to be so “blessed” and so “cursed”  at the same time? As usual, the sentimental tone
suggests that this is merely a rhetorical question, expressing the speaker’s outrage with a cruel fate.
The chronology, however, is decisive, as is the narrator’s precise literal meaning. He here clearly
suggests that he may have done something to “deserve” at once the declarations by which he felt so
blessed, and the “removal” of the woman who made them. He does not tell us what it was that he
did—but does he really have too?
He tells us Ligeia spent “long hours (…) detaining my hand.” This too, on a first reading,
appears perfectly innocuous. The narrator appears to be saying that she was “holding” his hand
because she loved him. The verb he uses to express the thought is, however, a little quaint. This
quaintness would not mean much had our suspicious not been raised by all the other suspicious
inconsistencies  in  his  text.  Though,  as  time  goes  on,  we  come  to  realise  they  are  not  really
inconsistencies—on the contrary, they form a perfectly consistent picture of a femicide.
We must not forget that the narrator himself has just slyly intimated he may have caused
Ligeia’s death. He certainly did much to “deserve,” as he puts it, the “removal” of his second wife.
Overall, the thing appears obvious enough. Ligeia wanted to live; he wanted her to die. And all
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indicates  he did not  limit  himself  to  wishing her  dead,  but  actually  attempted against  her  life.
Moreover, she appears to have known he was about to kill her. Is it any wonder, then, that she
should tell him precisely what he wanted to hear? With Amper, I think: “When Ligeia’s threats fail
to induce her husband to spare her, she tries cajoling instead. This is the import, not previously
noted, of her surprising death-bed conversion from cold intellectual to ardent lover” (“Masters of
Deceit” 131). Nothing else makes sense.
The widower’s  own words—their  actual,  precise  meaning—betrays  him,  as  usual.  Even
while attempting to convince the reader that it was the other way around, he mentions her “desire”
for “life” six times in the two consecutive, actually specifying, twice, that her “desire” was “but for
life,”  always  with  emphasis  added.  He  could  not  make  it  any  clearer  what  was  uppermost  in
Ligeia’s thoughts. She wanted to keep on living, and that was all there was to it. Later, he convinced
himself that she lived only for him, but his words actually emphasise how utterly unwarranted this
interpretation is. My interpretation, in addition to making, I think, much better sense than his, is also
compatible  with  the common modern  sense  of  the verb “detain.”  Ligeia  was,  it  would appear,
staying her husband’s murderous hand. Indeed, as we connect the dots, the impression that an actual
fight between the narrator and Ligeia took place becomes increasingly obvious. This would explain
everything.
Susan Amper notices that Koster and Matheson “accept her protestations as genuine and
think the narrator does likewise;” they “believe that he now repents his decision to kill her, alas too
late to save her,” but the
narrator’s words contradict such a construction. Her outpouring rings false to him: it
is  too  exaggerated  (“more  than  womanly”)  and  too  “unmerited.”  Worse,  it  is
“unworthily  bestowed.” This sneaky phrase does not,  as it  first  seems, imply the
“unworthiness” of the object of affection; instead it accuses the bestower—Ligeia—
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of  acting  unworthily.  At  length  the  narrator  sees  what  she  is  up  to,  identifying
unambiguously her professed longing for him with her desire for life.
(Amper, “Masters of Deceit” 126).
It appears to me, however, that the “unworthiness” of the object and of the “bestower” are
not necessarily incompatible ideas. On the contrary. As I see it, the passage clearly states that no one
could  love  the  narrator.  The  analogy  with  Rowena’s  case,  incidentally,  is  not  irrelevant.  She
“dreaded the fierce moodiness of my temper,” her husband tells us, and therefore “loved me but
little” (Poe, “Ligeia” 323). Ligeia seems to have had as little reason to love him.
Besides, as I have already indicated, it appears to me that Amper inverts the chronology: the
narrator clearly indicates that at  the time he correctly  surmised Ligeia  was only trying to  save
herself, and had never loved him. Later, he concluded he had been mistaken. She had loved him,
although he did not deserve it. This, of course, exactly corresponds to the patriarchal ideal of self-
sacrificing love that Bulwer-Lytton projected on Madeline Lester: the spiritual woman atoned for
her fleshiness precisely by sacrificing herself for a man that did not deserve her love. In fact, it was
implied that no man was worthy of the love of these ideal women. In fact, by placing Ligeia above
the carnality associated with “normal” femaleness, the narrator rendered her a fitting object for his
extreme sentimental conception of love. At the risk of stating the obvious, I must point out that this
idealisation required her death. At first, then, her husband thought Ligeia’s resistance “pitiable.” “At
length,” however, he saw—or perhaps dreamed that he saw—that she wanted to live not for her own
sake, but for his, and was delighted.
Ligeia’s death is, indeed, the chief chronological reference in her story. According to her
husband,  she expressed her love for him only as she was about  to  die.  At  the same time,  she
expressed her desire for life, while “detaining” the hand of her husband, who admits he may have
done something to deserve her death. Her declarations, the actual letter of which he refrains from
transcribing,  were  therefore  contemporaneous  with  the  “struggle”  he  mentions,  as  was  the
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miraculous dilation of her eyes, that haunted him ever since he spent “the whole of a midsummer
night”  struggling to “fathom” them (Poe, “Ligeia” 323). Indeed, all these things are, as we shall
presently see, strictly contemporaneous. When he wrote this, Poe probably had in mind the exploits
of the first fictional femicide in the Gothic vein in American literature, Brockden Brown’s Wieland
in the novel of the same name (1798), who not only strangles his wife, but, like our hero, “pities”
her for resisting what he regarded as her unavoidable doom. In his confession, the uxoricide recalls
that, as he was nerving himself to the deed, his wife Catharine “took my (…) hand between her’s,
and pressing it to her heart, spoke with that voice which had ever swayed my will, and wafted away
sorrow,” that is, like Ligeia, she “detained” his hand. But her efforts were wasted on the killer.
Wieland had made up his mind: “Catharine! I pity the weakness of thy nature: I pity thee, but must
not spare. Thy life is claimed from my hands: thou must die!” (Brown, Wieland 158-59). 
Like our narrator, Wieland saw that his wife had to die. And she did die, but like Ligeia, not
as  quickly  as  her  husband  would  have  wanted  her  to:  “My accursed  hand  was  irresolute  and
tremulous. I meant thy death to be sudden, thy struggles to be brief. Alas! My heart was infirm; my
resolves mutable. Thrice I slackened my grasp, and life kept its hold, though in the mist of pangs.
Her eye-balls started from their sockets” (Brown, Wieland 159 emphasis mine). Finally, Catharine
Wieland gave up the fight: “Haggard, and pale, and lifeless, at length thou ceasedst to contend with
thy destiny” (159). Likewise, according to her husband, Ligeia initially resisted the “shadow,” but
finally forfeited her life. Indeed, she made him read the poem she had written, otherwise known as
“The Conqueror Worm,”  after her struggle. When he finished his recitation, she repeated to him
those haunting words he attributes to Glanvill. Finally, “as if exhausted with emotion, she suffered
her white arms to fall, and returned solemnly to her bed of Death. As she breathed her last sighs,
there  came  mingled  with  them  a  low  murmur  from  her  lips.  I  bent  to  them  my  ear,  and
distinguished, again, the concluding words in the passage in Glanvill” (Poe, "Ligeia" 329). Thus, we
know exactly where the narrator was when she died.
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But  the  eyes  are  the  real  key  to  Ligeia’s  mystery.  As  I  mentioned  above,  the  narrator
developed a theory for Ligeia’s extraordinary, “more than womanly” love: 
An intensity in thought, action, or speech, was possibly, in her, a result, or at least an
index, of that gigantic volition which,  during our long intercourse,  failed to give
other and more immediate evidence of its existence. Of all the women whom I have
ever known, she, the outwardly calm, the ever-placid Ligeia, was the most violently a
prey to the tumultuous vultures of stern passion. And of such passion I could form no
estimate, save by the miraculous expansion of those eyes which at once so delighted
and  appalled  me—by  the  almost  magical  melody,  modulation,  distinctness  and
placidity of her very low voice—and by the fierce energy (rendered doubly effective
by contrast with her manner of utterance) of the wild words which she habitually
uttered. ("Ligeia" 315)
He maintains, then,  that Ligeia was more passionate than any other woman he had ever
known, only it did not show. Susan Amper remarks on the ominous ambiguity of this passage, the
interpretation of which, like so much else in the tale, is reframed by our recognition of the narrator’s
true  character:  “A model  of  weasel  wording is  the  statement  that  Ligeia  was a  ‘prey’ to  stern
passion. An idiomatic reading would suggest that she was unable to control her own passion, but the
passion can more appropriately be identified as the narrator’s. The veiled meaning of the sentence is
that  the  narrator,  who has  victimized  many women,  preyed on the  impassive  Ligeia  the  most”
(“Masters of Deceit” 129). Susan Amper is convinced that the narrator is a serial-killer. I personally
feel  that  there is  no conclusive textual  evidence to  suggest  this.  I  agree that  the phrase “more
violently a prey” refers to the narrator’s “passion,” but, to my mind, it suggests that Ligeia alone
suffered  its  “violence.”  This  highlights  the  contrast  with  Rowena,  who  did  not suffer  physical
violence at the hands of the narrator. Therefore, in my interpretation, the phrase signals that Ligeia
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had actually been strangled, a suggestion which is then reinforced by internal evidence as well as
the buried allusion to Wieland.
Accordingly,  my solution  to  the  mystery of  Ligeia’s  eyes  also differs  slightly  from that
offered by Amper: “The primary index of the ‘passion’ he seeks to arouse is her eyes, which during
an assault would naturally dilate from fear, and which become the narrator’s obsession. Revisiting
his ecstatic description of Ligeia’s eyes we discover an unmistakable sexual context” (“Masters of
Deceit” 129). Indeed, this “stern passion” of which the narrator speaks is being contradistinguished
from common passion—it appears here as a substitute of the passion he demanded from his wife,
but which she never manifested. Once more, the narrator of Ligeia makes it very clear that the
couple had no active sex-life, and also that he was not satisfied with this state of affairs.
I agree with Amper that the “dilation” of the eyes can only have occurred when the narrator
assaulted her—which, incidentally, is not consistent with her claim that poison had killed her—but I
think it was not the result of fear. Again, I believe the key is in the chronology. The only indexes of
Ligeia’s “stern passion”—for it must be noted that the phrase ostensibly refers to her—were the
wonderful dilation of her eyes and a concomitant change in her tone of voice. But even this was not
always noticeable. In fact, the “miraculous expansion” of the pupils, as the narrator puts it, in which
he  claims  to  have  surprised  the  essence  of  her  character,  was  noticed  by  him on  very  select
occasions.  In  all  rigor,  he  witnessed  her  excitement  only  once during  all  the  time  they  spent
together:
For eyes we have no models in the remotely antique. It might have been, too, that in
these eyes of my beloved lay the secret to which Lord Verulam alludes. They were, I
must believe, far larger than the ordinary eyes of our own race. They were even fuller
than the fullest of the gazelle eyes of the tribe of the valley of Nourjahad. Yet, it was
only at intervals—in moments of intense excitement—that this peculiarity became
more than slightly noticeable in Ligeia. And at such moment was her beauty—in my
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heated fancy thus it appeared perhaps—the beauty of beings either above or apart
from the earth—the beauty of the fabulous Houri of the Turk. (Poe, "Ligeia" 312-13)
As usual, the narrator transforms Ligeia’s portrait in a problem in metaphysics, and throws
some learned  allusions  to  round things  up.  Thus,  Poe  slyly  lures  the  reader  away from literal
readings. The passage, however, contains many details that are crucial to the establishment of the
chronology of the events in the story. In Ligeia’s eyes, then, lay the secret of the phantom that
haunted the narrator. That is, in the expression of her eyes “in moments of intense excitement.” And
when did Ligeia ever get excited? He could not be any clearer on that point. Not until her last hour
was “the external placidity of her demeanor” shaken. This avowal, however, comes later in the tale,
much too late for recognition, in a passage I have transcribed earlier in this chapter. By that time,
the reader is already too busy trying to get at the symbolical meaning of those eyes, and will not be
bothered with details.
And yet,  the  conclusion  is  unavoidable.  Only  “in  death,”  during  her  struggles  with  the
“Shadow,” could the narrator have noticed what he calls the “miraculous expansion” of Ligeia’s
eyes, for that was the only time she ever got excited; and he could not have noticed it at all unless
he was himself looking into her eyes as she was “struggling.” Which, of course, was exactly what
he was doing: for the night he “struggled” to “fathom” those eyes was the last night of her life. This
leaves  him in  a  very  compromising  position.  Again,  I  believe  he is  being  quite  literal:  he  did
actually  “struggle” to  “fathom” Ligeia.  The dilation of  the eyes  itself  suggests violence.  Susan
Amper, as we have seen, believes Ligeia was sexually assaulted, which is perfectly consistent with
the evidence, but that this was not what killed her: “Observing first that the unusual largeness of her
eyes  became fully  noticeable  only  ‘in  moments  of  intense  excitement,’ at  which  times  he  was
himself  in  ‘heated  fancy,’”  the  narrator  then  proceeds  to  describe  how  he  had  “struggled”  to
“fathom” those eyes; “[r]epeatedly he believes he comes close to discovering in them the passion he
craves, but always he falls back disappointed. This recurring pattern, sexually suggestive in itself,
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finds its counterpart in the repeating episodes of revivification and relapse” (“Masters of Deceit”
129-30). Rape appears, indeed, the only viable solution to all these ominous hints. However, Amper
did not realise, I think, that the same hints suggest that rape and death occurred simultaneously.
As the reader will recall, the supposed “relapses” of Rowena-Ligeia, which Amper identifies
as a reenactment of the rape of the first wife, wore the aspect of a struggle with an “invisible”
assailant. This suggests that the narrator was haunted by the look Ligeia had in her eyes when she
died. And, of course, the narrator admits Ligeia satisfied him only in death. Thus, it would appear
that she satisfied his desires  in death. The narrator, however, seems to have taken great pains to
obscure the connection between the expression and the special circumstances of its occurrence. The
narrator simply does not want to talk about it.
There is another point on which the narrator “cannot bear to dilate,” and that is how could he
have deserved death and love at the same time. By yet another suggestive choices of words, he once
more draws attention to  the very fact he intended to conceal:  that  he had done something that
accounted at once for Ligeia’s unexpected, indeed incredible demonstrations of love, her death, and
the miraculous dilation of her eyes. This chain of obscure connections is what leads me to conclude
that  this  dilation  was  not  caused  by  fear.  Wieland  had obtained  precisely  the  same results  by
strangling his wife.
He too had been particularly impressed by the image of his wife’s eyes, which had started
from their  sockets  when  he  tightened  his  grip  around  her  throat.  At  first,  after  the  deed  was
accomplished, the killer “gazed upon” the corpse of his wife “with delight;” but this feeling soon
gave way to horror, as his glance once again fell on her distorted features, and particularly on her
eyes: “These deadly and blood-suffused orbs but ill resemble the azure and exstatic tenderness of
her eyes (…). Alas! (…) the gripe of the assassin had been here!” (Brown, Wieland 160).79 This, I
79 “Orb” is a term also often applied in “Ligeia” to the title-character’s eyes: “The hue of the orbs was the most
brilliant of black;” “I was possessed with a passion to discover. Those eyes! those large, those shining, those divine
orbs!;” “her large and luminous orbs” (Poe, "Ligeia" 313-14).
Incidentally, it is also Matthew Lewis’ pet term for breasts. This rather unusual use of term (not recognised by
the OED) is chosen presumably to suggest their fullness in some of the most lurid passages of The Monk, such as
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think, is also the more than probable explanation for the expansion of Ligeia’s eyes, and of the
horror its recollection inspires in her husband.
I said before that the narrator of “Ligeia” will not tell us what he was doing while Ligeia was
struggling for life, but that is not strictly true. After comparing her eyes with those of the Houri, he
speaks at length of the time he spent examining them. He only neglects to mention that this had
taken place in the night she died:
The hue of the orbs was the most brilliant of black, and, far over them, hung jetty
lashes of great length. The brows, slightly irregular in outline, had the same tint. The
‘strangeness,’ however, which I found in the eyes, was of a nature distinct from the
formation,  or  the  color,  or  the  brilliancy  of  the  features,  and  must,  after  all,  be
referred to the  expression. Ah, word of no meaning! behind whose vast latitude of
mere sound we intrench our ignorance of so much of the spiritual. The expression of
the eyes of Ligeia! How have I, through the whole of a midsummer night, struggled
to  fathom  it!  What  was  it—that  something  more  profound  than  the  well  of
Democritus—which lay far within the pupils of my beloved? What  was it? I was
possessed with a passion to discover. (Poe, "Ligeia" 313)
the scene in which Rosario reveals himself as the beautiful Matilda, threatening to commit suicide if he rejects her:
“She lifted her arm, and made a motion as if to stab herself. The Friar’s eyes followed with dread the course of the
dagger. She had torn open her habit, and her bosom was half exposed. The weapon’s point rested upon her left
breast: And Oh! that was such a breast! The moon-beams darting full upon it, enabled the Monk to observe its
dazzling whiteness. His eye dwelt with insatiable avidity upon the beauteous Orb” (The Monk 65). The “monkish”
resonance of the term, infects the second quotation from Poe’s tale in the previous paragraph, in which the narrator
mentions his “passion to discover.” Perhaps he would have liked to discover those other orbs that are not habitually
exposed? I refer the reader to the previous section, where I argue that the same suggestion is contained in the
passage where the narrator describes his ostensibly intellectual intercourse with Ligeia.
A well-known Gothic tale of which Poe would have been aware, Polidori’s Vampyre (1819), was prefaced by
“An Extract of a Letter to the Editor” which contained an anecdote in which breasts and eyes were also significantly
coupled. In the famous night in which Byron, Shelley, and Mary Godwin—soon to become Shelley's wife—dared
each other to write a supernatural thriller, Polidori asserts that Percy Shelley “suddenly started up and ran out of the
room” (xv). Upon inquiry, Byron and “the physician,” that is, Polidori himself, “found that his wild imagination
having pictured to him the bosom of one of the ladies with eyes (which was reported of a lady in the neighbourhood
where he lived) he was obliged to leave the room in order to destroy the impression” (“Extract of a Letter”  xv). One
cannot help but wonder if the lady in question was his future wife. Polidori’s testimony is notoriously suspect, and,
possibly slanderous. However, the interest of this episode for our purposes is quite independent of its testimonial
value. I transcribe it for its suggestiveness which I feel Poe, if he ever came across it, must have appreciated.
The eye, however, is also associated via Glanvill to the vagina, a connection I discuss in the next chapter. The
two, however, are not mutually exclusive. I believe Poe deliberately appealed to the intertext to draw attention to
the sexuality his narrator attempts to suppress.
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The “metaphysical” fireworks intimate spiritual love, but the chronology suggests otherwise.
As Ligeia “struggled” for life, the narrator “struggled to fathom” her eyes. Although he appears
honestly  convinced  that  within those  eyes  lay  some  secret  of  cosmical  and  transcendental
significance, he never strays much from the literal and exact truth. The “expression” in the eyes
haunts  him.  Since  this  expression  can  be  traced to  Ligeia’s  death,  it  becomes  clear  that  Poe’s
narrator was, like Wieland, haunted by the distorted features of his agonizing victim. Thus, the
“struggle to fathom” Ligeia appears to have been both a rape, as the verb crudely intimates, and the
cause of Ligeia’s death. In other words, death and the satisfaction of his wildest desires—again, this
is what the narrator had been telling us all along—must have happened more or less at once, which
would also explain  why the  recollection  of  the expression in  the  dying Ligeia’s  eyes  “at  once
appalled and delighted” him.
With this explanation,  the symmetry between the two halves of the tale finally becomes
intelligible. To the narrator, what he describes as a “drama of revivification” wore the aspect of a
struggle between the dying Ligeia and an “invisible foe,” whose position he assumed, or resumed,
in Rowena’s chamber (Poe, “Ligeia” 328-29). They were, of course, one and the same. The terse
original account of the death of Ligeia, in the first versions of the tale, hinted the solution to the
mystery  even  more  plainly.  “Methinks,”  the  mourner  there  wrote,  “I  again  behold  the  terrific
struggles of her lofty, her nearly idealized nature, with the might and the terror, and the majesty, of
the great Shadow. But she perished. The giant  will succumbed to a power more stern” (318n). In
fact, this appears to me more than a hint: I believe it is the literal truth. While he writes, the narrator
is haunted by the awful spectacle of Ligeia’s struggle with the “great Shadow.” His resentment is,
incidentally,  perfectly apparent here: the woman who dared have a will  of her own was finally
vanquished by that shadow in which his male pride is here but too clearly projected. Ironically,
without his realising it, the same thing had happened to him in Rowena’s room. Ligeia’s struggle
was always before him.
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The signs of life supposedly on Rowena’s corpse, therefore, are the signs of life the narrator
had actually seen on Ligeia as he struggled with her. From this we may conclude, then, that the
narrator repeatedly assaulted Ligeia, leaving her for dead several times. This in turn suggests that,
like Wieland, he had “slackened his grasp” several times before accomplishing his design. At the
end of this struggle, the narrator had indeed seen Ligeia rise from her bed, and advance “with feeble
steps, with closed eyes, and with the manner of one bewildered in a dream” (Poe, "Ligeia" 329). I
am  convinced  that,  after  reliving  his  struggle  with  Ligeia,  he  projected  this  image  on  the
phantasmagoria, confusing it with reality.
Again, the parallel with the crypt scene in The Monk proves illuminating: “Gradually He felt
the bosom which rested against his, glow with returning warmth. Her heart throbbed again; Her
blood flowed swifter, and her lips moved. At length She opened her eyes, but still  opprest  and
bewildered by the effects of the strong opiate, She closed them again immediately” (M. Lewis, The
Monk 380). Ligeia’s “bewilderment” is consistent, indeed, with the supposition that she too—and
not  Rowena—had  been  given  a  “strong  opiate,”  and  prematurely  prepared  for  the  grave.  The
resemblance between the “apparition” of Ligeia and the revived Antonia furthers the suggestion. All
this is entirely conjectural, of course—but so is the narrator’s “thesis.” My conjectures have the
advantage of being by and large consistent with the narrator’s meaning, which is more than can be
said for what he lets the reader believe happened.
According to the narrator, his is the story of the sacrifice of Ligeia for her love for him, the
implied moral of which perfectly corresponds to that of the archetypal male story, “Snow White,” as
stated by Gilbert and Gubar: the protagonist’s “only deed (…) can be a deed of death, her only
action the pernicious action of self-destruction” (Madwoman 42). Self-sacrifice, indeed, is the only
course of action suitable for the ideal “spiritual” woman, as the narrator conceives her. “Ligeia,”
however, is structured in such a way that this idealization is systematically subverted. In this sense,
the murder  of Ligeia is  not,  properly speaking,  a  submerged meaning, as it  corresponds to the
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superficial,  literal  sense  of  everything  the  narrator  says,  for  his  discourse  is  actually  perfectly
coherent. However, the tendency of his rhetoric is to predispose the reader to disregard the violent
femicidal  implications  of  his  text  as  unintended  slips,  or  accidents  of  expression.  In  reality,
however,  upon analysis,  we find that,  in order to accommodate his  “thesis,” we would have to
disregard the actual meaning of every single line of his text—which, as we have seen, is precisely
what most critics of Poe’s work have long been advising readers to do.
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5 — The Secret of Ligeia’s Eyes: Glanvill, Wtiches and Animal Magnetism
My statement  of the metonymical association between the scrutiny of Ligeia’s eyes and
sexual  penetration may appear  a  platitude.  Indeed,  I  suppose that  no one will  deny that  sex is
implied in this matrimonial tale, but most modern critics thought that this meaning was deeper than
I here imply. Most critics have regarded it, in practice, as a Freudian slip, that is, as a content that,
despite  being  integral  to  the  structure  of  the  tale,  was,  as  it  were,  far  below  the  writer’s
consciousness. However, I believe the conscious effort on Poe’s part to distance himself from his
narrator  is  evident.  This  effort  is  a  textual  fact  which  must  be  addressed  by  any  true
psychoanalytical reading of “Ligeia,” which would have to distinguish Poe’s slips from those of his
narrator.
Simply put, before we attribute a slip to Poe, we must first certify ourselves that it cannot be
more convincingly traced to  the narrator’s inability to see things as they are. The shadow on the
floor to which I keep returning misleads us into thinking that what happened to the narrator cannot
be explained; however, the explanation of this phenomenon is so conspicuously obvious as to leave
no doubt not only that the narrator made a mistake, but also that the mistake was planned by the
author. Another double clue, working in a similarly deceptive way, indicates that Ligeia’s eyes were
indeed associated in the narrator’s mind with sex, and also that he was unable to grasp this, just as
he was unable to grasp the true meaning of the shadow. This clue is Joseph Glanvill (1636-1680),
but not the passage the narrator attributes to Glanvill, and which was as mysterious to him as the
eyes themselves. That too is a mistake, and a cover for the real allusion—just like the works Poe
refers in the Pinakidia are distractions masquerading his real sources.
As we have seen, the narrator admits to having derived from “passages from books” the
same mysterious feeling that he had got from Ligeia’s eyes (Poe, “Ligeia” 314). He gives, however,
only one example of this: the words Ligeia addressed to him right before she died, and which he
351
partly attributes to Glanvill. We have also seen in the previous section that the expression to which
he refers was the look in Ligeia’s eyes at the time of her death. Thus, Ligeia’s eyes, her death, and
the passage the narrator attributes to Glanvill are inexorably associated in his mind.
I  say the narrator  “attributes” the passage to  Glanvill,  because it  could never  be found,
neither in his or anyone else’s work. It did not appear “genuine” to Mabbott, who admitted “Poe
may have made it up” (Tales 330n). But no one seems to have valued how vague the narrator’s
attribution of authorship is:
Among innumerable other  instances,  I  well  remember something in  a  volume of
Joseph Glanvill, which (perhaps merely from its quaintness—who shall say?) never
failed  to  inspire  me  with  the  sentiment.  (…)  Length  of  years,  and  subsequent
reflection, have enabled me to trace, indeed, some remote connection between this
passage in the English moralist and a portion of the character of Ligeia. 
(Poe, "Ligeia" 314-15)
For  a  man  with  his  pretensions  to  scholarship,  the  narrator  is  remarkably  inexact.  He
remembers  the  words  vividly,  but  he  evidently  cannot  recall  where  in  Glanvill’s  work  they
appeared. One gets the feeling the narrator is quoting from memory, trusting his intuition, which, as
so often happens with Poe’s characters, is flawless.
Indeed,  there is  something in  a volume by Joseph Glanvill  that  could have inspired the
strange feelings the narrator harbours for his first wife, and particularly for her eyes. In fact, the
phrase the narrator had employed, in the previous paragraph, to express the unfathomable mystery
of Ligeia’s eyes, “something more profound than the well of Democritus” is doubtless an allusion to
a passage in Glanvill’s “Against Confidence in Philosophy and Matters of Speculation,” included in
Essays on Several Important Subjects  (1676) Poe would later use as motto for “A Descent to the
Maelstrom” (1841) (Poe, “Ligeia” 313). Thus, the narrator paraphrases Glanvill without mentioning
his name in one paragraph, and in the next mentions his name in reference to a passage that he
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probably  did not write. The vagueness of the attribution makes this fact significant: it becomes a
literary  fact,  which  indicates  Poe’s  intention  of  indicating  to  the  reader  that  his  narrator  was
confused, and also that he—Poe—had indeed made the passage up himself.
I will discuss the significance of this particular allusion later in this chapter (see section 10).
I  am convinced,  however,  that  Poe  intended to  allude,  through misquotation,  not  to  a  specific
passage in Glanvill, but to a group of very peculiar ideas on the subject of witches entertained by
that author. Indeed, the conclusion that Ligeia was a witch clearly flows from the narrator’s thesis.
Glanvill happened to be a firm believer in witches and a great supporter of witch-hunts. In a long
essay, which appeared originally under the title  Some Philosophical Considerations Touching the
Being of Witches and Witchcraft Written in a Letter to the Much Honour’d Robert Hunt, Esq.  in
London in 1667, Glanvill maintained that all that was said of witches was true. In its original form,
the essay was an open letter to Robert Hunt, a judge now mostly remembered for the witch trials to
which he presided in  the county of Somerset  in  the 1650s,  which produced many convictions.
Glanvill congratulates his friend for waging war against witchcraft, and urges him onward.80 The
essay  later  appeared,  in  a  considerably  revised  form,  in  Essays  on  Several  Important  Subjects
(1676),  which  is  probably  Glanvill’s  more  well-known book,  under  the  title  “Against  Modern
Sadducism in the Matter of Witchs and Apparitions.” The essay is best known in the much enlarged
edition prepared after Glanvill’s death by his friend Henry More and first published in 1681 under
the  title  Saducismus  Triumphatus:  Or,  Full  and  Plain  Evidence  Concerning  Witches  and
Apparitions. This book, which was reprinted at least twice in the following decades (in 1700 and
80 I quote the text of the revised 1676 edition of Glanvill’s essay, which, being the last published in the author’s
lifetime, may be regarded as the definitive version. In that version, however, the first paragraph of the text of the
original  published  text  of  the  letter  was  omitted:  “Sir,  The  frequent  and  late  dealings  you  have  had  in  the
Examination of Considerations on the Subject, which thought they are the careless and hasty product of a sitting or
two,  may  yet,  I  hope  affors  you  some  not  unreasonable  accounts  of  the  odd  phenomena  of  Witchcraft  and
Fascination, and contribute to the Defence of the Truth and certainty of matters which you know by Experiments
that could not deceive, in spite of the little exceptions of those that are resolved to believe nothing in affairs of this
nature” (Glanvill, “Some Considerations” 1-2).
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1726),  became  a  fundamental  text  in  the  literature  on  the  subject.81 “Ligeia”  contains  strong
evidence of Poe’s acquaintance with this text.
The narrator of Poe’s tale, then, was particularly fascinated with the eyes of Ligeia, whom he
evidently believed was a witch. In “Against Modern Sadducism,” Glanvill advanced an entirely
original theory of witchcraft, which included a startling new explanation for the witch’s reputed
power of fascination. He conceived of witchcraft as a sexually transmissible infection. The sources
agreed that the origin of the witch’s power was a pact with a malignant spirit, or “familiar,” who
performed wonders at her bidding. Glanvill believed that these “familiar” spirits were “feculent and
gross,” and “not perfectly abstract from all Body and Matter,” remarking that they had been known
to become momentarily palpable on occasion (“Against Sadducism” 10). Thus, he admits not only
the  possibility,  but  the  probability  (which  in  his  vocabulary  means  certainty)  of  “palpable
Intercourses  between  the  bad  Genii,  and  Mankind” (23).  Thus,  the  partial  materialization  of  a
81 Barbara Cantalupo was the first Poe scholar to intimate, albeit in very vague terms, a connection between Glanvill’s
essay on witches and Poe’s “Ligeia:” “Although critics have not successfully attributed the quotation [used as a
motto for  the tale]  to Glanvill,  his  Saducismus Triumphatus,  first  published in 1689 and revived in 1834 as a
sixpenny pamphlet, Plain Evidence of the Actual Evidence of Witches, relates the testimonials of people purporting
to have witnessed spiritual possessions, and his name would have been associated not only with occult practices but
with the nature of doubt as well” (“Poe’s Visual Tricks” 58). The last part of the sentence echoes Stuart and Susan
Levine’s remark,  quoted in a  footnote to Cantalupo’s text,  that  Glanvill  was “best  remembered,” among other
things, “for his philosophical skepticism” (Thirty-Two 55n2). The latter probably had in mind Glanvill’s “Against
Confidence in Philosophy,” the first in the 1676 anthology Essays.
Cantalupo’s account of the convoluted history of the publication of the essay and its several incarnations is
innacurate in several respects. As already mentioned, Saducismus Triumphatus is an expanded edition of the essay
which  was  first  published  in  1667  under  the  title  Some Philosophical  Considerations  Touching  the  Being  of
Witches. The essay was then reprinted on several occasions in Glanvill’s lifetime with different titles. The Library of
the University of California Davis (digitised copy available at Hathi Trust) holds a copy of a volume published in
London in the following year, 1668, entitled A Blow at Modern Sadducism In Some Philosophical Considerations
About Witchcraft (…) with Reflections on Drollery, and Atheisme which is labelled “The Fourth Edition Corrected
and Inlarged.” The first part of the book contains the original letter to judge Hunt. To this was added a second part,
entitled Palpable Evidence of Spirits and Witchcraft, containing some accounts of supposed witchcraft (starting in
page 113). Then, as I have already mentioned, the essay was republished in revised form in 1676.
Saducismus Triumphatus, then, is an enlarged edition of A Blow at Modern Sadducism with the addition of a
“Letter of Dr. Henry More on the Same Subject,” prepared by the latter after Glanvill’s death in 1680. The first
edition, however, appeared in 1681, and not in as 1689, as stated by Cantalupo. To further confuse the issue, the
1681 and 1700 editions spell the first word in the title with one “d,” whereas “sadducism” had been consistently
written  with  two  in  previous  editions  of  Glanvill’s  essay.  Moreover,  the  author’s  last  name  is  there  spelled
“Glanvil.” The 1726 edition of the book, however, restaures what appears to have been Glanvill’s spelling of the
title. The 1834 pamphlet mentioned by Cantalupo is an abridged edition of the second part of  Sadducismus, and
does not contain the text of Glanvill’s original essay on witches.
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disembodied spirit that the narrator of “Ligeia” believes took place, despite being incompatible with
conventional notions of pneumatology, was regarded by Glanvill as an indisputable fact.82
This is  crucial  for his theory,  for he believed the original pact between a witch and the
familiar spirit was sealed through sexual congress. This is mostly inferred from another supposed
fact, to wit, that witches were “suck’d in a certain private place of their Bodies by a familiar” (5-
6).83 In view of this, it seems “probable” to Glanvill
that  the  Familiar  doth  not  only suck the  Witch,  but  in  the Action  infuseth  some
poisonous  Ferment  into  Her,  which  gives  her  Imagination  and Spirits  a  magical
Tincture, whereby they become mischievously influential (…). And ‘tis very likely
that this Ferment disposeth the Imagination of the Sorceress to cause the mentioned
ἀφαιρεσὶα,84 or  separation of the Soul from the Body, and may perhaps keep the
Body in fit temper for its reentry; as also it may facilitate transformation, which, it
may be,  could not be effected by ordinary and unassisted Imagination.  (“Against
Sadducism” 10)
Glanvill here alludes to three wonders reportedly performed by witches, which, incidentally,
are also implied in “Ligeia:” resurrection, conceived as the ability of the spirit to leave the body and
reenter it, shapeshifting, and the ability to colonise their victims minds’ with their imagination, that
is, fascination. What makes Glanvill’s proposal absolutely original is his contention that all these
phenomena may be traced to the effect of that elusive poisonous “ferment,” which foreshadows
Mesmer’s inconceivably subtle “magnetic” fluid. This pseudo-physiological theory of fascination is
particularly  relevant  for  our  purposes:  “the  influences  of  a  Spirit  possess’d  of  an  active  and
enormous Imagination, may be malign and fatal where they cannot be resisted; especially when they
82 Glanvill himself recognises that his “facts” clash with the conventional notion of a “spirit:” “if all those Relations
were  arbitrary  Compositions  [i.e.,  if  the  accounts  of  cases  of  witchcraft  were  fictional],  doubtless  the  first
Romancers  would  have  framed  them more  agreeable  to  the  common Doctrine  of  Spirits”  (“Against  Modern
Sadducism” 6).
83 Another  formulation of the same idea appears  later in the text:  “the Devil’s sucking the Sorceress is  no great
wonder, nor difficult to account for” (Glanvill, “Against Modern Sadducism” 10).
84 The word, which is not found in Liddell and Scott’s A Greek-English Lexicon (1940), may be a typographical error
for αφαερεσιs, εως, ἡ.
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are accompanied by those poisonous Reaks that the Evil Spirit breathes into the Sorceress, which
likely are shot out, and applyed by a Fancy heightned and prepared by Melancholy and Discontent”
(“Against Sadducism” 19). According to Glanvill, the seats of this this power of fascination were
the “Eyes and” the “Imaginations [sic]85 by which for the most part she acts upon tender bodies”
(14). By “she,” Glanvill means the witch.  Thus, he believed that “the Pestilential Spirits” were
“darted by a spightful and vigorous Imagination from the Eye, and meeting with those that are weak
an passive, in the Bodies which they enter, will not fail to inject them with a noxious Quality, that
makes dangerous and strange Alterations in the Person invaded by this poisonous influence” (14).
Glanvill thought that women alone were equipped to establish the sexual contact with an evil
spirit from which he supposed witches derived their power. Indeed, he thought that witches were
necessarily female, as is indicated by his applying the pronouns “she” and “her” to the “witch” in
the passage detailing that transaction I have quoted above, and also by his frequent use of the term
“sorceress” as a synonym for “witch.” Although he is too prudish to name the “private part” in
question, Glanvill evidently means the vagina.
Notwithstanding, although they could not establish the original sexual contact with an evil
spirit,  men  were  exposed to  a  sort  of  secondary  infection  by  the  nefarious  “ferment”   if  they
established eye contact with a witch. The narrator of “Ligeia,” of course, had spent long hours
gazing into Ligeia’s eye; he also sensed some connection between her eyes and Glanvill, but could
never exactly define the nature of that connection. If only the narrator could remember his Glanvill,
he would have known how dangerous it was to look a woman, especially one such as Ligeia, in the
eye! It appears to me that the “ferment” is that elusive something the narrator felt was deep inside
Ligeia’s  eye,  but  could  never  quite  define.  By  the  same  token,  this  theory  is  evidently  that
“something” in “a volume” of Glanvill that inspired the feeling the narrator had about the eyes.
85 The plural  is  probably not a mistake. Glanvill  sometimes uses the term “imagination” in the unusual sense of
imaginary form or idea.
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Naturally, since he could never accurately recall what he had read, he could never get at the bottom
of the matter. 
Indeed,  Glanvill  articulates  the  vague  feelings  the  narrator  projects  on  his  wife’s  story,
notably by postulating a concrete, physical association between eyes and vaginas and, by extension,
sexual  intercourse.  This  constitutes,  I  think,  the  best  indication  that  Poe  intended  to  allude
specifically to the most peculiar notions Glanvill entertained on the subject of witches. Indeed, all
the  aspects  of  the  official  story  of  “Ligeia,”  including  those  that  appeared  strange  to  Philip
Pendleton Cooke, are compatible with Glanvill’s theory. The narrator of the tale clearly suggests,
for example, that he unwittingly summoned his dead wife: “I would call aloud upon her name,
during the silence of the night, or among the sheltered recesses of the glens by day, as if, through
the eagerness, the solemn passion, the consuming ardor of my longing for the departed, I could
restore her to the pathway she had abandoned—ah,  could it be forever?—upon the earth” (Poe,
"Ligeia" 323). For Glanvill this too was perfectly probable, for familiar spirits come in two major
varieties. They may be demons, but “are sometimes wicked Spirits of our own Kind and Nature,”
that is, spirits of the dead, “and possibly the same that have been Sorceress and Witches in this Life”
(“Against Sadducism” 12).
Glanvill also believed that witches had the ability to send their spirits from their bodies, but
also, by virtue of the all-powerful mysterious fluid, of maintaining the latter “fit” to receive the
former, upon its return. Most particularly, he thought that the imagination of witches could perform,
again, by virtue of his diabolical “ferment,” “alterations” in their own bodies or those of others. All
this  is  clearly  implied  in  the  passage  I  transcribed  earlier  about  the  “ferment,”  which  was
characterised by a certain hesitation regarding the nature of the changes thus operated. This is, in
fact, one of the most singular and intriguing aspects of his theory: “an heightened and obstinate
Fancy  [fancy  and  imagination  are  convertible  terms  in  Glanvill]  hath  a  great  influence  upon
impressive Spirits, yea (...) on the more passive and susceptible Bodies” (“Against Sadducism” 19).
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Therefore, he thought, the wonders witches were able to performe, and particularly the “alterations”
he mentions, could be either illusory or real—it was impossible to decide: “’tis easie to apprehend,
that the Power of Imagination may form these passive and pliable Vehicles [Glanvill means bodies],
into those shapes,” the witch imagines; or, “perhaps sometimes the confederate Spirit puts tricks
upon the Senses of the Spectators, and those shapes are only Illusions” (9).
This is, of course, the same kind of hesitation that permeates “Ligeia,” and which Thompson
thought could not be overcome. What seems to me most significant, is that, according to Glanvill’s
system of thought, the mere possibility of a wonder being an illusion is not enough to exclude real
magic. The observer may or may not have been deceived; that is of no practical difference to him.
Whether real or imaginary, Glanvill would ascribe miraculous transformations and resuscitations
such as the narrator of “Ligeia” reports to the witch’s overdeveloped imagination, and never to the
unassisted imagination of the potential dupe of the illusion.
Let us apply the theory to the evidence reported by the narrator of “Ligeia.” According to
this  authority  ofn  witchcraft,  to  which  the  narrator  happens  to  allude,  the  change  in  personal
appearance in the body of Rowena does not exclude the hypothesis of possession by the spirit of the
dead Ligeia,  as Cooke supposed, because the spirit  of dead witches,  as we have seen,  may be
summoned and act as a familiar, therefore, theoretically, it may possess a “passive” body, changing
its shape. These things, Glanvill says, are all very likely. But then, the transformation could also be
an illusion wrought by the spirit of the dead witch, especially if the beholder had been infected by
the noxious “ferment”—for, and this is another of Glanvill’s peculiar notions, there is no such thing
as a spontaneous illusion.
Indeed, Glanvill is sometimes credited with being a precursor of modern scientific thought.
This  is  a  very  unfair  assessment  of  his  work,  which  constitutes  rather  an explicit  inducement,
precisely, to the kind of absolute credulity in matters of fact that the narrator of “Ligeia” displays. In
reality, it is no exaggeration to say that Glanvill’s essay is a defense of superstition. To those who
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objected  that  the  wonders  attributed  to  witchcraft  were  impossible,  the  author  replied  that  the
“suppos’d Impossibility of these Performances, seems to me a probable Argument that they are not
wilful, and designed Forgeries” (“Against Sadducism” 6). The fallacious reasoning behind this may
be summarised as follows. An impostor, by definition, wants to pass as historical truth something
that never took place. Since any spinner of yarns could come up with something more probable than
the  incredible performances attributed to witches, Glanvill  concludes that such impostors  would
necessarily  come up with  something more  probable.  Glanvill  thought,  in  other  words,  that  the
improbability of such a report being false was always greater than that of the miracle itself—in fact,
he regarded a false improbable report as a practical impossibility. No impostor would make up such
a story, because it would never be believed, therefore, all supernatural, seemingly impossible stories
were necessarily true. Of course, Glanvill defeats his own argument by proving that a story needs
not be probable to be believed.
But must we credit all that was said about witches? Are we not permitted to doubt at least
some of  the  reports?  Not  according  to  Glanvill:  “to  deny  evidence  of  Fact,  because  their
Imagination may deceive the Relators, when he hath no reason to think so, but a bare presumption,
that there is no such thing as is related, is quite to destroy the Credit of all Humane Testimony, and
to  make  all  Men  liars”  (“Against  Sadducism”  17).  This  argument  tends  to  the  paradoxical
conclusion that reports of seemingly possible things alone are suspect. Any bare relation of “facts,”
say, like those that the narrator of our tale believes have taken place at Rowena’s wake, by their
very  impossibility,  should  be  worthy  of  implicit  credit.  Since  no  one  would  believe  such  an
incredible story, no one would have invented it, therefore, it must be true. Glanvill erases a third
possibility: that of the witness being the dupe of an illusion. Surely, to be “deceived” is not the same
thing as being a “liar.”
Overall, Glanvill topsy-turvy empiricism, inasmuch as it rejects any system of negotiation
between doubt  and belief,  illustrates  the  meaning of  the  word preposterous.  Indeed,  though he
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affects to proceed rationally from “facts” to theory, he effectively seals his own argument, and the
testimony on which it is based, against the possibility of any test of fact. In the context of Poe’s
work, his approach is significant for being the exact opposite of Dupin’s. The detective, faced with
the seemingly impossible, started by excluding absolute impossibilities; Glanvill, on the other hand,
accepted everything that appeared impossible. Consequently, not to make liars of all men, he made
presumptive witches of all women.
This was a matter of faith to Glanvill. The duty of the pious “philosopher” was to prevent
any doubt from creeping into the minds of the faithful by whatever means possible. If the public
consented to believe everything, all would be well; if, however, the tiniest doubt were to get past his
blockade, his fragile Faith would surely be defeated, and society would slide into atheism: 
When Men are arrived to this degree of Diffidence and Infidelity [that is, when they
no longer believe in witches], we are beholden to them if they believe either Angel,
or  Spirit,  Resurrection  of  the  Body,  or  Immortality  of  Souls.  These  things  hang
together in a Chain of Connexion, at least in these Mens [sic] Hypothesis, and ‘tis but
an happy chance, if he that hath lost one Link, holds another.
(“Against Sadducism” 2)
Therefore, he felt it his duty to regard all the wonders of witchcraft as “infinitely confirmed”
facts, and thought that to doubt them, or any report of supposedly supernatural phenomena, was
tantamount  to  irreligion—this  is  the  “sadducism” mentioned in  the  title  of  his  book (Glanvill,
“Against  Sadducism”  38).86  The  inevitable  consequence  of  this  Inquisition-like  reasoning,  of
course, was that all those accused of witchcraft were guilty, and deserving of punishment. Glanvill’s
86 The passage is worth transcribing in its  entirety. Glanvill contends the Scot’s  Discovery,  a book which argues
against the belief Glanvill tries to defend, is worthless, because the “Author doth little but tell odd Tales, and Silly
Legends, which he confutes and laughs at, and pretends this to be a Confutation of the Being of Witches and
Apparitions” (“Against  Modern Sadducism” 38).  Glanvill  therefore concedes that  Scot has,  indeed, “confuted”
some reports, but that those reports were worthless themselves. True reports, he further implies, are impossible to
“confute.”  However,  as  I  indicated  before,  Glanvill  contradicts  himself,  for  in  his  system  no  report  can  be
dismissed, provided it appears impossible. In any case, Glanvill mostly calls Scot names: “His Reasonings are
Trifling and Childish; and when He ventures at Philosophy, He is little better than absurd: So that I should wonder
much if any but Boys and Buffons should imbibe Prejudices against a Belief so infinitely confirmed, from the loose
and impotent Suggestions of so weak a Discourser” (38).
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theory also reflected the most extreme prejudices against women. Indeed, Glanvill offered explicit
encouragement to his friend Hunt to condemn witchs, and his writings would later inspire other
similar witch trials, such as those held in Salem. Inasmuch as these trials victimised mostly women,
his superstition was femicidal not merely in spirit but in effect.87
It appears to me, then, that the significance of Poe’s allusion to Glanvill—to the texts he
actually wrote, as opposed to the passage he evidently did not—is that of making clear that the
narrator of the tale had suffered the contagion of that writer’s misogynous superstition—that is, that
he had been the victim of a kind of influence which does not require a satanic ferment: suggestion.
Ironically, this is a possibility not contemplated by Glanvill’s theory. Even if the narrator could
remember what he read, his works would not help him to separate dreams from reality. On the
contrary, Glanvill’s theory would have suggested to the narrator the very hesitation that permeates
his narrative. Everything is possible. Ligeia may have broken the bonds of the tomb, or perhaps
taken possession of the tenantless body of her successor, changing its shape, or it may have been an
illusion.  In  any  case,  a  reader  impressed  by  Glanvill’s  suggestions  would  not  doubt  it  was
witchcraft.
Through his  stealthy but  pointed  allusion,  Poe indirectly  suggests  also that  the  spirit  of
gullibility  and misogyny that  had presided to  the  witch-hunts  of  the  past  had not  been wholly
eradicated in the supposedly enlightened nineteenth century. Those who refuse to think will always
be the dupes of superstition, no matter how much “reading” they may boast of. Indeed, the question
is not how much one has read, but how much one has profited from that reading. Once again, Poe
drives home the point that, as Pope once said, “A little learning is a dangerous thing” (“Essay on
Criticism” 63).
The buried allusion to Glanvill, aside from discrediting the narrator’s pretensions to learning
and scientificity, and upsetting the official supernatural theory, also contributes to show that sexual
87 For a detailed study of the Salem Witch trials see Elizabeth Reis’s Damned Women: Sinners and Witches in Puritan
New England.
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motivations played an important role in his behavior. Indeed, the two most prominent traits of the
narrator’s style are a very obtrusive display of erudition denoting the pride of scholarship, and the
implied rejection of sexual desire. By explicitly construing his relationship with his first wife as that
of  a  pupil  and master,  and insisting that  their  intercourse consisted exclusively in  the study of
metaphysics, he encourages the reader to dismiss the erotic undertones of his description of Ligeia,
of  her  struggle,  and  her  supposed  return  to  life.  This  impression,  of  course,  is  everywhere
contradicted by submerged meanings and allusions.
As  we  have  seen,  the  narrator  claims  that  Ligeia’s  “passion”  expressed  itself  not  only
through the “miraculous expansion of the eyes,” but also “by the almost magical melody (…) of her
very low voice” (Poe, "Ligeia" 315). We have already seen that the text forces us to conclude the
“expression” to which the narrator refers is that exhibited by Ligeia at the time of her death. This is
confirmed by his reference to her “very low voice,” for, this too may be traced to her final hours. As
she was fighting for her life: “Her voice grew more gentle—grew more low,” the narrator admits,
refusing, however, to discuss the “meaning” of the “wild words” she then pronounced, and which
we  must  conclude  are  those  very  “words”  he  had  mentioned  earlier,  when  he  discussed  the
expansion of her eyes (317). The allusion to Glanvill, reiterating the implied association between
the eyes and sex, reinforces the suggestion that what the narrator describes as the “fathoming” of his
first wife’s eyes was, in fact, a sexual encounter.
This conversation held in very low tones,  and involving close eye contact,  constitutes, I
think, another buried allusion to a source which reiterates the suggestion that sexual intimacy is the
solution to  the riddle.  The bewilderment  Poe’s narrative induces in  the reader  exactly  parallels
Tristram Shandy’s mock bafflement  in  Laurence Sterne’s novel  of  the same name before “The
Intricacies of Diego and Julia,” an ostensibly inscrutable tale by the fictional Slawkenbergius.88
88 In  his  introduction  to  “Lionizing,”  Mabbott  considers  that  “Poe  undoubtedly  knew ‘Slawkenbergius’ Tale,’ in
Tristram Shandy by Laurence Sterne” (Tales 1:171).
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Specifically,  Shandy  declares  himself  positively  at  a  loss  to  understand  what  happened  “when
Fernandez left the courteous stranger and his sister Julia,” who were lovers, “alone in her chamber:”
Heavens!  thou art  a  strange creature  Slawkenbergius!  (…) how this  can  ever  be
translated, and yet if this specimen of Slawkenbergius’s tales, and the exquisitiveness
of his moral, should please the world—translated shall a couple of volumes be.—
Else, how this can ever be translated into good English, I have no sort of conception.
—There seems in some passages to want a sixth sense to do it rightly.—What can he
mean by the lambent pupilability of slow, low, dry, chat, five notes below the natural
tone,—which you know, Madam [Shandy means the reader],  is little more than a
whisper? The moment I pronounced the words, I could perceive an attempt towards a
vibration  in  the  strings,  about  the  region  of  the  heart.—The  brain  made  no
acknowledgment.—There’s often no good understanding betwixt ‘em.—I felt as if I
understood it.—I had no ideas.—The movement could not be without cause.—I’m
lost. (Sterne, Tristram Shandy 274-75)
The word “pupilability” appears to be a whimsical invention.  Apparently,  it  was formed
from the adjective “pupillary,” which has reference to “pupil,” in the sense of student, which does
not make much sense in the context. The narrator interprets the word as a punning allusion to the
“pupil”  of  the  eye.  Shandy  believes,  then,  like  the  narrator  of  “Ligeia,”  there  is  some hidden
meaning connected with the eyes and the very low voice in which the couple’s private interview was
conducted; like him, he also “feels” he understands the mystery but declares that meaning cannot be
plainly expressed.89 The humor of the passage, however, depends on the obviousness of the mystery,
which only the most ingenuous of readers could miss.
89 This determines an additional  layer of  irony, for,  of course,  “pupilability” is  itself  the narrator’s translation of
Slawkenbergius  original  Latin.  The  OED,  which  gives  Tristram Shandy as  the  only  occurrence  of  the  word,
conjectures the word was formed from the adjective “pupillary,” which refers exclusively to “pupil” in the sense of
student, but acknowledges Sterne meant “a punning allusion to the pupils of the eyes.”
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Indeed, in spite of his pretended inability to declare the hidden meaning, Shandy himself
clarifies the sense of the supposedly untranslatable passage,  and of the pun in particular,  by an
additional layer of ludicrously transparent sexual innuendo:
I can make nothing of it,—unless, may it please your worships, the voice, in that case
being little more than a whisper, unavoidably forces the eyes to approach not only
within six inches of each other—but to look into the pupils—is not that dangerous?
—But it can’t be avoided—for to look up to the ceiling, in that case the two chins
unavoidably meet—and to look down into each other’s laps, the foreheads come into
immediate  contact,  which  at  once  puts  an end to  the  conference—I mean to  the
sentimental part of it.—What is left, Madam, is not worth stooping for.
(Sterne, Tristram Shandy 274)
Shandy thus signals to the knowing, worldly reader that he was perfectly aware of the sexual
nature of the interview, but that his sense of decorum did not permit him to declare a meaning which
he deemed unsuitable for lady readers. But who could possibly miss his hints?
 And, of course, the mystery of the “lambent pupilability of slow, low, dry chat five notes
below the natural tone” appears to be the same mystery before which the reader of “Ligeia” is made
to stare in perplexity. Ligeia too spoke to her husband in a very low voice, at a time when he was
busy scrutinizing her “pupils.” These two details imply the same kind of sexual intimacy hinted by
Shandy, but, of course, in Poe’s tale, this intimacy took place at the point of death. Moreover, Sterne
humorously declares what Glanvill mystically intimates: that it is “dangerous” for a man to look
into  a  woman’s  eye,  while  slyly drawing attention  to  what  went  on “below.”  Thus,  the text  is
structured  on  the  same  metonymical  association  between  sex  and  the  eye  which  Glanvill  had
literalised. There is, of course, one significant difference between Poe’s narrator and Shandy: the
former seems to be sincerely baffled by the mystery. As a consequence, the ridiculousness of the
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mystery reflects on him: whereas Shandy comes through as sophisticated and sly, Poe’s narrator
manages only to make a fool of himself, once again.
It appears to me that the conjugation of these uncommon elements, a private interview held
in  very low  tones  involving  looking  through the  pupil  and  sly  sexual  innuendos,  defines  the
coordinates by which the allusion may be detected—or rather, these coordinates constitute a covert
allusion. As we have seen, the narrator himself invites the reader to go source-hunting when he tells
us that his feelings were inspired by books, and, in this case, the specificity of this combination is
indeed sufficiently distinctive as to narrow the range of possible sources to one single text. In fact,
inasmuch as Tristram Shandy may be regarded as one the fundamental texts in the shared culture of
the early nineteenth century, a knowledge of which could be presumed of any competent reader, I
regard  the  allusion  as  being  one  of  those  “unités  proprement  stylistiques  [que]  s’imposent  à
l’attention du lecteur, (…) dont la perceptibilitité est obligatoire,” to use Riffaterre’s terminology
(“L’Explication” 12). Indeed, this allusion appears to me a perfect illustration of that critic’s concept
of  “paragramme,”  which  roughly  corresponds  to  what  I  have  termed  “buried  allusion:”  “je  ne
verrais,” he writes, “de paragramme, au sens restreint ou au sens large, que lorsqu’un élément du
texte me forcerait à chercher un métatexte” (15).
A buried allusion, as I conceive it, then, is a semantic structure by which the text constrains,
as it were, the reader to look for a “metatext.” For Riffaterre, however, this sort of mechanism
necessarily enforces ambiguity: “L’ambiguïté que l’explication devrait éviter de dissiper ne résulte
pas d’une mélecture, d’une incompréhension qui varierait avec les lecteurs. Elle est dans le texte: y
sont encodées à la fois qu’un choix est possible entre plusieurs interprétations, et l’impossibilité de
décider de ce choix. (…) Pour que la polysémie joue un rôle dans le style, il faut que la plurilecture
soir  imposée au lecteur” (Riffaterre,  “L’Explication” 14-15).  It  appears to me that  this  is  not a
common characteristic of literature, but only of some literary texts. As we have seen, Romanticism
attempted to create the hesitation Riffaterre describes. It seems to me that Poe evidently used buried
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allusions to create an opposite effect: to imply, precisely, that the confusion his narrator experiences
is the result of a misreading he himself had promoted.
It may be useful to distinguish the two types of buried allusions involved in the mystery of
Ligeia’s eyes which we have hitherto identified. In the first type, the source is not named at all, but
only implied. Thus, both Tristram Shandy and Wieland are evoked. The allusion to Glanvill, which
more exactly corresponds to the sort of ruse practiced by Poe in Pinakidia and Marginalia, belongs
to a second type of allusion that works by indirection. We are pointed towards Glanvill, but by way
of a quotation that is, to all indication, fabricated. Once again, Poe proves that readers must form a
decision  about  such  allusions  on  appearances  alone.  The  old-fashioned  style,  the  theme,  the
mystical tendency of the passage make it a superficially convincing counterfeit of a seventeenth-
century  English  religious  writer,  and  so  we  accept  the  passage,  as  it  were,  provisionally.  The
narrator’s doubts concerning attribution, however, are Poe’s way of slyly inviting the reader to visit
Glanvill’s work, where we will not find the “quotation” he used as a motto for Ligeia, but many
other passages that exactly match the spirit of “Ligeia.” Thus, the announced collapse of the vague
ostensible allusion, the meaning of which was necessarily conjectured by the reader on trust, reveals
the real allusion, on which Poe’s meaning hangs.
Poe, who had a shrewd understanding of fiction, knew the leisurely reader does not bother to
follow a lead, be it a clue to murder or an allusion. This reader expects to be entertained by his
reading—most of the time, that is what we all expect from our reading. And, since it would be
impossible to keep the meaning in suspense pending the verification of an obscure allusion, we
guess  its  meaning  by  approximation.  Poe  thought  that  it  was  the  poet’s  duty  to  exploit  these
shadowy processes of inference to create illusions. Accordingly, he used his allusions to trick the
public into all kinds of misapprehensions, diverting attention from his satire, which was designed to
show  that   poets  could  sometimes  abuse  their  power  over  the  reader’s  responses  to  promote
delusion, and inflated conceptions of the role of poetry itself. The two allusions I have analysed in
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this section further this design by returning a sexual meaning where a transcendental idea had been
promised.
Poe proves  his  point—that  only exceptionally will  the reader  follow a hint—even more
conclusively in his review of William Newnham’s Human Magnetism, which appeared on April 5,
1845, in the Broadway Journal. Indeed, despite having been regarded by many as evidence of Poe’s
endorsement of the doctrine of Animal Magnetism, or “Human Magnetism,” as Newnham prefers to
term it,  Poe’s short  review is evidently ironic,  and its irony is  certainly not of the “Romantic”
variety.90 The satire is confirmed, and its meaning clarified by an allusion which, although direct and
entirely accurate, I suspect the critics who support that view did not look up. Indeed, the allusion is
itself ironic, inasmuch as Poe effectively dissuades the reader from finding the passage to which he
alludes by making its meaning appear obvious.
Poe opens his article with a quotation from the “Introductory Chapter” of the work under
appreciation. That chapter is all one needs to detect Poe’s ruse—that is, if one pays close attention
to both texts.  In a passage Poe transcribes,  Newnham explains his  conversion to the mesmeric
faith91. He had originally intended to debunk the claims of the “mesmerists,” and, with this end in
view, conducted a research that afforded what he regards as “indisputable” evidence that the most
extravagant claims of the mesmerists could be false. One would suppose such evidence would have
90 Carroll  Dee Laverty,  for  example,  explicitly evokes this review as  evidence of  Poe’s adherence to the theory:
“There are, however, certain facts that suggest a belief in mesmerism. He considered the Rev. Mr. Townshend’s
work on the subject ‘one of the most truly profound and philosophical books of the day.’ And he asserted that in
general he agreed with the conclusions of W. Newnham in his book on mesmerism” (304). Laverty alludes to two
statements Poe makes in his review of Human Magnetism. As we shall see, however, both statements are evidently
not meant to be taken seriously.
Sidney Lind, on the other hand, thought that Poe did not like Newnham’s book, but “was appreciative of the
forcefulness of Townshend’s reasoning” (“Poe and Mesmerism” 1089).
More recently, Bruce Mills, in Poe, Fuller and the Mesmeric Arts (2009), has argued that Poe’s adherence to
the “science” of Animal Magnetism was complete.
91 “About  twelve  months  since,  I  was  asked  by  some friends  to  write  a  paper  against mesmerism—and  I  was
furnished  with  materials  by  a  highly  esteemed  quondam  pupil,  which  proved  incontestably  that  under  some
circumstances the operator might be duped—that hundreds of enlightened persons might equally be deceived—and
certainly went far to show that the pretended science was wholly a delusion, a system of fraud and jugglery by
which the imaginations of the credulous were held in thralldom through the arts of the designing. Perhaps in an evil
hour I assented to the proposition thus made—but on reflection I found that the facts before me only led to the
direct proof that certain phenomena might be counterfeited; and the existence of counterfeit coin is rather a proof
that there is somewhere a genuine standard gold to be imitated” (Newnham, Human Magnetism 9). Poe reviews in
his  article  the  American  edition of  Newnham’s  book,  which  had  been  previously  that  same year  appeared  in
London. My quotations of the book are extracted from the former.
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confirmed his skepticism.  Surprisingly,  it  had the opposite  effect on Newnham, who ultimately
concluded that the possibility of either delusion or fraud actually  proved the reality of the most
extravagant claims of the mesmerists. The argument that supports this conclusion is that nothing can
be “counterfeited” that does not exist.  Incidentally, Newnham’s reasoning very nearly resembles
Glanvill’s,  at  least  in  its  effects,  for  he  too  implies  that  all  reports  of  seemingly  impossible
phenomena are necessarily true. His statement about counterfeits, although linguistically correct, is
logically unsound, indeed preposterous, as Poe points out: “the fallacy here is obvious, and lies in a
mere  variation  of  what  the  logicians  style  ‘begging  the  question.’ (…)  Now  in  the  case  of
mesmerism our author is merely  begging the admission. / Such reasoning as this has an ominous
look on the very first page of a scientific work—and accordingly we were not surprised to find Mr.
Newnham’s treatise illogical throughout” (Rev. of Human Magnetism 69).
Thus, Poe makes his contempt for the book perfectly plain. But then comes the puzzling part
of  the article,  in which Poe appears  to contradict  his  opening statements:  “Not that  we do not
thoroughly  coincide  with  him in  his  general  views—but  that  we attain  (for  the  most  part)  his
conclusions by different, and we hope more legitimate routes than his own” (Poe, Rev. of Human
Magnetism 69).  This  comes  as  a  complete  surprise.  After  he  exposed  the  reasoning  on  which
Newnham’s entire defense of mesmerism was rooted, one would expect Poe rather to disagree with
him.
Things get even more puzzling with Poe’s next sentence: “In some important points—his
ideas of prévision,  for example,  and the  curative  effects  of magnetism—we radically disagree”
(Poe, Rev. of  Human Magnetism  70). Poe alludes here to the ability to predict the future, visit
faraway  lands  in  spirit,  and  cure  otherwise  incurable  diseases,  which  most  adepts  of  Animal
Magnetism believed were possessed by “somnambulists.” But, if Poe disagrees with Newnham on
these two points, I am afraid there is not much left with which he could agree with the author of
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Human  Magnetism,  as  the  avowed  purpose  of  the  book  is  to  promote  the  belief  precisely  in
miraculous cures and clairvoyance, as the author makes perfectly clear in his preface.
There is, however, another “point” in which Poe disagrees with Newnham: “most especially
do we disagree with him in his (implied) disparagement of the work of Chauncey Hare Townshend,
which we regard as one of the most truly profound and philosophical works of the day—a work to
be  valued  properly  only  in  a  day  to  come”  (Rev.  of  Human  Magnetism  70).  The  common
misconception that Poe endorsed the most startling “facts” of mesmerism must ultimately be traced
to this sentence. After accusing a book on the subject of being completely “illogical,” Poe suddenly
expresses  admiration—as  it  seems—for  Townshend,  one  of  the  firmest  believers  in  the  extra-
sensorial perception of “somnambulists” and in their ability to effect miraculous cures. Indeed, it is
hard to understand how exactly Poe could “radically” disagree with Newnham, when Newnham
himself  was  in  complete  agreement  with  Townshend in  precisely  those  “points”  in  which  Poe
disagrees with the former. How could this be? This might be taken as one of those irredeemable
contradictions of which Poe is supposed to have been very fond. It is the same kind of apparent
contradiction that  is  involved in  his  ostensible  endorsement  of  the very “transcendentalism” he
spent his time ridiculing. The conventional answer to this sort of conundrum is to presume Poe did
not really mean what he said, or that he was carried away by his desire for distinction.92
But, in this case, this is manifestly the wrong answer. As usual, Poe provides a clue to the
correct one: “We hope, however, that nothing here said by us will influence a single individual to
neglect a perusal of the book of Mr. Newnham. It should be read, as a vast store-house of suggestive
facts, by all who pretend to keep pace with modern philosophy” (Rev. of Human Magnetism 70).
92 I have already mentioned Floyd Stovall’s theory that Poe agreed with the very views he attacked. Another case in
point is the following passage from Stuart and Susan Levine’s Introduction to a recent edition of Poe’s Eureka: “Poe
complains in various pieces about transcendentalism in general and about Ralph Waldo Emerson in particular, but
he is often very close to Emerson” (xvi). By way of illustration, the editors quote a passage in  Eureka in which
“Poe’s narrator” employs the word “consistent,” remarking that in his poem “Blight” “Emerson uses ‘same’ to mean
just about what Poe does” by “consistent,” concluding from this that: “Emerson in fact deals with science just the
way Poe does” (xvi).
It appears to me, rather, that such similarities warrant the supposition that Poe meant to mock Emerson. At any
rate, in both “Ligeia” and the review of Newnham’s book, he approaches science in a way that appears to me to be
the opposite of Emerson’s.
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The irony of this remark is obvious—Poe had just destroyed Newnham—, but can only be fully
appreciated by those who read Human Magnetism—or, at least, its “Introductory Chapter,” which of
course very few will be inclined to do after reading Poe’s review. Poe’s ambiguous statements had
suggested that he disliked the book, but agreed with its doctrines; its perusal, however, shows us
that this was not the case. Thus, Poe’s true meaning comes to light: what he meant was that the book
was a particularly good illustration of what he thought was the general decay of philosophy in his
time.
As it turns out, Newnham does not “disparage” the “truly pious and excellent Townshend”
(Rev. of  Human Magnetism  13). On the contrary, Townshend’s is the last name in a long list of
witnesses from which, Newnham writes, “your reporter has  not withheld his belief,” and which
includes contemporaries like Berthollet, Cuvier, Deleuze, Colqhoun, Elliotson, but also  Puysègur,
Mesmer’s first disciple, and, in fact, almost everyone that had ever written “for” Animal Magnetism
(Human Magnetism  30). Indeed, the only name conspicuously missing from the list  is  Mesmer
himself, whose reputation was, in those days, far worse than that of the discipline he had founded.
“Chauncey Hare Townshend,” then, concludes this open list of respectable men whose testimony
Newnham regarded as absolutely unimpeachable, and which was broad enough to include “many
others not enumerated” (30-31). 
The  list  is  so  broad,  indeed,  as  to  make  it  apparent  that  Newnham  believed  virtually
everything he read about “human magnetism.” No matter how improbable the tale, if it came from
any of these highly respectable men, it was true. In fact, Newnham had much to say on the subject
of  probability:  “Our  present  argument  rests  on  the  calculation  of  probabilities,  and  has  been
employed as an unanswerable reply to Hume’s celebrated sophistry, with regard to the number of
witnesses necessary to establish the truth of a miracle, which he affirms to be far greater than the
testimony required for the establishment of any natural phenomenon” (Human Magnetism 32). The
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author of  Human Magnetism, of course, disagrees. I guess now we know exactly where we stand
with Newnham.
As for Townshend, Newnham’s only fear is that the public will not believe him implicitly—
as implicitly as Newnham himself believed him. Indeed, he thought the only defect of Townshend’s
Facts  in  Mesmerism was  the  fact  of  its  author  being  a  “clergyman,  whose  habits,  it  will  be
supposed, were not such as to lead him scrupulously to examine the laws of evidence, and who
might easily be deceived by the designing” (14). Likewise, the Isis Revelata,93 by J. C. Colquhoun,
“[b]y far the best work on this ill-fated question,” did not turn public opinion in favor of Animal
Magnetism,  according  to  Newnham,  because  its  author  was  a  “barrister,”  and  not  a  “medical
person” (14).
Our initial reading of Poe’s claim that Townshend’s book will “be valued properly only in a
day to come” is determined by the suggestion that Newnham had disparaged him. The suggested
meaning depends, therefore, on the false representation of Newnham’s relationship with Townshend
that Poe tricks us into forming, and which can only be dispelled by reading his book. Newnham
implies that Townshend was right, but no one would believe him, and this is the only thing on the
former’s “Introductory Chapter” that can be construed, however vaguely,  as a “disparagement.”
Therefore,  when  Poe  disagrees  with  Newnham’s  opinion,  he  implies  that  the  latter’s  fears  are
ungrounded; that is, that Townshend may actually succeed in converting a great number of people to
Animal Magnetism.
Now we also understand what Poe meant by calling  Human Magnetism  a “storehouse of
suggestive facts.” Although “illogical throughout,” these books will produce irresistible beliefs on
the unwary reader who neglects to examine the matter dispassionately and is carried away by his
93 The 1836 edition of  Isis  Revelata is  an expanded edition of  Colquhoun’s  1833  Report  of  the Experiments  of
Animam Magnetism, Made by a Committee of the Medical Section of the French Royal Academy of Sciences. This is
the report of the second comission appointed by the French Academy of Sciences, not to be confused with the first,
which had been led by Benjamin Franklin in 1784. 
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hankering after the sensational. This is precisely what Poe intimates in the last paragraph of his
review, while ostensibly agreeing with Newnham:
In saying above that we disagree with the author in some of his ideas of the curative
effects of magnetism, we are not to be understood as disputing, in any degree, the
prodigious importance of the mesmeric influence in surgical cases:—that limbs, for
example, have been amputated without pain through such influence, is what we feel
to be fact. In instances such as that of Miss Martineau, however, we equally feel the
weakness of attributing the cure to magnetism. Those who wish to examine all sides
of a question would do well  to  dip into some medical  works of authority before
forming an opinion on such topics. In the case of Miss Martineau we beg leave to
refer to the “London Lancet,” for March 1845, page 265 of the edition published by
Burgess and Stringer. (Rev. of Human Magnetism 70)
This paragraph is truly a masterpiece of misdirection. Poe, then, declares his belief in the
anesthetic proprieties of “magnetism,” selecting an extreme example, the amputation of a limb, thus
overtasking the credulity of his reader. Nonetheless, he tells us, he believes the fact. Why? Because
he “feels” its truth. He agrees, then, with the opinion of the writer of an illogical book because he
“feels” that if an amputation is performed on a patient under the influence of “magnetism,” the latter
will feel no pain. The verb he employs, of course, is suspicious. The obvious sense is disturbed by
the suggestion that no one but those who experienced the “fact” would be in a condition of “feeling”
its truth. Even while apparently endorsing the kind of intuitive approach to facts exemplified by the
mesmerists,  however,  he  openly  states  that  a  correct  assessment  of  their  claims  required  the
examination  of  “medical  works  of  authority,”  which  is  placed  in  explicit  opposition  with  the
treatises of Newnham and Townshend, who, of course, had no medical credentials whatsoever. The
precise reference to  The Lancet, which contrasts powerfully with the vagueness of his “feeling,”
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demonstrates, indeed, that Poe himself had not formed an opinion based on their suggestions, but
sought more reliable information. He advises his reader to do the same thing.
In the transcribed passage,  Poe alludes to the case of Harriett  Martineau (1802-1876), a
pioneering female intellectual,  writer  and journalist  known today as one of the founders of the
discipline of Sociology. At the time, however, she was garnering considerable attention from the
English press  for other  reasons.  In  1844 Martineau underwent  “magnetic” treatment,  under  the
guidance  of  the  celebrated  mesmerist  Spencer  T.  Hall,  for  a  very  debilitating  illness  that  had
afflicted her for years, and which had until then resisted conventional therapy. Shortly afterwards,
her  condition  improved  considerably,  and,  ascribing  her  almost  complete  recovery  to  the
“magnetic” therapy to which she had subjected herself, she became one of the most enthusiastic
supporters of the movement. In 1845 she published her own account of the case under the title
Letters on Mesmerism.
In Chapter VII of Human Magnetism, devoted to the subject of “magnetic” cures, Newnham
mentions in passing the case of a “well-known literary lady, who has for some years been greatly
suffering,  and  who  has  been  relieved  by  magnetism,”  without  naming  Martineau  (Human
Magnetism  132). In an appendix, however, Newnham breaks the secret and transcribes “extracts
(…) from Miss Martineau’s account of her own case:” “‘During these five years, I never felt wholly
at ease for one single hour. I seldom had severe pain: but never entire comfort. A besetting sickness,
almost disabling from taking food for two years, brought me very low; and, together with other
evils, it confined me to a condition of almost entire stillness; —to a life passed between my bed and
my sofa’” (qtd. in Newnham, Human Magnetism 387).
In the portion of her book Newnham transcribes, Martineau goes on to tell how her illness,
which had resisted conventional approaches for five years, and at length had made an invalid of her,
was practically defeated by some months of “magnetic” treatment. But there is something missing
from both Newnham’s brief summary of the case and from his appendix. Neither explains exactly
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what ailed Martineau. In fact, she herself had evaded the issue in her book: “This is not the place in
which to give any details of the disease” (Martineau, Letters 3).
Diligent as ever, Poe found his answers elsewhere: “in page 265” of the American edition of
the renowned medical journal The Lancet for the first semester of 1845 we find an article entitled
“Miss Martineau’s Case.” This is a summary of the report of Martineau’s case by her personal
physician and brother-in-law Thomas Michael Greenhow, who was not at all convinced that the
magnetic influence had been the cause of the alleviation of the patient’s sufferings.94 His detailed
medical report, unlike Newnham’s statement of the matter, leaves nothing to the imagination.
 Greenhow’s  controversial  decision  of  publishing  his  report  appears  to  have  had  two
motivations. First, as a medical practitioner, he resented the claim, implied in his patient’s account
of her illness, that he had relied entirely on “opiates” to alleviate her symptoms.95 Secondly, in the
interest of science, he intended to prevent Martineau’s cure from being numbered among the “facts”
of Animal Magnetism. In his professional opinion, Martineau’s illness had a physiological as well
as a “nervous” element, that a modern doctor would term psycho-somatic. As regards the former,
his diagnosis was: “Either prolapsus uteri or a polypous tumour, of fibrous nature,” which he denies
having ever regarded as incurable: “Knowing well that no malignant disease of the affected organ
existed, I always believed that a time would arrive, when my patient would be relieved from most of
her distressing symptoms and released from her long-continued confinement” (Greenhow, “Miss
94 Greenhow was married to Harriett Martineau’s older sister, Elizabeth.
95 Martineau declares that it was only “[a]fter my medical friend’s [Greenhow] avowal of his hopelessness” that she 
resorted to mesmerism (Letters 5).
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Martineau’s Case” 265-66).96 He somewhat bitterly complains, however, that the patient would not
accept his optimistic prognosis, 
but  seemed  always  best  satisfied  with  admissions  that  she  must  ever  remain  a
secluded invalid—an additional symptom of the morbid influence over the nervous
system, of the class of diseases in which this case must be included. Oftener than
once I have used the expression that, probably, before long, Miss M. would take up
her bed and walk. In this case the advocates of mesmerism may try to find arguments
in support of their opinions. But the experienced practitioner will have little difficulty
in  bringing  the  whole  into  harmony  with  the  well  established  laws  of  human
physiology. The condition of the uterus in December 1844, is but the natural sequel
of progressive improvement began in April; and the time had arrived when a new and
powerful stimulus only was required, to enable the enthusiastic mind of the patient to
shake of the nervous symptoms. (266)
Magnetism,  then,  was  that  stimulus.  Greenhow’s  diagnosis  depends  on  the  supposed
association between the uterus and the kind of “nervous” symptoms he describes. During the course
of  the  following  decades,  indeed,  the  term  “hysteria,”  which  implies  this  association,  would
gradually gain currency. This, of course, entailed the belief that women were more likely to develop
psychological disorders involving somatisation than men, which in turn contributed to perpetuate
the  notion that  they  were unbalanced,  and therefore less  rational.  We know now that  this  is  a
misconception: there is no significative correlation between uterine illness and neurosis. Greenhow
96 I quote Greenhow’s article from the American edition of  The Lancet, retitled  The London Lancet, mentioned by
Poe. The article appears in the January 4, 1845 issue, pp. 19-20 of the original edition of journal. The article is an
extract from the pamphlet T. M. Greenhow had published earlier that year, Medical Report of the Case of Miss H
—— M——” (London, 1845). The book mentioned only Martineau’s initials and, therefore, the article in The Lancet
was the first time she was explicitly identified in print as the subject of Greenhow’s report.
Alexis  Easley’s  Literary  Celebrity,  Gender,  and  Victorian  Authorship,  1850-1914 contains  an  in-depth
discussion of the controversy: “In his report, Greenhow disputes Martineau’s interpretation of her cure, arguing that
it resulted from the natural progression of the disease rather than from the effects of external stimuli. In doing so, he
publicized the details of her gynecological symptoms in grotesquely graphical terms. As a result of this publication
and the publicity that ensued, Martineau refused any further contact with him, personal or professional” (160).
Easley goes on to discuss the importance of this controversy in the broader context of an intense debate over the
limits of scientific inquiry.
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was undeniably subject to the preconceptions typical of the medical profession of his time. This
should not prevent us from recognising, however, the importance of his testimony in the context of
the  debate  about  Animal  Magnetism.  His  example  demonstrates  that  doctors  already  had  a
sophisticated enough understanding of the relations between the mind and the body to be able to
account for the beneficial influence of “magnetic” treatment without having to accept the theories of
the  adepts.  In  other  words,  Greenhow demonstrates  that  even at  that  early  period,  the medical
community admitted that a physical ailment could be treated, or at least mitigated, through the use
of purely psychological means, that is, by suggestion97. The mesmerists, of course, maintained that
the process involved a magnetic “fluid.”
In his review, Poe declared, as we have seen, “we equally feel the weakness of attributing
the  cure to magnetism”, thereby implying that he agreed with Newnham on this point (Rev. of
Human Magnetism 70 emphasis mine). Analysis of the sources proves otherwise: he agreed with
Greenhow. However, Poe alludes specifically to page 265 of The Lancet. On the designated page,
Greenhow writes: “The occupation of the vagina by the enlarged and retroverted uterus I wish to be
held in view” (Greenhow, “Miss Martineau’s Case” 265). Evidently, Poe also wanted his reader to
contemplate what the mesmerists had ignored, namely the clinical aspect of Martineau’s illness. In
fact, considering the kind of examination that supports Greenhow’s diagnosis, the satirical intention
of Poe’s very precise allusion becomes apparent:
97 The contemporary Scottish physician James Braid, who apparently coined the term “hypnotism,” is often credited
with emancipating “mesmerism” from the “magnetic” theory. Though this is not the place to argue the point, I
believe  this  to  be  grossly  inaccurate.  Although Braid  reviewed the  terminology,  to  make it  more  palatable  to
medical professionals, he essentially adhered to the traditional theory, and, more to the point, accepted the most
miraculous supposed “facts” of mesmerism.
Incidentally, this had been recognised in the more prudent medical circles as early as 1845. Charles Radclyffe
Hall, in an examination of the literature of “mesmerism” published in The Lancet, and which I outline below, offers
the following very lucid remarks on Braid, and other contemporary attempts to legitimise mesmerism: “At the
present time Hypnotism, the mental offspring of Mr. Braid, a surgeon at Manchester, differs from mesmerism as
previously known, in not requiring the assistance of a second person to produce the effects. Mesmero-phrenology,
phreno-magnetism,  or  phrenopathy,  is  a  combination  of  the  most  startling  parts  of  mesmerism with  the  least
probable ones in phrenology” (“On the Rise, No. 1” 322).
It should be added that Radclyffe Hall did not deny all effects, but he consistently regarded them as strictly
psychological  phenomena.  In  this  connection,  the  only  author  he  thought  had  approached  these  matters
scientifically was J. P. Catlow—not James Braid—whom, he writes, “is by no means to be enrolled amongst the
supporters of mesmerism, as commonly understood, many of his views being ingenious and philosophical” (“On
the Rise, No. 2” 405n11).
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[o]ccasional examinations of the affected organ took place, but no change could be
discovered,  excepting the appearance of  a  membranous substance at  the os  uteri,
which, generally, scarcely protruded beyond its lips, though occasionally described as
larger, resembling the appearance observed at Venice, though smaller. It proceeded
from the uterus, and had no attachment to the neck, the finger passing round it on all
sides, naturally giving rise to the renewed supposition that the uterus contained a
polypus  growth,  whose  separation  might  be  effected  by  time.  (Greenhow,  “Miss
Martineau’s Case” 265 emphasis mine)
Anyone wishing to “examine all sides of a question,” Poe wrote, “would do well to dip into”
page 265 of The Lancet. Through his allusion, he forces us, as it were, to dip into the “matter” by
proxy. In the context, the choice of this verb is, of course, positively mischievous. But Poe knew
very well that he was safe; that neither the general public nor the editors of magazines of general
circulation were in the habit of reading scientific journals. And here lies the sharpest barb of his
review. Poe intimates that, by submitting to misplaced notions of decorum, the press favored the
propagation of humbugs like Animal Magnetism, which he so cunningly exposes to ridicule.
Poe’s allusion to The London Lancet is also significant in another respect. Newnham stated
that only a physician could successfully defeat the skepticism about the “facts” of magnetism. He
thus suggests that no inquiry into the matter had yet been attempted by a physician. Poe, displaying
a medical reading which Newnham evidently did not possess, shows that this was not the case. The
same volume of the Lancet that contained the letter by Harriet Martineau’s physician also contained
the first installments of a long and detailed study of the subject by Charles Radclyffe Hall, entitled
“On the Rise,  Progress,  and Mysteries  of  Mesmerism in  All  Ages and Countries.”  This  was a
thoroughgoing and well  documented examination of the opinions of all the leading magnetisers
going  back  to  Mesmer  himself.  Poe  found  Newnham’s  book  “illogical  throughout;”  Radclyffe
conclusively demonstrates that the majority of the books written on the subject, from which he
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quotes liberally, were equally illogical. A common misconception regarding the early debate over
Animal  Magnetism is  that  the  adepts  upheld  the  therapeutic  virtues  of  suggestion  against  the
skeptics, who denied it. In reality, it was the other way around. Radclyffe Hall thought that so called
“magnetic” cures, such as Martineau’s, whose case involved a real physiological element, illustrated
what  became  known  as  the  placebo  effect,  while  the  adepts  attributed  it  to  the  action  of
“magnetism.”98
Along with the report of the first French commission charged with the examination of the
claims  of  the  mesmerists,  led  by  Benjamin  Franklin,  and which  had long been translated  into
English, Radclyffe Hall’s treatise is a must read for anyone interested in examining the controversy.
These are the true forerunners of the scientific study of hypnotism and suggestion. Poe evidently
knew both sides of the question and was not impressed with the arguments that had been presented
by the mesmerists. Radclyffe Hall notices that these invariably employed the age-old argument of
authority. Exasperated, he makes the following answer: “As well might one hesitate to disbelieve in
the elixir of life and transmutation of metals, because he had not examined and refuted the thousand
facts, so called, on the numerous works on occult science! If we can disprove the facts asserted in
every similar instance, we may safely neglect the others recorded, of many of the conditions of
which we must necessarily be ignorant” (Hall, “On the Rise. No. 1” 216).99
98  Indeed,  Greenhow’s  text  demonstrates  his  awareness  of  the  importance  of  the  placebo  effect,  which  is
generally  recognised  by modern  medicine,  as  the  following passages from a  modern  manual  of  general  medicine
illustrates: “We now know that the administration of placebos may have profound effects, both good and bad. (…) This
(…) becomes more understandable and is put into perspective once one recognises that there are 2 components of the
placebo response. One is the anticipation (usually optimistic) of effects because of the expectations associated with
medication. One can call this ‘suggestibility,’ ‘faith,’ ‘hope,’ or whatever. / The (second) component, however, is at
times even more important—spontaneous change. If a placebo has been taken before improvement, it may be given
credit” (“Placebo” 1527-28).
Greenhow  evidently  thought  this  second  component  was  chiefly  responsible  for  Martineau’s  faith  in
mesmerism.  He also  thought,  of  course,  the  symptoms had  themselves  been  aggravated  by  his  patient’s  negative
expectations. This demonstrates, I think, his awareness of the mechanisms of suggestion, and even of its potential for
therapeutic uses.
99 Radclyffe Hall quotes Colquhoun, author of Isis Revelata, according to whom critics had to “prove that their authors
‘were and are fools, or knaves and liars,” and that nature herself  is ‘an arrant quack and impostor;’ before they can ‘be
allowed to boast of having refuted animal magnetism’” (“On the Rise. No. 1” 216).
Poe  remarked  that  the  logic  of  Newnham  was  flawed;  Colquhoun  was  no  less  remarkable  for  illogical
reasoning. Bruce Mills, however, completely missing the point of Poe’s review of Human Magnetism, sets Colquhoun
as a model of scientific reasoning, and as a following in the footsteps of the likes of Newton and Copernicus: “scientists
and scholars repeatedly reminded readers of the need to practice intellectual humility in the face of new and remarkable
findings,” and Colquhoun had attempted to lead people “to more enlightened understandings of human will and the
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It  may appear  to  my reader  that  I  digress.  It  appears  to  me,  however,  that  this  episode
demonstrates that Poe never really endorsed the common “transcendentalist” approach to science. In
fact,  in  his  review of  Human Magnetism,  he  ridiculed  it  by  the  same kind of  allusion  he had
employed in “Ligeia.” And the popular narrative of Martineau’s case which he indirectly ridicules
has something else in common with Poe’s tale. Sex, though ostensibly absent, is at the heart of the
matter. But sex had become a forbidden subject for a magazinist like Poe, and therefore had to be
obfuscated. Supposedly for their own good, the general public was being prevented from forming
informed opinions on matters that were discussed openly in specialised forums. Evidently, this was
done with a view to spare the gentle female reader.
Gilbert and Gubar have argued that the rejection of carnality that characterised patriarchal
discourses resulted in a sort of symbolical mutilation of the female body.  Duessa, a female witch in
Spenser’s The Fairie Queene, who “is deformed below the waist,” 
significantly (…) deceives  and ensnares  men by assuming the shape of  Una, the
beautiful and angelic heroine who represents Christianity, charity, docility. Similarly,
Lucifera [another character in Spenser] lives in what seems to be a lovely mansion, a
cunningly  constructed  House  of  Pride  whose  weak  foundation  and  ruinous  rear
quarters are carefully concealed. Both women use their arts of deception to entrap
and destroy men, and the secret, shameful ugliness of both is closely associated with
their hidden genitals—that is, with their femaleness. (Gilbert and Gubar, Madwoman
30)
operations of the mind,” in works he describes as “fully researched examinations of animal magnetism” which “include
extensive reviews of published material” (Poe, Fuller 22-23).
Colquhoun, of course, did much more than advocate scientific “humility”—he preached wholesale credulity. In
any case, Mills shows complete insensibility to the signs of irony in Poe’s review. More importantly, he evidently did
not follow his clue to The Lancet. Mills writes: “For modern readers who look back on Franz Anton Mesmer’s theory of
animal magnetism and nineteenth-century studies of mesmeric consciousness as ‘pseudo’-science, it is easy to fall into
the kind of skepticism that Emerson apparently felt and to attribute evidence of inexplicable powers to both skillful
trickery and deception” (Poe, Fuller x). Here he suggests that no one at the time saw the “facts” of animal magnetism as
pseudo-science. Yet, this is precisely how Radclyffe Hall looked at the phenomenon as early as 1845—and he was not
alone.
379
I  think  the  irony  in  both  “Ligeia”  and  the  review  of  Human  Magnetism constitutes  a
deliberate challenge to the ideology that had determined the suppression of sexual identity, and
sexuality itself. Poe’s mischievous allusions, and sly innuendos inexorably lead, precisely, to the
female genitalia. And, by this act of indirect exposure of what, according to the prevailing ideology
of his time, should remain hidden, he also highlights the potentially disastrous consequences of
ignoring a fundamental dimension of human experience.
As I see it, “Ligeia” is a tale about sex, in all senses of the word. But his review of Animal
Magnetism shows us, albeit in a humorous fashion, that this was a subject that could only be treated,
at  least  in the generalist press, by stealth—through suggestion. And suggestion could be a very
dangerous thing. The narrator of “Ligeia,” for example, influenced by the misogynous Glanvill, felt
it  was dangerous to look into Ligeia’s eyes, but could not remember exactly why. However, he
appears to have had no qualms about raping, and even killing women. Indeed, the definitive version
of the femicide moral of the tale depends on Glanvill. It goes more or less as follows: “It is safe for
a man to rape, or even to kill a witch—and all women are potential witches—, just as long as he
does not look her in the eye.” And this, the horrible truth about the femicide, was in turn what the
public was not being allowed to look in the eye.
380
6 — The Philosophy of Decomposition: “Ligeia” and Memoirs of the Rev. William 
Tennent, Jr.
Up to this point, I have proceeded to a systematical examination of the many supposed facts
that  support  the narrator’s  supernatural  thesis,  with a view to show that  they are,  in  fact,  very
questionable interpretations of the real facts, none of which can be said to be free from suggestion.
However, a supposed medical fact still stands that would invalidate my conclusion that the corpse of
Rowena and the ghost of Ligeia were two separate entities that the narrator had merged in his
delirium, fuelled conjountly by guilt and by his desire for the dead.
What the narrator terms a “drama of revivification” could equally be described as a drama of
mortification.  Indeed, the narrator claims that “each terrific relapse was only into a sterner and
apparently more irredeemable death” (Poe, “Ligeia” 329). He indirectly backs his assertion, some
lines below, by boasting “no little medical reading” (328). In itself, however, his sentence is not
very flattering for the narrator’s pretensions. Are we to understand that the adjective “irredeemable”
varies in degree? Does he mean to imply that the corpse was getting “deader?” This is, of course,
absurd,  for  death  is,  by  definition,  irredeemable.  But,  quite  apart  from  this  terminological
impropriety,  which  manifests  the narrator’s  confusion,  there is  something else in  the  narrator’s
reasoning that totally invalidates both his conclusion and his pretensions to medical knowledge. He
thought that Rowena’s corpse looked much  deader than it should have been at that point—dead,
say, as only Ligeia could have been.
This, however, contrary to his suggestions, is not a medical fact. I said the narrator does not
lie, but he does make mistakes. I am afraid this piece of supposed medico-legal evidence is an
instance of this. Sitting on his ottoman, he had the sensation the corpse was coming back to life.
“Suddenly,” however, “the color fled, the pulsation ceased, the lips resumed the expression of the
dead, and, in an instant afterward, the whole body took upon itself the icy chilliness, the livid hue,
the intense rigidity, the sunken outline, and all the loathsome peculiarities of that which had been,
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for many days, a tenant of the tomb” (Poe, "Ligeia" 328). He seems to know what he is looking for,
thus demonstrating that he was indeed acquainted with medical literature. However, the conclusion
that he draws from this evidence is not backed by the medical literature. One does not need a degree
in medicine to know this is  not what a corpse would have looked like after “many days.” The
narrator appears to be wholly unaware of putrefaction.
The state in which he found Rowena, after those elusive signs of life subsided, is exactly
what one would expect of a day-old corpse. For the narrator has just accurately described signs of
recent decease which were already well known to doctors of that period, including rigor, algor, and
livor mortis.100 He had evidently read somewhere that these signs were used to determine the time of
death, as indicated by his boast, but had forgotten what they meant. Thus, he actually displays no
little medical misreading. This is not all that surprising. After all, we already knew he was not much
of a student.
Thus,  we  once  again  discover  the  narrator  presents  as  wonderful  a  fact  which,  being
perfectly consistent with basic, well known laws of nature, was entirely predictable. Thus, we find
here at  work the same sort  of  irony of  the episode of the shadow. Given his  ignorance of  the
philosophy  of  the  decomposition  of  corpses,  the  narrator  took  the  supposedly  wonderful
“mortification” of Rowena as proof that he was not just imagining things, and this in turn somewhat
paradoxically confirmed him in the belief that Ligeia had briefly, and miraculously, come to life.
Indeed, the supposed fact of Rowena’s body being much “deader” than it should is decisive to
establish the impression that a miracle took place.
In view of this, there is even a sort of humor—let us call it mortician humor—in the phrase
the narrator employs to describe the first of the multiple supposed “relapses” of Rowena: “all the
100 Indeed,  The Cyclopædia of  Practical  Medicine  (1832-5),  a common medical  reference work, contained a long
article by T. E. Beatty entitled “Persons Found Dead” in which all these signs of death are described in considerable
detail.
The article even mentions “[t]hat peculiar cast of countenance termed from its first describer the Hippocratic.”
This is what Poe’s narrator terms “sunken outline.” The word “sunken,” indeed, is prominent in the translation of
Hippocrates classical description provided by Beatty: “‘The forehead wrinkled and dry; the eye sunken; (…) the
temples sunken, hollow, and retired; (…) the cheeks sunken’” (319). 
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usual rigorous stiffness immediately supervened” (Poe, "Ligeia" 327). “Rigorous stiffness” is an
unjustifiable pleonasm, the first word of the pair being cognate with “rigor” (as in  rigor mortis),
which is Latin for “stiffness.” This linguistic blunder, of which the meticulous Poe must have been
aware, appears to be another consequence of that medical misreading which helped the would-be
coroner confuse Rowena with the entombed Ligeia. The real point of the joke, however, is that the
“usual” stiffness “supervened” on schedule, for it is indeed usual for rigor mortis to set in within the
first  twenty-four  hours  after  decease.  Although  the  bio-chemical  mechanism  underlying  the
phenomenon was not yet understood, the fact itself was already common knowledge for well-read
doctors in Poe’s day. The Cyclopædia of Practical Medicine (1832-5), for example, clarified that:
“The rigidity of the body is a criterion of great value, as it points out the general contraction of the
muscular fibres that occurs shortly after dissolution;” the article also points out that some diseases
produced a similar stiffness, but that this  “can never be confounded with cadaverous rigidity if
proper attention be paid to the facts connected with it; for” in such cases “it takes place immediately
after the invasion of the disease, and always precedes apparent death,” which was evidently not the
case  with  Rowena  (Beatty,  “Persons  Found  Dead”  318).  The  same  source  points  out  that  the
stiffness is fleeting, and that “it is only when suppleness is restored that putrefaction commences”
(318).  The  rigidity  of  Rowena’s  body,  in  short,  is  not  strange  at  all;  on  the  other  hand,  the
persistence of that rigidity for “many days,” which the narrator regards as a normal occurrence,
would be truly wonderful.
Apart  from  the  confusion  between  Ligeia  and  Rowena,  the  most  important  clue  that
indicates that the “drama of revivification” was an illusion is the intermittency of the supposed signs
of reanimation mentioned by the narrator. He claims, for example, that the heart of the woman
before him—whoever she was—had a pulse, but that this  entirely ceased as soon as he started
“reanimating”  her.  This  sequence  is  then  repeated  an  indeterminate  number  of  times.  I  am
convinced that Poe picked up the details of this “drama” in a very obscure book, to which I suspect
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his  phrase “a  tenant  of  the  tomb” is  a  punning allusion:  the anonymous biography of  William
Tennent, Jr., attributed to Elias Boudinot (1740-1821), published in 1827 in Philadelphia with the
suggestive  title  Memoirs  of  the  Life  of  the  Rev.  William  Tennent,  Formerly  Pastor  of  the
Presbyterian Church at Freehold, in New Jersey, in which is contained among other interesting
particulars, an Account of his being Three Days in a Trance, and Apparently Lifeless.101 The subject
of the biography, William Tennent, Jr. (1705-1777) was the second son of William Tennent, Sr., an
Irish Minister who came to America in 1718 with his wife and four sons and who is now mostly
remembered as the founder of the “Log College,” the predecessor of the College of New Jersey,
which still later became Princeton University. 
William Tennent, Jr. had in his youth, sometime before 1733, been apparently dead for three
days.102 However, he completely recovered from this crisis. In fact, after enjoying a relatively long
life—certainly what would be considered a long life in those days—he died a natural death in 1777.
The written account  of  his  trance and subsequent  resuscitation from which I  have derived this
information appeared many years later, in 1806. The parallel between the extraordinary episode in
Tennent’s biography, as told by Boudinot—presuming he is indeed the author of the anonymous
biography of the former pastor of Freehold—, and the corresponding passages in “Ligeia” is very
striking. As we have seen, Rowena’s (or Ligeia’s) body did not exhibit, as the narrator thought, “all
the loathsome peculiarities of that which has been, for many days, a tenant of the tomb;” in fact, it
exhibited none of them (Poe, "Ligeia" 328). Yet, although it did not look like a tenant of the tomb,
the  corpse  presented  all  those peculiarities,  with  a  single,  decisive  exception,  that  the  body of
101 According to Archibald Alexander, which included the narrative in his Biographical Sketches of the Founder, and
Principal Alumni of the Log College  (1845), the text had been published originally in  The Assembly’s Literary
Magazine in 1806, “and although it was not accompanied with the author’s name, it was well understood to be from
the pen of the Hon. Elias Boudinot.” Alexander remarks, however, that Boudinot should be regarded more as the
editor of the narrative,  “the greater part” of which “was written,  at  his request,  by the late Dr.  Henderson,  of
Freehold” (Biographical Sketches 161).
My quotations were taken from what appears to be the earliest publication of the narrative in book form, from
1827. Other editions of the pamphlet followed in 1828, 1833, 1847 and 1848. I could not locate the magazine
edition mentioned by Alexander.
102 The biography does not provide an exact date for the extraordinary events which concern us here. It stated only that
they took place sometime before October 1733, when Tennent became the pastor of the Presbyterian Church of
Freehold, New Jersey (see Boudinot, Memoirs 23).
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William Tennent, whose name is a perfect homophone of “tenant,” had exhibited during the three
days that mediated between his apparent death and supposed resurrection.
Tennent  was then going through an especially trying period in his  life:  “After  a regular
course  of  study  in  theology,”  he  “was  preparing  for  his  examination  by  the  Presbytery,  as  a
candidate for the Gospel ministry. His intense application afflicted his health, and brought on a pain
in his breast, and slight hectic” (Boudinot, Life 12). Finally overcome, as it seems, by the excessive
strain of his studies,  “he fainted and died away” (12).  Here,  Tennent’s collapse is ambiguously
referred by a phrase that allows two interpretations, both actual and apparent death. This ambiguity
pervades the whole narrative, just as it does the final scene of “Ligeia,” where, as we have seen, the
narrator wonders whether Rowena might not have been prematurely pronounced dead. Tennent’s
biographer, however, will later unambiguously betray his conviction that Tennent had not merely
fainted, but actually died.
Certain signs indicate, however, that a medical friend of Tennent’s, “a young man who was
attached to him by the strictest and warmest friendship,” did not share that opinion (Boudinot, Life
12).  As it  seems,  this  medical  friend is  the  unsung hero  of  the  tale.  He appears  to  have  very
narrowly  avoided  the  premature  burial  of  the  future  pastor  of  Freehold.  Gilbert  Tennent,  the
supposed deceased’s brother,  being perfectly convinced of William, Jr.’s death, arranged for his
body to be prepared for burial. During the process: “one of the persons who had assisted in laying
out the body thought he had observed a little tremor of the flesh under the arm,” but no one but the
medical friend valued the report: “he endeavoured to ascertain the fact. He first put his own hand
into warm water, to make it as sensible as possible, and then felt under the arm, and at the heart, and
affirmed that he felt an unusual warmth, though no one else could” (12, 13). Incidentally, I would
like to point out the ambiguity of this sentence, which, without positively denying it, does not make
clear whether the doctor verified the “tremor”—I will discuss the significance of this later on. Apart
from these discreet signs of animation, the appearance of Tennent’s body, “the eyes (…) sunk, the
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lips discoloured, and the whole body (…) cold and stiff,” being consistent with death, his brother
was disposed to  proceed with  the  burial,  scheduled  for  the  following day;  nevertheless,  at  the
doctor’s request, he consented to postpone the ceremony for three days, during which “all probable
means were used to discover symptoms of returning life” (13). Tennent, then, seemed at this point
as ambiguously poised between life and death as Rowena’s body appeared to her husband during
her wake. Indeed, the signs of life mentioned by Boudinot are very similar to those noticed by the
narrator of Poe’s tale, whose account of the matter contains, moreover, many of the key words of
the corresponding passages in Tennent’s biography: he too speaks of “a tremor upon the lips,” of “a
slight  pulsation at  the  heart,”  and  even  of  “a  warmth”  that  “pervaded  the  whole  frame  (Poe,
“Ligeia” 328, emphasis mine). And then, the body of Rowena also exhibits all the  signs of death
listed by Tennent’s biographer, including stiffness, coldness, discoloration of the skin, and even
“sunken eyes” (328).
Meanwhile, the three days’ reprieve having elapsed without any noticeable change in the
“dead” man’s condition, he was about to be buried, as planned. At this point, however, a “drama of
revivification” very nearly resembling that of Rowena began in earnest. As the young doctor, still
hopeful, was—or so the biographer tells us—in the course of applying an “emollient ointment (…)
with a feather” to the parched tongue of Tennent: 
the body, to the great alarm and astonishment of all present, opened its eyes, gave a
dreadful groan, and sank again into apparent death. This put an end to all thoughts of
burying him, and every effort was again employed, in hopes of bringing about a
speedy  resuscitation.  In  about  an  hour,  the  eyes  again  opened,  a  heavy  groan
proceeded from the body, and again all appearance of animation vanished. In another
hour, life seemed to return with more power, and a complete revival took place, to
the  great  joy  of  the  family  and  friends,  and  to  the  no  small  astonishment  and
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conviction of the very many who had been ridiculing the idea of restoring to life a
dead body. (Boudinot, Memoirs 14-15)
The unaccountable oscillation between “animation” and “apparent death” in “Ligeia,” then,
is not, as has always been supposed,  entirely unprecedented—Tennent’s story contains all its key
elements. As the mourners in Boudinot’s story are startled by a “groan,” only to see Tennent sink
again into lifelessness, so the narrator of “Ligeia” was first aroused by “a sob, low, gentle, but very
distinct,” which he “felt  (…) came from the bed of ebony,” but claims that shortly afterwards “a
relapse had taken place” (Poe, “Ligeia” 326).103 Even the timings are similar. Boudinot tells us that
after an interval of an hour Tennent uttered a second “groan;” likewise, the narrator of “Ligeia”
reports that “an (..) hour” had “elapsed” when he “was a second time aware of some vague sound
issuing from the region of the bed” (this time, he no longer doubted it came from the corpse), which
sound being repeated he concluded “it  was a sigh” (327).  Equally significant is the fact of the
restorative manoeuvres having proven initially unsuccessful on both Tennent’s and Rowena’s case,
although “every effort” was “employed” on the former, and “every exertion which experience, and
no  little  medical  reading,  could  suggest”  on  the  latter  (Poe,  "Ligeia"  328).  This  verbal  echo,
culminating a long line of coincidences,  practically confirms that Poe’s “drama” is a deliberate
reworking of Boudinot’s extraordinary narrative. And the coincidences do not stop there.
In  both  cases,  the  unproductive  attempts  at  reanimation  were  apparently  succeeded  by
complete revival. However, these reanimations are very different in nature. Rowena, the narrator
believes, never came back to life—he supposes Ligeia did, but only very briefly. Afterwards, as Poe
indicated in his letter to Cooke, Rowena would finally be interred as Rowena. This suggests, as I
have  repeatedly  remarked,  that  Rowena  had  not  been  only  apparently,  but  actually  dead.  In
103 He “felt” it came from the bed of ebony—he was not certain. He insists: “I could not have been deceived. I  had
heard the noise, however faint” (Poe, "Ligeia" 326). As I stated before, there is nothing extraordinary about his
hearing noises. This suggests that he misconstrued the noise, and this would in turn mean that Rowena suffered no
“relapse,” as he claims, but remained dead throughout. As usual, however, the narrator decides it really was a sob
later on, from the evidence of other, equally ambiguous impressions.
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Tennent’s  case,  however,  the  resuscitation  was  certainly  real,  which  suggests,  in  turn,  that  his
“death” had been only apparent.
In fact, the evidence for this seems to have been much stronger than Boudinot suggests. The
drama of  alternating  revival  and  mortification,  in  particular,  appears  to  have  been  a  complete
fabrication. Through most of the narrative, the biographer keeps a pretense of scientific detachment
by avoiding outright statements that Tennent had been dead, and employing instead such ambiguous
expressions as “apparent death” to refer to his state after the collapse. Thus, he suggests that, despite
being stiff,  pale,  cold and motionless,  Tennent could have been alive.  By the end of the story,
however, throwing caution to the wind, the writer states that the idea of restoring life to a “a dead
body” was not ridiculous, thus indirectly assuming, for the first time, what had remained doubtful
up to that point, to wit, that Tennent had, like a modern-day Lazarus, been raised from the dead.
To support this  idea,  the author,  who was not  a  direct witness to the events  he reports,
appears to  have slightly distorted the evidence contained in a document that  is  presumably his
source  for  this  epoch  in  Tennent’s  life.  Being  “solicitous  to  obtain  any  confirmation  of  this
extraordinary event,” he “wrote to every person he could think of, likely to have conversed with Mr.
Tennent on the subject” (Boudinot, Life 18-19n). In a footnote to his text, he transcribes in full the
written testimony of the man who succeeded Tennent in the ministry of the Presbyterian church of
Freehold, New Jersey, who had obtained his information directly from Tennent’s mouth, who in turn
had been told by his friends what happened while he was unconscious, and presumed dead.104
As we have seen, Boudinot says that the “tremor” was first identified by an unidentified
person, who brought it to the attention of the medical friend, who then tried to confirm the report. I
must remind my reader that this “tremor” was felt under the left arm, and is, therefore, a very good
indication that Tennent’s heart was beating.105 Although this is not directly stated, the main narrative
104 Boudinot never names the author of this letter.
105 Also conspicuously absent from the letter is any reference to “groans.” Signs of partial reanimation prior to total
revival are mentioned, but these are far less spectacular than Boudinot makes them. He tells us that everyone noticed
these reanimations, and that after each all signs of animation vanished, none of which is corroborated by the letter,
which contains only Tennent’s own account of an intermittent reanimation. The minister supposedly told Boudinot’s
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conveys the impression that the “tremor,” which is there mentioned only once, was not confirmed
by the doctor, who instead discovered  another sign of life which no one else could confirm, an
“unusual warmth”—unusual, of course, for a corpse. This is not corroborated by the unidentified
correspondent whose testimony appears in the footnote, according to which the “young doctor,”
William’s “particular friend,” convinced Gilbert Tennent to postpone his brother’s funeral for three
days, alleging “the tremor under the arm continued. (…) During this interval many means were
made use of  to discover,  if  possible,  some symptoms of life;  but  none appeared excepting the
tremor” (Boudinot,  Life 19n emphasis mine). That  other sign of life, the “warmth,” is not even
mentioned. More importantly, of course, the letter explicitly states that the doctor confirmed what
seems to have been a pulse. According to this, then, he never attempted to reanimate a “dead body.”
On the contrary, he was evidently trying to convince Gilbert Tennent that his brother was still very
much alive, and being ridiculed by him for his pains: “What! a man not dead who is cold and stiff as
a stake?” (219n). Finally, the letter also makes clear that the pulse on the supposed corpse never
disappeared until a complete revival took place.
Incidentally, the phrase “all probable means were used to discover symptoms of returning
life” of the main narrative, which I have quoted earlier, is an evident paraphrase of the letter in the
footnote.  There are many other  parallelisms between the two texts which suggest that this  was
Boudinot’s  main  source  of  information  for  these  events.  The  suggestion  of  resurrection  is
strengthened, of course, by the claim that the body had strangely oscillated between life and death
for  a  while  before  a  complete  revival  took  place,  and  that  several  unsuccessful  attempts  at
reanimation had been made. This too is  entirely absent from what is presumably the source of
Boudinot’s  account,  which  states  that,  at  the  end  of  the  three-days  reprieve,  the  doctor  had
convinced Gilbert  to further postpone the burial  by succeeding periods of “one hour,” “half  an
correspondent that he had been ordered back to his body, and that this filled him with disgust: “nothing could have
shocked me more: I cried out, Lord, must I go back! With this shock I opened my eyes in this world. When I saw I was
in this world I fainted, then came to, and fainted for several times, as one probably would naturally have done in so
weak a situation” (qtd. in Boudinot,  Memoirs  20n). Boudinot apparently embellished this relatively tame narrative to
make it more impressive.
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hour,” and, finally, “a  quarter of an hour: when just at the close of this period, on which hung his
last hope, Mr. [William] Tennent opened his eyes. They then pried open his mouth, which was stiff,
so as to get a quill into it, through which some liquid was conveyed into the stomach, and he by
degrees recovered” (Boudinot, Life 20n). Judging from this statement, the revivification of Tennent
appears to have been not nearly as dramatic as the biographer intimates in the main text.
If the letter  was, as it  appears, the source of Boudinot’s narrative,  the idea that Tennent
twice “sank again into apparent death” before a complete revival took place may have been inspired
by a passage of the letter which contains Tennent’s own account of the matter, as heard by the
unidentified correspondent (Boudinot,  Life 14).106 The reverend was convinced that his spirit had
temporarily left his body, and been wafted to the presence of God. Much to his chagrin, he was then
ordered back to the body he had abandoned: “nothing could have shocked me more (…). With this
shock, I opened my eyes in this world. When I saw I was in this world I fainted, then came to, and
fainted for several times, as one probably would have done in so weak a situation” (20n).
Thus, it becomes clear that the biographer had either tampered with the evidence, or at least
rejected  such  testimony  as  indicated  that  Tennent  had  almost  been  buried  alive.  Archibald
Alexander,  who reprinted  this  account  in  Biographical  Sketches  of  the  Founder,  and Principal
Alumni of the Log College (1845), remarks that the story of William Tennent’s trance had been well-
known by hearsay long before it was printed: 
There can be no doubt about the authenticity of the facts here stated, however they
may be accounted for. The writer has heard the same facts from elderly persons, who
never  had  seen  this  published  account;  and  they  were  so  public,  that  they  were
generally known, not only to the people of this part of the country, but they were
currently reported and fully  believed,  in  other  states.  The writer  has  heard them,
familiarly talked of in Virginia, from his childhood. (161)
106 It might be remarked that the phrase “sank again into apparent death” expresses the same thought that the narrator 
of “Ligeia” embodies in “a relapse had taken place” (Poe, “Ligeia” 327).
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Another reference to the case appears in William Leete Stone’s Letter to Doctor A. Brigham,
on Animal Magnetism (1837), where it is evoked to support the mesmerists’ claims of extra-bodily
experiences: 
why deny to the ethereal spirit, when in such a state [mesmeric trance], the power of
visiting,  in its imagination,  other climes and other spheres, for its amusement,  its
wonder,  or its  instruction? Is  it  more wonderful than the trance of Tennant  [sic],
whose spirit,  without controversy, did thus leave its tenement of clay, and behold
things more glorious than that holy man dared to describe?” (60). 
The misspelling of Tennent’s name certainly suggests that Stone had the story only from
hearsay, though the mistake could be a typo. In any event, I suspect the lapse—either Stone’s or the
typographer’s—may have suggested to Poe the pun with which I believe he intended to allude—or
rather to confirm his buried allusion—to the Memoirs of the Life of the Rev. William Tennent, which
I regard, on the evidence outlined in the previous pages, as Poe’s source for the details of Rowena-
Ligeia’s supposed revivification.107
By thus mentioning en passant Tennent’s case, Stone also suggests that the story was being
presented in  spiritualist  circles  as  providing positive  proof  that  the  spirit  could  leave the body
without death. One suspects the rumor was that Tennent had been dead for three days. My guess is
that Boudinot, or the man from whom he commissioned the biography of Tennent, was convinced
of this, and, no doubt realising that some of the information with which he had been provided, most
notably that persistent tremor on the region of the heart, strongly suggested he had only fainted,
adapted  the  testimony  to  accommodate  his  preestablished  idea.  Although  the  procedure  is
107 That Poe had no great regard for Stone is clearly indicated both by his review of his novel Ups and Downs in the 
Life of a Distressed Gentleman, which Poe suggested “should have been printed among the quack advertisements, 
in a spare corner” of The New York Commercial Advertiser, of which Stone was then the editor (218), and by the 
epigrammatic humorous analysis of his “handwriting” Poe would later devote to him in his “Autography” and “A 
Chapter on Autography.
In the last of these articles, published in two parts in November and December 1841 in Graham’s Magazine, 
Poe specifically mentioned Stone’s “defence of Animal magnetism,” along with the aforementioned novel and “his 
pamphlets concerning Maria Monk,” conferring on all three the dubious distinction of being “scarcely the most 
absurd” of the writer’s abundant output (“A Chapter on Autography” 214).
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technically  fraudulent,  the  fact  of  the  letter  containing  all  the  information  that  contradicts  his
hypothesis being appended in a footnote bespeaks his fundamental honesty. Indeed, the writer’s
awkward,  and  sometimes  amusing  attempts  at  misdirection  seem  to  me  more  suggestive  of
ingenuity than guile. A good illustration of this is his misrepresentation of the procedure employed
by the medical friend to convey, by means of a “quill,” some water to the stomach of the afflicted
Tennent, who, after three days of inanimation, can be presumed to have been in a state of severe
dehydration. Boudinot, as we have seen, places this occurrence at the beginning of Tennent’s trance,
thus directly contradicting the following passage of the letter, according to which this would have
taken place immediately before Tennent’s  revival,  and flatly  denies  the avowed purpose of the
procedure: 
He  [the  doctor  friend]  had  discovered  that  the  tongue  was  much  swoln,  and
threatened to crack. He was endeavouring to soften it by some emollient ointment put
upon it with a feather, when the brother came in (…), and mistaking what the doctor
was doing for an attempt to feed him [Tennent], manifested some resentment, and
said, in a spirited tone, ‘It is shameful to be feeding a lifeless corpse.’ (Boudinot, Life
14). 
The physician would no doubt agree with this statement—he knew, of course, that he was
providing much-needed nourishment to a living, albeit probably very enfeebled, person.
In retelling the story of the “resurrection” of William Tennent, Jr., the biographer appears to
have kept all that was consistent with the spiritualist thesis, twisting or omitting all that was not.
The end result,  however,  was far  from convincing—even less  convincing,  let  it  be said  to  the
writer’s credit, than it would have been had the compromising letter been omitted. Writing in 1845,
Archibald Alexander recognised the obvious fact that Tennent had been in what may be called a
state of suspended animation, and that his friend had saved him from the ignorance of his brother:
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It may be acknowledged, that some of the facts recorded in the preceding, are of a
marvelous nature; but we are inclined to believe that they all may be accounted for
on  natural  principles,  except  one.108 The  appearance  of  death,  when  life  is  not
extinguished, but only suspended, has been often observed, on the termination of
nervous fevers, and in epileptic and apoplectic. (…) Persons have been known to lie
in one of these trances, for weeks together. And there is too much reason to fear, that
many persons have been buried alive, by being prematurely carried to the grave. This
undoubtedly would have been the unhappy case of Mr. Tennent, had not his young
friend interposed. And as to the happy state of his mind, during this period, and his
imagining that he was in heaven, it is all very natural, and does not require that we
should suppose the soul to have been separated from the body. (…) in certain states
of the nervous system, when the common functions of life seem to be suspended, it is
no uncommon thing for the imagination to be strongly affected.
(Biographical Sketches 222-223 emphasis mine)
I am perfectly convinced that Poe deliberately alludes in “Ligeia” to this story, which I am
sure he knew had had a tremendous impact on people like Col. Stone. The irony in this allusion is
obvious. Even though his body was stiff, cold, and discoulored as a corpse in the first stages of
decomposition, Tennent’s heart was still beating. Boudinot appears to have altered the narrative so
as to make it appear that Tennent’s heart had ceased to beat, and therefore that he had really been
dead for three days, before reluctantly renewing his lease on life. The whole point of the alteration
was to make the outcome of the story, Tennent’s final awakening to a long and healthy life, appear
positively miraculous. For what had been, in his time, a technical knowledge possessed only by
some  particularly  well-informed  people,  like  the  medical  friend,  had  in  the  meantime  become
common knowledge: the absence of a heartbeat was a sure sign of death, whereas rigidity, low body
108 This exception is a premonitory dream (see Alexander, Biographical Sketches 229-230).
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temperature,  and  discoloration  were  not.  This  knowledge,  of  course,  contributed  to  dispel  the
impression that death was not always irredeemable. Thus, what might, in less enlightened times,
have been taken as a resurrection, became a cautionary tale illustrating the danger of premature
burial, and this in despite of Boudinot’s creative retelling of the facts.
The irony is that in the case of Rowena-Ligeia the impossible drama that appears to have
been  concocted  by  Boudinot  appears to  have  actually  taken  place.  The  narrator  mentions  an
intermittent heartbeat, and a cycle of reanimations and mortifications, both of which are, according
to  the  accepted  laws  of  nature,  absolute  impossibilities.  Of  course,  the  presumable  aim of  the
alterations Boudinot made to the original tale was precisely that of forcing the reader to conclude
that Tennent had been dead. However, since the facts reported by the biographer appear to have
been a fabrication, we have to conclude instead, as Alexander did, that Tennent was in suspended
animation. Conversely, the facts reported by the narrator of “Ligeia,” inasmuch as there is a viable
rational explanation for them that militates against the narrator’s theory, appear not to have been
fabricated and, therefore, we are forced to conclude that Rowena was dead, and remained dead
throughout the whole scene, despite his claims to the effect that she had been hovering between life
and death. Indeed, the possibility of a miracle is clearly discredited, as Poe himself pointed out, by
the fact, recognized by the narrator himself, that she never came back to life. Moreover, while the
fact that Tennent  had a pulse had,  according to the letter  in the footnote,  been noticed by two
different witnesses, and then confirmed by the doctor’s repeated examinations, Rowena’s pulsation
was  not  verified by external testimony. In fact, it was not even confirmed by the narrator’s own
examinations. From this, and from the impossibility of the supposed fact—an intermittent heartbeat
—the narrator should have concluded he was deluded—that he was dreaming about the pulsation he
had found on Ligeia’s body, many days previously. In short, all the indications that suggest both that
the return of Ligeia was an illusion and that Rowena was dead, inexorably lead to the conclusion
that the narrator of the tale had attempted what Tennent’s friend evidently did not, that is, to revive a
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corpse. The ridicule reflects, of course, on Colonel Stone and Boudinot, who, in their eagerness to
confirm their faith, had not been too scrupulous with their facts.
395
7 — The Vampire Motif in “Wake Not the Dead” and “Ligeia”
M. R. James (1862-1936), one of England’s foremost authors of ghost stories, once wrote:
“It is not amiss sometimes to leave a loophole for a natural explanation, but, I would say, let the
loophole be so narrow as not to be quite practicable” (qtd. in Tracy ix-x). He followed this maxim,
which he derived from the practice of his avowed master, Poe’s contemporary Sheridan Le Fanu
(1814-1873), in his own work. At least since the 1970s, most critics have assumed Poe had himself
followed this rule. Thus, in a passage I have quoted earlier, G. R. Thompson declared “we cannot be
sure of what did or did not take place” in “Ligeia,” and feels nothing at  all  may have actually
happened outside the confines of the narrator’s restless mind (Poe’s Fiction 104). In The Rationale
of Deception in Poe (1979), David Ketterer asserted that “the meaning of an arabesque tale,” like
“Ligeia,” “can only be tentatively fixed within certain limits;” and that “[a]lmost all of” those tales
“can be genuinely interpreted in a variety of ways” (181). Stuart and Susan F. Levine’s annotated
edition of the tale reiterates this view: “Poe frequently provided readers with an alternative ‘rational’
way of accounting for the fantastic. In ‘Ligeia,’ the narrator’s ‘incipient madness’ and his addition to
opium provide the needed margin of credibility: all that follows may be an illusion. Note, however,
that madness and drugs are traditionally believed to be routes to transcendent truth. One chooses
one’s own interpretation” (Thirty-Two Stories 62n9). But, why, may one ask, should that “rational”
explanation be regarded as an “alternative;” and to what is it an alternative exactly?109
The terms employed by these writers can be misleading. What distinguishes the kind of
supernatural tale that M. R. James wrote is not the possibility of “multiple interpretations.” All
fiction, strictly speaking, admits many equally valid readings, but, in most cases, the events narrated
are not at all dubious. Although the causes that determine it are a matter of speculation, the action of
Oedipus Rex, for example, is not itself doubtful. In other words, any competent reader can produce
109 To be fair, the Levines provide a straight, albeit, in my opinion, unsatisfactory answer to such questions, and one
which is implied in Thompson’s, Wilbur’s, and Winters’s readings of the tale: “In each story, a visionary sees the
underlying truths of the universe” (Thirty-Two Stories 54).
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a straightforward synopsis of the tragedy on the main points of which, at least, all other readers
must agree. On the other hand, a consensus will never be reached on the meaning of the tragedy.
What distinguishes tales like Le Fanu's “The Familiar” from Oedipus Rex, then, is that in the former
the action is itself a matter of speculation. In that tale, two distinct interpretations of the action
cohabit, the natural and the supernatural, none of which fits all the facts, and most critics agree that
this is also the case with “Ligeia.” In other words, the predominant view today in Poe studies is that
“Ligeia” is a tale with a loophole.
But I have been trying to show that the “hole” in the narrator’s “thesis” is not nearly as
narrow as James recommended,  and Thompson and Ketterer  thought.  There is,  in fact,  a huge
gaping crater in the narrator’s thesis, but being camouflaged by a thick layer of misleading mystical
jargon, the hole goes almost unnoticed on a first reading. Nevertheless, it is there,  in the surface,
poised to swallow the apparent story. Indeed, as one pursues the many avenues of inquiry suggested
by the text, the evidence for a supernatural explanation itself contracts into an increasingly narrow
loophole, which eventually gets too narrow to be practicable. The accumulated evidence that shows
that the narrator misinterpreted the evidence in light of his superstition and ignorance, although
cunningly disguised, is too compelling to dismiss. Therefore, instead of a delicate balance between
natural and supernatural explanations and one indeterminate story, we end up with two different
stories:  one  supernatural,  the  other  natural.  The  former,  since  it  depends  on  all  the  narrator’s
blunders,  is  demonstrably  false;  the  latter,  being  based  on  the  probable,  indeed  obvious
interpretation of the facts, is true. “Ligeia,” and the other tales we have looked at, are, therefore, not
supernatural tales, but tales of ratiocination. In the limited sense that they are designed to trick the
reader into thinking some supernatural agency is involved, they are, of course, supernatural tales—
as  such,  they  exerted  great  influence  over  future  writers  of  supernatural  horror  thrillers.  Poe
certainly knew how most effectively to scare readers out of their wits, so to speak. But his ability to
mystify readers was even more remarkable.
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The false, supernatural story in “Ligeia” seems to be as much a combination of ideas Poe
picked up from obscure sources as the true one. In the previous section we have seen how Poe’s
“drama  of  revivification”  was  probably  inspired  by  a  fraudulent  retelling  of  the  extraordinary
revival of William Tennent, Jr. (Poe, “Ligeia” 328). In Poe’s complicated design, this became a
cloak for the true story of Ligeia’s reanimation, which in turn appears to have been inspired by the
crypt scene in Matthew Lewis’s The Monk. In this section I will look at the probable source of other
aspect of the false story: the vampire motif.
Ligeia apparently returned to assume the degrading role of a “patsy for murder,” as Susan
Amper  puts  it  (“Masters  of  Deceit”  142).  Indeed,  the  narrator  “dreams,”  as  it  were,  that  his
entombed wife came back from the grave to get rid of her successor. But what exactly was the
returned Ligeia? This is one of the most perplexing aspects of the story. This supernatural murderess
appears to be a bizarre cross between a ghost and a revenant, or vampire. As usual, however, the
impression  can  be  decomposed.  Analysis  of  the  tale  shows  that  the  Ligeia  that  appeared  in
Rowena’s room belongs to an illustrious line of accusing ghosts that goes back to Banquo, and
beyond, and the direct inspiration for which probably came from the femicide stories by Dickens
and Macnish,  and the ghost of the murdered Elvira in  The Monk—this  was the truth about the
apparition.  Yet,  this  is  not  how the  narrator  perceives  it,  hence  the  confusion.  He believes  he
inadvertently raised his sorceress wife from the dead, and that she got rid of his second wife so she
could take, if only temporarily, her place.
From a genetic standpoint, the figure in Rowena’s room was, I believe, both a ghost and a
revenant, in the sense that Poe had borrowed the motif of the vampire wife from yet another rather
obscure source, the tale “Wake Not the Dead,” included in the 1823 collection Popular Tales and
Romances of the Northern Nations. Paul Lewis first pointed out the resemblance between the two
tales in 1979, in his article “The Intellectual Functions of Gothic Fiction: Poe’s ‘Ligeia’’ and Tieck’s
‘Wake Not the Dead’” (1979). As his title indicates, Lewis attributed the latter tale to the German
398
Romantic poet Ludwig Tieck  (1773-1853).  This is an unambiguously supernatural story, with no
loophole, about a man who cannot stand his fair-haired second wife and is possessed with an unholy
desire for his raven-haired first wife, whom he eventually summons from the grave with the aid of a
mysterious  sorcerer.  Upon  her  return,  the  dark  Lady  banishes  her  successor,  and  temporarily
resumes her former position, with tragic consequences. This is, more or less, what the narrator of
“Ligeia” thinks happened to him, with only one important difference: he believes Ligeia gave his
wife Rowena some drops that  hastened her  death—this  idea,  I  believe,  came from yet  another
obscure source I will discuss in the next section.
In his article, Paul Lewis points out only the general resemblance, and offers very little in
the way of actual comparison between the texts of the two tales:
Both  [stories]  deal  with  a  man’s  conflict  between morality  and passion,  spiritual
study and mundane concerns, summarized in both by the choice between a fair and a
dark woman. In both the man chooses, even after the dark beauty has died, to revive,
at any cost, the dead lover and teacher. Both men are reduced to near madness and
trance-like mental states by their association with the undead. The correspondence of
several minor details—e.g., the redecoration of the bedrooms, the hair colors of the
two women, and the first wives’ peculiar combination of metaphysics and desire—
suggest Poe’s familiarity with Tieck’s tale. (“Intellectual Functions” 216)
Later, in 1995, Thomas S. Hansen and Burton R. Pollin attempted the first systematic study
of the influence of German literature on Poe in  The German Face of Edgar Allan Poe.  In my
opinion, their  book settled the dispute concerning Poe’s ability to read German literature in the
original by demonstrating conclusively that his references to German authors are either vague, and
second-hand, or to texts he could have read in translation. Aside from such references, Poe evinces
nothing but  the most  rudimentary knowledge of  the language.110 As regards  Tieck,  specifically,
110  Mabbott, in a section of the introduction to his edition of the tales entitled “Foreign Influences,” had already stated
that Poe’s knowledge of German was, contrary to what had been asserted by previous scholars, probably very basic:
“Poe’s German was self-taught, a blilingual book by Sarah Austin was his primer, and there is no evidence that he
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whom Lewis regarded as the author of “Wake Not the Dead,” Hansen and Pollin remarked that:
“Readers had long been struck by apparent similarities” between some of his tales and poems and
Poe’s, “but have never been able to make an iron-clad case for actual influence” (German Face 95).
In a cursory reference to Lewis’s article, however, Hansen and Pollin sustain that, from all
the critics who had dealt with the issue, he had come closest to making such a case, by finding
“strong affinities that suggest Tieck’s ‘Wake Not the Dead’ as a plausible source for Poe’s ‘Ligeia,’”
which, nevertheless, they feel were not wholly conclusive:
As Lewis points out, many details are standard conventions of the Gothic fantastic.
Still one cannot help being struck by the basic situation in the two tales, in which a
husband mourns for a dark-haired, passionate, intellectual wife, but finally replaces
her  with  a  fair-haired,  less  exceptional  one.  More  striking  is  the  fact  that  he
redecorates  their  bedroom  with  new  draperies,  which  in  “Ligeia”  are  a  central
atmospheric  detail.  This use of draperies  suggests  a  knowledge of Tieck’s  text—
though  such  an  atmospheric  touch  may  be  Poe’s  invention.  With  the  aid  of
necromancy  Tieck’s  protagonist  brings  the  former  wife  back  from  the  grave,
whereupon her vampirism spreads death. (German Face 96)
I have to agree with Hansen and Pollin that the evidence outlined in the previous quotations
is not decisive. But they too limit themselves to outlining the resemblance of what they term the
“basic situation.” A much stronger case for influence can be made if one takes into account the
many verbal parallelisms between “Wake Not the Dead” and “Ligeia,” which they and Lewis have
overlooked for reasons that are easy to understand. These critics were not specifically interested in
the English text, which both regarded as a translation, but in discussing the possibility of Poe’s
direct  acquaintance  with  German  originals.  Lewis  assumed  Poe’s  acquaintance  with  a  German
progressed beyond it. He could find and copy out a passage from Humboldt’s Kosmos, of which an English version
was before him, and probably could have read a simple German text by the aid of a dictionary, but that he ever read
three consecutive pages of German is to be doubted” (Tales 1:xxiii). Despite this, many critics continued to assume
Poe could read German texts in the original until Hansen and Pollin published their book, which seems to have put
an end to the question.
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original, and, therefore, presumably thought the comparison between the English text of the tale and
Poe’s would be pointless. Pollin and Hansen, on the other hand, were trying to show that Poe could
not read German. The very existence of an English text proved their point: Poe’s acquaintance with
the tale, although probable, did not prove he read German.
But neither Lewis nor Hansen and Pollin provide the publishing details of the supposed
German original, or even its title. Indeed, the attribution of the authorship of “Wake Not the Dead”
to Tieck appears to be wholly conjectural. The anthology where the English text appeared, Popular
Tales and Romances of the Northern Nations, although purporting to be a collection of translations
from the German—which, for the most part, it was—did not include author names for any of the
tales. Patrick Bridgwater, in The German Gothic-Novel in Anglo-German Perspective, has recently
pointed out that there is no hard evidence connecting Tieck, or any other German author, to “Wake
Not the Dead:”
No German original has been found. Tieck’s authorship having been disputed, Ernst
Raupach was put forward as author of the tale, presumably on the strength of his
comedy  Laßt die Toten ruhen!  (1826), which, whatever else it is, is clearly not the
original of Wake Not the Dead. (…) My own view is that Wake Not the Dead is not
by Tieck, and that it is most likely not a translation at all, just one of the many early
Gothic tales masquerading as “From the German.” (240-41)
Although Poe himself may have believed it a translation, until the hypothetical original of
“Wake Not the Dead” is produced, the tale cannot be admitted as evidence of Poe’s acquaintance
with German literature, though it certainly reiterates that the kind of horror tales he wrote were
associated  by  his  contemporaries  with  Germany.  The  evidence  that  establishes  it  as  source  of
“Ligeia,” on the other hand, appears to me quite irrefutable. Poe seems to have adapted not only
part  of the plot of “Wake Not the Dead” for his tale, but even whole passages of its text.  The
protagonist  of that tale is  a  “powerful lord of Burgundy” by the name of Walter,  who remains
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obsessed with his dead first wife, the demonic Brunhilda, even after marrying the chaste, angel-like
Swanhilda. In the opening lines of the tale, we find Walter expressing his forbidden desire for the
dead: “Wilt thou for ever sleep? wilt thou never more awake, my beloved? but henceforth repose for
ever from thy short pilgrimage on earth? O yet once again return!” (“Wake Not the Dead” 233-34).
Poe’s narrator, of course, also hoped he “could restore” Ligeia “to the pathway she had abandoned
—ah,  could it be forever?—upon the earth” (Poe, “Ligeia” 323). The parallelism is, I think, quite
evident.
This  parallelism extends to  the  physical  description  of  Brunhilda,  whose  “tresses”  were
“dark as the raven face of midnight” (“Wake Not” 235). This phrase evidently provided the model
for the “the raven-black, the glossy, the luxuriant and naturally curling tresses, setting forth the full
force of the Homeric epithet, ‘hyacinthine!’” of Ligeia ("Ligeia" 312 emphasis mine). Discounting
the excessive profusion of adjectives, and the high-flown scholarly allusion, both of which reflect
the tastes of Poe’s pretentious narrator, we find the same idea expressed in the same words: both
women  had  “raven  tresses.”  Incidentally,  in  the  last  paragraph  of  the  tale,  Poe  reinforces  the
parallelism by comparing Ligeia’s hair with “the wings of the  midnight” ("Ligeia" 330 emphasis
mine). Thus, all the key elements of the phrase which denotes Brunhilda’s “tresses” are applied, in
Poe’s  tale,  to  Ligeia’s.  This  scattered  allusion,  and  many  others  like  it,  added  to  the  basic
resemblance of the apparent story, make it impossible to believe, I think, that this was anything but
a voluntary borrowing. And there are many other such coincidences between the two tales.
Ligeia, then, whose role corresponds, in the structure of the tale, to Brunhilda’s, resembles
her also in being black-haired. Likewise, Swanhilda, Walter’s second wife, is blonde like Rowena:
“Her golden locks waved bright as the beams of morn” (“Wake Not” 236). Thus, one would expect
a more or less direct correspondence between the pair Ligeia-Rowena and Brunhilda-Swanhilda.
Paul Lewis, as we have seen, certainly suggests this correspondence. But the resemblances between
the women in the tales often escape this neat pattern. Ligeia’s mysterious eyes, for example are
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exactly what the eyes of Brunhilda are said not to be: “her eyes did not resemble those burning orbs
whose pale glow gem the vault of the night, and whose immeasurable distance fills the soul with
deep thoughts of eternity, but rather as the sober beams which cheer this nether world, and which,
while they enlighten, kindle the sons of earth to joy and love” (“Wake Not” 235). Ligeia’s “orbs”
“became to me,” her  husband admits,  “the  twin stars  of  Leda,  and I  to  them the devoutest  of
astrologers;” at the end of the following paragraph, he follows this astronomical metaphor with an
actual  astronomical  analogue  of  Ligeia’s  eyes:  “there  are  one  or  two  stars  in  heaven—(one
especially, a star of the sixth magnitude, double and changeable, to be found near the large star in
Lyra) in a telescopic scrutiny of which I have been made aware of the feeling” inspired by the dead
wife’s eyes (Poe, "Ligeia" 312, 314).
Technically,  in  astronomy,  magnitude  is  a  measure  of  brightness;  the  sixth  magnitude
corresponding to the least luminous stars that can be distinguished by the naked eye. There being a
strong correlation between brightness and distance, Poe’s passage reinforces, in practice, the idea of
“immeasurable distance” we find in “Wake Not the Dead,” which is underlined by the reference to
“telescopic scrutiny.” The point of the original metaphor,  of course,  was that of comparing the
luminosity, or more precisely the heat, of more distant stars with that of the sun, whose relative
brightness, owing to its proximity to the Earth, is many times greater than that of even stars of the
first magnitude, the brightest in the night sky. Once again, we find the same metaphor that had been
used to qualify the physical portrait of the beloved late wife in “Wake Not the Dead” serving the
same purpose in “Ligeia.” This time, the image is not only greatly amplified in Poe’s tale, and
accompanied by the usual displays of reading, but the idea itself—the coldness of distant stars—is
greatly exaggerated. The most significant difference, however, is that Ligeia appears on the cold
side of the comparison.
Although  she  resembled  Ligeia  in  so  many  other  things,  the  eyes  of  the  “passionate”
Brunhilda were not cold and distant, but hot like the nearest star which daily “kindles” men to “joy
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and love.” The narrator of Poe’s tale, of course, cannot understand why that exceedingly dim star in
the constellation of Lyra reminded him of Ligeia’s eyes. But the author of “Wake Not the Dead,”
whoever he may be, does not, like Poe, leave the task of decoding his astronomical allegory to the
reader. He means that Brunhilda was a fiery lover. After the wedding, she and Walter “abandoned
themselves to the enjoyment of a passion that rendered them reckless of aught besides;” it was “a
delirium which they prayed might continue for ever;” it was “phrenzied passion” (“Wake Not” 236).
Such  “reckless”  loving,  the  tale  implied,  is  not  healthy.  After  a  while,  Brunhilda,  apparently
succumbs to an over-active sex life, and dies childless.
The comparison between the sun and the more distant  stars in  the initial  description of
Brunhilda foreshadows the contrast between her and the chaste Swanhilda, Walter’s second wife, as
those distant stars are later used, precisely, as an analogue of the latter’s eyes: “her limbs were
proportioned in the nicest symmetry, yet did they not possess that [Brunhilda’s] luxuriant fullness of
animal life: her eye beamed eloquently, but it was with the milder radiance of a star tranquilizing to
tenderness rather than exciting to warmth. Thus formed, it was not possible that she should steep
him [Walter] in his former delirium” (“Wake Not” 236-237). Ligeia may have inherited Brunhilda’s
“raven tresses,” but she has Swanhilda’s cold and eloquent eye.
In “Wake Not the Dead” stargazing is an explicit metaphor of sexual abstinence. As usual, in
“Ligeia”  the  image becomes  a  mystery.  But,  although  the  narrator  seems  unaware  of  this,  his
comparison also implies the idea of frigidity. Evidently, only on the point of death did Ligeia satisfy
his desire. Her husband admits, however that, in the last period of their marriage, the “radiant lustre
of her eyes” was wanting (Poe “Ligeia” 316). He also speaks at length of their “expression.” This
word conveys the same idea that is attached in “Wake Not the Dead” to the adjective “eloquent.”
These women’s eyes spoke to their husbands.
The  idea,  of  course,  is  that  through  their  disinterest  in  sensual  fruition,  these  women
purified, as it were, their husband’s base earthly passions. Again, this is made quite explicit by the
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astronomical image in “Wake Not the Dead.” While the fiery eyes of Brunhilda inflamed Walter’s
passions, making him forget all but his present sensuous enjoyment, the star-like eyes of Swanhilda
exerted  a  “tranquilising”  influence;  the  distant  stars  to  which  her  eyes  are  now  likened  had,
previously in the tale, in the passage that described Brunhilda’s eyes, been said to fill “the soul with
deep  thoughts  of  eternity.”  Thus,  Swanhilda  led  him onward  to  a  spiritual  ecstasy,  which  was
continually deferred. The narrator of “Ligeia,” of course, suggests Ligeia’s eyes had the same effect
on him. In referring their wizard power to their “expression,” he remarks, as we have seen, this was
a word “behind whose vast latitude of mere sound we intrench our ignorance of so much of the
spiritual” (Poe, “Ligeia” 313).
Another trait Ligeia and Swanhilda have in common is that they appear themselves wholly
aloof from sensuous passions, and subject only to spiritual enthusiasms. Thus, “only when excited
by some emotion of her soul did a rosy hue tinge the lily paleness of” Swanhilda’s “cheek” (“Wake
not” 236 emphasis mine). Likewise, Ligeia was “outwardly calm” and “ever-placid,” except when,
in rare “moments of intense excitement,” her appearance, and her eyes especially, were transfigured
in a way that suggested to the narrator “the beauty of beings either above or apart from the earth”
(Poe,  "Ligeia"  313).  Thus,  for  once,  Poe  is  more  explicit  than  his  original:  the  dehumanising
tendency  of  Swanhilda’s  portrait  becomes  explicit  in  his  treatment  of  Ligeia.  But  spiritual
enthusiasm was not at all what the men in these tales demanded of a wife. Walter ends up divorcing
his starry-eyed second wife Swanhilda, returning her to her parents’ house, alleging that “her cold
disposition, bordering upon indifference, but ill assorted with his ardent temperament” (“Wake Not”
255). Evidently, the lack of “ordinary passion” in “Ligeia” was equally displeasing to her husband,
who we have good reason to surmise has taken more energic measures to get rid of her. At the same
time, he indirectly confirms the suspicion that he had raped her, for, even at the point of death, when
she supposedly manifested her “love” for him, her eyes remained cold and spiritual—in fact, they
were even colder than usual, which strongly suggests he was thinking about the dead Ligeia.
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This ultimately disturbs the neat identification of Ligeia and Rowena with “passion” and
“morality,” respectively, which Paul Lewis took for granted. Indeed, this kind of identification is as
impracticable in “Ligeia” as it is inescapable in “Wake not the Dead.”  There is no indication that
her husband found Rowena any more passionate, in the “ordinary” way, than Ligeia. He liked them
both better  after  they were dead. Thus, none of the wives in Poe’s tale conforms to any of the
unrealistic stereotypes represented by Brunhilda and Swanhilda.  I  suspect this  was the point of
Poe’s imitation.
The two wives in “Wake Not the Dead” represent the opposite poles of the phallo-centric
sentimental view of women which the femicide story indirectly exposes as a form of misogynous
aggression. One might argue that Walter’s two wives are not really women, but rather symbols, or
allegories,  respectively,  of  pleasure  and  morality.  The  demon-woman  Brunhilda  represents  the
pursuit of sensuous gratification as an end in itself, which is quite explicitly associated with death
and  sterility;  the  pure,  virtually  fleshless,  and  angel-like  Swanhilda  represents,  through  the
stereotype  of  the  virgin-mother,  the  domestication  of  male  sexual  instinct,  which,  through  her
chastening influence, is curbed and channeled to the culturally accepted end of procreation, and
otherwise repressed, and sublimated into a sort of spiritual enthusiasm.
Swanhilda significantly bears Walter two children, a boy and a girl, which later fall prey to
Brunhilda’s vampirism. For, after returning from the grave, she needed the blood of vigorous youths
to “animate the dull current in her veins and awaken the glow of life and the flame of love” (“Wake
Not” 281). As a last resort after all young people had either died or fled from the region, she fed on
Walter himself, who was already much enfeebled when he finally became wise to her. The tale thus
demonises female sexual pleasure in a way that is typical of the patriarchal discourse of the time.
Indeed, Brunhilda’s sexual initiative is, at least in part, what makes her a monster, according to the
implied  moral  of  the  tale.  She  thus  represents  the  male  dread  of  the  sexually  active  woman,
expressed by the anxiety that she might consume her lover’s vigour and rob him of his virility, and
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even of his life. But even then, she is not a real woman, but a projection of male lust. When Walter
accuses her of killing his children, she retorts: “I was obliged to pamper myself with warm youthful
blood, in order that I might satisfy thy furious desires—thou art the murderer” (273). Later, Walter
assumes the guilt: “Murderer of thy own offspring,” he calls himself (277). Swanhilda, on the other
hand, is sexually passive. While she does not exactly oppose her husband’s desires, she keeps them
in check by means of her awful modesty. She thus matches the conventional representations of the
model wife in the literature of the time. 
Necrophilia is the explicit theme of “Wake Not the Dead,” as Brunhilda herself makes clear
when she tells Walter that he had had “the courage to love the dead—to take into thy bed, one who
had been sleeping in the grave, the bed-fellow of the worm,” and to “clasp in” his “lustful arms the
corruption  of  the  tomb”  (“Wake Not”  273).  But  this  necrophilia  is  allegorical,  not  actual,  and
subjected to a moral which can be rendered thus: “The man who devotes himself entirely to satisfy
his sexual urges, ignoring morality, consorts with death.” 
At first sight, Poe’s tale appears to be a retelling of the same male story. Aspasia Stephanou
as recently presented a reading of “Ligeia” as a typical tale of vampirism in “Lovely Apparitions
and Spiritualized Corpses:”
evil is materialized as the vampire Ligeia. The struggle [Ligeia’s struggle, that is] is
that between life and death, a weak and a strong will, and evil and good.
Poe’s  response  to  the  question  of  womanhood  can  be  read  through  his
treatment of philosophical ideas circulating in antebellum America. In his stories,
vampirism and disease are dramatized through the tension between mind and body,
masculine and feminine, life and death. There is an urge for metaphysical union that
is disrupted by the horror of woman’s evil spirit. The horror of Poe’s vampire stories
arises  from the  tension  between  metaphysics  and  sexual  difference,  between  the
desire to synthesize dualisms into an absolute identity and their disruption by the
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fleshy  materiality  of  monstruous  femininity  and  her  dangerous  persistence  to
transcend God’s will. (45).
Thus,  Ligeia “fanatical  spirit” is  regarded as evil  (Stephanou,  “Lovely Apparitions” 44).
Stephanou concludes that tales like “Ligeia” directly express the anxieties of the author which, like
Gilbert and Gubar, she regards as the typical male of the culture in which he was inserted: 
Southern belles are transformed into southern vampires, but such monsters remain
other to patriarchal structures. Woman’s otherness is written on her body and mind.
Her vampirism and consumptive disease, evident through her physical disintegration
and  her  satanic  mind,  are  part  of  her  personal  identity,  and  thus  simultaneously
material and spiritual. Woman’s horror, like that of Poe’s tales, is that of the perfect
synthesis, of the luciferian wedding of matter and spirit.
(51)
This, of course, accurately captures the spirit in which the narrator writes his tale. Indeed,
this interpretation of the typical male story of female vampirism perfectly fits “Wake Not the Dead,”
and this is its greatest limitation. For Poe completely subverts the ideology that is inherent to the
tale from which he borrowed the vampire motif.  In “Ligeia,” the contrasting stereotypes of the
angel- and demon-woman are exploded by being projected simultaneously on the same character.
This, of course, has always been one of the chief causes of perplexity before Poe’s tale: Ligeia
appears an angel and a demon both at once. In the end, however, we must conclude she was neither:
she was merely a woman, no more, and no less.111
We have already seen that Swanhilda’s cold eyes represented her sexual passivity. Ligeia’s
eyes, of course, were even colder. By crossing the broken threads of relevant information, as we
111 In this respect, the apparent inconsistency of Ligeia’s character is foreshadowed by Matilda in Lewis’s The Monk.
Louis F. Peck remarks, indeed, that the latter is not “consistently diabolical. (…) The suggestion has been advanced
that Lewis changed his mind in the course of the narrative, conceiving her first as a human maiden torn with desire
and later as a succubus; but it seems clear that the author, though he fell into inconsistencies which could easily
have been removed, had determined upon her evil nature from the start” (A Life 39). Unlike Peck, however,  I
believe the inconsistency was not the result of oversight, but integral to Lewis’s subversive design.
408
have seen, we are brought to the conclusion that her eyes became cold and expressive only at the
point of death. Thus, Poe suggests that the ideal of the passive sexual partner that the author of
“Wake Not the Dead” had projected on Swanhilda can only be met, in reality, by a dead woman.
Thus, the metaphoric necrophilia of that tale becomes literal, albeit encrypted, in “Ligeia.” This is,
to be sure, horrible stuff. But Poe does not merely borrow from “Wake Not the Dead;” he alludes to
it in a way that suggests that the implications of the view of sexuality that pervades that tale are no
less  disturbing than  his  narrator’s  behaviour.  In  fact,  he  suggests  a  fundamental  affinity  exists
between the two.
And this is where the real subversion begins. The same ideology that informs “Wake Not the
Dead” is projected on Poe’s corpse-loving narrator, but in a context where the expectations that flow
from that ideology clash with a female figure that does not correspond to any of the stereotypes
according to which women were conventionally perceived. Thus, Poe suggests—as he does again
and  again  in  this  tale,  in  many  different  ways—that  such  male  expectations,  since  they  must
eventually  clash  with reality,  inexorably  promote  a  morbid  fascination  with  dead women.  This
fascination, of course, is not a wild theoretical possibility. It was a very real cultural phenomenon in
the Romantic age.
This is illustrated by an anecdote reported by Gilbert and Gubar: 
In  1869,  to  retrieve  a  poetry  manuscript  he   had  sentimentally  buried  with  this
beloved woman whose face ‘fill[ed] his dreams’—buried as if woman and artwork
were necessarily inseparable--[Dante Gabriel] Rossetti had [his wife] Lizzie’s coffin
exhumed, and literary London buzzed with rumors that her hair had ‘continued to
grow after her death, to grow so long, so beautiful, so luxuriantly as to fill the coffin
with its gold.’ As if symbolizing the indomitable earthliness that no woman, however
angelic, could entirely renounce, Lizzie Siddal Rossetti’s hair leaps like a metaphor
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for monstrous female sexual energies from the literal and figurative coffins in which
her artist-husband enclosed her. (Madwoman 27)
Such stories were very common in that period, both before and after Poe.112 In fact, Ellen
Weinauer has recently shown that Poe’s later tale “The Oblong Box” is probably a satire directed at
Rufus Griswold who in November 1842, “about a month” after his wife’s death, “undertook an
action that is worthy of one of Poe’s bereaved husbands: he went to Green Wood Cemetery, where
Carolina [Griswold] was interred, opened the burial vault, and embraced her decaying corpse,” an
episode he himself narrates in a letter (“Undead Wives” 183). Such episodes express perfectly the
extreme patriarchal outlook that characterises the femicide character. Commenting on the first of
these episodes, and on Rossetti’s appropriation of his wife’s memory, Gilbert and Gubar remark:
If we define a woman like Rossetti’s dead wife as indomitably earthly yet somehow
supernatural, we are defining her as a witch or monster, a magical creature of the
lower world who is a kind of antithetical mirror image of an angel. As such, she still
stands, in Sherry Ortner’s words, ‘both under and over (but really simply outside of)
the sphere of culture’s hegemony.’ But now, as a representative of otherness,  she
incarnates the damning otherness of the flesh rather than the inspiring otherness of
the  spirit,  expressing  what—to  use  Anne  Finch’s  words—men consider  her  own
‘presumptuous’ desires rather than the angelic humility and ‘dullness’ for which she
was designed. Indeed, if we return to the literary definitions of authority  with which
we began this discussion, we will see that the monster-woman, threatening to replace
her angelic sister, embodies intransigent female autonomy and thus represents both
the author’s power to allay ‘his’ anxieties by calling their source bad names (witch,
112 Novalis is perhaps the most emblematic example of the sometimes morbid idealisation of a sexless romantic partner
in which certain Romantic partners engaged. According to some reports: “La morte est sans cesse présente à sa
pensée; un jour, il croit la voir assise auprès de lui sur un canapé, la tête tournée de profil, avec le châle vert que’elle
portait dans sa dernière maladie. Ou bien il organise, avec des vêtements de Sophie et des objects familiers, une
sorte de mise en scène dont il espère un miracle, la présence vrai. Surtout il y a la vision du 13 mai, sur la tombe:
‘Le soir, j’allai voir Sophie. Moments d’enthousiasme foudroyants. D’un souffle, je dissipai la tombe comme un tas
de poussière—les siècles ne semblaient plus que des instants—sa présence me devenait sensible—il me semblait
qu’elle était sur le point d’apparaître’” (Bianquis, Avant-propos 16).
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bitch,  fiend,  monster)  and,  simultaneously,  the mysterious power of the character
who refuses to stay in her textually ordained ‘place’ and thus generates a story that
‘gets away’ from its author. (27-28)
I am convinced this was precisely the point Poe was trying to make—not overtly, of course,
but by presenting outrageously exaggerated versions of the typical male story in which he defied the
pervasive  myths  of  femaleness  which  “Wake  Not  the  Dead”  presented  to  the  reader  in  all
seriousness. Of course, that tale, like all Gothic stories, even the tamest, itself contains an element
of subversion. In “Wake Not the Dead” the stereotypes of the demon and the angel are mostly
unscathed, and are only slightly undermined by the repulsiveness of the protagonist. In Poe’s tale,
on the other hand, they are brought to a crisis.
And the  similarities  between the  two stories  do not  stop  here,  for  Brunhilda  resembled
Ligeia much more after Walter had raised her from the dead than she had in her natural life. To his
dismay, he found she was not quite as hot-blooded as she once had been. In addition, she looked too
pallid and death-like for his taste. For a fortnight afterwards a “shudder (…) would not permit him
to touch her” (“Wake Not” 250). Yet, although she looked dead, Walter found her more desirable
and fascinating than ever, and quickly overcame his repulsion. But Brunhilda was not herself. In
life, the dark lady had been a pleaser; the pale revenant, however, was a teaser:
Never till now had her voice sounded which such tones of sweetness; never before
did her language possess such eloquence as it now did, when she conversed with him
on the subject of the past. (…) And, while she thus vividly pourtrayed their hours of
past delight, she delineated in still  more glowing, more enchanting colours, those
hours of approaching bliss which now awaited them, richer in enjoyment than any
preceding ones. In this manner did she charm her attentive auditor with enrapturing
hopes for the future, and lull him in dreams of more than mortal extasy. 
(“Wake not” 250-51)
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According to her husband, of course, Ligeia suffered a similar change, which took place,
however, not after, but immediately before her death. During that period, he tells us he “hearkened,
entranced, to a melody more than moral—to assumptions and aspirations which mortality had never
before known,” a phrase which is a clear paraphrase of the last sentence in the passage transcribed
above (Poe, “Ligeia” 317). This strengthens the parallel between the  live Ligeia and the undead
Brunhilda. They both excited their husband’s desire, but deferred its satisfaction by repulsing his
advances. The vampire, who was no longer capable of real passion, was cunningly manipulating
Walter. Indeed, she puts a price on her body: the repudiation of Swanhilda. After this condition is
met, she became an even more fiery lover than her former self had ever been—fierier, the text
suggests, than any live woman could be. But, even then, “she would continually discourse with him
on the bliss experienced by happy beings beyond the grave, assuring him that, as his affection had
recalled her from the tomb, they were now irrevocably united” (“Wake Not” 265).
It  would  seem,  then,  that  Brunhilda  was  imparting  to  her  husband  the  same  forbidden
knowledge that the narrator of Poe’s tale suggests Ligeia was imparting to him. But we find here the
same  pattern  of  repetition  and  variation  that  characterises  all  of  Poe’s  borrowings.  Brunhilda
became her husband’s teacher only after she died, whereas Ligeia had always, even in her prime,
been her husband’s teacher; more importantly, the latter, unlike the former, had never in her life
expressed the “ordinary passion” that her husband expected. This significant inversion of the pattern
hints at another, decisive difference between the two tales.
In her  eloquence,  the dead-alive Brunhilda resembles  Ligeia  in  the period in  which her
husband  “saw  that  she  must  die”  (Poe,  “Ligeia”  316).  At  length,  Walter  comes  to  the  same
conclusion—that he would have to shut his ears to his wife’s promises of eternal bliss and kill her.
The sorcerer who had shown him how to bring his dead wife back from the dead, now instructs
Walter to stab her to the heart—this was the only way to dispose of the undead. As he did so, she
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opened her eyes and told him “in a hollow dying accent:” “Thou too art doomed to perdition”
(“Wake Not” 283). 
Walter, however, did not exactly kill a woman—he killed a foul monster, which was already
dead. In another sense, he destroys the symbol of his forbidden lust. Nevertheless, he experiences
the pangs of a guilty conscience. Brunhilda’s “image continually haunted Walter’s imagination, so
that his existence was one continued martyrdom;” often did he recall “her expiring words, and,
appalled at their terrific import, imagined that the doom of his perdition was irrecoverably passed”
(“Wake Not” 264-65). Poe’s narrator was avowedly afflicted by the same tell-tale symptoms of
guilt: the image of his dying wife, and her expiring words. As we have seen, although he “would not
wish to dwell on the wild meaning” of some of the words she addressed to him at the time, he
remembers vividly the words that she uttered with “her last  sighs,” which he identifies as “the
concluding words of the passage in Glanvill” (Poe, “Ligeia” 319). This too appears to be a mistake.
Most likely, she was cursing him, only not as explicitly as she presumably had done with those
words he preferred not to transcribe. The parallelism indicates, once again, that the narrator of Poe’s
tale had killed his first wife, like Walter had killed his. As usual, however, the differences are as
significant as the similarities. Evidently, Poe’s narrator had not killed a vampire—he had killed a
woman.
We keep finding the deep “mysteries” of “Ligeia” explained in Poe’s sources.  But there is
always a difference. In this case, the solution which is handed to the reader of the unquestionably
supernatural  original  tale  actually  invalidates  the  supernatural  reading  of  “Ligeia.”  Walter  was
haunted because he had killed his dead-alive wife; in “Ligeia,” the ghost of the murdered first wife
is  merely  confused  with  a  revenant.  This  is  the  perfect  illustration  of  Poe’s  “chemistry  of  the
intellect.” His composition is oriented towards an effect that is radically different from the one the
author he plundered intended to achieve. Indeed, Poe deliberately appropriated and subverted all the
sensationalist literature that preceded him to produce something new. This, of course, my reader
413
may reply, is what all good writers do. What distinguishes Poe, however, is the cool, undaunted
deliberateness of his approach, as well as the complete, uncompromising rejection of the moral and
aesthetical codes of his time. 
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8 — “The Somnambulist:” Another Source of “Ligeia”
Although it is probably not the genuine article, “Wake Not the Dead” is certainly patterned
after a kind of supernatural tale that writers of the second generation of German Romanticism, like
Hoffmann, Tieck, and Chamisso, had brought into fashion. These were modern fairy tales which
reflected a new-found interest in “folklore.” They were unambiguously set in a world where fairies,
witches, vampires, and other mythological figures derived from ancient pagan beliefs are real. In his
time, Glanvill could still sustain the reality of such beings without attracting universal ridicule. By
the  late  eighteenth-century,  however,  this  was  no  longer  a  tenantable  position.  It  was  then
understood that  the supernatural  was not  literal,  but  figurative,  and that  it  expressed  obscurely
intuited  truths  about  human  nature—thus  understood,  the  fairy  tale  was  a  natural  choice  for
Romantic  literateurs,  inasmuch  as  it  lent  itself  for  symbolical  interpretations.  Of  course,  the
supernatural was already a metaphor in Perrault’s fables, but the reader was there provided with the
key to the allegory. In the new style of fairy tale pioneered by the German Romantics, supernatural
motifs became rather symbols, expressing insights into subterranean aspects of human psychology,
which the reader was invited to sound.
Chamisso’s “Peter Schlemihl” is a good example of the way the supernatural can be used as
an inducement to analogical thinking. People in the real world do not just lose their shadows—on
this everyone can be supposed to agree. Therefore, the reader surmises the tale is a reflection on
personal  identity,  the  meaning  of  which  must  be  tentatively  fixed  by symbolism.  Likewise,  in
“Wake Not the Dead,” we know that Walter  really raised his first wife from the dead. Since it is
understood that this is impossible, all that is left for the reader to do is to figure out what this means.
We assume, that is, that vampires like Brunhilda do not exist.  We presuppose, at least,  that the
author did not expect his reader to believe such things were possible. Thus, she and Swanhilda are
allowed to stand as personifications respectively, of virtue and vice, intemperance and chastity. The
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symbolism  also  easily  lends  itself  to  a  psychological  interpretation,  with  Walter’s  two  wives
representing opposing aspects of the human mind, the rational and what would later be termed the
subconscious. The same assumption is usually made with regard to “Ligeia.” According to Richard
Wilbur’s influential reading of the tale, the title-character represents the narrator’s “psyche” (see
Wilbur, Complete Poems 16).
But the doubt that surrounds the supernatural events in Poe’s tale disturbs such readings.
For example, in Poe’s “A Decided Loss” (1835) the original version of “Loss of Breath,” which I
will discuss in more detail in the following chapter, the narrator’s inability to breath is clearly a
metaphor for sexual impotence. The narrator, of course, believes that he did, in actual fact, lose his
voice. Certain signs, however, suggest that he may have been merely afflicted by the condition of
which this appears to be the metaphor. In fact, he appears not to be aware of the metaphor. “I had
heard of Peter Schlemil,” he tells us, “but I did not believe in him until now” (Poe, “A Decided
Loss”  54).  Through  this  allusion,  Poe  emphasised  the  crucial  difference  between  his  tale  and
Chamisso’s, while also suggesting that his  narrator was too literal-minded and, indeed, that his
compulsion to take the metaphor literally manifested his inability to acknowledge the true nature of
his problem. Thus, the tale can be read as a study in abnormal psychology. The comparison between
“Ligeia” and “Peter Schlemihl” is equally revealing. The latter recounts the story of a man who lost
his shadow; the former deals with a man who does not recognise his own shadow, a mistake which
signals to the reader that he had completely misrepresented himself. Again, the emphasis is shifted
from facts to beliefs, and the metaphor made literal for the purpose of emphasising an underlying
psychiatric inbalance.
Thus,  what  was,  in  the  typical  German  modern  fairy  tale,  unquestionable,  although
incredible, is made doubtful in Poe’s tale—so doubtful, indeed, that it must ultimately be rejected as
an illusion of the narrator. The same applies to Poe’s borrowings from tales that had no hint of the
supernatural, either actual or explained, about them. The narrator believes, as we have seen, that his
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first wife, Ligeia, appeared in the bedroom of his second wife, Rowena, then in the throes of a
illness that threatened her life, and poisoned her wine, thus causing, or at least ensuring her death—
for, whatever other properties the drops appeared to have, he is certain that they caused Rowena’s
apparent  death.  This  is  something  that  Poe  did  not  find  in  The Monk,  The  Confessions  of  an
Unexecuted Femicide, or any of the other stories from which he appears to have drawn inspiration
for his tale.
He seems to have picked this very distinctive idea from yet another exceedingly obscure
source,  and one which  has  become even more  so since  Poe’s  day,  a  short  story  entitled  “The
Somnambulist,”  first  published in  Tait’s Edinburgh Magazine in  February 1838,  which  did  not
identify its author. It was the first, and apparently the only instalment of a series entitled Extracts
from the Memorandum Book of the Late Pastor of St. Leonard’s.113 Tait’s was one of the leading
English magazines of the time, and one on which Poe was likely to keep a close look. In the event
of having missed the tale there, however, he could have read it in the American magazines  The
Museum of Foreign Literature, Science and Art or Littel’s Spirit of the Magazines and Annuals, both
of which had the tale in their July 1838 issues.114 Wherever he found it, the many resemblances
between this tale and his “Ligeia,” first published in September 1838, demonstrate conclusively, I
think, his acquaintance with “The Somnambulist.”
Like most of Poe’s tales, this is narrated in the first person by the male protagonist, only, in
this case, orally, to the Pastor of St. Leonard mentioned in the title of the projected series, who
provides  a  short  narrative  frame  to  the  actual  narrative.  The  story  is  obviously  a  critique  of
marriages of convenience, a common theme in Romantic literature. Some of the femicide stories we
have looked at so far can also be read as reflections on that subject: Macnish’s femicide ostensibly
abandons his first bride to court a rich heiress; the fabulous wealth of Dickens’s “madman” enables
113 I have been unable to determine the author of the tale. No other installment of the projected series appeared on
Tait’s, or,  to my knowledge, any other contemporary magazine. Its title indicates that it  was modeled after the
Passages from the Diary of a Late Physician, by Samuel Warren, published by Blackwood between 1832 and 1837.
114 “The Somnambulist” appears in pages 377 through 386 of vol 33 of  Museum and in pages 433-442 of vol. 7 of
Littel’s. Both magazines were published in Philadelphia.
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him to buy himself a blue-blooded bride from an impoverished aristocratic family. Their stories,
which incidentally were both published before “The Somnambulist,” end in tragedy. Here, however,
the common motif is given an unexpected twist. As I have before stated, the events in the tale are
not doubtful. The narrator, a Scottish laird identified as Walter B——, knows that the sweetheart of
his youth, the daughter of one of his tenants called Lucy Oliver, but known locally as the “Beauty of
Dowielee,”  poisoned  the  wine  of  his  genteel  wife  Amelia  in  order  to  take  her  place  (“The
Somnambulist” 435). Indeed, her crime was not detected, and she became in time Walter’s second
wife. He later found out the truth, but kept it a secret for many years. By the time he finally decides
to unburden his conscience to the pastor, Lucy had herself been long dead and Walter was in his
seventies. Of all the shady narrators we have encountered thus far, he and Poe’s narrator alone have
been twice widowed when they decide to tell their tale.
When his first wife died, then, Walter ignored the real cause of her death. But perhaps it
would be more accurate to say that he was not consciously aware of it. For, in retrospect, he blames
himself for having overlooked the significance of the many signs that he now perceives but too
clearly announced the catastrophe. In fact, Walter suggests he had been blinded by his love for
Lucy, which he did not admit even to himself. Thus, only when Lucy re-enacted her crime, in the
very room where it had been committed, in a state of somnambulism, did the narrator discover, or
rather recognised the crime for which he feels partially responsible.
The narrator presents his story quite ostensibly as a tragedy, and himself as its hero. “I have
experienced more pain in one minute of time than all the splendid and magnificent language of
Æschylus in his ninety plays, or of Shakspeare in all he wrote, is capable of conveying to the mind
of man,” he tells the minister, adding the ominous remark that “we get little consolation from our
own consciences, in the midst of self-caused suffering, from any fine-spun distinction between blind
error and voluntary crime” (“The Somnambulist” 84). To emphasise his error, then, the narrator
chooses to confine his audience of one almost entirely to the narrow perspective of his tragically
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blind former self, who, as it appears, simply did not want to see what was happening. At each point
of the narrative, then, the reader knows only what the narrator himself  had known, or what he
allowed himself to recognise, at the time.
Thus,  the story of Amelia’s death is  told twice.  The first  time around,  the crime is  not
disclosed,  but  only  obscurely  intimated  by  increasingly  clear  hints,  and  the  narrator’s  own
comments, by which he shows us, in anticipation of the dramatic revelation he plans to make, that
he  knows  more  than  he  is  telling.  These  intimations  of  his  terrible  secret,  whose  mysterious
significance is retroactively settled by the catastrophe, are therefore perfect embodiments of the
concept of tragic irony. Then follows the story of Walter’s second marriage, with Lucy Oliver, at the
culmination of which the narrator lets the murderess herself reveal the truth to the reader, as she had
revealed it to him. Indeed, the somnambulist’s reenactments of her crime—for the drama had to be
repeated several times before the narrator finally brought  himself  to acknowledge its  import—,
clarify  the  meaning of  the  obscure  omens  and fills  the  holes  the  narrator  had,  to  preserve  the
suspense, deliberately left in the first half of the tale. Thus, “The Somnambulist” is an interesting
cross between a tragedy and the kind of conventional murder mystery of which Barnaby Rudge is
an early example.
As a youth, then, Walter had been desperately in love with Lucy Oliver, but thought that it
would be a dishonour for his family for him to marry a plebeian woman, and penniless to boot. He
therefore broke his affair with her, which he assures us had never gone beyond sweet talk and the
holding of hands, to woo a more convenient bride, his cousin Amelia Gordon, the daughter of his
mother’s brother, “a lovely young woman of eighteen years of age, highly educated, with refined
sentiments” (“The Somnambulist” 86). Sometime after the birth of the couple’s first child, a boy,
Lucy approached Amelia offering her services. The narrator, who, out of embarrassment, had never
told his wife about his innocent liaison, could not now divulge his secret without revealing his
previous omission, which he regarded as a breach of the trust he owed to his wife. Since he had no
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other credible reason to refuse, he took the easy way out, and consented to his wife’s request to hire
Lucy as a maid. He suggests, of course, that his judgement might have, even then, been swayed by
his desire to be close to Lucy. This was the first in what the narrator suggests was a long series of
tragic mistakes.
Lucy seemed completely devoted to her rival and, even when alone with her former lover,
betrayed  no  recollection  of  their  engagement.  This  was,  of  course,  one  of  the  first  signs  that
something was amiss. In due course, Amelia became pregnant for the second time, and gave birth to
a female child. Two days later, she was taken ill, and the doctor diagnosed “puerperal fever,” which
in those days was a real cause of concern (“The Somnambulist” 88). With the assistance of Lucy,
the narrator tended to his wife in her sickness. At this point, he almost betrays his secret: “Good
God! When I look back to that awful scene—my wife in the grasp of one of the most dangerous
diseases incident to mortal; her nurse, my former lover (…); and I (...)—the witness of all that”
(“The Somnambulist” 88).
After several days of agony, Amelia seemed finally out of danger. The relieved husband,
exhausted by many sleepless nights, felt he could finally take a rest. He fell asleep on the couch—
which we later  find out was in the next room—, entrusting his wife to Lucy.  Two hours later,
however, she wakes him up to inform him that his “dear wife” had “relapsed during night:” “The
lovely victim,” he remarks, “was in the firm grasp of the grim Destroyer” (“The Somnambulist” 88-
89). The narrator is being deliberately disingenuous, of course. Indeed, he admits that he knows
more than he cares to disclose at this time: “I cannot continue these details” (89). The reason why
he abstains from going into the details, expressing himself by carefully worded metaphor to refer to
the cause of his first wife’s death, is that he intends to maintain the suspense. He already knows that
when Lucy saw that Amelia might pull through, she had decided not to let the outcome of her
illness, on which her hopes to replace her hung, to chance. While he slept, she had slipped some
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poison into the convalescent’s medicinal wine which her doctors had, according to what appears to
have been then the general practice, prescribed to her.
This scene, as the reader has no doubt noticed, foreshadows many details of “Ligeia.” As
usual, however, Poe appears to have mixed things up quite a bit. The parallelism that immediately
stands out is with Rowena’s story. The narrator of Poe’s tale evidently believes his former partner
caused, or at least hastened the death of his bed-ridden second wife, which also resembles Amelia in
being an aristocrat, by slipping some pernicious liquid into her wine. However, structurally as well
as stylistically, this scene very closely mirrors, rather, the description of Ligeia’s death.
Indeed, both tales can be divided very neatly in two parts: one recounts the first marriage,
placing particular emphasis on the death of the wife, which is rendered in very vague terms; the
second recounts the second marriage, but is mostly occupied, as we shall see, with a very detailed
description of a ghostly drama that takes place in the couple’s bedroom and which is ultimately
found to be a depiction of the scene of which only a very mysterious account had been given earlier:
the death of the first wife. The first-person narrators both deliberately conceal crucial details about
their first wife’s death in the middle of the tale. Indeed, the narrator of “Ligeia” also interrupts his
description of the scene, by declaring that “upon this subject I cannot bear to dilate,” a phrase which
is  the  exact  equivalent,  both  in  meaning  and  function,  of  the  one  employed  by  Walter  in  the
corresponding point of his narrative (Poe, “Ligeia” 317). However, these men are being cagey for
different reasons. The husband in “The Somnambulist” saves the revelation that Amelia had been
poisoned by Lucy for dramatic effect. This revelation is to coincide with the anagnorisis of the
tragedy of which he is simultaneously the hero and the narrator, that is, the moment in which he
himself discovered the terrible truth that he apparently was hiding from himself. The narrator of
“Ligeia,” on the other hand, does not clarify his reasons for keeping the reader in the dark, but
obscurely intimates his secret through the same kind of irony which anticipates the revelation in
“The Somnambulist.”
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To keep the tragic suspense, then, the somnambulist’s husband “cannot” tell us what really
killed Amelia. Indeed, he actively misleads the pastor, and by extension the reader, into thinking she
had died of  natural  causes.  He resorts  to  a technique often employed by Poe:  weasel-wording.
Specifically,  he  uses  a  personification  of  death  to  disguise  Lucy’s  role:  “the  grim  Destroyer.”
Similar  expressions  such  as  “the  grim  Azrael”  and  “the  Shadow,”  performed  much  the  same
function in “Ligeia,” only in that case, the murderer whose identity they were designed to conceal
was the narrator himself who, in his pride, thought he could keep the secret forever from his reader
("Ligeia" 316-17). The narrator of “The Somnambulist,” who now sees what he did not want to see
then, deliberately plants clues to Lucy’s crime, even while he turns the reader’s thoughts in another
direction—this is the very definition of misdirection. His counterpart in “Ligeia,” although he seems
genuinely intent on concealing the crime, for whatever reason, appears to be equally unwilling to
resort to downright lies.
But, unlike Lucy, Ligeia had an iron-clad alibi for the murder of Rowena: she had been dead
for years. More importantly, in the first “mysterious” part of the tale, Ligeia appears in a role that
clearly corresponds to that of the poisoned Amelia, while the narrator engages in the same kind of
cover-up that characterises the corresponding portion of “The Somnambulist,” with the important
difference  that  he  never  discloses—not  consciously—what  it  was  that  he  left  unsaid.  Thus,  an
alternative parallelism slowly begins to emerge, between the narrator and the murderess, which is in
fact both more viable and more significant.
This parallelism is reiterated in the second part of “Ligeia,” where the coincidences between
the two tales continue to pile up. Two years after Amelia’s death, Walter and his first love were
finally  wedded, and he “again experienced human happiness  greater  than mortals  generally are
destined to enjoy in this world” (“The Somnambulist” 89). In the corresponding point of Poe’s tale,
we find a very similar phrase employed in a very different sense: “I had no lack of what the world
calls wealth.  Ligeia had brought me  far more, very far more than ordinarily falls to the lot of
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mortals” ("Ligeia," 320 emphasis mine). Both men recognise that they stood to gain something
from their  first  wife’s  death,  more  than  most  “mortals”  can  ever  hope  to  enjoy.  But  they  are
speaking of widely different gains, and this illustrates the differences between the two.
Whereas Walter speaks of conjugal bliss, Poe’s narrator speaks of money. In both cases, the
death of the first wife enabled them to fulfil their secret dreams, but these too were very different in
nature. Walter had evidently never forgotten Lucy. The fact that he let the tragedy happen, suggests
that he secretly desired to marry her, which, after Amelia had given him a legitimate offspring not
unworthy of his family, he considered himself free to do. Even so, he regrets the wife he lost, as is
indicated by his claim that he was happy “again.” Poe’s narrator, on the other hand, was finally free
to  indulge  those “follies” for  which “even in  childhood” he had “imbibed a  taste,”  and which
evidently included a somewhat morbid fascination with the dead (Poe, “Ligeia” 320).
As always, the similarities between Poe’s tale and his source render the deviations from the
parallelism significant. Unlike Poe’s narrator, Walter was, for a while, very happy with his new
wife. But, like Amelia, she too was taken ill after the birth of their first child—Walter’s third. She
became weak and emaciated and suffered from “neuralgic pains” (“The Somnambulist” 89). But the
most distressing symptom of her strange affliction were the strange nightmares that disturbed her
sleep. This was, of course, the first sign of a guilty conscience.
“A change now came over my dear Lucy,” her husband recounts (“The Somnambulist” 89).
The nightmares ceased, but she began to talk in her sleep. At first, she uttered only “mutterings and
broken unintelligible speech” (89). Soon after, she took to walking in her sleep. The first time this
happened, the narrator tried to bring her back to bed: “She uttered a long piercing scream, and,
escaping from my grasp, fell senseless on the floor” (89). The following night, he decided to leave a
candle burning, so he could follow the somnambulist’s movements, in case a new attack should
occur. He was indeed presented with a drama that he would never forget, but the obvious meaning
of which was at first lost on him: 
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At the same hour [midnight] she rose and left the bed, walking erectly and firmly, as
if her weakness had suddenly left her, and she had been restored to health. She went
to a small rosewood cupboard that stood in the end of the room, and opened it, taking
from it a small bottle, which she folded in her arms and pressed to her bosom. She
then held it up to the light of the taper, and sighed deeply as she looked through it.
She turned her face to the bed, and stared at me with open lack-lustre eyes for several
minutes. (90)
Although she was staring at the narrator, in his place the somnambulist “saw” Amelia, whom
she had poisoned as she was laying in that very bed. Indeed, Lucy accompanies her performance
with a soliloquy that confirms that she was dreaming about her rival:
Keeping this frightful attitude, with the bottle held up in her hand, she spoke:
“She is past danger now, and will recover.” (A pause, and listening.) “That breathin is
lighter—no sae like death—her mains and grains are gane—the struggle’s past, and,
when she recovers, I maun continue to dress her for his eye and undress her for his
embrace. Shall that be guid help?” (Looking through the vial.) “Na, na, she has had
her time, and mine waits me. A revivin’ patient needs a cordial. Hark! he comes from
the couch in the next room. (…) Quick—quick!—his twa hours are oot, and he’ll
have a braw awakenin: she canna refuse a cordial frae the hands o’ Lucy Oliver.”
(“The Somnambulist” 90)
Evidently, the somnambulist was going through the motions of killing Amelia. “She now
approached the bed where I lay in a state of horripilation. (...) I lay, bound to the bed, without power
to move, to think, to speak” (“The Somnambulist” 90). She now addressed the narrator directly, to
offer him the harmless “cordial,” while dreaming she once again was ministering the fatal draught
to Amelia: “Quick, dear leddie—ay, ay—there, there—a drap still remains, it’s owre precious to be
424
lost.  There—you  will  sleep  now;  and  when  ye  waken,  Dowielee  will  kiss  ye  in  joy  o’ your
recovery” (90).115
Judging from these words, one supposes the narrator took his medicine from the hands of his
sleepwalking  nurse.  At  this  point,  the  reader  knows Lucy  had  poisoned  Amelia.  The  narrator,
however, did not get the message. Or rather, he could not bring himself to admit the unmistakable
meaning of  the weird theatrical  performance he had witnessed:  “Was there  anything in  Lucy’s
words that indicated more? (...)  But to what did my doubts point? I could not mention it.  The
thought was not recognized by me by as an act of my conscious mind. It was a rebel. I quelled it”
(“The Somnambulist” 90). He reassured himself with the thought that “somnambulists do strange
things in their nocturnal vocations” (90). By “strange” he means, of course, meaningless. But the
somnambulist would not allow him much longer to ignore the truth.
Two nights later, she staged a revised version of her original performance. “Her manner was
more confused on this occasion; for she approached and receded the bed; walked along the room
with a rapid step; repeated these motions eight or ten times; and, at last, stood still in the middle of
the apartment” (“The Somnambulist” 90). This time, her soliloquy was even more explicit: “I can
wait nae langer. This chance has failed. (…) the fever has passed its dangerous hour. Now or never!
Lucy Oliver or Amelia Gordon maun dee. She or I maun drink this black death, to the health o’
Apothecary Watson, wha, silly man, refused at first to gie me’t” (90). Thus, the somnambulist made
it impossible for her husband to ignore the meaning of the ceremony she was about to perform for
the second time. She went  “through the same series of movements,  and using nearly the same
words, as on the previous occasion” (91). 
The  whole  episode  has  an  obvious  resemblance  with  the  mysterious  ghostly  drama  in
Rowena’s room. But the play of masks in “Ligeia” confuses the picture. The most conspicuous, and
superficial evidence reiterates the identification of Lucy and Ligeia. In the final scene of the tale,
115 Lucy significantly addresses  the narrator,  her  future  husband,  by the  name of  his  estate.  With this  touch,  the
anonymous author emphasises class difference, which is also made apparent by the language in which they express
themselves: she always in Scots, he in what was once known as “the king’s English.”
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this  identification  is  mostly  suggested  by  her  position,  and by an  odd choice  of  words  on the
narrator’s part. Indeed, according to the narrator, she arose from the bed, and, “with the manner of
one  bewildered  in  a  dream,  (…)  advanced  (…)  into  the  middle  of  the  apartment,”  where  she
appears  to  have  previously  poisoned  her  successor  (Poe,  “Ligeia”  329  emphasis  mine).  The
somnambulist  delivers  her  ominous soliloquy,  precisely,  in  the middle of  her  room, before her
husband’s  eyes.  The  phrase  “one  bewildered  in  a  dream,”  which  clearly  evokes  the  idea  of
sleepwalking, I think clinches the allusion.
But the phrase partakes of the same ambiguity that pervades Poe’s entire tale. We can take it
to  mean  that  Ligeia  was  dreaming,  hence  sleepwalking—this  would  be  the  most  idiomatic
interpretation—, but also that the figure was such as “one bewildered” might appear in “a dream,”
hence, that the narrator was the one “dreaming.” This latter construal, although technically possible,
might  appear  a  little  forced—that  is,  until  we realise  that  it  makes much better  sense than the
straight reading.
The “drops” which support the identification of Ligeia with the poisoner, of course, had
themselves felt like a dream to the narrator. In fact, the evidence suggesting the identification of the
narrator  of “Ligeia” with the killer-somnambulist is much more compelling, if less conspicuous,
than  that  which  suggests  the  identification  of  the  latter  with  Ligeia,  which  is  entirely
phantasmagoric. The narrator’s very behaviour in Rowena’s room very closely matches that of the
somnambulist  reliving  her  crime,  and  this  suggests  that  he  too  was  “dreaming”  about  another
occasion. He too “hastened across the chamber” to get the wine that had been prescribed to his wife;
on his way back to her bed, moreover, he too paused in the middle of the apartment; and, during the
“drama of revivification” that ensued some days later, he, also like the somnambulist, was stuck in a
rut, repeating over and over the same movements, while dreaming about the dead Ligeia. Instead of
her paralysed husband the sleeping Lucy “saw” the dead Amelia; likewise, the narrator of Poe’s tale
“saw” Ligeia whenever he approached the unresponsive body of Rowena. Finally, the sleeping Lucy
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did not  really poison her husband, and, apparently, neither did the narrator of Poe’s tale poison
Rowena.
But,  although  the  drama  is  distinctly  similar,  the  roles  of  the  husband  and  wife  are
significantly inverted in Poe’s tale. The very detailed parallelism suggests that the husband was the
one dreaming, only in this case he was daydreaming, and also that the dream had the same meaning
in both tales. He was apparently under the same compulsion to reveal a former crime by which
Lucy was actuated. In “Ligeia,” however, we are seeing the crime not from the victim’s perspective,
but through the murderer’s eyes.
Conversely, Walter’s position in the drama that made Lucy’s crime and his error apparent to
him, perfectly parallels not that of the narrator of Poe’s tale, but rather that of the ill-fated Rowena
in the night of the ruby-drops. This parallelism in turn indirectly corroborates the explanation I have
previously supplied for the latter’s death. For in Walter’s description of the nervous breakdown he
suffered after  being forced to  see what  he had so long fooled himself  into not seeing,  we see
depicted the full horror of Rowena’s position from the eyes of the victim.
Indeed, the revelation of Lucy’s crime made such a powerful impression on Walter that he
was  “seized  with  a  fever”  (“The  Somnambulist”  91).  Lucy  then  resumed,  to  her  husband’s
unspeakable  terror,  the  role  of  nurse.  She  tended to  him with  the  same apparent  zeal  she had
displayed  towards  Amelia.  But  now that  he  knew how  perfectly  she  had  dissembled  her  true
feelings, he could not trust her: “I saw often at my bedside, Lucy Oliver, my wife, who administered
to me medicine—cordials—restoratives. O God! what were the thoughts which, suggested by her
image, changed and coloured by a maniac fancy, mixed with the recollections of Amelia Gordon!
(…) I recovered from the fever; but I convalesced with poison on my mind” (91).
Imaginary poison, then,  almost killed Walter. Every time Lucy gave him a “cordial,” he
imagined it was poisoned. After all, she had already poisoned him once in imagination. Evidently,
Rowena lived in the same perpetual fear of being poisoned, which is but too clearly indicated by her
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refusal to drink the wine from the hands of her husband. She had in fact more reasons to be terrified.
Lucy had killed Amelia for Walter’s sake—she loved him. Rowena’s husband, on the other hand,
detested his wife, and was not afraid to show it.
Walter is technically innocent of the murder of his wife. However, he clearly was indirectly
responsible for it. Lucy was, he tells us, the “doating, resigned, conquered, love-distracted girl, the
daughter  of  my  (…)  cottar;”  “the  conquered  being  whose  fate  was  in  my  hands”  (“The
Somnambulist” 86). This submission flattered the male pride of her lover, while also confirming his
sense of class superiority. His peasant lover was, in fact, his slave: “her thoughts followed the train
of my ideas; her feelings were gratified only by a sympathy which she drew from my thoughts,
words, looks, and sighs” (86). 
He implies, then, that there was between Lucy and him a rapport so perfect that she could
guess his unexpressed yearnings from “looks” and “sighs.” Considering she was a “somnambulist,”
his sentence evokes the supposed power the animal magnetists claimed they had over their subjects’
wills. Thus, Lucy’s crime must be referred to a secret desire of the narrator to get rid of Amelia. By
his constant self-reproaches, the narrator intimates that this was so. Lucy lived only to make him
happy,  therefore,  would  never  do anything to  make him unhappy.  Thus,  one may regard “The
Somnambulist,” even though the actual poisoning his done by Lucy, as a story of femicide by proxy.
Lucy, then, displayed that idolatrous love Ligeia’s husband craved, and of which he thought,
against all evidence, she had given full proof by ridding him of a wife he hated. This conclusion is
not only preposterous, but also incompatible with what we know of Ligeia’s character. Whereas
Lucy had no will but Walter’s, Ligeia had “a giant will” (Poe, “Ligeia” 318n). Thus, the parallel
with “The Somnambulist” suggests what all evidence confirms: that Ligeia was not the murderer,
but the victim, and that her murderer, the narrator of the tale, unconsciously staged his crime in a
trance that was, in many respects, akin to somnambulism. Indeed, “The Somnambulist” provides a
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model of unconscious behaviour that perfectly fits Poe’s tale, showing, once again, the mistake in
reading the unexplainable urges of Poe’s narrators in psychoanalytical terms.
The reluctance of the narrator of “The Somnambulist” to see the truth was, of course, itself
dictated by an unconscious urge. He persistently refused to see the truth his somnambulist wife was
busily trying to convey to him. But he was eventually compelled to fit the pieces together—the
words and the gestures. He recognised at last that the dream had reference to that fateful night when
he had decided to take a nap:
Her tale was now more connected, and filled with an import more dreadful. It bore a
character of waking reality—borrowing from the waking occurrences of life, facts—
undeniable, melancholy truths—turning them to a rational account, and explaining
even those very parts of her conduct which never, in my estimation, quadrated with
human nature. My mind tried to escape from the fearful, connected, rational sense of
her monologue. Its truth horrified me. (“The Somnambulist” 91)
Poe’s narrator combines the somnambulist’s urge to denounce herself with her husband’s
reluctance to admit the evident meaning of the unconscious drama. This is what confers to “Ligeia”
its peculiar atmosphere of terror. For the narrator is himself terrified. His delirium, of course, is as
“connected” and fraught with meaning as the somnambulist’s. By subtly leading his reader to this
passage, Poe once again prompts us to fit the pieces of his narrator’s delirium together, like Walter
has done with his wife’s dream. At first, we too cannot bring ourselves to accept the “rational sense”
of the drama in “Ligeia”—but there simply is no escaping the truth.
I think of “Ligeia” as a very elaborate, very strange labyrinth. At first, all paths appear to be
blocked. Indeed, after a few twists and turns we get the feeling that we will inevitably get lost in the
tangled maze of horror Poe prepared for us. Yet, on cool examination, we find that, no matter how
tortuous, all paths lead to the goal. In the end, we are rewarded with a name for all the horror of the
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tale: femicide. And, as Poe often reminded us, a known crime is always preferable to a nameless
horror.
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9 — “Shadow of a Shade:” Ann Radcliffe’s The Italian and the Poetics of Delusion
As usual, Poe’s buried allusion to his source slyly highlights the cleverness of his adaptation
of the source material. In “Ligeia” Poe merged the two protagonists of “The Somnambulist” into
one, making the guilty “somnambulist” the narrator of his own tale, but also the baffled spectator of
the phantasmagoric drama that ultimately reveals to the reader the crime he had concealed. Each
hint he misses, each obscure allusion returns the same picture of a deluded, mystified femicide. This
picture gets more detailed and consistent each time one of the mysteries in the tale is solved. It was
always the narrator. His mark is everywhere. But, in order to recognise this, we must resist his
appeal to seek the answers in the depths, where everything gets vague and indefinite.
The crucial clue by which the narrator betrays himself is that “shadow of a shade,” which he
saw in the middle of the room in the tower of his dilapidated abbey, which is the semantic node on
which all other clues depend (Poe “Ligeia” 325). This is one of those salient phrases that, by their
very peculiarity, suggest that their meaning depends on some foundational text which, conscious or
unconsciously, has made its way to the author’s mind. In his explanatory notes, Mabbott writes,
with his usual terseness, that “‘Shadow of a shade’ recalls  Hamlet  (...), ‘A dream itself is but a
shadow’”  (Tales 334n30).  Evidently,  he  thought  the  connection  was  self-evident.  Here  is  the
relevant passage in Shakespeare, in its entirety:
HAMLET O God, I could be bounded in a nutshell and count myself a king
of infinite space, were it not that I have bad dreams.
GUILDENSTERN Which dreams indeed are ambition. For the very 
substance of the ambitious is merely the shadow of a dream.
HAMLET A dream itself is but a shadow.
ROSENCRANTZ Truly; and I hold ambition of so airy and light a quality
that it is but a shadow’s shadow. (Hamlet 2.2.253-261)
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The exchange, with its suggestion of waking dreams, blends well with the atmosphere of
uncertainty in Poe’s tale. Indeed, the two passages resonate. The narrator is constantly dreaming,
even when awake, about Ligeia; when he sees the “shadow” he imagines it belongs to his recurring
dream, which would make it, of course, a shadow of a dream, hence a shadow of a shadow. But this
somehow does not seem entirely satisfactory. One senses some ulterior connection, such as one is
tempted  to  express  in  terms  of  a  symbolical  relationship.  Perhaps  the  shadow  represents  the
narrator’s aspirations to a transcendent knowledge, which can in turn be seen as symbolic of the
Romantic poet’s exaggerated ambitions. On a straight reading of the tale, such an interpretation
appears viable.
Still,  the  connection  is  not  pointed  enough  to  generate  more  than  a  feeling  of  vague
allusiveness—the same sort  of connection that  the narrator  of the tale  felt  existed between the
mystery of Ligeia and some books he read. But the association of the idea of involuntary self-
incrimination, the phrase “shadow of a shade,” and a mimic drama depicting the killing of a woman
coalesces into a definite allusion to an episode in Ann Radcliffe’s  The Italian  (1797), where the
phrase, which despite its Shakespearean flavor does not appear in any of Shakespeare’s works, is
applied to precisely such a pantomime. The somnambulist drama in Poe’s tale and this pantomime
are not only vaguely similar, they click together in a way that indicates not only that Poe had read
The Italian, but also that he intended to point to his reader the similarities between the episode in
question and his own text.
The protagonist of The Italian, the proud Count di Marinella, had taken the vows under the
assumed name of  Schedoni  after  having attempted  to  kill  his  wife for  an  imaginary  infidelity.
Having left her for dead, he never learned she had in fact survived, and dies with the supposed
crime on his  conscience.  This  circumstance  is  also  kept  from the  reader  until  the  penultimate
chapter.  Thus,  Radcliffe  manages  to  make  femicide  the  theme  of  her  novel,  and  yet  save
appearances. Schedoni was, of course, morally a femicide. Moreover, he was quite willing to kill
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women. Indeed, he was about to stab the rather unremarkable heroine Elena in her sleep when he
saw a locket around her neck which convinced him that she was his daughter—in another surprising
twist, the reader is later informed that she was in fact his niece. He would have killed any woman
but his daughter, and therefore spared her.
Immediately after this scene, the monk comes across a country fair. There, by another of
those  improbable  coincidences  for  which  Radcliffe’s  novels  are  notable,  a  group  of  travelling
entertainers was performing a play that depicted precisely the crime he thought he had just been on
the point of committing. In a “theatre, (…) a mimic opera, the ‘shadow of a shade,’ was exhibiting,”
which occasioned a “roar of laughter, excited by the principal buffo within” (Radcliffe, The Italian
273). On closer inspection, however, Schedoni and his fellow-travelers find that the “crowd” which
“assembled  round  a  stage  on  which  some  persons  grotesquely  dressed,  were  performing”  had
misinterpreted the ambiguous pantomime: “The people above were acting what seemed to have
been intended for a tragedy, but what their strange gestures, and incongruous countenances, had
transformed into a comedy” (274).
Schedoni’s simple-minded guide illustrates the perplexity the incongruous play occasioned
among the public, who, moments earlier, had been laughing: “the peasant, with gaping mouth and
staring eyes, stood like a statue, yet not knowing whether he ought to laugh or cry, till suddenly
turning round to the Confessor [Schedoni], (...) he seized his arm, and pointing to the stage, called
out,  ‘Look!  Signor,  see!  What  a  scoundrel!  what  a  villain!  See!  he  has  murdered  his  own
daughter!’” (Radcliffe,  The Italian 274). Thus, when the leading performer acts out the murder of
his daughter on stage, the nature of the play finally becomes evident, even to the most illiterate
among the public. The well-educated monk, on his part,  immediately “perceived that the actors
were performing the story of Virginia,” a well-known episode of Roman history on which Chaucer’s
“Physician’s  Tale” and John Webster’s  tragedy  Appius  and Virginia  were based:  “It  was at  the
moment when she was dying in the arms of her father, who was holding the poniard, with which he
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stabbed her. The feelings of Schedoni, at this instant, inflicted a punishment almost worthy of the
crime he had meditated” (275).
Betrayed by a heavy conscience, the sneaky monk loses his habitual composure when he
sees an exact depiction of the crime he had plotted—he too had intended to stab the young woman
he believes  is  his  daughter.  Elena,  his  intended victim,  “perceived,  with surprize,  the changing
emotions of his soul,  and the inexplicable character of his countenance” (Radcliffe,  The Italian
275). Noticing he is acting suspiciously,  the monk flies into a rage and hastily flees the scene,
drawing even more unwanted attention on himself.
This scene and the “drama” in Rowena’s room dovetail nicely into each other, although, as
usual, the connection depends on the true story, which has to deduced from the scattered clues in
“Ligeia.” Still, the meaning of Poe’s allusion—for we can no longer doubt that it is an allusion—is
now perfectly clear, I think. Radcliffe’s monk sees his crime represented in a pantomime entitled
“shadow of a shade” and betrays himself; Poe’s monk-like narrator plays the “principal buffo” in a
pantomime representing his former crime—for his performance too is silent—, without recognising
that the “shadow of a shade” was his own. Thus, in the crucial moment in which the narrator fails to
recognise his own shadow, thus betraying himself to the reader, Poe evokes the scene in which
Schedoni involuntarily exhibits his own guilt.
Radcliffe’s scene was itself an obvious nod to Shakespeare’s  Hamlet, more specifically to
the cunning plan the hero of the tragedy devises to verify his suspicion that his uncle had poisoned
his father. The prince of Denmark arranges for a play depicting a poisoning to be performed before
the presumptive murderer, which he calls “The Mousetrap” (see Shakespeare, Hamlet 3.2). During
the performance, he and Horacio observe the reactions of the suspect, whose guilt becomes indeed
manifest.  Thus,  one  might  say  that  the  allusion  to  Radcliffe  redirects  the  vague  allusion  to
Shakespeare.
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Nevertheless, the true subtext of Poe’s scene is Radcliffe’s version of “The Mouse Trap,”
which has a much more complete and meaningful parallelism with his tale. The reaction of the
public to the grotesque pantomime is a perfect allegory of the recognition by the reader of the true
import of the ghostly drama in “Ligeia” and, by extension,  of the tale itself.  The spectators of
Radcliffe’s “shadow of a shade” could not, at first, understand what was going on in the stage or
what the play was about—this was hardly surprising, as the play had no words. The suspense ends
when the leading player goes through the motions of stabbing a woman on the stage—the public
realises then that the play was a tragedy, and not, as it had seemed, a comedy. Likewise, the readers
of “Ligeia” are forced to revise their interpretation of the silent “drama” performed by the narrator
once they realise that he was not actually “reviving” Rowena, but reenacting the murder of Ligeia.
Only in his case, the “principal  buffo” was not consciously aware of what the play was about, or
even that he was playing a part. In the terms of this allegory, then, the position of the readers of
“Ligeia” vis-à-vis the phantasmagoria corresponds to that of the baffled spectators of Radcliffe’s
misleading pantomime. Thus, the guilt of the narrator of “Ligeia,” that is uncovered by carefully
fitting the pieces of the mystery together, is in a way corroborated by Poe’s allusion.
Ligeia’s poem, which Poe added to the tale in 1845, has commonly been read, like the tale
itself, as a cosmical allegory. Indeed, it has mostly been taken as an exposition of the symbolism of
the tale in which it was included. The tone and the imagery of the poem, being vaguely reminiscent
of the poetry of the English metaphysical poets, certainly invite this sort of reading: a group of
“angels,” wearing veils over their faces, attend a drama in which a “worm” devours human-shaped
“mimes.” Richard Wilbur, in an explanatory note to the poem included in his 1959 edition of Poe’s
Poems, was perhaps the first to attempt a systematic explanation of the symbolism:
This poem represents man’s condition in the Biblical “latter years.” The universe has
reached maximum diffusion and incoherence, the Earth is physically and spiritually
at its remotest from God (hence “lonesome”), and its purgation by cataclysm is at
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hand. The music of the spheres is “fitful” because the universe is near-chaotic. Since
they are closer than man to the divine order that was and shall be, the angels weep at
the “formless” disorder of life on Earth, and at the thought that creatures made in the
image of “God on high” must inexplicably be casualties of the cosmic process. 
(“Introduction” 142)
For Wilbur, poem and tale embodied the same “cosmic myth” which he considered to be a
“justification of his [Poe’s] kind of poetry, making it not only purposive but indispensable, and
rendering the poet not only elect, but Godlike” (Wilbur,  Complete Poems 12). At first glance, this
appears an acceptable interpretation of the tableau presented in the first three stanzas of the poem:
Lo! ‘tis a gala night
Within the lonesome latter years!
An angel throng, bewinged, bedight
In veils, and drowned in tears,
Sit in a theatre, to see
A play of hopes and fears,
While the orchestra breathes fitfully
The music of the spheres.
Mimes, in the form of God on high,
Mutter and mumble low,
And hither and thither fly —
Mere puppets they, who come and go
At bidding of vast formless things
That shift the scenery to and fro,
Flapping from out their Condor wings
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Invisible Wo!
That motley drama! — oh, be sure
It shall not be forgot!
With its phantom chased forevermore,
By a crowd that seized it not,
Through a circle that ever returneth in
To the self-same spot,
And much of Madness and more of Sin,
And Horror the soul of the plot. (Poe, "Ligeia" 318)
The angels’ initial response to the play is, indeed, characterised by incomprehension, pity,
and finally horror. Despite the hints of “madness” and “sin,” the irresistible forces that determine
the suffering of the human mimes seemed inscrutable to the public. This is apparently compatible
with Wilbur’s idea that the angels lamented the cosmic tragedy of human existence in an absurd
world, in which death reigned supreme. However, there are certain ambiguities in the poem that
destabilise the allegory. Later, when he prepared the notes to his edition of the poem, Mabbott,
ostensibly  recovering  Wilbur’s  interpretation,  attempted  to  flesh  out  more  fully  the  symbolical
meaning of the figures.116 In reality, however, he ended up highlighting the impossibility of coming
up  with  a  coherent  symbolical  reading.  Thus,  he  explains  that:  “The  phantom  is  Happiness”
(Mabbott,  Complete  Poems  327n19).  Although  intended  as  a  clarification,  this  identification
actually short-circuits the allegory. What is more, it flatly contradicts Wilbur’s interpretation.
116 Indeed, Mabbott gave the form of a methodical  commentary to Wilbur’s relatively unsystematic interpretation.
Regarding the “phrase ‘the lonesome latter years,’” in the second line, he notices that: “According to a note by
Richard Wilbur (...), Poe here suggests that the end of the world approaches” (Talies 1:326n2). Mabbott obviously
agrees. Then, commenting on the last two lines of that stanza, he again paraphrases Wilbur: “The music of the
spheres is fitful because of the disharmony of the degenerate world, Wilbur explains” (1:327n7). In both cases, he
paraphrases from Wilbur’s ten lines long note to the poem, most of which is transcribed above.
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If the phantom is Happiness, then the “crowd” chasing vainly after it  is  Humanity. This is
the time-honoured meaning of the stock allegory to which Mabbott tacitly alludes. However, in the
poem, the ones doing the chasing appear to be the angels, as implied by the use of “crowd,” a
synonym of “throng” in the third line. Yet, in Wilbur’s interpretation, the angels, who witnessed but
did not participate in the drama, did  not stand for humanity—the helpless “mimes” did, and they
were not chasing after the “phantom.” They appear, rather, to have been chased by it. Indeed, the
phrase “in the form of God on high,” in the beginning of the second stanza, a clear paraphrase of
Genesis 1.27, renders the identification between the “mimes” and humankind binding. As a result,
the identification of the “phantom” with happiness becomes positively absurd. Thus, although they
both  regarded  the  poem  as  a  serious  allegory  manifesting  Poe’s  visionary  theories  about  the
Cosmos, Mabbott and Wilbur were not only unable to provide a reasonable, coherent explanation of
the allegory, they could not even agree on its meaning.
More importantly, both ignore the crucial moment of recognition. The angels were, indeed,
trapped in a vicious circle of incomprehension—but this circle is broken when the hideous “worm”
emerges, and starts slaughtering the “mimes,” thus providing a concrete object to the vague horror
of the previous stanzas. The entrance of the “worm” corresponds to the anagnorisis of the tragedy
being  performed.  But,  given  the  play-within-a-play  structure  of  the  poem,  the  focus  is  on  the
audience. Although initially baffled, they now finally understand what the play was about, and their
attitude undergoes a complete reversal. This unexpected twist is introduced by a very conspicuous
“but” in the fourth stanza:
But see, amid the mimic rout
A crawling shape intrude!
A blood-red thing that writhes from out
The scenic solitude!
It writhes! — it writhes! — with mortal pangs
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The mimes become its food,
And seraphs sob at vermin fangs
In human gore imbued.
Out — out are the lights — out all!
And, over each quivering form,
The curtain, a funeral pall,
Comes down with the rush of a storm,
While the angels, all pallid and wan,
Uprising, unveiling, affirm
That the play is the tragedy, “Man,”
And its hero the Conqueror Worm. (Poe, "Ligeia" 319)
At first, the presence of the monster was only indirectly indicated by the mimes’ suffering:
the  “invisible  wo.”  Indeed,  they  appeared  “puppets,”  whose  actions  were  determined  by  “vast
formless things,” which correspond to the “phantom” in the third stanza. Once the “worm” emerges
from the “scenic solitude,” however,  the angels understand that he was,  as it  were,  pulling the
strings from behind the scenes. Thus, the formless horror that had the human-like figures running
about finally acquires a shape and, consequently, the movements of the mimes become themselves
intelligible, when the hero of the tragedy, the “worm,” reveals himself. The terrible catastrophe
marks the abrupt end of the drama, and, after the curtain falls over the ghastly scene, the angels
significantly remove their  veils, the obvious symbol of their  blindness,  before they “affirm” its
meaning.117
117 Poe may also have had in mind Matthew Lewis’ account of the only public performance of his “monodrama” “The
Captive,” published in the anonymous volume The Life and Correspondence of M. G. Lewis in 1839, in which he
reports that “two people went into hysterics during the performance, and two more after the curtain dropped,”
declaring that: “The only chance was, whether pity would make the audience weep; but, instead of that, terror threw
them into fits” (234).
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Wilbur’s and Mabbott’s apocalyptic interpretations were predicated on the assumption that
the angels remained in a state of ignorance to the end, but this is clearly not borne out by the text. In
fact, although the third stanza mentions the “phantom” of the play being “chased forevermore” by
“a  crowd that  seize it  not,”  this  is  not  a  statement  of  fact.  On the contrary,  the  stanza  clearly
expresses  a  desire  that  this  might  not  come  to  be.  Also  decisive  is  the  implied  suggested
identification of “Man” with the “Conqueror Worm,” which further disturbs the cosmic allegory.
Indeed, most tragedies are named after their heroes. The “mimes,” on the other hand, have only a
passive role in the tragedy, and therefore are evidently not the “hero” of the tragedy.
Poe reinforces this correspondence by another covert allusion. “It is (...) likely,” Mabbott
writes,  “that  Poe’s  impulse  to  write  his  poem came from a  passage  in  a  review in  Graham’s
Magazine for February 1841 of Dr. James McHenry’s epic, The Antediluvians,” which “can hardly
have escaped” Poe’s “eye” (Mabbott, Complete Poems 324). McHenry’s text contained some lines
which developed the same basic conceit around which “The Conqueror Worm” revolves: “Such
scenes of cruelty and blood, / Exhibited before appalled heaven, / To make the angels weep, to look
on earth!” (qtd.  in Mabbott,  Complete Poems 324). The review traces this idea to a passage in
Shakespeare’s  Measure for Measure:  “But man, proud man, / Dress’d in a little brief authority, /
Most ignorant of what he’s most assur’d— / His glassy essence—like an angry ape / Plays such
fantastic tricks before high heaven / as makes the angels weep” (Shakespeare,  Measure  2.2.118-
124).118 Mabbott thought that the only thing these texts had in common with Poe’s poem was the
idea of angels weeping at the spectacle afforded by humans “and especially the  frailty of man”
(324). But these echoes evidently reinforce also the identification of the cruel “worm” with “man,”
and the latter’s “ignorance” of precisely those subjects in his knowledge of which he feels more
confident. These connections appear to me to be equally decisive to the implied meaning of Poe’s
tale.119
118 Shakespeare’s text, however, was truncated in the review.
119 The last stanza of the poem, incidentally, itself provides a spectacular illustration of Poe’s method of combination.
Another “inspiration,” Mabbott remarks in the introduction to his edition of the poem, “may have come, as Ingram
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The  cosmical  reading  proposed  by  Wilbur,  of  course,  requires  us  to  read  “man”  as  an
ungendered term, designating humankind in the aggregate. But the narrator’s self-incrimination in
the bridal chamber brings gender back with a vengeance. Suddenly, we realise that we know Ligeia
only through the man that killed her, and this forces us to read gender back into her words. This
applies also to her commentary on the poem: “O God! O Divine Father! — shall these things be
undeviatingly so? — shall this Conqueror be not once conquered? Are we not part and parcel in
Thee? Who — who knoweth the mysteries of the will with its vigor? Man doth not yield himself to
the angels, nor unto death utterly, save only through the weakness of his feeble will” (Poe, "Ligeia"
observed, from a little verse romance,  The Proud Ladye  (1840), by an obscure New York poet, Spencer Wallace
Cone,” which “Poe reviewed (…) in Burton’s for June 1840” (Mabbott, Complete Poems 324). However, the two
poems have little else in common.
The final stanza of the poem, however, contains equally distinct echoes of two other sources which, as far as I
know, had hitherto not been identified. The comparison of the curtain in a theatre with a “funeral pall” is clearly
inspired in Scott’s motto to chapter XXXIII (or chapter X, vol. III, in the first edition) of Anne of Geierstein (1829):
Toll, toll the bell!
Greatness is o’er,
The heart has broke,
To ache no more;
An unsubstantial pageant all—
Drop o’er the scene the funeral pall. (366)
These lines are identified simply as from an “old poem.” J. H. Alexander, who prepared the Edinburgh Edition
of the novel I have used, writes that this was “not identified; probably by Scott” (Scott,  Geierstein 563n). The
thematic similarity and the rhyme “all”-” pall” practically confirms Poe’s borrowing.
Indeed, Poe’s use of the same rhyming words betrays a deliberate allusion. The same strategy is used, I think,
in the same stanza, to allude to another of Poe’s sources, the penultimate stanza of the short poem “Man” by George
Herbert (1593-1633):
More servants wait on Man,
Than he’ll take notice of: in ev’ry path
He treads down that which doth befriend him,
When sickness makes him pale and wan.
O mighty love! Man is one world, and hath
Another to attend him. (85)
The last stanza of “The Conqueror Worm,” has “pallid and wan” rhyming with “Man.” The parallel is, I think,
quite irrefusable. This echo reinforces the connection between Poe’s poem and the metaphysical poets. Inasmuch as
it may prompt the reader to think the poem is a cosmical allegory in their manner, the allusion is misleading. Yet, as
usual, the correspondences are significantly altered in Poe’s poem. The phrase “pale and wan” refers, in Herbert’s
poem, to “man” himself; Poe’s “pallid and wan” refers rather to the angels, that weep at the spectacle of human
beings being slaughtered by the “worm.”
The allusion to Herbert’s poem is very significant in the context of American letters in Poe’s time. Emerson
had quoted most of the poem in his first book,  Nature (1836). In fact, he quotes the first sentence in the stanza
above in chapter  II,  “Commodity,” and the majority of the poem, with only the fifth and seventh last  stanzas
omitted, in the last, “Prospects.” Given the centrality of Emerson in American Transcendentalism, one might say
that George Herbert’s “Man” is itself a fundamental text for the movement. In fact, Nature may be read as a sort of
extended gloss, or meditation on the poem. I think, therefore, that this is an indirect allusion to Emerson, or rather, a
stab at him, that is crucial to understanding Poe’s relationship with Transcendentalism.
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319). Man means “not woman;” it also means “the Conqueror,” her conqueror, whom Ligeia hopes
may someday himself be conquered by means of the “feebleness” of his own “will.”
She appeals to God, then, not in the name of “Man,” but of woman. Thus, the obscure sense
of her prophetic poem also becomes apparent. The implied identification of the “worm” with man
seems, at first, not to make sense, as the “mimes” are explicitly identified as humans. This apparent
contradiction, however,  disappears once we realise the significance of gender.  The “mimes” are
human,  but  not  “men:”  they  represent,  of  course,  women.  As  a  conventional  apocalypse,  it  is
impossible, as we have seen, to reduce the poem to sense; as a feminist apocalypse, it makes perfect
sense.  According  to  this  reading,  then,  the  “mimes”  would  represent  the  subaltern  position  of
women in a patriarchal society, and the “worm” the male tyrant, that is, the femicide.
Indeed, these overtones cannot be deemed irrelevant in a tale dealing with the death of two
women, narrated by a very cagey male, and fraught with disturbing hints of murder. Indeed, some
critics have posited a more direct connection between the poem and the plot of “Ligeia.” Susan
Amper mentions Joan Dayan and Yaohua Shi, who have “read the poem as a foreshadowing of
Rowena’s death,” but argues that this interpretation is not viable: 
The problem remains in explaining how Ligeia can have guessed so precisely the
circumstances  of  Rowena’s  death.  Among her  mental  gifts,  the ability  to  tell  the
future was never mentioned. Rather, she is reporting her own experience of sexual
violence and murder at the hands of her husband. Her poem is a bill of indictment,
composed in the hope that her drama (…) “shall not be forgot!” (…) The Phantom is
the murdering narrator, chased by the threat of exposure; the crowd that “sees it not”
could be readers who fail to discover her message in the poem.
(“Masters of Deceit” 131-32)
Implied in this passage, of course, is the idea that the poem is an allegory of the reading of
the mystery tale itself to which it has been grafted. Indeed, it appears to me that the poem is a
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prophecy of the implied dénouement of “Ligeia,” that is, of the uncovering of Ligeia’s true story by
the reader. The precise meaning of the allegory, however, is established by reference to Radcliffe’s
“shadow of a shade.”
As the reader has no doubt noticed, the situation depicted in the poem has many significant
similarities with the country-fair scene in The Italian. Both involve a drama performed by “mimes”
which only became intelligible after the leading character committed murder. Moreover, the two
phases in the public’s reaction to these dramas are perfect analogues of the reader’s response to the
tale: the initial perplexity before the mysterious one-man drama performed by the narrator, and the
sudden insight  incident  on the  identification of  the  “shadow of  a  shade,”  which then becomes
clearly identifiable  with the “Phantom,” making definite  sense of  Amper’s  interpretation of the
poem.
The  narrator  chased  after  a  “phantom,”  without  being  able  to  “seize”  it.  The  public,
convinced that the chase was an allegory of the quest of the Romantic poet for Supernal Beauty and
Absolute Truth, followed in his footsteps, and, therefore, could no more grasp the mystery of the
story than the narrator. Indeed, his inability to get a hold of the ghost matches his failure to achieve
the full knowledge of the mystery of Ligeia: he “felt it approaching—felt it approaching—yet (…)
at length entirely depart” (Poe, “Ligeia” 314). Likewise, the reader also intuits a vague sort of half-
sense—the cosmical allegory—which is not entirely consistent with the drama performed by the
narrator of the tale or Ligeia’s poem, and which supplies the place of literal meaning in a situation
where this does not seem practicable. Yet, we, the readers, can never shake the feeling that the
apparent meaning does not quite add up. And so, the “circle” of misunderstanding must ultimately
be  broken.  This  is  Ligeia’s  prophecy.  In  terms of  the  diegesis,  she  obscurely  predicts  that  her
husband will involuntarily reveal his crime. Thus read, her poem intimates also her awareness of her
husband’s exhibitionism, which is, indeed, one of his most distinctive features.
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Poe’s allusion to Radcliffe’s “shadow of a shade” is emblematic of his unconventional use of
the intertext,  which is, in a sense, quite the opposite of that described by Michael Riffaterre in
“Paragramme et signifiance.” According to this critic, what distinguishes the literary text from other
modalities  of  discourse  is  the  presence  of  “incohérences  déictiques  de  la  signifiance,”  that  is,
antithetical statements for which “il n’y a pas de visualisation possible:”
La dérivation du texte à partir  d’une donnée sémantique élimine la référence des
mots aux choses et la ramplace par la référence des mots à un système de mots ou à
un système sémique situé  en dehors  du texte.  (…) Quand le  lecteur,  docile  à  la
séquence lexicale, cesse de lire en fonction de référents non verbaux, et qu’il lit en
fonction du paragramme sémantique, la coupure s’efface ou plutôt écarts et solutions
de continuité sont perçus comme signes que les référents verbaux ne son plus dans le
texte même, mais dans l’intertexte” (Riffaterre, “Paragramme” 80, 82-83).
The  phrase  “shadow  of  a  shade”  in  “Ligeia”  is  indeed  made  salient  by  the  apparent
impossibility of reducing it to a concrete, literal meaning. In other words, the common semantic
mechanism of reference appears to  collapse,  and this  effectively prompts  the reader  to seek its
reference in the intertext, rather than visualise the scene being described. Thus, the buried allusion
functions as “le mot inducteur du paragramme” (Riffaterre, “Paragramme” 75).
However, in Poe’s text, the allusion doubles back on itself. That is, instead of leading, as one
would expect, away from the text, broadening its semantic possibilities by generalisation, it actually
leads the reader back to it, providing clues for the concrete meaning the reader is bound to miss at
first.  In  this  case,  the  appeal  to  the  intertext  re-establishes  the link between words  and things,
intimating  a  solution that  requires,  precisely,  that  one visualises  the scene  depicted in  the tale.
Indeed, the narrator himself keeps pointing toward the same spot, the middle of his bridal chamber,
thereby enabling the reader to form a very precise mental picture of the decisive moments of the
tale: “From out the most central recess of this melancholy vaulting, depended (…) a huge censer,”
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he recalls; later, the faint “shadow of a shade” appears on that very same spot; later still, on the
fateful night of the return of Ligeia, he vainly searches for the shadow there; finally, later that same
night, the enshrouded Ligeia advances to “the middle of the apartment” (Poe, "Ligeia" 321, 325
329). Thus, that allusiveness that we are used, even trained, to recognise as a sign of the collapse of
the mechanism of reference in poetry, becomes in Poe’s method, an instrument of misdirection,
which disguises the  precisely coded literal meaning of the shadow and the equally precise meaning
of the allusion. Thus, meaning is, in a sense, reinstated, and the text’s ability to convey it affirmed,
in the face of the typical Romantic rhetoric of the narrator.
At first, then, we assume the tale is one of genuine supernatural, hence, that the reader is
required temporarily to suspend disbelief in order to appreciate it. The text, however, forces us to
conclude  that  the  narrator  was  himself  suspending  disbelief,  therefore,  that  the  tale  is  one  of
delusion. Nevertheless, the narrator remains a viable representation of the creative process as the
great English Romantic poets conceived it. Wordsworth’s theory of poetry as a sort of controlled
delusion is particularly relevant in this context. In his famous preface to the third edition of Lyrical
Ballads,  published in  1802—and which was an expanded version of the preface to the second
edition of 1800— he maintained that the poet was a man—indeed, for Wordsworth the poet seems
to be always a “man”—who evinced “a disposition to be affected more than other men by absent
things as if they were present;” and who “has acquired a greater readiness and power in expressing
what he thinks and feels, and especially those thoughts and feelings which, by his own choice, or
from the structure of his own mind, arise in him without immediate external excitement” (Preface
256).
But, as long as the poet is making a deliberate effort to get out of himself, he is also acutely
aware of his own situation. Therefore, the creative mood, as Wordsworth conceived it, is always
fundamentally distinct from a real trance. Still, Wordsworth wistfully adds: “it will be the wish of
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the Poet (…) for short spaces of time perhaps, to let himself slip into an entire delusion and even
confound and identify his own feelings with” those of his characters (Wordsworth, Preface 256).
Inherent in Wordsworth’s theory is the idea that it is impossible for a poet to be deluded in
this way. The word “wish” is decisive here. The poet makes a conscious effort of depersonalisation,
but remains lucid—otherwise, he would not be able to arrange his thoughts into a poem. Inasmuch
as it is an intellectual effort, poetic creation requires the poet to be aware of his situation. It requires,
that is, a certain level of detachment. Wordsworth’s poet, however, wishes he could somehow forget
himself, and believe he really was in the situations he imagines even while he writes; he wishes, that
is, that he could believe that the “absent things” he imagines were really before him instead of a
sheet of paper. In other words, he wishes poetic creation were not an act of will, but the result of
unconscious elaboration. This sentiment defines the Romantic attitude. The idea of striving after the
impossible  synthesis  of  objective  and subjective,  feeling  and emotion  is,  at  least,  the  common
ground shared by the great English Romantics, Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Shelley.
Poe’s calculating, mischievous approach to fiction has, in fact, much more in common with
the Gothic.  Walpole illustrates the enormous chasm that separates the Gothic trickster from the
Romantic  visionary: whereas the latter  wanted to  believe the illusions he produced,  the former
merely intended to make the reader believe this illusion. In his insightful introduction to The Castle
of Otranto, Walter Scott demonstrates how the prose romance he helped to codify and popularise
was no more than an updated form of the Gothic. Indeed, Scott’s essay is, I think, the missing link
between Poe and the Gothic:120 “The reader, who is required to admit the belief of supernatural
interference understands precisely what is demanded of him; and, if he be a gentle reader, throws
his  mind  into  the  attitude  best  adapted  to  humour  the  deceit  which  is  presented  for  his
entertainment,  and  grants,  for  the  time  of  perusal,  the  premises  on  which  the  fable  depends”
(Introduction 11). 
120 For a recent discussion of the influence of Scott’s essay on Poe’s criticism see Sean Moreland’s “Ancestral Piles: 
Poe’s Gothic Materials.”
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One can easily mistake this with the “wiling suspension of disbelief for the moment” which
Coleridge thought was required of the reader of a supernatural story (Biographia Literaria 2:6). In
reality, however, Scott clearly intimates that the writer of romances should force readers to assume
this  frame of  mind,  for  example,  by  deftly  exploiting  their  emotions.  Thus,  according  to  him,
Walpole’s object had been to “to wind up the feelings of his reader till they became for a moment
identified with those of a ruder age,” in which belief in the supernatural was wide-spread (Scott,
Introduction 10).
In his second review of Twice-Told Tales, as we have seen, Poe wrote: “During the hour of
perusal the soul of the reader is at the writer’s control” ([1842] 572). This sentence clearly betrays
the influence of Scott’s theory of the “romance” on Poe’s critical thought. Not only does he agree
with Scott on the basic effect to be wrought by the prose romance, he also agreed with him on the
means best adapted to produce it. Scott likens the experience of reading a horror story in this style
to that of spending the night alone in a lonesome Gothic chamber—indeed, he maintains that the
object of such stories is to recreate in words that experience:
He who, in early youth, has happened to pass a solitary night in one of the few
ancient mansions which the fashion of more modern times has left undespoiled of
their original furniture, has probably experienced, that the gigantic and preposterous
figures dimly visible in the defaced tapestry, the remote clang of distant doors which
divide him from living society, the deep darkness which involves the high and fretted
roof of the apartment, the dimly-seen pictures of ancient knights, renowned for their
valour, and perhaps for their crimes, the varied and indistinct sounds which disturb
the silent desolation of a half-deserted mansion; and, to crown all, the feeling that
carries us back to ages of feudal power and papal superstition, join together to excite
a corresponding sensation of supernatural awe, if not terror. It is in such situations,
when superstition becomes contagious, that we listen with respect, and even with
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dread, to the legends which are our sport in the garish light of sun-shine, and amid
the  dissipating  sights  and  sounds  of  every-day  life.  Now it  seems to  have  been
Walpole’s object to attain (…) that same association which might prepare his reader’s
mind for the reception of prodigies congenial to the creed and feelings of the actors.
(…) in short, the scene, the performers, and action, so far as it is natural, form the
accompaniments of his spectres and his miracles, and have the same effect on the
mind of the reader that the appearance and drapery of such a chamber as we have
described may produce upon a temporary inmate. (Scott, Introduction 9)
By insulating  the  reader,  then,  the  writer  of  supernatural  thrillers  attempts  to  create  an
experience in which superstition is “contagious.” This is another idea that appears to have filtered
into Poe’s criticism. In “The Philosophy of Composition,” furthering a conception he had already
outlined in his criticism of Hawthorne, he wrote: “that a close circumscription of space is absolutely
necessary to the effect of insulated incident:—it has the force of a frame to a picture. It has an
indisputable  moral  power  in  keeping  concentrated  the  attention,  and,  of  course,  must  not  be
confounded with mere unity of place” (Poe, 67).
Indeed, confinement to an awe-inspiring Gothic atmosphere serves, in Scott’s description,
the same purpose that Poe assigns to his “circumscription:” that of keeping the reader insulated,
preventing  “the  dissipating  sights  and sounds of  everyday life,”  as  Scott  had  put  it,  or,  in  the
alternative formulation Poe used in his 1842 review of Twice-Told Tales, “worldly interests” from
interfering with the intended effect (572). In other words, the atmosphere of the tale was meant to
lull “la raison froid, that cold common sense, which,” Scott writes, Walpole “justly deemed the
greatest enemy of the effect which he hoped to produce” (Introduction 12). It is no coincidence that
Rowena’s bedroom should so resemble Scott’s Gothic room.
But like Coleridge,  Scott  thought  that  to  explain  the  delusions  of  the characters  was to
destroy the supernatural effect: 
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The bold assertion of the actual existence of phantoms and apparitions seems to us to
harmonize much more naturally with the manners of feudal times, and to produce a
more  powerful  effect  upon  the  reader’s  mind,  than  any  attempt  to  reconcile  the
superstitious credulity of feudal ages with the philosophical scepticism of our own,
by  referring  those  prodigies  to  the  operation  of  fulminating  powder,  combined
mirrors, magic lanthorns, trap-doors, speaking trumpets, and such like apparatus of
German phantasmagoria. (Scott, Introduction 12)
Scott’s essay on Otranto comes at a very interesting epoch in his career. In 1811, Scott had
achieved notoriety has a poet, but had yet to publish the first novel in the Waverley series, for which
he  is  best  known today.  This  series  is  named  after  his  first  published  novel,  which  appeared
anonymously in 1814. Evidently, Scott was already preparing his career as a novelist. It is curious to
note that during the rest of his relatively long and very prolific career he seldom followed the advice
he gave novelists in 1811. Many of his novels contain episodes of explained supernatural. Anne of
Geierstein (1829), which I will be looking at in the following chapter, is a good example. Poe, on
his part, evidently used both strategies: he had his narrator assert, or at least clearly intimate his
belief in real ghosts, while at the same time including in his tale phantasmagoric devices to which
the apparitions could, and should be referred. He did this in many of his tales, but most notably in
“Ligeia.” The reason why Scott objected to the supernatural explained, is that it worked against the
chief effect for which the Gothic thriller was designed, which was to constrain the reader to identify
himself  momentarily  with  the  superstitious  fears  of  the  characters.  If  the  reader  knew  this
explanation, he would rather laugh at their credulity. But Poe managed to circumvent this difficulty
by making his explanation hard to detect. The main difference between the way the two writers
conceived the Gothic thriller, however, was that while Scott merely strived to deceive the reader,
Poe  attempts  to  trick  him  into  sharing,  as  it  were,  an  actual  delusion—for,  in  his  tale,  the
supposedly supernatural events can indeed be shown to be a delusion of the narrator.
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As Scott saw it, the Gothic was a poetics of delusion which aimed to make the reader forget
he was  not superstitious by all means possible. Poe’s narrator, however, supplements the Gothic
associations  of  his  medieval  chamber  with  phantasmagoric  devices,  not  to  mentions  chemical
stimulants, and ends up slipping, as Wordsworth would say, into an “entire delusion.” Evidently,
Poe intended to suggest that this was not as difficult  as Wordsworth thought,  provided one did
earnestly wish to believe. Thus, it becomes clear that his narrator is a caricature of the Romantic
attitude. The character he assumed for the tale does not merely share the superstition supposedly
prevalent in the Middle Ages; he adds to this the “transcendentalism” which Poe regarded as the
peculiar superstition of his own age. But Poe knew his character was deluded and, therefore, was no
more “transcendentalist” than Walpole was “Gothic.” It was only a ruse. It was only fiction. And,
unlike Wordsworth, Poe never wished he could forget it.
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10 — “Far Within the Pupils of my Beloved:” The Metaphor of Depth in Poe
At  first  glance,  “Ligeia”  appears  a  typical  expression  of  the  Romantic  myth  of  poetic
creation, but this myth is subverted by the reinstatement of literal meaning. This tale, like the rest of
Poe’s work, rewards doubt, analysis, and close attention to detail with solutions; it rewards, that is,
precisely those habits of thought that Romanticism most distrusted, and which are represented in the
tale  by  the  confused  narrator.  Poe’s  version  of  the  Romantic  myth  also  highlights,  through
hyperbole, its intrinsically patriarchal nature. The male narrator presents Ligeia quite explicitly as
the muse by whose mediation he was enabled to get glimpses of the world beyond. Yet, she was the
one actually writing poems. Thus, the narrator effectively rewrites Ligeia, subordinating her to his
own quest for transcendence.
In “Not a  Woman: The Murdered Muse in  ‘Ligeia,’”  Catherine Carter  has attempted to
describe the murder of Ligeia in allegorical terms. Building on Matheson’s claim that the first wife
was murdered, she writes: 
Applied more figuratively to Ligeia as muse, such a reading suggests not only that
the narrator’s muse is unusual in her strength of character but that her husband finds
such force and authority unnerving; in his own phrase, he is  both ‘delighted and
appalled’ by what he sees in her eyes. This combination encompasses the narrator’s
entire relationship with Ligeia (…). Such, perhaps, is the struggle of the self with
submission to vision, of the self with the loss of self that creative work entails.
(Carter, “Not a Woman” 51)
Ultimately, Carter argues against literal interpretation: “It is possible that he [the narrator]
does somehow kill his own muse (perhaps through opiates) in a frantic revolt against its dominance
and power, but it is equally possible that it  is nothing less than her death—her  absence—which
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inspires his greatest resentment. I incline to the latter choice” (“Not a Woman” 51). Thus, as her title
indicates, Carter regards Ligeia as “not a woman.”
The irresistible emergence of the literal, however, is a textual fact that cannot be dismissed.
This fact vindicates Ligeia, defeating her husband’s attempt of appropriating her legacy. In addition
to killing her and defiling her body, under pretence of glorifying the entombed the despotic and
pedantic narrator also defaced her memory through innuendo and poisonous compliments, in order
thus to assert his own gigantic ego, and with it the status quo of gender. Distorting Ligeia’s words,
he presents his case as an illustration of the universal “tragedy” of “man.” Thus, he seeks to create a
bond of solidarity between him and his readers that is rooted in a sense of helplessness before fate.
But, by reading gender out of the word “man,” he conceals Ligeia’s tragedy, and, by extension, the
plight of women in a patriarchal society.  Thus,  Poe indirectly  exposes what  Gilbert  and Gubar
accurately term “our culture’s historical confusion of literary authorship with patriarchal authority”
(11).
Indeed, Ligeia’s situation can be seen, more particularly, as a fictional representation of the
situation of the female author in a world dominated by men, as Poe himself described it in the
opening sentences of a long review of an American anthology of Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s early
work,  The  Drama  of  Exile,  and  Other  Poems (1845),  published  before  she  married  Robert
Browning: “‘A well-bred  man,’ says Sir James Puckle, in his ‘Gray Cap for a Green Head,’ ‘will
never give himself the liberty to speak ill of women.’ We emphasize the ‘man.’ Setting aside, for the
present, certain rare commentators and compilers of the species G—, —creatures neither precisely
men, women, nor Mary Wollstonecraft’s—setting these aside as unclassifiable, we may observe that
the race of critics are masculine—men” (1).
Thus, Poe draws attention to the overwhelming “maleness” of the literary establishment,
which hopelessly distorts critical responses to works written by women. He argues that, given this
disproportion, the word “man” cannot be read as an ungendered term. In order to understand the
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political motivations of this “male” criticism, he provokingly suggests, one must read gender back
into  it.  As  usual  in  Poe,  such  culturally  disrupting  contents  are  disguised  by  his  apparent
endorsement of the very prejudice he denounces.
Indeed,  the  passing  reference to  Mary Wollstonecraft  appears  contemptuous.  It  certainly
would  have  appeared  so  to  a  conservative  reader  unsympathetic  with  her  project  of  female
emancipation.  She was often perceived as an “unfeminine woman,” or as a sexual freak.  In an
explanatory  note  to  the  passage,  Burton  R.  Pollin  quotes  Walpole’s  famous  statement  that
Wollstonecraft was an “‘hyena in petticoats,’” adding that this was “perhaps Poe’s sole knowledge
of her importance to the female movement” (Poe, Writings in the Broadway Journal 2:2n1/9). But
the context suggests otherwise. Poe is discussing precisely the peculiar plight of women writers like
Wollstonecraft. Besides, his remark bespeaks a direct acquaintance with Wollstonecraft’s arguments
that  most  of her  detractors lacked.  In her  Vindication of  the Rights of  Woman (1792),  she had
rejected  both  available  gender  roles,  arguing that  men  and women were,  under  existing  social
conditions, equally irrational, and that both should become more “masculine,” in the sense usually
given  to  the  word.  Therefore,  she  saw  herself  as  neither  “woman”  or  “man,”  in  the  senses
commonly attached to these terms. In fact, the real object of Poe’s satire appears to have been “G
—,” which probably stands for Rufus Griswold.
Poe’s  harsh  criticism of  the  irrationalism of  some passages  in  Barrett  Browning’s  book
actually develops a Wollstonecraftian point. He rejects the system of gallantry that prevented most
“men” from applying the same standard of excellence to a woman’s poem that was applied to the
productions of male poets. It  was then the fashion to praise women for their “sensibility,” thus
implicitly denying them rationality. Poe, on the other hand, rejects not only the identification of
woman with sensibility, but the very ideology of sensibility. Poe wrote at a time when it was the
fashion to regard poetry as the expression of “feeling” rather than thought. As we have seen, this
created the idea that poetry was not supposed to make sense, but that it should rather expose the
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limitations of the understanding by tapping a putative universal human experience of which the
poem was supposed to be the imperfect realisation. The best the poet could hope, therefore, was to
convey to the reader a glimpse of this ineffable, ultimately unintelligible truth, through indirectness.
In his review, Poe rejected this mystical conception of poetry in the strongest terms.
Commenting on the titular poem of the collection, which offers a new take on the Miltonian
theme of the Fall, Poe complains of the lack of paraphrasable content, particularly as regards the
character of Eve:
It would have been better for Miss Barrett if, throwing herself independently upon
her own very extraordinary resources, (…) she had involved her Eve in a series of
adventures merely natural, or if not this, of adventures preternatural within the limits
of at least a conceivable relation—a relation of matter to spirit and spirit to matter,
that should have left room for something like palpable action and comprehensible
emotion (…). As the case actually  stands,  it  is  only in  a  few snatches of  verbal
intercommunication with Adam and Lucifer, that we behold her as a woman at all.
For the rest, she is a mystical something or nothing, enwrapped in a fog of rhapsody
about Transfiguration, the Seed, and the Bruising of the Heel, and other talk of a
nature that no man ever pretended to understand in plain prose (…).
(rev. of A Drama of Exile 3)
Then,  he singled out  some lines of  speech of “a Chorus of  Invisible  Angels addressing
Adam”  as  particularly  unintelligible,  remarking,  however,  that  this  sort  of  thing  met  the
expectations of the reading public of that era:
Now we do not mean to assert that, by excessive “tension” of the intellect, a reader
accustomed  to  the  cant  of  the  transcendentalists121 (or  of  those  who  degrade  an
ennobling philosophy by styling themselves such) may not succeed in ferreting from
121 The phrase is an obvious pun on Immanuel Kant, who exerted, through Coleridge, great influence on the 
transcendentalist movement.
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the passage quoted, and indeed from each of the thousand similar ones throughout
the book, something that shall bear the aspect of an absolute idea—but we do mean
to say first, that, in nine cases out of ten, the thought when dug out will be found very
poorly to repay the labor of the digging;—for it is the nature of thought in general, as
it is the nature of some ores in particular, to be richest when most superficial. And we
do mean to say, secondly, that, in nineteen cases out of twenty, the reader will suffer
the most valuable ore to remain unmined to all eternity, before he will be put to the
trouble of digging for it one inch. And we do mean to assert, thirdly, that no reader is
to be condemned for not putting himself to the trouble of digging even the one inch;
for no writer has the right to impose any such necessity upon him. What is worth
thinking is distinctly thought: what is distinctly thought, can and should be distinctly
expressed, or should not be expressed at all. (Rev. of The Drama of Exile 3-4)
The “cant of the transcendentalists” had so perverted the expectations of the public, that
readers were now more than willing to wring something that looked like an idea from passages that
contained none. He thought that Barrett Browning had catered to this preposterous contemporary
taste  or,  as  he puts  it  later  in  the article,  that  “[h]er  sense of Art”  had “been contaminated by
pedantic study of false models” (Rev. of The Drama of Exile 15). The false critical notions to which
Poe alludes are the school of “all Lawlessness” originated by Shelley, “the misplaced didacticism of
Wordsworth, and the even more preposterously anomalous metaphysicianism of Coleridge” (14). 
The long quotation above depends on a clean-cut distinction between meaning and nonsense
which is projected on the metaphor of depth. “Profound” pseudo-ideas, forced on the text by the
“transcendentalist” method, are contradistinguished from the kind of intelligible content that may be
reduced to prose. Thus, Poe makes a plea for literal meaning, being convinced, however, that this
can never find echo in the readership of his time, who is accustomed to take seemingly profound
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absurdities as a valid alternative to meaning, which, he tells us, is usually on the “surface,” that is,
in the terms of his metaphor, on the text itself, rather than beyond it.
For Yvor Winters, Poe had himself cultivated precisely the sort of “transcendentalism” that
he is condemning: 
Poe sees truly enough that the enforcement of truth,  in itself,  does not constitute
poetry,  and on the basis of that elementary observation he falls into the common
romantic  error,  which may be stated briefly  as follows:  truth is  not  poetry;  truth
should therefore be eliminated from poetry,  in the interests  of a purer poetry.  He
would,  in  short,  advise  us  to  retain  the  attitude,  but  to  discard  the  object  of  the
attitude. The correct formula, on the other hand, is this: truth is not poetry; poetry is
truth and something more.  It  is  the completeness  of  the poetic  experience which
makes it  valuable.  How thoroughly Poe would rob us  of all  subject  matter,  how
thoroughly he would reduce poetry, from its traditional position, at least when ideally
considered, as the act of complete comprehension, to a position of triviality and of
charlatanism (...). (“Edgar Allan Poe” 241).
As I have before remarked, I think that Winters is one of the most astute critics that ever
dealt with Poe. There are, indeed, many texts in Poe’s work, including, of course, “Ligeia” and
“Morella,” in which Poe appears to make the apology of this Romantic attitude, exaggerating it so
as to reduce it to a form of delusion or charlatannerie. The problem is, Winters could never conceive
that Poe was not serious about his “transcendentalism.” He appears to have thought that a man
living  in  Poe’s  time  could  not  help  being  a  Romantic.  Thus,  Poe’s  exaggerated  Romanticism
appeared to him the perfect illustration of what he regarded as the “common mistake” that was
inherent to all Romantic poetry.
It appears to me, however, that Poe’s “transcendentalist” statements are invariably corroded
by irony. In particular, they all indirectly enforce the distinction between meaning and nonsense that
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underlies the review of Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s work. Indeed, Poe’s basic understanding of
poetry appears to have much more in common with the Augustan ideal of perspicuity than it does
with the aesthetics of obscurity of the Romantics. His critique of the mystical haziness of Romantic
poetry recovers the standard of intelligibility that Alexander Pope (1688-1744) had demanded of
poetry in An Essay on Criticism (1711), when he complained that the understanding of readers was
lulled by music and rhyme, and thus prepared to accept “some unmeaning thing” dull-witted poets
“call a thought;” in fact, Pope already denounced the tendency of the reader to value this sort of
vague suggestiveness more highly than definite meaning: “As things seem large which we through
mists descry, / Dullness is ever apt to magnify” (67).
By truth, Winters means intelligible content. Poe used the word in the same sense. But I do
not believe that his depictions of this exaggerated version of Romanticism were ingenuous. In other
words, I think that he did not fall into the “common romantic error;” on the contrary, I believe he
meant to denounce this error. Indeed, like Winters, Poe appears to have been convinced that the
error  was  intrinsic  to  Romanticism itself,  for  he  appears  to  have  thought  that,  by  striving  for
“something more,” the poet necessarily ended up with something less than meaning.122 In his review
of A Drama of Exile, at least, he clearly is making an argument against nonsense in poetry. Milton,
the avowed model of the poem, is not spared: 
even in Milton’s own day, when men had the habit of believing all things, the more
nonsensical the more readily, and of worshipping, in blind acquiescence, the most
preposterous of impossibilities—even then, there were not wanting individuals who
would have read the great epic with more zest, could it have been explained to their
satisfaction, how and why it was, not only that a snake quoted Aristotle’s ethics, and
122 Margarida Vale de Gato, in her doctoral thesis “Edgar Allan Poe em Translação: entre textos e sistemas, visando as
rescritas na lírica moderna em portugal,” describes Winters’s essay on Poe as “mais uma batalha na guerra travada
por este crítico contra o anti-racionalismo na poesia,” citing it as a particular instance of the New Critics’ contempt
for Poe (115n1). Regarding the New Critics attitude toward Poe, she remarks that, considering the way in which
Poe’s theory of poetry foreshadows twentieth-century formalism: “não deixa de causar perplexidade o facto de os
New Critics anglo-saxónicos verem na poesia de Poe um exercício de obscuridade deliberada que mina a auto-
suficiência do poema” (115).
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behaved  otherwise  pretty  much  as  he  pleased,  but  that  bloody  battles  were
continually  being  fought  between  bloodless  “innumerable  angels,”  that  found  no
inconvenience in losing a wing one minute and a head the next, and if pounded up
into puff-paste late in the afternoon, were as good ‘innumerable angels’ as new the
next morning, in time to be at  reveillé  roll-call: And now—at the present epoch—
there are few people who do not occasionally think. This is emphatically the thinking
age; —indeed it may very well be questioned whether mankind ever substantially
thought before. (Rev. of The Drama of Exile 4)
Nothing could  be less  Romantic  than  the  emphasis  Poe  here  places  on “thinking.”  Poe
demands of poetry strict intelligibility—indeed, he spends most of his review vindicating Barrett
Browning  from the  imputation  of  obscurity.  She  had  become involved  in  absurdities,  but  Poe
thought  this  was  a  consequence  of  her  choice  of  theme,  and  of  the  influence  of  mistaken
“transcendentalism.” But Milton had been no less absurd, nor was his absurdity more excusable,
Poe thought. Incidentally, the irony of the compliment Poe pays his own age is obvious. With his
tongue in his cheek, Poe tells us that in his day people did think on occasion. He also points out that
even in Milton’s supposedly unenlightened age some people had been known to think. Thus, in
effect, he implies the world had not changed materially.
In the end, the image Poe gives us of Elizabeth Barret Browning is not too flattering. But he
remained true to his opening statement. He rejected the irrational tendency of her poetry, but refused
to excuse what he regarded as its  defects with her sex. For him, poetry was an art,  that is,  an
intellectual product. However, a “school” had been established “if that absurd term must still be
employed—a school—a system of rules—upon the basis of the Shelley who had none” (Poe, rev. of
A Drama of  Exile 14).  This  “school” conceived of poetry as  an intuitive,  mostly extra-rational
pursuit. But for Poe, the effectiveness of Shelley’s poetry was not due to “sensibility,” but rather to
his intuitive grasp of the rules of the art. Still, for this “school” to reach a perfection which Poe
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tacitly construes as chimerical, the “abandon” of Shelley, as he calls it, would have to be combined
with “the most profound instinct of Art, and the sternest Will properly to blend and vigorously to
control all” (15).
This sense of Art, and ability to confer a coherent form to a poem, of course, were then
generally associated with maleness. But Poe indirectly grants these qualities on Barrett Browning.
He also accuses her of having been intimidated by the received ideas of gender: “Her sense of Art is
pure in itself,” he tells us, but she did not trust it; she studied “false models,” meaning Shelley and
his imitators, “a study which has the more easily led her astray, because she placed an undue value
upon it as rare—as alien to her character of woman” (rev. of A Drama of Exile 15). This is certainly
an unusual thing for a male critic of his time to say, as Poe himself had pointed out in the beginning
of  his  essay.  Although  he  is  never  straightforward,  Poe  never  fails  to  confound  the  Romantic
expectations  of  his  readership.  In  this  case,  he  blocks  the  common  Romantic  association  of
“transcendentalist” poetry with “man.”
Within the framework of the Romantic myth of creation, indeed, women and poets were
described in similar terms. Poets, at least considered in that capacity, were not expected to think—
not in the proper, full sense of the word; like women, they were supposed to be endowed with an
exquisite sensibility, and an intuitive perception of absolute Truth, which was defined by contrast
with the truths the understanding could grasp. Yet, and paradoxically, it was also thought that great
poetic  achievements  required  abstract  thought,  and a  sort  of  deliberateness  that  were  generally
regarded as male prerogatives.
This  was  not  the  only  text  where  Poe  exaggerated  the  common  Romantic  rhetoric  to
highlight the paradox in the conception of gender on which it was built. In the Broadway Journal
for December 27, 1845, Poe transcribed an obituary of the American poet Maria Brooks (b. 1794)
from The Boston Courier which reported that Charles Lamb could not believe her Zophiel had been
written by a woman. Poe replied that “Lamb had little understanding of the true nature of Poetry—
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which, appealing especially to our sense of Beauty, is, in its very essence, feminine. If the greatest
poems have not been written by women, it is because, the greatest poems have not been written at
all” (Poe, Obituary of Maria Brooks, 357-58). Although apparently conforming to the ideology of
“sentiment,” Poe pushes it to absurdity, in the same way that he exaggerated “transcendentalism.”
Critics  patronised  women  writers  like  Elizabeth  Barrett  Browning  by  measuring  their
achievements against an inferior standard of intelligence and artistic mastery. Thus, it was assumed
from the outset that they were constitutionally unable to compete with men on an equal footing.
This rhetoric of sentimentality provided a justification for the system of gallantry that reiterated the
prejudice against women, and enforced gender inequality. Poe’s ironic rejection of this rhetoric, on
the other hand, brought into question the ideology that was inherent to that system. The outlook
implied by Poe’s review of Barrett Browning’s work is, indeed, strictly rationalist, or, to be more
precise, “intellectualist.”
Poe evidently believed that women had the same potential for reason that men, or in other
words, they were capable of thinking, in the proper sense of the word. Incidentally, the exposure of
the obtuseness of the narrators of “Ligeia” and “Morella” comes with the realisation that they had
only excelled women by force or by the power society gave them over them—in that sense, they
were the perfect representatives of male tyranny, as it had been described by Wollstonecraft and,
indirectly,  by  Radcliffe’s  novels.  But,  since  this  sentiment  was  illegible,  or  at  the  very  least
unprintable, he often expressed himself in riddles, like the women writers of the Victorian period
whose works Gilbert  and Gubar analyse in  The Madwoman in the Attic.  The murder of Ligeia
remained hidden because the public did not heed the obvious signs of the narrator’s resentment for
his  wife’s  intellectual  supremacy.  This  resentment  is  evidently  rooted  in  a  feeling  of  male
superiority. This is something that would remain hidden for as long as the word “man” could be
employed to render women invisible.  It  is interesting to note, in this regard,  that his review of
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Barrett Browning’s poetry was published in January 1845, scarcely a month before “The Conqueror
Worm” was included in “Ligeia” for the first time.
 Significantly, Poe ostensibly avoided in his review of A Drama of Exile the gallant clichés
his narrator employs to belittle his wife by puffing her beyond humanity. Instead of praising Barrett
Browning for her sensibility, and enthusiasm, according to the common practice, he upbraids her for
following the trends. In other words, he thought Barrett was an artist, that is, that she was capable of
controlling her medium, but also that she was guilty of palming absurdities on the public. But he did
not say she was absurd because she was a woman; or, what would have amounted to the same thing,
that “sensibility” supplied her inability to think clearly. Although this might appear condescending
to contemporary audiences, it is certainly a marked departure from the tone of most of the criticism
of the time. In fact, Poe’s implied feminism is not very different in spirit from the writings of Mary
Wollstonecraft and other early feminist philosophers, whose thought is usually described by modern
critics as “liberal feminism.” These writers also insisted that women and man possessed the same
potential for reason.
One of the reasons why most critics did not take Poe’s “intellectualism” seriously is the fact
that  he  often  adds  some  surprising  exception  to  his  uncompromising  demand  for  meaning  in
literature. His review of A Drama of Exile is a good example:
Nevertheless, there is no more appropriate opportunity than the present for admitting
and maintaining, at once, what has never before been either maintained or admitted
—that there is a justifiable exception to the rule for which we contend. It is where the
design is to convey the fantastic—not the obscure. To give the idea of the latter we
need, as in general, the most precise and definitive terms, and those who employ
other terms but confound obscurity of expression with the expression of obscurity.
The fantastic  in  itself,  however,  —phantasm—may be  materially  furthered  in  its
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development by the quaint in phraseology: —a proposition which any moralist may
examine at his leisure for himself. (Rev. of The Drama of Exile 4)
This passage partakes of that oracular quality that peculiarly distinguishes much of Poe’s
criticism. Yet, his meaning is not as esoteric as it might seem. In effect, he contends that repetitive,
nonsensical  expressions  are  not  necessarily  meaningless.  They  may  be  brought  to  bear  by  an
overriding conception. In particular, they may be used to convey the idea of the “fantastic,” a term
he traces to its etymological sense: phantasm.
He made a similar movement in many other critical and theoretical texts. In a very well-
known article of the Marginalia, included in the fifth instalment of the series, published in March
1846 in Graham’s magazine (M 150, in Pollin’s edition), for example, Poe stated: 
I do not believe that any thought, properly so called, is out of the reach of language. I
fancy,  rather,  that  where  difficulty  in  expression  is  experienced,  there  is,  in  the
intellect which experiences it, a want either of deliberateness or of method. For my
own part, I have never had a thought which I could not set down in words, with even
more distinctness than that with which I conceived it. (Brevities 258)
In the rest of the article, however, Poe appears to recant, or qualify, his initial assertion,
describing an alternative mode of conveying “vague” thoughts, which were not really thoughts, by a
language that was not really expression. This is the sort of statement often presented by Poe’s critics
as  constituting  irrefutable  evidence  that  Poe  was  a  typical,  albeit  extreme  representative  of
Romanticism. While mainstream Romantics were contented to have some meaning, Poe implies
that only through utter meaninglessness can a writer convey these inexpressibly vague ideas to the
reader’s mind. Winters thought that Poe thus reduced Romanticism to nonsense. This is undeniable.
But Poe’s palinode is evidently not meant to be taken seriously: 
There is, however, a class of fancies, of exquisite delicacy, which are not thoughts,
and to which,  as yet, I have found it absolutely impossible to adapt language. I use
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the word fancies at random, and merely because I must use some word; but the idea
commonly attached to the term is not even remotely applicable to the shadows of
shadows in question. They seem to me rather psychal than intellectual. 
(Brevities 258)
Most critical readings of this passage and similar passages in Poe fail to realise its radical
irony—just as most critical  readings of “Ligeia” failed to detect the shadow. Some critics have
argued,  for  example,  that  this  kind  of  prose  was  a  deliberate  illustration  of  the  idea  of  the
arbitrariness of the linguistic sign.123 But surely, it is one thing to recognise that the relationship
between words and things is a matter of convention and another to choose words at random, as Poe
pretends to do here. A writer who employs such processes does not expect to be understood. We
may  suppose  him  to  be  attempting  other  forms  of  communication  that  do  not  rely  on  the
understanding, as the Symbolists would do later in the nineteenth century, and the Surrealists early
in the following century. But then, Poe is obviously not using words at random. 
The rest  of  the  article  contains  a  preposterously  absurd  theory  purporting  to  describe  a
process  to  induce  a  sort  of  ecstasy  that  would  enable  a  poet  to  embody  those  “shadowy”
conceptions which were too indefinite to even deserve the name of “fancies:”
They  arise  in  the  soul  (alas,  how  rarely!)  only  at  its  epochs  of  most  intense
tranquillity—when the bodily and mental health are in perfection—and at those mere
points of time where the confines of the waking world blend with those of the world
of dreams. I am aware of these “fancies” only when I am upon the very brink of
sleep, with the consciousness that I am so. I have satisfied myself that this condition
exists but for an inappreciable point of time—yet it is crowded with these “shadows
of shadows;” and for absolute thought there is demanded time’s endurance.
(Brevities 258)
123 Michael J. S. Williams’s A World of Words: Language and Displacement in the Fiction of Edgar Allan Poe is 
perhaps the most developed statement of this position.
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Apparently, Poe is glossing the well-known Romantic trope of the poet’s striving after the
unattainable,  and gloriously failing.  Indeed, this  has generally been taken as one of Poe’s most
sincere statements of his aims as a poet. But, as usual, this interpretation requires us to dismiss his
meaning. One must remember that Poe began by saying that he had never tried to embody these
“shadows” in words, effectively claiming, therefore, that he had been always aware of a meaning in
everything he had actually attempted. This was written at a time, March 1846, when most of Poe’s
work had already been published. Therefore, although it certainly is true that Poe’s words capture
the Romantic ethos, in reality, he is actually denying any of the work he had published so far had
been  written  in  that  spirit.  In  other  words,  he  intimates  he  had  never  been  sincere  about  his
Romanticism.
If sincere, however, this statement would mean that, Poe was about to convert himself to
“transcendentalism.”  This  would  be  suspicious  in  itself,  but  Poe  is  actually  taking  this
“transcendentalism” to absurd extremes, emphasising the absolute impossibility of the enterprise he
humorously proposes in a way that makes it perfectly clear, I think, he had no intention to mend his
ways.124 In what sense can a “condition” be said to “exist” in a “point of time” with no duration?
And even if this could be conceived, how could the author have “satisfied” himself of its existence?
This  condition  is  positively  a  non-existence.  The humour  in  Poe’s  use  of  the  phrase  “absolute
thought” depends on this fact. The “transcendentalist” tone would seem to require the idealist sense
of the adjective. This tone, as usual, induces the reader to overlook the sense actually required by
124  Poe would later indirectly confirm that his text enforces an “intellectualist” stance in the opening lines of the poem
“To – — —,” first  published in  March 1848:  “Not  long ago,  the writer  of  these lines,  /  In  the mad pride of
intellectuality, / Maintained the ‘power of words’ — denied that ever / A thought arose within the human brain /
Beyond the utterance of the human tongue; / And now, as if in mockery of that boast, / Two words (…) / Have
stirred from out the abysses of his heart, / Unthought-like thoughts that are the souls of thought / (…) The pen falls
powerless from my shivering hand. / With thy dear name as text, though bidden by thee, / I cannot write – I cannot
speak or think, / Alas, I cannot feel” (Poe, Poems 407-8).
The poem was written for Marie Louise Shew, whose name is omitted in the printed version of the poem. In his
notes, Mabbott remarks that the “reference here is clearly to a passage” in Marginalia number 150 (although his 
note incorrectly refers it as number 149), the text from which I have been quoting. Of course, if Poe had really been 
sincere about that article, the reference would be absurd. In reality, Poe does in the poem exactly what he had done 
in the Marginalia. Since he tells us that the feeling excited by the dedicatee’s name makes him powerless to 
“write,” to “think,” and even to “feel,” it follows that the poem is also not an attempt to express the “unthought-like 
thoughts” he mentions. Thus, the poem is, like the note in the Marginalia, an intellectual product.
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the context: this whatchamacallits of his, despite resembling what the typical Romantic idealism of
his time termed “absolute thoughts,” or ideas, are,  strictly speaking, not “thoughts” at all. In fact,
the phrase appears here in precisely the sense in which Poe had employed it in his review of Barrett
Browning’s  poetry,  where  he  maintained  that  the  readers  educated  in  “the  cant  of  the
transcendentalists”  were  perfectly  willing  to  force  “something  that  shall  bear  the  aspect  of  an
absolute idea” on nonsensical, or “quaint” passages (rev. of A Drama of Exile 3). Thus, by making it
clear that such nebulous conceptions are not thoughts, Poe cheats such readers of their expectations.
In a way, of course, this makes perfect sense: it takes a non-existent text to express a non-existing
thought.
This is made even more apparent in the following paragraph, in which Poe describes the
state of enthusiasm in which he claims to have “experienced” these “fancies:”
I  regard  the  visions,  even  as  they  arise,  with  an  awe  which,  in  some  measure,
moderates or tranquilizes the ecstasy—I so regard them, through a conviction (which
seems a part of the ecstasy itself) that this ecstasy, in itself, is of a character supernal
to the Human Nature—is a glimpse of the spirit’s outer world; and I arrive at this
conclusion—if  this  term  is  at  all  applicable  to  instantaneous  intuition—by  a
perception that the delight experienced has, as its element, but  the absoluteness of
novelty. I say the absoluteness—for in these fancies—let me now term them psychal
impressions—there is really nothing even approximate in character to impressions
ordinarily received. It is as if the five senses were supplanted by five myriad others
alien to mortality. (Brevities 258)
This  does  not  make  any  sense.  But  then,  neither  does  it  pretend  to  make  any.  The
tautological  nature  of  this  passage  is  heightened  by  pleonasm and  hesitation.  This  is  certainly
inexcusably  bad  prose;  the  kind  of  thing  that  led  Eliot,  Winters,  Bloom,  and  many  others,  to
disparage Poe as an incompetent writer. But this passage is so outrageously inane, so ostensibly
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absurd,  as  to  make  it  impossible  to  take  it  seriously.  Besides,  Poe’s  nonsense  is  fraught  with
meaning. With this terrible prose, Poe hints his disdain for the illogical train of argument he is
pursuing, or more precisely, for the conception of poetry of which it is a no doubt deliberate parody.
Let us weigh his words carefully here. Now, the writer’s belief in the authenticity of this
“ecstasy” is part of the “ecstasy” itself. Poe could not make it any clearer, I think, that faith supplied
the absence of “absolute thought,” and, therefore, that the expectation of depth, to use one of his
favorite metaphors, was self-confirming. Thus, he also reiterates that these “fancies,” or “shadows
of shadows,” or “psychal impressions” had no intellectual content whatsoever, and, consequently,
that whatever was required to form even a shadowy conception of them was not thinking. In fact, he
tells us that one would have to completely abstain from thinking to accept them.
Poe thus humorously suggests that he had got himself into a trance, while, at the same time
emphasising its impossibility. Evidently, this trance never  took place—which is precisely what he
had been telling us. He does not mean to say that he did actually embody the “shadows in question”
in any of his work—a feat he describes as an absolute impossibility. “I mean to say, merely, that
now I can be sure, when all circumstances are favourable, of the supervention of the condition, and
feel even the capacity of inducing or compelling it:—the favourable circumstances, however, are
not the less rare—else had I compelled, already, the Heaven into the Earth” (Brevities 259). The
sheer enormity of Poe’s hyperbole is enough to destroy what little credibility remained. If Poe, or
anyone else for that matter, ever achieved to express such “fancies,” the world would surely come to
an end.
However,  although this  evidently  would  never  come to  pass,  he  states  that  he  did  “not
altogether despair of embodying in words at least enough of the fancies in question to convey, to
certain classes of intellect, a shadowy conception of their character;” 
nothing can be more certain than that even a partial record of the impressions [he
purports to have obtained, for lack of a better word, through his hypnagogic method]
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would startle the universal intellect of mankind, by the supremeness of the novelty of
the material employed, and of its consequent suggestions. In a word—should I ever
write a paper on this topic, the world will be compelled to acknowledge that, at last, I
have done an original thing. (Poe, Brevities 259)
The irony could not be more palpable, and it is evidently not of the “Romantic” variety. Poe
here suggests that this impossible paper, that he explicitly denies ever having attempted to write,
would be the first original thing he did in his career, thus slighting all he ever wrote, and, indeed, all
that he or anyone else could ever hope to write. To my mind, Poe makes it impossible for us to
imagine he was serious. Poe never did this thing, and he thought that no one could, however, it was
perfectly possible to convey a “shadowy conception” of these impossible non-ideas to a certain kind
of reader. Evidently, he alludes to those readers who he claimed could extract “something” that
looked like but was not an “idea” from Milton’s and Barrett Browning’s mystical nonsense. 
But, while in those cases there remained something that could be construed as a meaning,
Poe’s text is  utterly and ostensibly absurd.  His contention that only by straining the “intellect”
beyond its capacity could readers get something that appeared a meaning out of language that had
none, implies, by contrast, the idea which Pope expressed with the utmost terseness in the following
verse from  An Essay on Criticism:  “Would all but stoop to what they understand,” Pope wrote
(Essay 60).125 This is precisely what the typical Romantic poet could never accept.
Throughout  this  dissertation  I  have  employed the  term “Romanticism” in  a  fairly  loose
sense, which corresponds roughly to what Yvor Winters understood by the term. I employ it to refer
to a school of writers that refused to settle for a relative knowledge obtained through the means of
rational empirical inquiry. Instead, these writers sought to momentarily turn off the understanding,
as it were, in order to get a distant glimpse of the grander, absolute, inexpressible Truth, while in a
125 The April 1846 installment of the  Marginalia  contained a note which mentioned Pope specifically, apropos of a
witticism by Voltaire: “That Pope was a fool, indeed, seems to be an established point, at present, with the Crazy-
ites—what else shall I call them?” (Poe, Brevities 268). Poe used “Crazy-ites” as a term of abuse for the American
“transcendentalists” of the Brook Farm group (see Pollin’s note to the text).
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sort of ecstasy in which they were, in a greater or lesser degree, abstracted from everyday reality,
and, in a sense, even from themselves. Poetry thus understood was not an art, but an act of mystical
communion. Wordsworth’s preface to the third edition of  Lyrical Ballads  perfectly captures this
spirit: “the Poet, singing a song in which all human beings join with him, rejoices in the presence of
truth  as  our  invisible  friend and hourly  companion.  Poetry  is  the  breath  and finer  spirit  of  all
knowledge: it is the impassioned expression which is in the countenance of all Science” (259).
Considering  most  critics  have  taken  Poe’s  visionary  theory  seriously,  it  is  not  at  all
surprising that he never got much respect outside the small but dedicated group of his admirers.
After resisting him for many years, Harold Bloom, in the introduction to Susan Amper’s  How to
Write About Edgar Allan Poe  (2008), reluctantly admits that Poe is “permanent and inescapable”
because his tales “dream universal nightmares;” they are “myths” (vii-viii).126 Their value, therefore,
lies in the depths; their surface he regards as utterly worthless. “The first principle,” he declares, “in
writing about Poe is never to discuss how badly he performed in both prose and verse;” his tales “do
not sustain being read aloud” and his poems are “paced like a metronome” (vii). For his part, he
confesses: “I still resort to French and German translations when I am compelled to read Poe’s tales,
and I avoid the poems” (viii). But even Bloom has to admit that “his flaws in diction” are not what
one would expect of a man of Poe’s intelligence (Bloom calls it “cognitive sophistication”) (viii). I
would go so far as to say Poe was evidently too clever for most of his diction.
In fact, Poe used absurdity to convey an intelligible meaning—a satirical meaning—, as we
have seen, in Marginalia number 150, and the review of A Drama of Exile, but also in his fiction.
This is very clearly indicated by his “How to Write a Blackwood Article,” published in November
1838 in the same magazine, the Baltimore American Museum, in which the first published version
of  “Ligeia” had appeared two months  previously.  In  this  tale,  Poe has Mr.  Blackwood himself
126 Another writer who has also proved an embarassment to critics is Matthew Lewis, whose case, I think, has very
significant affinities with Poe’s case. Most of his critics, although begrugingly recognising his notoriety, have felt
that Lewis was artistically insignificant and lacked a sense of taste: “Over a period of more than a century and a half
the  general  course  of  criticism  directed  at  Lewis’ romance  has  been  praise,  excoriation,  contempt,  and  the
patronizing interest bestowed upon a curiosity, but the world has refused to let The Monk die” (A Life 37).
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explain the rules of the trade to the aspirant magazinist Psyche Zenobia. One can either do what
“our best novelists” do, and employ the “tone elevated, diffusive, and interjectional,” which consists
in keeping words “all in a whirl, like a humming top, and make a noise very similar, which answers
remarkably well instead of meaning. This is the best of all possible styles where the writer is in too
great a hurry to think;” or else employ the “tone metaphysical:” “If you know any big words this is
your chance for them. Be sure and abuse a man named Locke. (…) when you let slip anything a
little  too  absurd, (…) just add a foot-note, and say that you are indebted for the above profound
observation  to  the  ‘Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft,’  or  to  the  ‘Metaphysische  Anfangsgründe  der
Naturwissenschaft;’” finally, one may also resort to “the tone transcendental,” “the merit” of which
“consists in seeing into the nature of affairs a great deal farther than anybody else. (…) A little
reading of the ‘Dial’ will carry you a great way. (…) Put in something about the Supernal Oneness.
(…) Above all, study innuendo. Hint every thing—assert nothing” (Poe, “How to Write” 341-42).
In addition, Blackwood advised Zenobia to always write from experience, as this was valued
highly by the public. Zenobia faithfully carried out Blackwood’s suggestions in “A Predicament,” a
riotous tale in which the author recounts how she had, quite literally, lost her head. As Susan Amper
remarks, “[w]ithin a year of the appearance of ‘How to Write a Blackwood Article,’ Poe brought out
‘Ligeia’ and ‘Usher:’ two tales that follow to the letter the formula he derided” (“Masters of Deceit”
105). In fact, it may be argued that in most of his serious tales, he gets into the character of a writer
who has either no time or no inclination to think, employing both the “humming top” technique, the
verbose, allusion-laden “metaphysical tone,” and the “tone transcendental,” all at the same time.
He used these techniques, as he has Blackwood suggest, to disguise the absurdity of his text.
Yvor Winters, who, like Bloom, could not stomach Poe’s diction, found many examples of terrible
prose and verse in his works. He quoted the following examples from “Ligeia” and “Morella,”
respectively, which he thought spoke for themselves: “’Where were the souls of the haughty family
of the bride , when through thirst of gold, they permitted to pass the threshold of an apartment so
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bedecked, a maiden and a daughter so beloved?;’ ‘Morella’s erudition was profound. As I hope to
live, her talents were of no common order—her powers of mind were gigantic’” (qtd in Winters,
“Edgar Allan Poe” 258-59). Poe’s verse, he thought, was even worse than his prose: “We are met on
every page of his poetry with resounding puerilities such as the ‘pallid bust of Pallas,’ and ‘the viol,
the violet, and the vine’” (259). “This,” he concludes, “is an art to delight a servant girl” (259). I
think that such examples are indeed indefensible. Bloom was of the same opinion, but granted that:
“If his [Poe’s] appeal were only to the subliterate, it would by now be over” (Bloom, Introduction
viii emphasis mine). Winters, however, almost hits on what I think is the solution to the problem. It
is  certainly  wonderful  that  anyone  could  ever  have  taken  such  stuff  seriously;  it  is  downright
preposterous to think Poe took it seriously.
He deliberately perpetrated this terrible prose and verse as a parody of the literature of his
time. In fact, the prose of Poe’s narrators is often not only stylistically unsound, and as absurd as
Poe’s  disquisition  on  “psychal  impressions,”  in  some  cases,  it  is  incorrect.  Perhaps  the  most
remarkable example of this is the following passage in “Morella,” where the narrator recalls how
his wife used to “rake up from the ashes of a dead philosophy some low, singular words, whose
strange meaning burned themselves in upon my memory” (Poe 230). The singular name “meaning”
does  not  agree  with  the  plural  pronoun  “themselves,”  which  of  course  renders  the  sentence
ungrammatical. But there can be no doubt that this was what Poe intended. This sentence appeared
in the first printed version of “Morella,” in the  Southern Literary Messenger for April 1835 and,
although he revised the text extensively when he prepared the first anthology of his  Tales (1840),
making “[m]any verbal changes,” Poe never altered it (Mabbott, Tales 225).
Of course, writers are allowed occasional violations of the rules of grammar for stylistic
purposes—this is vulgarly termed poetic license. And since there is very little room to doubt that the
deviation was intended by Poe, commentators and editors of his work have intimated, through their
silence, that this was not bad English, but syllepsis. But, as Poe himself was in the habit of pointing
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out, such deviations from grammatical norm, which he termed in his review of Barrett’s A Drama of
Exile the “quaint in phraseology,” are only legitimate when they serve a discernible rhetorical and
artistical purpose (4). In this case, however, the deviation appears to be utterly devoid of meaning;
at least, of a meaning that the narrator could have intended.
From a grammatical as well as a logical standpoint the sentence is simply unjustifiable. It is
a mistake. Are we to believe Poe, the merciless “tomahawk man” who never forgave the slightest
grammatical fault  in others, could overlook such an egregious blunder in a tale he reviewed as
carefully as he did “Morella?” This, in itself, would be incredible. But Poe highlighted the blunder
so as to make it, I think, impossible to doubt he was aware of the solecism, by adding the adjective
“singular” to the name “words.” Thus, Poe points out, by contrast, that the name “words” is plural,
and  therefore  agrees  in  number  with  the  pronoun  “themselves.”  The  sentence  was  even  more
conspicuously absurd in the early incomplete manuscript of the tale (Mabbott’s text A): “words
whose singular import burned themselves in upon my memory” (Poe, “Morella” 226). Instead of
correcting  the  mistake  which  the  position  of  the  adjective  “singular”  made  perfectly  apparent,
however, Poe slightly revised his wording to make it a little less obvious.
And so, the conclusion is inescapable. The sentence certainly makes no sense. However, its
lack of sense is full of meaning; a meaning that is perfectly in keeping with Poe’s overall design.
The “meaning,” singular, of the “words,” plural, should “burn” itself in the narrator’s mind—this is,
without a doubt, what the narrator meant to say. But that is not what really happened. The narrator
poses  as  an  intellectual.  He  understood  perfectly,  of  course,  all  that  wonderfully  abstruse  and
profound stuff that his learned wife talked to him about, but his grammar betrays him. It was not the
“meaning” that he retained, but only the words themselves (in the third chapter I will trace the
tragically  embarrassing  consequences  of  his  mistake).  The  narrators  of  Poe’s  tales  of  women
invariably end up saying more than they intended, and their lapses are always full of meaning.
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Thus,  though  the  sentence  is  unquestionably  bad English,  it  is  stylistically  correct.  Not
according to the common notion of style, of course, but according to Riffaterre’s definition. As we
have seen, this critic employed the term to designate the author as a textual fact, coded precisely by
such deviations  from the  rules  of  normal  speech as  we find  again  and again  in  Poe’s  fiction.
Alternatively, such stylistic effects can also be referred to Poe’s own theory of the “quaint,” a term
he employed in his review of  A Drama of Exile to qualify ungrammatical, illogical statements in
poetry, which he said were acceptable providing they were brought to bear by the plot. Specifically,
Poe meant to signal that his narrator was one of those readers who confused “shadowy” absurdities
with meaning,  thereby also providing a perfect  specimen of what Mr. Blackwood in the above
quoted passage of Poe’s eponymous tale termed the “elevated, diffuse, and interjectional” tone.
Harold Bloom and Yvor Winters could not understand how Poe could have had any appeal to
anyone but the “subliterate,” but I think the previous examples make it clear that their appraisal is
based on an incorrect assessment of Poe’s aims. The former implies, moreover, that the reason why
Poe was revered by the great French-speaking poets Charles Baudelaire, Stephane Mallarmé, and
Paul Valéry was because none of them “had much of an inner ear for English” and, therefore, could
not have realised how badly Poe performed linguistically (Bloom, Introduction vii). Baudelaire, of
course, is one of those translators that, Bloom implies, rendered Poe’s shoddy English into good
prose. In reality,  the ostensibly bad English of the narrator is there to signal that that character
represents  precisely  the  “subliterate.”  However,  Poe’s  joke  is  ultimately  not  on  the  culturally
deprived, but on people like Bloom, who ridiculed Poe for the mistakes of his narrator. Translators
like Baudelaire, although they certainly improved Poe’s reputation, did not “correct” Poe’s style—
they erased it, thereby making it impossible for the reader of the translation to realise what Poe
really was about.127 He was not merely following literary trends; he was mocking them. 
127  Not surprisingly, in translating the sentence in “Morella” I analyse here, Baudelaire completely ironed out the
“quaintness” of Poe’s original, silently correcting the narrator’s grammar: “Morella venait, plaçant sa main froide
sur la miene et ramassant dans les cendres d’une philosophie morte quelques graves et singulières paroles, qui, par
leur sens bizarre, s’incrustaient dans ma mémoire” (Baudelaire, “Morella” 276).
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He used botched allusions in his tales in much the same way to intimate the ignorance of his
arrogant narrators.  Although Poe did in “serious” tales like “Ligeia” exactly  what  the editor of
“How to Write a Blackwood Article” advised the would-be author Psyche Zenobia to do, very few
dared  question  the  Romantic  “seriousness”  of  the  first  of  these  tales.  In  “How to  Write,”  the
magazine writer is represented, precisely, as an impostor, who gives him or herself airs to impress
an ignorant  public  by displaying knowledge he does  not  really  possess.  “Let  us  suppose,”  Mr.
Blackwood tells Zenobia,
now you have determined upon your incidents and tone. The most important portion,
— in fact the soul of the whole business, is yet to be attended to – I allude to  the
filling up. It is not to be supposed that a lady or gentleman either has been leading the
life of a bookworm. And yet above all things it is necessary that your article have an
air of erudition, or at least afford evidence of extensive general reading.
(Poe, “How to Write” 343)
In  order  to  convey  this  false  impression  of  erudition,  the  writer  should  quote  some
information  which  “is  not  generally  known,  and  looks  recherché”  and  “give  the  thing  with  a
downright improviso air” (Poe, “How to Write” 343). For example, by dropping a reference to “The
venerable  Chinese  novel  Ju-Kiao-Li,” “you  will  evince  your  intimate  acquaintance  with  the
language and the literature of the Chinese” (344). Thus, Poe highlights the way in which readers are
forced to  interpret  allusions  to  facts,  books,  or  languages  which  they  ignore.  And then,  in  his
apparently “serious” tales, I believe he created allusions that are just a little too obviously erroneous
to intimate the narrators also affected a knowledge they did not truly possess.
In “Ligeia” almost every paragraph contains some such very abstruse allusion. Most of them
are flawed or incorrect, usually comically so. We have already mentioned how the narrator affected
a familiarity with medical matters, and how this was belied by his misconceptions on the subject of
corpses. In matters of “general reading” his ignorance is apparently as complete. I will select only
473
two of many possible examples to illustrate this point. The narrator declares he “sat upon one of the
ottomans of India” (Poe, “Ligeia” 324). He alludes to a piece of furniture, a sofa without armrests or
back,  which was common in the Ottoman Empire—hence the name.  The Ottomans,  of course,
hailed from the region of modern-day Turkey. Their Empire, however, even at its vastest, never
reached the Indian sub-continent. Although the phrase “ottomans of India” is not exactly wrong, a
person with the narrator’s pretensions to learning certainly should have avoided the absurd coupling
of “ottoman” and “of India,” if not for the sake of sense, at least for stylistic reasons.
The next example, however, is not only stylistically incorrect, but downright wrong: “if ever
(…) she, the wan and the misty-winged Ashtophet of idolatrous Egypt, presided, as they tell, over
marriages ill-omened, then most surely she presided over mine” ("Ligeia" 311). This is one of the
most abstruse-looking references in the tale. Mabbott, who never conceived such allusions could be
intended as anything other than a display of the  author’s  learning, explains that “Ashtophet was,
according to Rees’s Cyclopaedia, a goddess of the Sidonians. In mythology she has been identified
with, or assimilated to, Ashtoreth (…), Astarte, Aphrodite, and eventually Venus” (Mabbott,  Tales
331n2). Thus, he silently and reverently corrects Poe, who he believes mistook the Middle-Eastern
goddess with the Egyptian—Isis would be the Egyptian equivalent of the Assyrian Astarte. But
neither the British nor the American editions of Rees’s I consulted mention such a spelling, and even
the omniscient Google search-engine finds it only in Poe’s tale. Mabbott may have been betrayed by
his eagerness to save Poe’s face.128
128  The “deity of the Sidonians, which was worshipped by Solomon in his idolatrous days,” mentioned in Rees’s
Cyclopaedia (1819) is Astaroth, to which a separate heading is dedicated. The reader is there referred to the entry
concerning Astarte,  which contains  a  list  of  the ancient goddesses  of love that  have been identified with her:
“Astarte was called in Hebrew Astaroth or Ashtaroth. (…) The mythological writers, in general, have thought that
Astarte is, under different names, the Venus or Myllita of the Assyrians, the Mythra of the Persians, the Isis of the
Egyptians, the Io and Venus Urania of the Greeks, the great goddess of the Syrians, the Derceto of Ascalon, and
probably Diana, &c.” The “First American edition,” published in Philadelphia sometime between 1805 and 1825,
introduced no alteration to either of the original entries. It would appear that “Ashtophet” was not among the many
names by which the goddess was known, and all authorities on mythology I have consulted agree on that point.
All indicates, therefore, that Mabbott made a mistake which, incidentally, Stuart Levine and Susan F. Levine
perpetuated in their annotated edition of the tale (see Thirty-Two Stories 56n3).
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If so, his zeal appears to me to be misplaced. The form “Ashtophet” appears to be, not a
mistake,  but  a  whimsical  coinage,  created  to  imitate  a  real  involuntary  mistake.  The  form  is
evidently a portmanteau of “Ashtaroth” and the usual transliteration of the Hebrew word for hell:
“Tophet,” the ending of which has a certain “Egyptian” ring to it. The strange word was probably
designed by Poe to suggest the narrator’s faulty recollection, and insufficient grasp of the matter.
The narrator’s “they tell,” indeed, suggests that he had some vague recollection of a goddess of that
name, but did not take the trouble of checking the fact—somehow, he never seems to take the
trouble of checking his facts. Besides, had this been a mistake, Poe certainly would have corrected it
during one of the several extensive revisions to which he subjected “Ligeia.” But he did not—
instead, he drew attention to what must, until proven otherwise, be regarded as a hapax legomenon.
More importantly, even if “Ashtophet”  were  mentioned in some hitherto unidentified text,
the allusion would remain an obvious mistake, as the Egyptian deity associated with marriage, both
happy and unhappy, is Isis, an information Poe and his readers could have found in any number of
places.  The  suggestion  that  the  narrator  is  confuting  Isis  with  the  middle  eastern  Astarte  is
reinforced by the reference to wings, for Isis, unlike Astarte, was often represented in Egyptian art
with wings. All this indicates, therefore, that “Ashtophet” is, indeed, a lapse, but a purely fictional
one. In short, Poe’s narrator had succumbed to a childish urge to show off, and failed miserably—
this, I say, appears to be the idea Poe intended to convey.
At times, the chronic reluctance of commentators to admit the obvious irony of some of
Poe’s whimsical pseudo-allusions is perplexing. Pollin’s note to  Pinakidia  80 is a good example.
The short article includes the following list of false but widespread etymologies: “Bochart derives
Elysium from the Phoenician Elysoth, joy, through the Greek Ηλυσιον” (Brevities 55). Pollin admits
this “adaptation from H. N. Coleridge’s Introductions (…) probably indicates his [Poe’s] sense of
humor since the borrowed learning is self-evidently preposterous, although not advanced as such by
Coleridge,  in  citing  Samuel  Bochart  (1590-1667),”  an  author  who  was  already  known for  his
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“‘chimerical etymologies’” (55n). Surprisingly, Pollin then proceeds to explain, in all seriousness,
how Poe himself had derived his spelling of “Elysium” from precisely this etymology, and then
betrayed  this  source  by  a  childish  transliteration  mistake  he  never  bothered  to  correct:  “The
reference to ‘Elysoth’ had been used by Poe in his (…) tale, ‘Shadow,’ and would appear again in
‘Eleonora’ and in his  1844 rev.  of Horne’s  Orion,  giving reason enough to think that  Poe was
deceived by a hasty reading of the Greek word into his spelling Elysium as Helusion, with the
capital  ‘eta’ wrongly transliterated into ‘He’ and the upsilon retained as  a  ‘u’ instead of ‘y’ in
English” (55n). This statement is, of course, as preposterous as the mistake it describes. Poe may
have affected much more “learning” than he truly “possessed,” but he no doubt learned enough
Greek at  the University of Virginia to know the difference between a capital “eta” and a Latin
“H.”129 Through these deliberate “mistakes” Poe derided the common practice the editor in “How to
Write a Blackwood Article,” in the passage I quote above, termed “filling up.” 
In the review of A Drama of Exile, then, Poe said that absurd expression could be used to
convey the “fantastic,” which he identified with “obscurity of expression,” adding that this was
another of his original theories. The foregoing calculated mistakes show exactly what he meant.
Despite  all  this  absurdity,  most  critics  continued  to  presuppose  Poe’s  adherence  to  the  basic
structuring  ideas  of  Romanticism.  They  thought  he  placed  a  positive  value  on  obscurity  of
expression; that the collapse of semantic mechanisms in his work was meant to lead the reader to
contemplate the limitations of logical thought. On this point, as I have earlier stated, Poe’s admirers
129 Although he appears to have been a fairly competent Latinist, though not exactly a scholar, Poe’s knowledge of
Greek appears  to have been rudimentary. Yet,  given the emphasis the educators  of his time placed on ancient
languages, he must have known, at least, the Greek alphabet. On the subject of Poe’s schooling, Kenneth Silverman
writes: “Most elementary education in Virginia” in Poe’s youth “depended on private academies, of twenty or so
male  students  each,  that  offered  Greek  and  Latin,  French,  English  composition,  math,  some  science,  and
occasionally commercial subjects like accounting and shorthand,” adding that Poe himself studied for “about two
years” with “William Burke, an accomplished Latinist” (Edgar Allan Poe 23).
When he arrived at the University of Virginia, in 1826, Poe “enrolled in the schools of ancient languages,
taught  by  Cambridge  Master  of  Arts  George  Long,  and  of  modern  languages,  taught  by  th  German  George
Blaetermann”  (Silverman,  Edgar  Allan  Poe 29).  Again,  although  Latin  constituted  the  main  focus  of  Long’s
lessons, it is hard to believe Poe did not then learn to distingish Greek characters.
In “Poe and H. N. Coleridge’s Greek Classic Poets,” Palmer C. Holt points out that although Poe got most of
his Greek from reliable secondary sources, he evinced “creditable habits of scholarship, for Poe realized he must be
eternally vigilant in those classic areas in which he longed to excel but in which his formal training had been too
narrowly circumscribed” (8).
476
have  mostly  agreed  with  his  detractors  that  he  was  much  more  absurd  than  even  the  most
“transcendentalist”  among  his  contemporaries,  but  found  different  ways  to  account  for  this
peculiarity. While the latter have generally thought that Poe was very obtuse—almost incredibly so
—, the former have tended to regard him as either a brilliant lunatic, a prophet, or both.
In fact, Floyd Stovall himself seems to have had serious misgivings concerning Poe’s worth.
As we have seen, he thought that as a critic Poe did not meant what he actually said, and said more
than he meant. The best he could muster in his defence was: “His love of sweeping generalization
and of striking metaphor sometimes betrayed him (…) into saying more than he intended” (Stovall,
“Poe’s Debt” 794). As I said, Stovall is speaking specifically of Poe’s criticism, and this makes his
accusation even more damaging. Could he be speaking of the same Edgar Allan Poe who in the
“Exordium”  published  in  Graham’s  Magazine  in  January  1842  had  condemned  the  American
“transcendentalist” critics of his time for displaying precisely what he termed a “frantic spirit of
generalization” that made a criticism “anything and everything at once?:” 
of this science we know nothing, and really wish to know less; but we object to our
contemporary’s appropriation in its behalf, of a term to which we, in common with a
large majority of mankind, have been accustomed to attach a very definite idea. Is
there  no  word  but  “criticism”  which  may  be  made  to  serve  the  purposes  of
“Arcturus?” Has it any objection to Orphicism, or Dialism, or Emersonism, or any
other pregnant compound indicative of confusion worse confounded?
(43)
In  the  same  text,  Poe  affirmed,  in  fact,  the  specificity  of  criticism  against  the
“transcendentalists:”
Criticism is  not, we think, an essay, nor a sermon, nor an oration, nor a chapter in
history, nor a philosophical speculation, nor a prose-poem, nor an art novel, nor a
dialogue. In fact, it  can be nothing in the world but—a criticism. But if it were all
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that Arcturus imagines, it is not very clear why it might not be equally “imaginative”
or “dramatic”—a romance or a melo-drama, or both. That it would be a farce cannot
be doubted. (“Exordium” 43)
But we should not pay Poe any mind. Instead, Stovall, one of the leading authorities on the
subject in his time, instructed readers to forgive him, for he did not mean what he said.
Among the earliest attempts to rehabilitate Poe after the rough handling he suffered at the
hands  of  Winters,  Richard  Wilbur’s  was  certainly  the  most  influential.  But  Wilbur  started  by
granting  Winters’s  contention.  He  did  not  contest  that  Poe’s  poems  were,  strictly  speaking,
meaningless;  instead,  he  attempted  to  vindicate  unmeaningness  through  Poe’s  poems.  Poe’s
“vagueness [is] a consequence of his unearthly subject-matter; his denial of Intellect a means to
ultimate truth” (Wilbur, Complete Poems 12). “The City in the Sea,” for example, is, according to
Wilbur, “so thoroughly pictorial, so lacking in narrative or argumentative structure, that all evidence
of Poe’s true meaning must be drawn from external sources,  largely from prose-pieces of later
composition. The same is true of ‘The valley of Unrest,’ which, taken by itself, yields no ideas and
only the ghost of a story” (Wilbur, Complete Poems 32). In other words, Poe’s poems lack any of
the two varieties of intelligible content, argument or narrative. Their meaning should be sought in
Poe’s prose. On this point too, Wilbur is in full agreement with Yvor Winters, who answered to
those that argued that Poe was an “intellectual poet” by remarking that “this intellectuality, if that is
the name for it, is all anterior to the poem, not in the poem; it resides merely in the rules for the
practice of obscurantism which I have defined” (“Edgar Allan Poe” 261).
Wilbur, then, developed these notions into a general theory of poetry: 
Poetry does not offer ‘meaning,’ it offers ‘effect.’ What is more, the poem’s ‘effect,’
its power to induce a certain ‘spiritual’ state of mind in the reader, depends precisely
on the obscuration of ‘meaning.’ Poe thinks of the poem, here and generally, not as
an object of intellectual and emotional knowledge, but as a sort of magic spell or
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mesmeric  pass;  it  should move us not  to  contemplation but to  a  state  of  strange
abstraction in which we seem, for a moment, to apprehend an unearthly beauty.
(Complete Poems 34)
Poe’s poems would therefore be symbols in the religious sense of the word, that is, tokens of
untranslatable  ideal  realities  in  which the poet  has  faith.  But  Poe’s  mysticism was so extreme,
Wilbur thought, that his poems, unlike other symbols, did not really mean a thing in the world. Or,
in any case, whatever actual meaning they might have, that is not what Poe meant. Thus, Wilbur
reinforces  the old assertion that  Poe did not  “mean” what  he actually  “meant,”  adding that  he
scorned to convey any intelligible meaning at all:
It is as if the ‘content’ of the poems were there mainly because something must be
there; content seems less important, finally, than what is done to it, and what Poe
does to it is to render it ‘indefinite.’ That is, he obscures his subject-matter enough to
prevent the reader from having a conclusive sense of the poem’s meaning; such a
conclusive understanding would contain the reader’s mind within the poem, whereas
what  is  desired  is  a  sense  of  transcending  tiny  mundane  thought-patterns  in  the
direction of a ‘vague and therefore spiritual’ realm where the closure of the mind on
its material is impossible. Poe’s whole magic consists in starting the imagination and
then not stopping it. (Wilbur, Complete Poems 34-35)
I have been quoting from Wilbur’s introductory essay to his 1959 edition of Poe’s Poems I
have quoted earlier in this dissertation. In a lecture delivered in the same year, “The House of Poe,”
he maintained that Poe, like the more well respected American authors of prose fiction, Hawthorne
and Melville,  was “intentionally  symbolic:”  I  think we can make no sense about him until  we
consider his work—and in particular his prose fiction—as deliberate and often brilliant allegory”
(808). Thus, he thought the tales embodied the same extreme Romantic conception of poetry that he
found in the poems: 
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Poe conceived of art, you see, not as a means of giving imaginative order to earthly
experience, but as a stimulus to unearthly visions. The work of literary art does not,
in Poe’s view, present the reader with a provisional arrangement of reality; instead, it
seeks to disengage the reader’s mind from reality and propel it  toward the ideal.
Now, since Poe thought the function of art was to set the mind soaring upward in
what he called ‘a wild effort to reach the Beauty above,’ it was important to him that
the poem or tale should not have such definiteness and completeness of meaning as
might contain the reader’s mind within the work. Therefore, Poe’s criticism places a
positive  value  on  the  obscuration  of  meaning,  on  a  dark  suggestiveness,  on  a
deliberate vagueness by means of which the reader’s mind may be set adrift towards
the beyond. (Wilbur, “House of Poe” 808-809)
Wilbur supposes that the true meaning of Poe’s poetry and fiction must be sought in his
criticism. But the above paragraph, and particularly the idea that poetry should avoid “containing
the reader’s mind,” is distinctly reminiscent of Emerson’s manner; that is, of that very “Orphicism,
or Dialism, or Emersonism” Poe ridiculed in his “Exordium.”
In reality, Wilbur’s practice belies this declaration, inasmuch as his theory of Poe’s poetry
does not flow, as he claims, from the criticism. In reality, Wilbur projected, or rather forced, his
allegorical  reading  of  the  tales  of  women  on  Poe’s  criticism.  For  him,  “Ligeia,”  “Morella,”
“Berenice,” and “Eleonora” are “allegorical embodiments” of the “myth of the poet’s life” which
“permeates” Poe’s poetry (Complete Poems 13). Indeed, Wilbur explains the symbolism of those
poems which appear  to him to have no subject-matter,  explicitly or implicitly,  in terms of that
allegory.
The mourning narrator, then, would represent the poet. He is, as it were, the less allegorical
of the persons of the drama. His female counterpart, on the other hand, is regarded as fully and
emphatically allegorical. According to Wilbur, it would truly be a mistake to think of her as a literal
480
woman. He thought that the poet’s yearning for her represented “the poet’s nostalgia for ‘Psyche,’
for his lost intuitive possession of all things. That is what all of Poe’s dead and lamented ladies
stand for: Ligeia, Lenore, Morella, the whole troop” (Complete Poems 16). Thus, Wilbur saw in Poe
precisely the same male mythical narrative of the origin of poetry that Gilbert  and Gubar have
found in Shelley, in whose work, they write, woman appeared as “an epi-psyche, a soul out of the
poet’s soul” (Madwoman 12).
The  women  in  the  tales,  still  according  to  Wilbur,  were  “subjectively  transformed  or
‘Pythagorized’ by the hero” (Complete Poems 16). Of course, this process requires their death, and
this explains why the narrators of these tales did not regret that these women were dying, but rather
welcomed their demise. But Wilbur does not think this is very relevant. After all, he thought, these
were not real women.130
He accepts,  therefore,  that  the  female  characters  had  to  be  “Pythagorised”—a term he
derived from “Morella”—out of existence in order that the poet might transcend “physical” reality.
It is precisely this process that Wilbur regards as an allegory of poetry:
The point is that imagination for Poe must be unconditioned; must utterly repudiate
the things of this diseased Earth; must approach the ideal, not merely  through the
real, but by the negation of the real. Ermengarde and Rowena are mundane, physical
creatures, daughters of the ‘outer and everyday world;’ we will do them no violence
if  we see  them as  allegorical  figures  representing  Earthly  Beauty.  Unhappily  for
them,  the  poet  has  once  enjoyed,  in  and  through  Psyche  (Eleanora,  Ligeia),  an
130 Wilbur’s theory can itself ultimately be traced to Baudelaire’s first essay on Poe, in which the French poet, as we
have seen, writes that female characters like Ligeia and Morella “participent fortement de la nature de leur créateur”
(“Edgar Poe” 618).
Incidentally, that article also inaugurated the practice of applying quotations or paraphrases from “Ligeia” and
“Morella” directly to Poe.  For example: “Si jamais l’esprit de roman, pour me servir d’une expression de notre
poète, à presidé a une naissance—esprit sinistre et orageux!—certes il présida à la sienne” (Baudelaire, “Edgar Poe”
599).  This, of course, is adapted from one of the opening paragraphs of “Ligeia.” The following sentence, which
appears later in the same article, contains a direct quotation from “Morella” used in a similar way: “J’apprends qu’il
[Poe]  ne  buvait  pas  en  gourmand,  mais  en  barbare,  avec  une  activité  et  une  économie  de  temps  tout  à  fait
américaines, comme accomplissant une fonction homicide, comme ayant en lui quelque chose à tuer, a worm that
would not die” (613-14).
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acquaintance with Supernal Beauty, and therefore ‘nothing earthly’ can satisfy his
esthetic hunger. The poet may  use  Earthly Beauty as a means of reconceiving or
remembering Psyche; the process, however, is not so much sublimation as it is an
attritive negation. The images of Rowena and Berenice are worn away in the hero’s
mind  by  the  action  of  his  imagination,  until  they  have  grown  so  manageably
indistinct that they may be supplanted by the images of Ligeia and Egæus’ mother.
(Complete Poems 16-17)
Therefore:
The ‘Eleonora’ or ‘Ligeia’ sort of story is an account by a ‘mad’ hero of how, through
dwelling  among  fallen  creatures  [meaning  Rowena and Ermengarde]  on  a  fallen
planet [meaning the material world], he has managed—at least momentarily—to blot
out all consciousness of his environment and retrieve a state of mind unconditionally
visionary  [identified  with  the  realization  of  a  spiritual  communion  with  the
previously “pythagorised” Ligeia or Eleonora]. (19)
The  destruction  of  these  “earthly”  women  represented  “the  symbolic  destruction  of  the
physical,” or the “symbolical destruction of material fact” (Wilbur,  Complete Poems  37, 39). In
other words, their sacrifice is a sort  of ritual enactment of the apocalypse.  Thus, Wilbur tacitly
admits that the human condition is identified in the tale with the male condition. In effect, when he
states that “we would do them no violence” by seeing the “spiritual” counterparts of these earthly
women as allegorical figures, he instructs the reader to disregard the hints of actual violence in the
tale. He thereby implies that Poe endorsed the Romantic myth, and had no intention of exposing its
sexist implications, of which, indeed, he appears to have thought the author was unaware. In other
words, he thought that Poe did not think “Pythagorising” a woman was a form of aggression. Yet,
the narrator ends up “Pythagorising” both the “celestial” and the “earthly” women. In fact,  the
narrator is  consistently aggressive towards women—live women, that  is.  The hidden,  or not so
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hidden, murders, which Wilbur missed because he thought Poe could not but be a sincere Romantic,
of course, suggest this was deliberate on Poe’s part. However, in order to explain the tale, Wilbur
sometimes goes beyond the narrator’s delusion, hitting on some of the very irregularities that show
us that Poe was not being sincere. He was one of the few to notice, for example, that the ghost in
“Berenice” must belong to Egæus’ mother—Egæus himself never suspected this. 
Since the publication of Wilbur’s essays, most attempts to make sense of Poe’s work have
built on his basic interpretation. Even James W. Gargano, despite declaring that Poe’s narrators were
far more unreliable than had previously been thought, assumed Poe’s belief in the validity of his
narrator’s glimpse of the Ideal in his article “Poe’s ‘Ligeia:’ Dream and Destruction:”
Like  many another  romantic  idealist,  he  lives  tensely  at  the  highest  pitch  of  his
passioned imagination (…). Momentarily, then, he attains that glory or intensification
of being which justifies existence for the romantic. In other words, he has escaped
the limitations of the mortal condition through a vision of the ethereal and eternal
sphere of the Ideal. Ligeia, then, is (…) a huge metaphor for the narrator’s romantic
version of a Platonic “heaven.” (339)
Surprisingly, although he stated that the narrator was unreliable, what Gargano offers here is
a faithful rendering of the moral that narrator himself suggests for his story. At the same time, of
course, he ignores the fact that Poe had in fact denied in  Marginalia  ever having achieved, even
momentarily, the “glory” mentioned by Gargano.
The outlook on Poe’s work offered by G. R. Thompson Poe’s Fiction: Romantic Irony in the
Gothic Tales (1973) is also a restatement of Wilbur’s “apocalyptic” thesis. In tales like “Ligeia” he
found “an overall structure of collapse mirroring the pattern of the universe itself” that could not be
reduced to plain sense: “the reader is left to choose between the supernatural and the psychological,
or for strongest effect, to think one theory and feel the other” (Poe’s Fiction 90, 103). Some years
later, in 1979, David Ketterer’s The Rationale of Deception in Poe disappointed the expectations of
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a new approach created by his title by presenting yet another rendition of Wilbur’s theory. Indeed,
Ketterer’s  “deception”  exactly  corresponds  to  Wilbur’s  idea  of  the  collapse  of  meaning:  “Poe
conceived of the act of artistic creation in terms of the destruction of everyday reality;” “what
occurs [in “Al Aaraaf”] is an apocalypse of the mind” (Ketterer,  Rationale  165, 166). As for the
tales, Ketterer maintained, like Thompson, that their meaning was radically unsettled: “almost all of
them can be genuinely interpreted in any number of ways;” “complete interpretation involves the
ability to maintain these varying approaches and possibilities in a state of omnidimensional fusion”
(181).  Ketterer  regards  this  fusion  as  the  true  signifier,  inasmuch  as  it  makes  “the  distinction
between the literal narrative surface and the symbolic meaning disappear” (181).
Joan Dayan’s feminist approach in Fables of the Mind: An Inquiry into Poe’s Fiction (1987)
offered  a  genuinely  refreshing  perspective  on  Poe’s  work.  Yet,  her  intuition  that  Poe’s  tales
dramatised gender politics was hampered, in my opinion, by her adherence to the basic tenets that
support  the  traditional  view of  Poe.  She  reiterated  that  his  “two-tiered  notion  of  composition”
resulted in an “indefiniteness” that was “a radical uncertainty that makes us physically uneasy”
(Dayan,  Fables 7).  Recognising  that  the  aesthetic  she  attributed  to  Poe  was  emphatically
irrationalistic, she thought that Poe had advocated, against Locke’s epistemology, a “discipline of
not knowing:” “Poe must block comprehension and force us to recognize the point where reason
fails”  (13).131 Dayan  also  explicitly  denies  the  viability  of  natural  explanations  for  Poe’s
“supernatural,” claiming that it is “in the domain of the inconceivable, of the impossible, that Poe
will produce his fiction” (17). This constitutes a tacit reiteration of Baudelaire’s old notion of the
double Poe. We can scarcely believe this is the same man that wrote “How to Write a Blackwood
131 In this sentence Dayan refers specifically to  Eureka. However, she believes that in the “prose poem,” which she
rightly points out is “unreadable,” and “The Poetic Principle,” “although Poe implies we can know, he lures us into
the kind of ‘knowing’ that he writes his fiction to expose and subvert” (Fables of the Mind 12). I believe both prose
pieces mentioned by Dayan realise, indeed, the same kind of delirium to which the narrator of “Ligeia” is subject.
Both are also, in my opinion, evidently satirical. Eureka, in particular, is not only marked by the same kind of irony
that we have seen in the Marginalia piece about the “power of words,” but also evidently fictional. However, this is
not the place to pursue this argument.
In any case, I believe Poe’s purposes were roughly the opposite of what Dayan supposed them to be.
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Article,”  where  the  editor  advised  the  credulous  Zenobia  to  be  “sure and abuse  a  man named
Locke” (Poe, 342).
The scholarly debate about Poe has revolved over the same central axioms for so long that
they have come to be regarded as sacred dogmas. In the last decades, it is true, critics have become
increasingly  aware  of  the  contradiction  between  Poe’s  “severe  aesthetic  formalism”  and  his
supposed “transcendentalism,” but have for the most part attempted to describe this as an apparent
contradiction (McGann, The Poet 94). If anything, most recent criticism takes the idea that Poe was
a mystical visionary to even more perplexing extremes. Jerome J. McGann’s 2014 book The Poet
Edgar  Allan  Poe:  Alien  Angel exemplifies  this  trend.  In  it,  the  author  contends  that  Poe’s
supposedly extreme Romanticism was actually closer to the symbolism of Rimbaud and Mallarmé
than it was to High Romanticism. The pervasive theme of Poe’s poetry, according to McGann, is
what he calls the “catastrophe of the beauty. It is the moment when a reader understands what Poe is
saying: that a thing of beauty—this thing of beauty—is not and never could be ‘a joy forever’”
(McGann, The Poet 94).
McGann is convinced that Poe conceived of the poet as a “mourner” for the lost beauty
supposedly represented by his women. Although he never explicitly mentions the tales, like Wilbur,
he thinks of “Berenice,” “Morella,” and “Ligeia” as metaphors of Romanticism; of the quest of the
poet for that irretrievably lost supernal Beauty.  Indeed, he attributes to Poe himself the kind of
desperate  “transcendentalism” displayed by the  narrators  of  these tales.  Sarah  Helen  Whitman,
whom he calls “one of Poe’s best readers,” “several times commented on Poe’s lingering pity and
sorrow for the dead [and a] fear of having grieved them by some involuntary wrong of desertion or
forgetfulness. No critical remark ever made about Poe seems to me more incisive (…) The point of
Poe’s great subject— ‘mournful and never-ending remembrance’—is to attempt the impossible: to
do the dead justice on their own terms” (McGann, The Poet 166).
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Thus, “mourning” would be the peculiar form the Romantic longing for a putative original
unity assumed in Poe: “when the catastrophe of the beautiful occurs, when the loved become the
forever lost, the official recorders of human life, the poets, plunge into a crisis;” scholars “call that
crisis  Romanticism and have tracked its  proposals for living with the consciousness of ultimate
loss”  (168).  In  McGann’s  theory,  therefore,  Romanticism  ceases  to  be  an  historically  defined
cultural phenomenon, but rather a manifestation of an intemporal human drama, the loss of a loved
one—or more specifically, of a beloved  woman. This loss was supposedly transfigured into “the
catastrophe of the beautiful,” which he thought was represented in Poe’s tales by the death of the
title-characters.  This  interpretation  clashes,  of  course,  in  a  very  obvious  way,  with  the  actual
meaning of Poe’s tales. Morella and Berenice are never described as beautiful, and, while Ligeia is,
we are clearly given to understand, first, that she might not have appeared so to most men, and
second, that  the narrator himself  did not perceive her beauty until  she died.  As I  have already
remarked  more  than  once,  this  effectively  conveys  the  impression  that  dead  women alone  are
beautiful. Indeed, if these narrators love these women at all, it is only after they are dead, therefore,
no live woman can be described as their beloved.
Despite these ominous signs, McGann believes a tale like “Ligeia” must be approached in
the same spirit in which the “mad” narrator wrote his story. Like Wilbur, McGann thinks that the
supposed impossibility of reducing its mystery to a straightforward, consistent sequence of events
enables the narrated experience to work as a springboard to unearthly visions. And the collapse of
intelligible content is supposed to “propel,” as Wilbur puts it, the mind of the reader to a meaning
beyond meaning, ever-expanding and perpetually unsettled. Thus, McGann validates the view of
Poe’s poetry that Wilbur expressed in terms of the metaphor of depth along with the extreme sexist
ideology of the narrator:
 Poe’s criticism, then, assures that his work does have meaning. And Poe also assures
us  that  this  meaning  is  not  in  the  surface  but  in  the  depths.  If  we accept  Poe’s
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invitation to play detective, and commence to read him with an eye for submerged
meaning, it is not long before we sense that there are meanings to be found, and that
in fact many of Poe’s stories, though superficially dissimilar, tell the same tale.
(“The House of Poe” 809)
The  “surface,”  here,  represents  the  literal,  intelligible  “meaning”—meaning  properly  so
called—, as opposed to the “depths” which correspond to that profound mythical representation of
the human condition that is, according to Wilbur, the only serious story Poe had to tell. Poe is the
indisputable inventor of the detective story as we know it—a fact to which one suspects Wilbur
meant to allude. However, the critic is here using the “detective” as a metaphor. His “detective”
represents the precise opposite of the attitude of Poe’s famous detective, C. Auguste Dupin. Wilbur
is in effect telling us not to play the detective unto “Ligeia,” that is, not to pay the kind of attention
to detail for which Dupin is renowned (an advice later reiterated by Thompson). Wilbur assures us
that this would be vain, and more importantly, not at all what Poe wanted the readers of “Ligeia” to
do. Wilbur thought Poe wanted us to engage in deep metaphysical speculation and contemplate the
futility of reason, while tapping on our own emotional experience of loss and bereavement. He
wanted us, that is, to follow his narrator’s example. Again, this approach is precisely the opposite of
Dupin’s method: “there is such a thing as being too profound. Truth is not always in a well. In fact,
as regards the more important knowledge, I do believe that she is invariably superficial. The depth
lies in the valleys where we seek her, and not upon the mountain-tops where she is found” (Poe,
“Murders in the Rue Morgue” 545).
Moreover,  “in  his  criticism”  Poe  never  said  that  the  meaning  of  his  work,  was  in  the
“depths.” He said, more than once, exactly the opposite, using the metaphor of the well in the same
sense Dupin gave to it. Thus, Wilbur betrays the undeclared source of his theory of Poe’s poetry:
“Ligeia.” For, contrary to his claim, this is the only place in Poe’s work where truth is said to lie in
the “depths,” more specifically, at the “bottom” of Ligeia’s eyes: “What was it—that something
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more profound than the well of Democritus—which lay far within the pupils of my beloved? What
was it?” (Poe, “Ligeia” 313).
 This is a perfect example of the way in which the reader’s expectations may distort a text—
or, in this case, several. In the “Letter to B——,” with which he prefaced the Poems (1831), Poe
flatly stated: “As regards the greater truths, men oftener err by seeking them at the bottom than at
the top;  the depth lies in the huge abysses where wisdom is sought—not in the palpable palaces
where she is found. The ancients were not always right in hiding the goddess in a well” (7-8). This
is an allusion to the famous saying attributed to Democritus in Diogenes Laertius’s Lives of Eminent
Philosophers: “Of a truth we know nothing, for truth is in a well” (9.72). The quotation is there
presented as evidence of that philosopher’s skepticism, a school of thought which derived its name,
still according to Laertius, from the fact of their followers being “always looking for a solution and
never finding one” (9.90). The narrator of “Ligeia,” then, places himself neatly in what Poe said in
his criticism was the wrong side of the “well;” in the company of Coleridge, who, according to the
same “Letter to B——,” ended up “buried in metaphysics” (10).
Indeed,  the  word  “buried”  reinforces  the  association  between  the  Romantic  idealism of
Coleridge and over-profundity. The idea is that, by seeking profound answers to all problems, the
reasoner  will  inevitably  fail  to  perceive  the  solutions  to  most  problems,  which,  in  reality,  are
superficial. However, Poe also implies that the expectation of “depth” confirms itself: that is, the
“metaphysical”  thinker  will  invariably  find  what  he  is  looking  for,  but  not  the  an  intelligible
solution, which, in reality, that kind of reasoner  did not hope to find. The same idea, as we have
seen, was already implied in Diogenes Laertius account of skepticism.
Wilbur probably noticed the contradiction.  But,  like Stovall,  he believed that Poe was a
“transcendentalist” at heart, and did not mean what he said about Coleridge. Accordingly, he tells us
that Poe, the critic, did not really mean what  he  said about the “well of Democritus” either; he
meant what his narrator said. Again, I suspect that if we were talking of any other writer but Poe,
488
this notion would have been rejected as preposterous, but, somehow, Poe has so thoroughly puzzled
his readers that the idea stuck.
In  reality,  however,  the  narrator  illustrates  the  meaning  of  the  phrase  “buried  in
metaphysics” Poe had applied to Coleridge. He had missed the superficial solution to his problem
by looking for it in the “depths.” Thus, while he did thoroughly succeed in “disengaging,” as Wilbur
puts it in a passage I quoted above, his “mind from reality,” the tale contradicts the idea that he had
thereby achieved a valid insight into a higher truth. On the contrary, he had only succeeded in
making  himself  blind  to  the  particular  truth  of  the  matter.  In  this  sense,  then,  there  is  no
contradiction between the tale and the criticism; on the contrary, the fiction slyly enforces Poe’s
point.
It should be noted, however, that the reference to Democritus is a precisely coded allusion to
an intermediate source: the passage in Glanvill that Poe would later use as a motto for his 1841 tale
“A Descent into the Maelstrom:” “The ways of God in Nature, as in Providence, are not as  our
ways; nor are the models that we frame any way commensurate to the vastness, profundity, and
unsearchableness of His works, which have a depth in them greater than the well of Democritus”
(577 emphasis in the original). This is a slightly distorted quotation from “Against Confidence in
Philosophy  and  Matters  of  Speculation,”  included  in  the  volume  Essays  on  Several  Important
Subjects  (1676).132 This passage, then, evidently provided the stimulus for Poe’s sentence. This is
clearly indicated by his hinting of something  more profound than the Well, an idea not found in
Laertius text. This allusion provides a concrete link between Poe’s text and Glanvill, which was
132 Glanvill’s text was, indeed, slightly different: “The ways of God in Nature (as in Providence) are not as ours are:
Nor are the Models that we frame any way commensurate to the vastness and profundity of his Works; which have
a depth in them greater than the Well of Democritus” (Glanvill, “Against Confidence” 15).
In  Poe’s  motto,  “ours”  is  replaced  with  “our  ways,”  and  the  word  “unsearchableness”  is  added  after
“profundity.” This sentence appears, with these two alterations, in the preface of J. C. Colquhoun’s Isis Revelata An
Inquiry into the Origin, Progress, and Present State of Animal Magnetism (1836), from which I suspect Poe copied
it (see xxviii). It is also worth noticing that the motto of “Maelstrom” is attributed to Joseph Glanville. The only
other place where the author’s name is spelled with an “e” is the pamphlet  Plain Evidence of the Existence of
Witches (1834) mentioned by Barbara Cantalupo in “Poe’s Visual Tricks.”
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probably  designed,  among  other  things,  to  prompt  the  reader  to  discover  the  other  significant
connections “Ligeia” establishes with Essays.
Glanvill’s sentence carries the suggestion that the ways of God were somehow deeper than
Truth itself. At times Glanvill’s style is a little too loose, and this is a perfect example. With this
sentence, he creates the no doubt unintended suggestion of over-profundity—which was probably
what  interested  Poe.  The  ways  of  God,  which  Glanvill  presumably  regarded  as  the  ultimate
unattainable Truth, were somehow  deeper than Democritus’s truth, which, according to the pithy
sentence  Laertius  attributes  to  the  Greek philosopher,  was  itself  fundamentally  unknowable.  In
Poe’s text, however, since the story is one of delusion, the secondary meaning is made relevant. In
fact,  as we have seen,  in practice Glanvill  was not at  all  “skeptic;” on the contrary,  he was as
gullible as Poe’s narrator, a resemblance one suspects Poe meant indirectly to point out.
Meanwhile,  Poe  consistently  kept  denying  his  narrator’s  assertion  that  truth  was  in  the
depths after the publication of “Ligeia.” One notable example is a small article included in a series
entitled  Literary Small Talk, published in January and February 1839 on the  American Museum.
Apparently, the article is no more than a resented, somewhat arbitrary attack on Bulwer-Lytton for
infringing  rules  Poe  himself  constantly  transgressed.  Here  the  ubiquitous  image  of  the  well
resurfaces: 
Bulwer, in my opinion, wants the true vigour of intellect which would prompt him to
seek,  and enable him to seize truth  upon the surface  of  things.  He imagines  her
forever in the well. (…) He (…) condescends to ape the externals of a deep meaning,
and will submit to be low rather than fail in appearing profound. It is this coxcombry
which  leads  him  so  often  into  allegory  and  objectless  personification.  Does  he
mention ‘truth’ in  the most  ordinary phrase? —she is,  with a  great  T,  Truth,  the
divinity. (Poe, Brevities 458)
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Thus, Bulwer-Lytton’s penchant for allegory and generalisation is mere affectation, as was,
Poe maintains, the pedantic display of abstruse learning in The Last Days of Pompeii (1834): “in its
abundant  allusions  to  Egyptian theology,  gives  also sufficient  evidence of  his  love  of  the ‘far-
fetched’” (Brevities 458). Bulwer-Lytton’s over-profundity, therefore, consists in hinting of “deep”
unseizable meanings,  and throwing abstruse,  but really meaningless allusions in the way of the
reader for the sole purpose of bullying him or her into admiration. But then, this is exactly what Poe
did in many of his tales, notably “Ligeia,” in which Egyptian and other “deep” Oriental lore figures
prominently, along with the pledge of a commitment to profundity, and a corresponding scorn for
plain meaning.
All this would suggest, of course, that Poe did not agree with his narrator’s views. But this
conclusion is not imposed from outside the text, as Wilbur supposed the allegorical interpretation
was. On the contrary, it is strictly coded in the text. Indeed, the narrator gets a little too technical
about the eyes.  So technical,  indeed, as to let  the literal  import of his words interfere with the
metaphor of the well. His inspection of the eyes of Ligeia is certainly no metaphor. He really did
“struggle  to  fathom” them;  to  discover  that  “which  lay  far  within  the  pupils of  my  beloved”
("Ligeia" 313 emphasis mine).
Depth is the ostensible tertium of the comparison of eyes and wells. However, the narrator
involuntarily  draws  attention  to  another  characteristic  these  objects  share.  Under  normal
circumstances, one cannot really see through the pupil with the naked eye, any more than one can
see the bottom of a well, unless it be dry. To examine the retina modern healthcare professionals
employ a special instrument, the ophthalmoscope, or funduscope, which had not yet been invented
when  “Ligeia”  was  written.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  the  interior  of  the  eye  being  always
necessarily darker than the exterior, its smooth, transparent surface functions as a mirror, as does the
surface of the water in a well.
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It  is  believed  that  the  transparent  portion  of  the  iris  is  called  “pupil,”  from  the  Latin
“pupilla,” meaning “little girl-doll,” in reference to that minute reflection (see OED). The narrator’s
own insistence on “depth” and on looking into the eye, evokes this idea, which suggests the futility
of  his  misguided  attempts  to  “fathom”  the  mystery.  In  this  case,  at  least,  the  solution  was
superficial,  for  no  matter  how much he  “struggled,”  he  cannot  possibly  have  seen  beyond  the
surface, and there he saw—he must have seen—his own reflection, but, of course, could no more
recognise it than he could his own shadow. In both cases, he plunges into metaphysics, and gets lost
in  slippery theories of personal  identity,  dragging the reader with him. The literal  sense of the
narrator’s words—or rather the literal impossibility of the task he proposes himself to perform—
blocks the path to that supreme Truth he had promised us. As a consequence, his metaphor of the
quest for a knowledge too “deep” for words is turned on itself, and becomes instead a metaphor of
over-profundity. Poe’s text never delivers on the promise of depth—on the contrary, the surface
keeps providing the answers the narrator did not even believed existed. Somehow, reality and logic
always get in the way of Poe’s paths to the ideal world of absolute Truth and Beauty in the most
spectacular fashion. 
G. R. Thompson, incidentally, has noted a similar structure in “The Fall of the House of
Usher:” “The narrator’s first impression of the house is that it is like a human face (…). Then he
looks down on the pool, but sees only the reflection of the ‘face’ of the house. What is equally
likely, of course, is that he should see imaged there his own reflected features, since Poe is careful
to point out that the narrator wheels his horse up to ‘the precipitous brink’ of the tarn and thus gazes
straight down” (Thompson, Poe’s Fiction 95). Thompson goes on to note that, later in the tale the
narrator finds himself equally fascinated by Usher’s “large and luminous eyes.133 (…) He becomes
like Usher. In meeting Usher, he is symbolically staring into the face of his psychological double.
(…) Thus Usher’s ‘arabesque’ face and the face of the house are the same, and when the narrator
133 Incidentally, this phrase is actually never applied to Usher, but only to Ligeia: “her large an luminous eyes” (Poe, 
“Ligeia” 314).
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gazes into the pool, the reflected ‘arabesque’ face is merged with his own—symbolically is his
own” (96).
Of course, Thompson himself has only just provided us with the crucial information that
shows us that the face the narrator saw on the surface of the tarn was not only “symbolically,” but
literally his own. Poe was as careful here as he had been in “Ligeia.” Just as in the latter tale he
repeatedly pointed out that the narrator was precisely between a source of light and the shadow he
saw on the floor, in “Usher” he first describes the “tarn” so as to make it absolutely clear that it was
a mirror, that is, a dark background with a smooth glassy surface, repeatedly mentioning reflected
images, and then twice points out that his narrator’s gaze was perpendicular to that surface when he
saw what he identifies as the “face” of the house: “I reined my horse to the precipitous brink of a
black and lurid tarn that lay in unruffled lustre by the dwelling, and gazed down;” “my somewhat
childish experiment—that of looking down within the tarn” (Poe, “The Fall of the House of Usher”
398,  399).  This  fact—for  nothing  could  be  more  certain  than  this  identification—effectivelly
confirms Susan Amper’s brilliant discovery that the tale is narrated by Usher himself.134
Thus, the well-coded parallelism between the eye and the tarn performs the same function
that the comparison of Ligeia’s eye with a well performs in her tale: that of highlighting the mirror-
like  quality  of  the  pupil.  This  crucial  clue  points  towards  a  natural  explanation,  a  possibility,
however,  which Thompson, like the narrator,  refuses to contemplate: “The ghosts in the tale of
Usher, then, are those of the mind. Such an analysis does not deny the supernaturalistic surface level
134  According to her, the face in the “tarn” is in fact both the face of the narrator of the tale and Usher’s. 
According to Amper, “Usher” represents Poe’s blending of the explained supernatural with the detective story
at its best: “’Usher’ offers us (…) an excess of sensation into which we are tempted to sink, and at the same time a
trail of clues we are invited to track;” “[w]hat we find is much mendacity on the part of the narrator, and strong
evidence of murder in both deaths [Roderick’s and Madeline Usher’s]” (“Masters of Deceit” 151, 152).
According to this reading, then, the tale is technically another of Poe’s femicide stories. I will not here recap all
of the detailed argument that supports it, but only Amper’s conclusion. According to her, Usher planned to murder
his sister, who was spending the family’s fortune on charity. “What he needs is a fall guy, so he has his childhood
friend visit him. He will trade places with the friend, kill him, blow up the house, and ride away into the night, a
new and free man” (Amper,  Masters of Deceit 159). Accordingly, Amper writes: “I believe that the narrator  is
Roderick: not a psychological or literary double, but Roderick Usher in the flesh” (“Masters of Deceit” 160).
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of the tale. (…) Nothing at all may have happened in a conventional sense in the outside world—
only in the inner world of the narrator’s mind” (Thompson, Poe’s Fiction 96-97).
Thus, Thompson validates the narrator’s claim that the image had a deep meaning, and,
indeed, his overall disdain for superficial, definite meanings. However, the care with which Poe
described  the  actual  circumstances  of  the  observer  in  both  “Usher”  and  “Ligeia”  manifests  a
concern with the viability of a literal, natural explanation for his narrator’s vision, a concern which
is expressed precisely by the emphasis his text places on the surface. He therefore forces the reader
to acknowledge that the narrators of both tales saw their own image in the surface of the fascinating
eyes, and that this was at least in part what disturbed them so about them. Poe is equally careful in
pointing out, moreover, that these narrators lose sight of this crucial fact, and believe that they have
seen something beyond the surface. The narrator of “Usher,” in the passage just quoted, claims that
he looked “down within” the tarn, just as the narrator of “Ligeia” was obsessed with something he
thought he had seen “far within the pupils of my beloved” (Poe, “Ligeia” 313 emphasis mine). In
the conditions they describe, however, it is physically impossible for them to have seen anything but
a reflected image of themselves, and, by pointing out this literal interpretation, Poe indicates that
theirs is a false epiphany. Through their mistake, or rather through their blindness, these narrator’s
betray their secret to the reader.
For Thompson, however, the image of the bewildered narrator gazing into the eyes of his
friend becomes the emblem of the kind of transcendental method of indirection he attributes to Poe:
“a  total  pattern of  ironic mockery of  absurd self-delusion  is  all  that  remains—with  reader  and
narrator left face to face, as it were, staring into each other’s luminous eyes, wondering exactly what
has happened in these subjective encounters with the dark well of the unconscious” (Thompson,
Poe’s Fiction 104). Implied is the old symbolism of the eyes expressed by the cliché “windows to
the soul.” 
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But the mistake they make, and which Thompson himself helped to uncover, invalidates
such a reading. The supposed subjective insight into the deep truths of human psychology that
Thompson saw represented in these tales is a hoax—not a transcendental hoax, patterned after the
theories of Schlegel, but a common hoax. In short, Poe systematically vindicates the surface that his
narrators constantly ignore and disparage. This is a pattern that is repeated throughout the tale. No
matter where we look in the surface of “Ligeia,” we find the semblance of the narrator. But he never
payed attention to the surface—he is constantly attempting to see past it. 
In fact, the “arabesque” performs a similar function in “Ligeia.” It functions, more or less, as
the inkblots  in Roschach’s test,  which provide an intrinsically meaningless shape on which the
observer can project his personality. This is evidently what takes place with the “figures” wrought in
black against a golden background of the tapestry in Rowena’s room, which “partook of the true
character  of  the  arabesque only  when regarded from a  single  point  of  view,”  but  “were  made
changeable in aspect,” so that:  “To one entering the room, they bore the appearance of simple
monstrosities; but, upon a farther advance, this appearance gradually departed; and step by step, as
the visiter moved his station on the chamber, he saw himself surrounded by the ghastly forms which
belong to the superstition of the Norman, or arise in the guilty slumbers of the monk” (Poe, "Ligeia"
322).
Barbara  Cantalupo,  incidentally,  thought  that  the  chief  “phantasmagoric”  device  in
Rowena’s room was “anamorphosis,” which she defined as “the manipulation of perspective to
create an image that is distorted or hidden except when seen from a specific point of view,” stating
that  “Poe  purposefully  inserts”  this  “definition  in”  this  passage  (“Poe’s  Visual  Tricks”  54).
According to her reading, then, the “narrator” here “argues for a ‘single point of view’—not any
point of view chosen by the viewer. In other words, Poe’s text refers to an anamorphosis. (…) the
viewer of an anamorphic image (the kind being described in Poe’s text) must move through visual
distortions  and  either  position  himself  at  a  point  determined  by  the  author/creator  or  use  an
495
anamorphic device—‘a contrivance now common’—in order to discern a recognizable image or, in
Poe’s words, ‘the true character of the arabesque’” (57). Thus, according to Cantalupo’s reading, the
narrator is saying that the tapestry “yields a coherent picture only when the viewer positions him- or
herself at a specific vantage point” (56).
It appears to me, however, that the passage does not admit the construal Cantalupo places on
it. First, the narrator is not here specifying, contrary to her suggestion, a determinate “single point of
view.” On the contrary, he is saying that the “arabesque” nature of the designs was only apparent
when they were seen from  any single  point  of  view.  As the viewer moved his station—for he
evidently refers to his own experience—what had at first appeared “simple monstrosities,” that is,
non-representational designs, assumed, in his eyes at least, recognisable form. In other words,  the
movement of the figures, either real or apparent, is what causes the transformation. Indeed, Richard
Kopley has since argued very persuasively that the “contrivance now common” Cantalupo mentions
refers  precisely  to  the  “artificial  introduction  of  a  strong continual  current  of  wind behind the
draperies—giving a hideous and uneasy animation to the whole” by demonstrating that the passage
was lifted from the following passage in Bulwer-Lytton’s novel  Pelham: Or, The Adventures of a
Gentleman (1828) (Poe, “Ligeia” 323): “then appears the detail that Poe clearly refashioned: ‘There
was, as Glanville afterwards explained to me, a  machine in this room,  which kept up a faint but
perpetual breeze, and  the light curtains,  waving to and fro, scattered about perfumes of the most
exquisite odour’” (Kopley, “Pelham” 111, emphasis in the original). The mechanism the narrator
put  in  place,  by ensuring that  these  designs  were kept  in  constant  motion—hence the “uneasy
animation”—guaranteed, in fact, that they were never regarded from a “single point of view” (Poe,
“Ligeia” 322).135
135 Indeed Kopley tacitly identifies the artificial wind with the “contrivance now common:” “The ‘arabesque figures’
shift, as the narrator walks through the room, from ‘simple monstrosities’ to ‘ghastly forms which belong to the
superstition of the Norman (…). These figures are brought to life in a familiar way,” Kopley concludes, alluding to
Glanville’s wind-machine in Pelham (“Pelham” 111-12).
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More  importantly,  I  think  Cantalupo  failed  to  perceive  that  “simple  monstrosities”  and
“character of the arabesque” are equivalent terms, and that these are in explicit opposition with “the
ghastly forms” the narrator mentions next. Indeed, the word “arabesque” evidently alludes to the
geometrical  or  vegetal  patterns  of  flowing  lines  typical  of  Muslim decorative  art,  from which
“representations  of  living  creatures  were  excluded”  for  religious  reasons  (OED def.  B.2).  By
“simple monstrosities,” then, the narrator means abstract designs. Indeed, he is clearly describing a
passage from shapelessness to form. The nature of the forms the arabesques assumed is equally
clear. The narrator means to allude in a learned fashion to the denizens of hell, as they were usually
portrayed in medieval art.136 The narrator’s use of the impersonal construction “to one entering the
room” suggests that anyone would see the shapeless arabesques transform into demons—this idea is
reiterated by Cantalupo. But it is by no means clear that anyone would  see these demons in his
position.  In  fact,  the  idea  of  the  presence  of  an  anamorphic  contrivance  is,  I  think,  clearly
contradicted by the narrator’s statement that these figures were not perceivable from any one point
of view, but were rather prompted by the artificial “animation” he had given to designs that were, in
themselves,  clearly  non-representational.  Significantly,  Cantalupo does  not  clarify what  specific
image this supposed “anamorphic” device revealed. The hellish figures the narrator mentions are, I
think, the only candidate, but their appearance is not corroborated by the only other witness, which
he systematically ignores: Rowena. As we have seen, the narrator was definitely seeing things that
were not there.  Rowena, as we have seen,  mentions only movements in the curtains and slight
noises for which she could not account—she mentions, that is, phantasmagoric effects, not those
“ghastly forms” he refers. Another detail that seems to militate against Cantalupo’s hypothesis is the
final apparition of Ligeia. There, as we have seen, the flowing hair of the image is a clear analogue
136 That is what he means, but this allusion may be another deliberate “mistake.” According to Walter Scott’s Ivanhoe,
a work Poe no doubt knew, and to which the name of the second wife, Rowena, is a clear allusion, the “Normans,
being a mixed race, and better informed according to the information of the times, had lost most of the superstitious
prejudices which their ancestors had brought from Scandinavia, and piqued themselves upon thinking freely upon
such  topics”  (Scott,  Ivanhoe  154).  In  other  words,  Scott  thought  that  the  Normans  were  free  from “Gothic”
superstition.
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of,  precisely,  the non-representational  “whirls”  on the tapestry,  which suggests that  the designs
ultimately reassumed the “true character of the arabesque,” to facilitate the imaginary return of
Ligeia.137 The specific form the arabesques assume for the narrator, then, appear to me a subjective
projection of his guilt. 
In her article “Poe’s Arabesque,” a must-read for all those interested in understanding Poe’s
use of the term, Patricia C. Smith remarks that, in a semantic drift from its proper meaning, the
“arabesque” had become identified in Poe’s time, with the “grotesque.” Thus, in this broadened,
imprecise sense, the former term was often applied to the chimerical figures of “Gothic” demons.
However, she notices, “the terms grotesque and arabesque really were not as slippery as they seem
in 1974,” the date of writing (Smith,  “Poe’s Arabesques” 42). For example,  The Encyclopaedia
Americana, quoted by Smith in her text, provided a “succinct and correct definition” of both terms,
which Poe could also have found in many other common reference works (42). She also quotes
from an anonymous review of Benjamin Disraeli’s  Vivian Grey  (1827), published in the  Monthly
Review in 1827, and probably written by the author himself, which states that the grotesque, that is,
the representations of demons and other hellish motifs, are only properly employed to make “us
'sensible of the terrors of the guilty mind'” (qtd. in Smith 43).
The purpose of the narrator’s vision seems to have been precisely that of manifesting his
guilt to the reader. This is, incidentally, consistent with the literary conventions of Poe’s day, and of
the horror story in particular. The narrator of Dickens’s “A Madman’s Manuscript,” for example,
who resembles Poe’s narrator in so many ways, mentions “strange beings that flocked around me on
every side,” and even being “borne upon the arms of demons who swept along upon the wind (…)
and spun me round and round” (145). Once again, however, Poe gives proof of his extraordinary
ability to instil new vitality to hackneyed ideas. The common confusion between the “arabesque”
and the “grotesque” becomes, in his tale, another way of expressing his character’s inability to
137 I borrow here Cantalupo’s expression: “The first response to a completely anamorphic image,” which she supposes 
to be the case of the arabesques in Rowena’s room, “is to question its ‘true nature.’ Can the whirls be made 
representational?” (“Poe’s Visual Tricks” 58).
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understand that his visions were peculiar to himself, and the expression of unavowed guilt for an
undetected crime. Thus, yet another avenue to the promised transcendent meaning is blocked by the
overwhelming evidence pointing to a definite, literal truth.  
It appears to me that peer pressure has played an important part in obscuring Poe’s aims.
Indeed, it is not very surprising that very few critics dared brave the opinion of the overwhelming
majority that Poe’s secret was beyond his meaning; that he was too profound for comprehension.
Susan Amper was one of the few dissonant voices. Sadly, her groundbreaking doctoral dissertation
was never published. But her published output is equally decisive. Her How to Write About Edgar
Allan Poe, for example, is much more than its unassuming title suggests: it is a call to actually read
Poe, as if we encountered him for the first time, and to question what has hitherto always been taken
for granted. As regards the tales I have been reading, the “mysteries,” Amper ostensibly rejects all
ready-made answers:
you could examine the presence of humor in Poe’s seemingly dark tales. What, if
anything, is funny in the tale? How do you reconcile the humor with the apparent
seriousness? Does the humor reduce the tale to travesty? Or do you find yourself
pulled in opposite directions? What might the story be showing about the strange,
close relationship between horror and humor? In “Ligeia,” for example, two women
die slow deaths in a hideous drama of revivification: What is funny about that? Is the
horror funny? Or is our readiness to laugh at such stories horrible?
(How to Write 59)
I have attempted to provide new answers to precisely these questions. Amper here stresses
the fundamental ambiguity of the tales, which had been ironed out by previous scholars and lost in
translation, in order so to reconcile it with Poe’s purposes, and I have tried to do the same.
Wilbur, and all the critics that elaborated on his initial assertions, maintained that the tale
tricked  the  reader  into  thinking  it  had  intelligible  content,  when  there  was  in  fact  nothing  to
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understand. This structure, they thought, reflected Poe’s Romantic conviction that nothing could
really be known; that truth was a bottomless abyss. The moral of the tale would be, these critics
further tell us, that it is foolish to try to make sense of this story, of poetry, or, indeed, of anything.
In the end,  however,  it  is  not  meaning that  collapses,  but  the  narrator’s  ostensibly  irrationalist
approach, which is turned to scorn and ridicule. 
The reader is in fact tricked into thinking there is nothing to understand; this is, after all,
what the narrator had been telling us all along. He did not understand his story himself, of course,
because  he  completely  refused  to  approach  it  rationally.  Thus,  the  narrator  demonstrates
performatively that, whatever disadvantages might accrue from an excessive reliance on logical,
rational thought, there is greater and more immediate danger and ridicule in store for those who
refuse  to  think.  He demonstrates,  indeed,  not  only  that  a  “transcendentalist”  would  supply  the
absence of meaning in a “quaint” text with fantastical absurdities, but also overlook meaning, when
this was available, to accommodate a faith in a higher truth. Incidentally, this is, I suspect, what Poe
meant when he said, in the review of A Drama of Exile, that the “fantastic in itself (...) —phantasm
—may be materially furthered in its development by the  quaint in phraseology” (4). In “Ligeia,”
“quaintness” is used, precisely, to intimate the presence of a “phantasm,” which is ultimately proved
to be just that: all show and no substance.
In the end, it is for the reader to decide what to make of Poe. I personally find it impossible
to  believe  he  was  serious.  I  believe,  rather,  that  he  intended  to  challenge  gender  as  well  as
aesthetical conventions. In this respect, I think his poems are not significantly different from his
fiction—or more precisely, they too are fiction, in the full sense of the word. In his study of Poe’s
poetry, Jerome J. McGann contended that both reflected Poe’s desire “to do the dead justice on their
own terms,” which he thought was “splendidly executed in ‘The Sleeper,” which Poe declared his
best poem in the same letter in which he called “Ligeia” his best tale (166).138 The truth is, however,
138 “In a letter to James Russell Lowell, Poe wrote: “I think my best poems, ‘The Sleeper,’ ‘The Conqueror Worm,’
‘The Haunted Palace,’ ‘A Paen <sic.>,’ ‘Lenore,’ ‘Dreamland’ & ‘The Coliseum’” (Poe, Letters 450).
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that  one  cannot  defend  the  ideality  of  this  poem  without  incurring  some  horrible,  yet  funny
contradictions.
Like  “Ligeia,”  it  is  narrated  in  the  first  person.  Indeed,  the  speaker  includes  himself
explicitly in the scene he describes: “At midnight, in the month of June, / I stand beneath the mystic
moon” (Poe, Poems 186). He is, therefore, talking a moonlight stroll. The time is now, which gives
a sense of  urgency to the poem. Then,  this  “I”  describes the scenery:  the haze that  seemed to
“exhale from” the Moon, and a lake that looks “like Lethe” (187). He is, most certainly, outdoors.
Suddenly, however, the scene shifts: “All Beauty sleeps! — and lo! where lies / Irene, with her
Destinies!” (187).139 The smooth transition from the abstract to the concrete is remarkable. Sleeping
beauty enters as all Beauty (with a capital B) sleeps. So far, the scene appears idyllic enough.
The second stanza opens:
Oh, Lady bright! can it be right – 
This window open to the night?
The wanton airs, from the tree-top,
Laughingly through the lattice drop –
The bodiless airs, a wizard rout,
Flit through thy chamber in and out,
And wave the curtain canopy
So fitfully — so fearfully –
Above the closed and fringed lid
‘Neath which thy slumb’ring soul lies hid,
That, o’er the floor and down the wall,
Like ghosts the shadows rise and fall!
139 Incidentally, this couplet has the only forced rhyme in the poem (“lies,” “destinies”). “Irene,” the original version of
this poem, contained two forced rhymes: “skies,” “destinies,” in lines 23-24, and “canopy,” “eye,” in lines 35-36.
Perhaps Poe intended to signal with this deviation from standard accepted pronunciation that the poet had the same
morbid obsession with “eyes” that characterised the narrator of “Ligeia.”
501
Oh, lady dear, hast thou no fear? (Poe, Poems 187)
Fear? But what, may one ask, has she to fear from the open window? A chill? Surely not in
June, and in so pleasant a night. Yet, however suitable a cause of fear for delicate young ladies this
may, nevertheless seem, another possibility is intimated: ghosts. But who would fear such evidently
counterfeit  ghosts?  In  the  following  lines,  however,  the  unnamed  speaker  suggests,  without
positively stating it, that the sleeping beauty may be dead—her appearance is ambiguous. But this
does not make much sense either. If she was dead, she would be past fearing either chills or ghosts.
McGann suggests that the poet is in denial; that he lets himself imagine that a dead woman
is only asleep. But that is not the actual meaning of the poem. Its tone of morbid sentimentality, it is
true, is reminiscent of a kind of poetry, very popular in Poe’s time, where a male voice speaks
about, or rather to, a dead woman who appears to be only sleeping—Mabbott has identified some
such poems from which Poe evidently drew inspiration for his.140 But the feelings in Poe’s poem are
all topsy-turvy. Whereas those poems express the conventional sentimental desire that the “sleeping
beauty” may awake—here, the speaker earnestly and passionately desires her not to awake:
The lady sleeps! Oh, may her sleep,
Which is enduring, so be deep!
Heaven have her in its sacred keep!
This chamber changed for one more melancholy,
I pray to God that she may lie
Forever with unopened eye,
While the pale sheeted ghosts go by! (Poe, Poems 188)
This is the kind of thing a sincere mourner would never say. But then, this man is evidently
not a mourner. In fact, is the “sleeper” really dead at all? The idea that the woman seen through the
140  In his introduction to “Irene and The Sleeper,” Mabbott instances the obscure “Oh Lady, Love Awake! A
Romance,” by William Rufus, and “Edderline’s Dream” by John Wilson (a.k.a. Christopher North), noting that “Poe
practically quoted some of the phraseology” of the latter poem (Complete Poems 180, 181). The first of these poems
deals with a dead woman, exploiting the analogy between sleep and death; Wilson’s poem, on the other hand, deals with
a sleeping woman who appears to be dying, but was in fact having a nightmare.
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window is dead is inferred from the tone of the poem—or rather from its analogy with other poems
—, but  is  not actually  upheld by its  sense.  Indeed,  the poet  states,  without  ambiguity,  that  the
woman “sleeps,” and this is corroborated by his claim that her “slumb’ring soul lies hid” beneath
the eyelids. This means, of course, that the soul has not yet left the body, hence, that the “sleeper”
still lives. The poet, therefore, far from lamenting the sleeping beauty’s death, appears to be actually
wishing it:
My love, she sleeps! Oh, may her sleep,
As it is lasting, so be deep!
Soft may the worms about her creep!
Far in the forest dim and old,
For her may some tall vault unfold (...)
(Poe, Poems 188)
In his Edgar Allan Poe: A Critical Biography (1941), Arthur Hobson Quinn wished, rather,
the author could have “omitted” the third line in this passage “for which” he thought “no defence
can be made” (185). Later, in his note to this verse, Mabbott conjectured that Poe “perhaps intended
to make the worm a mystic symbol of immortality,” but agreed with “the reviewer in the London
Literary Gazette of January 1846” that it was “‘morbid’” (Complete Poems 189n). Like McGann,
these  commentators  thought  that  Poe  had  destroyed  the  impression  of  pure  ideality  which  he
intended to convey by a childish mistake. Responding to the critical outlook illustrated by these
remarks, Susan Amper complained that “it would be nice to have a view of the works in which Poe
is seen as having actually intended the effect he achieved” (“Masters of Deceit” 110).
In reality, however, the verse in question is not incongruous with the overall effect. For this
is certainly not an example of the morbid sentimental poetry that was in fashion in Poe’s day. The
poem embodies,  rather,  a  sentimentality—if we may call  it  so—that  is  the precise opposite  of
mourning. Apparently, the speaker cherishes the hope that the lady may not be sleeping, but actually
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dead. But then, that is not exactly it, either. To be precise, he expresses a desire that the lady might
remain in this state of apparent death long enough for her to be conveyed to a tomb, which is
described in very peculiar terms in the concluding lines of the poem:
Some sepulchre, remote, alone,
Against whose portal she hath thrown,
In childhood, many an idle stone –
Some tomb from out whose sounding door
She ne’er shall force an echo more,
Thrilling to think, poor child of sin!
It was the dead who groaned within. (Poe, Poems 188)
These lines evoke a thought that is even more appalling than the reference to the “worms:”
premature burial. Now, the poet gives us to understand that, if only asleep—as he had indeed told
she was—, the lady runs the risk of dying a horrible death. Even if someone happened to be passing
by  her  “remote  sepulchre,”  which  he  intimates  by  that  word  would  be  very  unlikely,  the
hypothetical passer-by would probably attribute any sound coming from inside the mausoleum to
the action of some restless spirit of the dead. Now, finally, we understand that the sleeping beauty
had a very good reason to be afraid: the creepy “poet” outside her window in whose shoes we have
unwittingly  stepped—whose  thoughts,  feelings,  and  even  impressions,  we have  been  forced  to
share.
And these are very vivid impressions. In fact, they conjure a very detailed picture. He was
outside, under the moon, when he saw the lady through the window of her bedroom—which was
open— “can it be right?” Apparently, he can hardly believe his luck. He also mentions that the
“wanton airs” were “dropping” from the “tree-top” into the room. It must have been a high window.
If so, it would appear that the poet had meanwhile climbed that very tree, and was himself on the
point of “dropping” into the lady’s room. All  indicates,  indeed, that he was projecting his own
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“wantonness” on the “airs.”  When we finally get the joke, we just do not feel like laughing. Why,
and how, could we have been taken in by such a ghastly hoax? This catastrophe of shame and
horror, the terrible moment in which we recognise our blindness, is the femicide effect. There can
be no doubt that this is the effect Poe achieved. I believe this was also the effect he intended.
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III – Poe, Godwin, Wollstonecraft
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1 – A Learned Wife: Representations of Intellectual Women in the Gothic Fiction of 
Matthew Lewis, Walter Scott, and Poe
The femicide story brought to a contemporary and ostensibly civilised setting the horrors by
which the Gothic novel represented the vulnerable situation of women in a strict patriarchal society,
making the perverse male tyrant the narrator of his own tale. He was no longer at a safe distance, in
that barbarous setting, remote in time or space, where bluebeards and evil monks were said to dwell.
The femicide might be our neighbour—or worse. He might be the reader’s husband, or father, or
perhaps the reader himself. Poe continued this tradition. The narrator of “Ligeia,” for example, who
married Rowena for the express purpose of imprisoning her, precisely, in a gloomy medieval tower,
thus bringing to life the conventional Gothic metaphor of marriage, perfectly embodies the sort of
tyranny that characterised the male villains in Radcliffe’s novels. He asserts his absolute power over
his wife, sanctioned by law and by the scientific authority represented in the tale by Rowena’s
physicians.  He abuses  that  power  to  torment  his  new wife,  and recognises  that  this  gave  him
pleasure. Indeed, that appears to be the only pleasure he derived from their intercourse. This is a
very good indication that, with him, sexual desire had been replaced by hostility for the object that
inspired it. Strictly and literally speaking, this husband was never a lover, except to dead or dying
women. And then there is the narrator of “Morella,” who imprisons his own daughter, confines her
exclusively to his society, and lives with her as he had lived with her mother. He evokes another of
the recurrent nightmares of the Gothic: incest.
However, there is something about these two tales that was entirely unprecedented in the
Gothic. “Morella” and “Ligeia” are monuments to dead female intellectuals by a male spouse, who
suggests his intercourse with his wife was chiefly, indeed exclusively intellectual. This is a very
specific idea—one might say a suspiciously unique idea, and one which Poe did not get from any of
the many sensationalist narratives we have looked at up until now. This idea is a departure not only
from typical Gothic conventions, and from the template of the femicide story that developed from it,
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but even from Poe’s early experiments with the femicide narrator. Indeed, in the previous chapter,
we have looked at many tales of femicide that have provided inspiration for different aspects of
“Morella” and “Ligeia,” but in these the female victim is never intellectually remarkable. Characters
like Mary Elliston, the wives in Bulwer-Lytton’s and Dickens’s similarly titled “madman” tales, or
even the harassed heroines of Radcliffe’s novels may be granted sensibility and intuition, the classic
traits  of  the  sentimental  conception  of  the  ideal  woman,  but  have  no  literary,  philosophical,
scientific,  or  political  ambitions  of  their  own,  and  therefore  pose  no  challenge  to  the  male
intellectual monopoly.
The male narrators of Macnish’s and Dickens’s femicide tales are themselves intellectually
unremarkable. The narrator of Bulwer-Lytton’s “Manuscript Found in a Madhouse,” however, is
different in this respect. Unlike his peers, he is exceedingly proud of his learning, which he displays
whenever he gets the chance. This is a feature he shares with the narrators of Poe’s first three tales
named after women, “Berenice,” “Morella,” and “Ligeia,” the last of which even contains, as we
have seen, a learned allusion that Poe lifted from Bulwer-Lytton’s tale. Egӕus, the hero and narrator
of the first of these tales, is paradigmatic in this respect. He claims to be descended from a long line
of  scholars,  even making the  implausible  assertion  that  he was  born in  the  rich  library  of  his
forefathers. His pedantry affects not only his diction, but even the way he goes about trying to
account for what happened to him. Indeed, he intimates the existence of some obscure mystical
connection between the strange events he narrates and the books he was reading at the time: he
alludes to St. Austin’s  The City of God; “well remember[s]” a little-known treatise by “the noble
Italian, Cӕlius Secundus Curio, ‘The Amplitudine Beati Regni Dei;’ quotes from “Tertullian’s  ‘De
Carne Christi,’”  in the original Latin, of course; and bases a simile on a passage of the equally
obscure  Ptolemy Hephestion  (Poe,  “Berenice”  213).141 These  texts  function  as  intimations  that
141 Incidentally, this allusion is, as so often happens in Poe’s tales, incorrect. As usual, Mabbott registers the fact but
offers very little in the way of explanation. Poe appears to have found the reference in Bryant’s Ancient Mythology.
Bryant, in turn, got his information from a fellow compiler, Photius, a Patriarch of the church of Constantinople
who lived in the 9th century A.D. All these sources mention, however, a “blade of grass,” not the Asphodel. “Poe
seems to have reasoned,” Mabbott writes, “if grass, why not better Asphodel, a symbol of death.” (Trales 1:220n9).
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something of the nature of resurrection may have happened to his cousin Berenice. However, he
himself  intimates  a  perfectly  natural  alternative  explanation  of  which  he appears  to  have  been
unaware. In this sense, then, his very “learning” appears to have misled him into superstition.
However, Egӕus does not say whether any of the Berenices, the dark ghost and the living
blonde, shared his love of rare old books. What particularly distinguishes Morella and Ligeia from
all their predecessors in previous iterations of the femicide story, then, is that they are themselves
ostensibly  depicted  as  scholars  and  philosophers.  Not  only  that,  they  became  their  husbands’
teachers. The ostensible purpose of their narrative, then, is that of telling the story of an incredibly
learned woman. At the same time, however, the narrators of those two tales profit from the occasion
to display their own learning, and promote their ambitions.
Morella and Ligeia are all the more remarkable as, in the Gothic, female characters who
excelled  in  philosophy,  science,  or  any  discipline  requiring  abstract  thought  and  the  ability  to
generalise ideas, which were then generally thought to be male prerogatives, were extremely rare.
But then, female philosophers, who competed with their male counterparts on an equal footing,
were, in those days, as rare in real life as they were in fiction. In this sense, the Gothic was a faithful
representation  of  the  society of  the  epoch in  which it  flourished.  Poe’s  eulogiums of  a  female
intellectual by her husband were, however, not  entirely unprecedented. There was one significant
and notorious real-life precedent, and one only, for this: Godwin’s book about his first wife, the
feminist philosopher Mary Wollstonecraft, Memoirs of the Author of a Vindication of the Rights of
Woman (1798). I believe that Poe wrote “Morella” and “Ligeia” with this text in mind. 
In fact, there were so few women who had made a name for themselves in philosophy, that a
man in a situation similar  to  that of Poe’s narrators,  that  is,  a man who had married a female
I believe Poe intended, first, to indicate that the proud Egӕus was quoting from memory; secondly, to indicate,
through the simile, the true nature of the narrator’s condition, and thirdly that he himself was not aware of it.
Egӕus, says his “reason” was “shaken from its balance only by trivial things,” and for that resembled Hephestion’s
“ocean-crag” which “trembled only to the touch of the flower called Asphodel” (Poe, “Berenice” 213). However,
whereas the “blade of grass” of the original is, indeed, the very symbol of triviality, the Asphodel is not a “trivial
thing.” It is a symbol of death, and that does make a difference.Through the botched simile, the narrator subverts his
own discourse, once again suggesting the obvious solution to the mystery of his fainting spells: necrophilia.
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philosopher, and, after her death, had written an account of the time he spent with her is even more
of a rarity. In English Letters it was, indeed, more than a rarity—it was an absolute singularity.
Among England’s more famous men of letters, only Godwin had written anything that was at all
comparable  with  Poe’s  tales.  And  the  story  of  Godwin  and  Wollstonecraft  was  by  no  means
forgotten in Poe’s day. On the contrary, a series of scandals, the first of which was precisely that
occasioned by Godwin’s biography of Wollstonecraft, boosted the notoriety of the two already well-
known radical thinkers.
The couple had been together for little over a year when Wollstonecraft died from childbirth
complications in September 10, 1797. Before July 1796 they had been virtually strangers to each
other. By January 1798 Godwin, assuming the role of literary executor of his wife, had printed a
selection of her unpublished works, under the title Posthumous Works of the Author of a Vindication
of the Rights of Woman, which was accompanied by a hastily assembled account of the life of the
author entitled Memoirs of the Author of a Vindication of the Rights of Woman. Like the narrators of
“Ligeia” and “Morella,” Godwin complained of having little information about his wife’s life prior
to their acquaintance, and, therefore, he admits, the portion of his text which deals with that period
contains many gaps. Poe’s tales are particularly reminiscent of the last two chapters in Godwin’s
biography. The first of these narrates their brief courtship, and the period of their cohabitation; the
second is  entirely devoted to what he calls “the last fatal scene” of Wollstonecraft’s life, from the
time she went into labor to her death (Godwin, Memoirs 112).142
In a letter to Philip Pendleton Cooke to which I have already alluded, Poe indicated that he
regarded the two tales under analysis as a unit within his fiction.143 Taken together, the parallel with
Godwin’s book becomes, in my opinion, even more striking. Morella dies giving birth to a child that
142 The quotation is from a passage of the first edition, of January 1796, of the Memoirs, which Godwin retouched for
the revised edition of August of the same year.
143 This is the letter dated September 12, 1839: “The gradual perception of the fact that Ligeia lives again in the person
of Rowena, is a far loftier and more thrilling idea than the one I have embodied. (…) And this idea was mine—had I
never written before I should have adopted it—but then there was Morella. (…) Since Morella is on record, I will
suffer Ligeia to remain as it is” (Poe, Letters 193).
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would be named after her—so did Mary Wollstonecraft, who died eleven days after she gave birth
to a female child, the writer Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin, later Shelley, whose life would, like that
of her parents, be involved in scandal. Ligeia, on the other hand, not only speaks in a style that is
highly  reminiscent  of  Wollstonecraft’s,  but  is  also  posthumously  spiritualised,  or  rather
sentimentalised by her husband in a way that resembles Godwin’s handling of his wife’s story.
In  Memoirs,  Godwin  revealed  details  of  Wollstonecraft’s  private  life  which  were
unacceptable according to the moral standards of his time, thereby contributing decisively for the
neglect into which her work, and particularly her most famous and ambitious book have fallen in
the following decades. Indeed, it is unanimously recognised that he “effectively buried his wife for
the next  two hundred years by telling the world that  she had had attempted suicide twice and
conceived two children out  of wedlock;” and also that  he “effectively entombed her books for
decades” with her (Ayres,  Betwixt 16,  36).  If,  as  Pamela Clemit  and Gina Luria  Walker  write,
“Wollstonecraft remained a potent, if publicly unacknowledged, presence,” this is due, for better
and worse, to Godwin’s book, who kept her in the public eye, while also making her name taboo:
“The  popular  counter-revolutionary  interpretation  of  the  Memoirs as  a  work  which  yoked
radicalism, feminism, and sexual immorality,” these critics write, “continued to shape attitudes to
the lives  and writings  of  both authors  well  into the nineteenth century” (35,  11-12).  Yet,  since
Wollstonecraft’s  late  nineteenth-century  revival,  the  tendency  has  been  to  excuse  Godwin’s
indiscretions, under the assumption that he had a right to expose his partner’s life as if it was his
own, and even to make confessions in her name. This took for granted that they were, for all intents
and purposes, as one. And thus, his book has itself been granted, for all practical purposes, the status
of an autobiography.
Brenda Ayres, however, has recently challenged what has become the official interpretation
of Memoirs, according to which the book is, as Clemit had put it, a form of “‘innocuous (…) self-
scrutiny’” (qtd. in Ayres, Betwixt 26). Ayres argues that the insensibility to the potential effects of
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his book implied by such interpretations is not plausible: “Was Godwin really so naïve to think that
society was going to tolerate such blatant defiance of social conventions? Did he really have no idea
that by proffering his own agenda in writing Wollstonecraft’s story the way he did would effectively
bury Wollstonecraft’s work with her which is exactly what happened?” (Betwixt 26).
Ayres also accuses other critics of overlooking the fact that Godwin systematically erased
Wollstonecraft’s  “identity,”  “not  only  by  publishing  information  about  her  alongside  his  social
subversion,” that is, by appropriating her figure to his political agenda, “but also by overriding her
belief systems with his own and by flagrantly disregarding facts about her life which resulted in
debasing it and her works” (Betwixt 26). Indeed, very few have recognised that Godwin destroyed
not only Wollstonecraft’s reputation as a woman, but also her reputation as a thinker, which it was
the declared purpose of his book to promote. 
This contrast  between the proposed ends and the actual effects  of the text is  something
Godwin’s  Memoirs  has in common with Poe’s tales of women. Like Poe’s narrators, although he
keeps telling us how wonderful his wife was, Godwin actually damns her character and demeans
her intellectual achievements. He does this, moreover, in such a way that we get the impression not
only that he did not mean to revile his wife, but that he was not even aware of how damaging his
text really was for her reputation. It is as if the actual effect of his writing was involuntary; as if the
writer himself had not been aware of his fundamental ambivalence towards his subject. Again, this
is precisely the impression we get from Poe’s narrators, who effectively suggest the wives after
which they long were overbearing witches.  Like them, Godwin claims to  have been moved to
writing only by selfless motives, but ends up promoting himself at the expense of his wife, as if he
did not mean to. This, as Ayres points out, is simply not credible. She argues that the conventional
reading of Memoirs is based on a too simplistic assessment of his motives. I have made a similar
argument  for  Poe’s  narrators,  who  I  believe,  are  not  what  they  affect  to  be,  that  is,  impartial
reporters.
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The ambivalence of these men towards their remarkable subject, moreover, is complicated
by gender issues. All of them resort to conventional sentimental representations of womanhood to
suggest that the intellectual efforts of the remarkable women whose story they tell were somehow
fundamentally  flawed  because  they  were  women.  In  this  sense,  Godwin,  like  the  narrators  of
“Morella” and “Ligeia” may be said to have spiritualised Wollstonecraft out of this world.
I do not believe that all these similarities may be described as coincidences. I believe Poe
deliberately  created  fictional  analogues  of  Godwin’s  rewriting  of  Wollstonecraft  in  order  to
highlight the subterranean motivations of such writing. Godwin and Poe’s narrators engage in a
surreptitious  form of  character  assassination,  but  not  just  any  kind  of  character  assassination.
Godwin’s misdeed is the literary equivalent of femicide, and the similarities between his rhetoric
and that of Poe’s narrators highlights this fact. This, I believe, was intended on Poe’s part.
In  order  to  argue  this  point,  I  shall  look  very  closely  at  Godwin’s  text  throughout  this
chapter.  My motive  for  doing  this  is  not  to  demonstrate  that  Godwin’s  text  is  marred  by  his
resentment for a woman that threatened his sense of manhood. That point has, I think, been argued
very persuasively by Brenda Ayres. My purpose in paying so much attention to Godwin’s seemingly
unintended meaning, to the subtle ways in which he reviles and demeans Wollstonecraft even while
protesting his love and admiration, is to show just how much these sly hints resemble those in Poe’s
tales, and how they produce similar seemingly unintended effects.
Poe’s narrators were oppressed by the mystery of their wives; and so was Godwin. He felt
powerless  to  describe  “the  personal  pleasures  I  enjoyed in  her  conversation  (…) They  can  be
measured only by the treasures of her mind, and the virtues of her heart. But this is a subject for
meditation, not for words” (Godwin, Memoirs 120-121). Despite his declared inability to describe
the charms of Wollstonecraft’s conversation, however, Godwin waxed eloquent about her supposed
flaws. His derogatory comments about her grammar, style, and the accusations of shoddy thinking,
all of which many were content to attribute to the author’s supposed uncompromising candour—the
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same candour which led him to confess his wife’s secrets as if they were his secrets—, did not help
Wollstonecraft’s reputation.
But even worse than his unduly harsh criticism, are his compliments. These had a far greater,
and more lasting negative impact on her reputation. Godwin presented the author of A Vindication
as  an  unpleasant  and  overbearing  virago,  whose  greatest  achievements  were  the  result,  not  of
intelligence, but of something else, a sort of instinctive sensibility he emphatically distinguished
from the abilities that were required of a philosopher. In fact, Godwin effectively turns the reader
away from  A Vindication,  which he considers a failed book, on the grounds that it  was unduly
“masculine”—the kind of book, he contends, that his wife, being a woman, and in fact a particularly
pure specimen of pure, spiritual femininity,  was constitutionally unfit  to pen.  She was, he said,
really made to make a man happy—but she spent most of her life running away from herself. In this
sense, the parallel with “Morella” and “Ligeia” is again striking.
Susan  Amper  argues  convincingly  that  the  narrator  of  one  of  Poe’s  earlier  tales,  “The
Assignation,” killed its Byron-like hero: 
I  believe  the  real  subject  of  the  tale  is  not  Byron  or  Byronism but  specifically
Moore’s biography of Byron. Poe fastens on the malice in Moore’s profile that shows
plainly  through his  effusive  flattery  of  his  famous  subject.  Poe  creates  a  similar
duplicity in the relationship of his narrator to the Byronic hero and dramatizes the
relationship by making the narrator the actual murderer of the hero.
(“The Biographer as Assassin” 14)
In  those  days,  even  those  who  had  been  shocked  by  Byron’s  disregard  for  the  moral
conventions of his time thought that Moore had shamefully stabbed—metaphorically speaking—a
friend in the back, exploiting his privileged position to get rid of a rival in the race for literary fame,
promoting his own reputation at  the expense of his  famous friend in the process. According to
Amper’s interpretation, the murder of the charismatic hero of “The Assignation” by the narrator was
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both a metaphor and a  caricature of the sort  of devious character  assassination in  which many
thought Moore had engaged under pretext of celebrating his friend. I will argue that in “Ligeia” and
in “Morella” femicide is, likewise, a metaphor of what Godwin did to Wollstonecraft. I will try to
show that Poe deliberately imitated the ambivalent tone of Godwin’s biography of Wollstonecraft in
“Morella” and “Ligeia” in the same way that he had modelled the tone of the “The Assignation” on
Moore’s biography of Byron.
If anything, the feeling of inferiority of the biographer towards his extraordinary subject is,
in  my opinion,  even  more  glaring  in  Godwin’s  text  than  it  is  in  Moore’s.  But  this  feeling  is
complicated, in Memoirs, by gender issues. Indeed,  “Morella”  and  “Ligeia”  are  notable  for
presenting a picture in  which the status quo of the relations between the sexes  is  significantly
inverted. “Morella’s erudition was profound. As I hope to live, her talents were of no common order
—her powers of mind were gigantic,” says the narrator of the first (Poe, “Morella” 229). Likewise,
according to her husband, “the learning of Ligeia (…) was immense,” “such as I have never known
in woman,” and her “acquisitions (…) were gigantic, were astounding” (Poe, "Ligeia" 315). Due to
their  proficiency in  intellectual  exploits  habitually  pursued by men,  these women are  therefore
perceived  by  their  husbands  as  unfeminine.  Indeed,  by  indicating  that  they  were  not  sexually
interested in these women—an odd circumstance considering they are talking of their wives—these
men help establish the perception that they were sexually aberrant. Indeed, they tacitly construe
their intellectual exploits as the product of some fundamental sexual deviation.
Thus, Poe’s narrators indirectly reinforce what Wollstonecraft’s friend Mary Hays (1759-
1843) described in her  profile  of Catharine Macaulay (1731-1791) as a common preconception
concerning women of learning. Indeed, Macaulay resembled Poe’s heroines in many respects. She
was an  accomplished scholar,  versed  in  both  ancient  and modern  languages,  whose  History  of
England boldly  challenged  the  traditional  notion  of  the  separate  spheres  of  male  and  female
intellect, and with it the idea of woman’s constitutional unfitness for abstract thought or sustained
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intellectual effort. Hays wrote of her: “the universal information which her conversation displayed,
appeared to her auditors not less admirable than her historical acquisitions, and the powers of her
mind. Her brilliant talents for conversation, with the variety of her knowledge, and the vivacity of
her  imagination,  rendered her  a  most  interesting  and instructive  companion” (Hays,  “Catherine
Macaulay Graham” 298).
Here we find, incidentally, the same ideas expressed by Poe’s narrators when talking of their
extraordinary wives, often clothed in the same words: universal erudition, extensive “acquisitions,”
remarkable “powers of mind,” great “talents,” such as had seldom been possessed by a woman,
were Macaulay’s glories. But Hays goes on to point out that, owing to the prevalent masculinist
prejudices, such exceptional women had habitually been perceived as “unsexeded” freaks.144 It was
supposed that their  success in  fields traditionally  dominated by men came at the price of their
“sensibility,” which, in the sentimental language of the day, was identified with womanhood. Thus,
intellectual women were seen as failed, or frustrated women, and this created a bias that prevented
their works from being judged according to their merits:
A female historian, by its singularity, could not fail to excite attention: she seemed to
have  stepped  out  of  the  province  of  her  sex;  curiosity  was  sharpened,  and
malevolence provoked. The author was attacked by petty and personal scurrilities, to
which it was believed her sex would render her vulnerable. Her talents and powers
could not be denied; her beauty was therefore brought into question, as if it was at all
concerned with the subject; or that, to instruct our understandings, it was necessary at
the same time to charm our senses. “She is deformed” (said her adversaries, wholly
unacquainted with her person), “she is unfortunately ugly, she despairs of distinction
and admiration as a woman, she seeks, therefore,  to encroach on the province of
man.” (“Catharine Macaulay Graham,” 292)
144 A satirical poem attributed to Richard Polwhele,  written against  Mary Wollstonecraft  and other notable female
intellectuals was entitled, precisely, The Unsex’d Females (1798).
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The narrators of Poe’s tales about learned women slyly confirm the prejudice which in effect
rendered any successful woman intellectual suspect of being not quite a woman. These narrators
perceive  their  wives  through  the  traditional  stereotypical  representation  of  the  woman  who
overreaches the limits imposed on her sex in a patriarchal society by striving after knowledge: the
witch. As I have before stated, women with intellectual ambitions were, in those days, as rare in
fiction  as  they  were  in  real  life.  One  rare,  and therefore  remarkable,  exception  to  this  rule  is
Matthew Lewis’s  Matilda,  for  whose  charms  the  monk  Ambrosio  originally  broke  his  vow of
chastity. Ambrosio fell in love with this androgynous character when he still thought that she was a
he.  Indeed,  the  novice  Rosario,  for  whom,  as  we  have  seen,  Ambrosio  was  terribly  attracted,
suddenly and conveniently turned into a lush female by the name of Matilda as the monk was on the
point  of  sexually  assaulting  him.  Along  with  this  personal  transgenderism,  this  character  also
exhibits what may be termed a mental, or intellectual transgenderism.
Matilda  seduced  Ambrosio,  actively  harassing  him,  while  still  impersonating  the  male
novice Rosario. This is, in itself, a breach of traditional gender roles, for man was supposed to play
the  active  part  in  the  game  of  seduction.  Yet,  during  that  period,  and  immediately  after  her
transformation,  Matilda,  although  assuming  the  initiative,  adopted  a  docile  and  ingenuous,
conventionally  feminine  manner,  which  allowed  Ambrosio  to  imagine  he  had  the  upper  hand.
Indeed, being subjected to a vow of chastity, the situation of the monk was socially comparable to
that of a woman, whose virtue was identified with chastity, and Matthew Lewis deftly exploited this
analogy to explode gender conventions. These conventions are subjected to an additional strain,
however,  for  Matilda,  in  disguising her  sexual  desire  under  a  submissive,  ingenuous cape,  and
acting out what was then commonly perceived as a feminine role, follows the practice of the male
gallant. In this sense, Matilda’s very womanliness, being false and designed to lure the monk to
break his chastity, was, under the prevailing values of Lewis’s time, typically masculine. Ultimately,
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the sort of strain to which the patriarchal ideology is subjected challenges the conception of sex in
terms of a dominance-submission relationship.
Indeed, Matilda, advocating the pursue of pleasure in defiance of conventional morals, uses
the typical rhetoric of an Eighteenth-century male libertine.145 On the one hand, she asks Ambrosio
to “[f]orget that I am a Woman,” and to “[c]onsider me only as a Friend,” thus explicitly replacing
the  conventional  hierarchical  conception  of  sexual  relationships  by  one  established  on  an
equalitarian basis; on the other hand, she acknowledges that “love the most impetuous, the most
unbounded, has induced me to disguise my sex,” a behaviour which constitutes a breach of the
passive role women were conventionally assigned in amorous transactions (M. Lewis,  The Monk
63). Indeed, at a time when women were chiefly regarded as passive sexual partners, she openly and
unabashedly assumes her sexual desire: “I lust for the enjoyment of your person. The Woman reigns
in my bosom, and I am become a prey to the wildest of passions. Away with friendship! ‘tis a cold,
unfeeling word. My bosom burns with love, with unutterable love, and love must be its return” (89).
This is a clear departure from the conventional sexual mores represented by her counterpart, the
ingenuous Antonia, whom her mother had preserved from any knowledge of sex, even going so far
as to expunge any erotic content from her copy of the Bible. At a time when female sexual desire
was a taboo, Lewis depicts a woman who assumes her lust, and this is certainly not the least of
Matilda the witch’s moral transgressions.
In fact, the typical contemporary depiction of sexual acts usually implied the wide-spread
view that only the male derived pleasure from such exchanges, or at least that it was not proper or
natural for a woman to enjoy them. Yet, in a passage the implied erotic content of which seems to
have been lost on Lewis’s contemporaries, the narrator gives us to understand that the first time
Matilda “enjoyed” the monk’s “person” he was the one who had taken no pleasure out of it. During
145  The phrase “male libertine” was, indeed, something of a pleonasm in those days. In the sense that has reference to
sexual mores,  the term “libertine” was, according to the  OED,  “[r]arely applied to a woman,” and is therefore
defined as follows: “A man who is not restrained by moral law, esp[ecially] in his relations with the female sex”
(def. A.3).
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a rendezvous with her, soon after she had revealed her true sexual identity to him, Ambrosio is stung
by  a  “Cientipedoro,”  a  fabulous  poisonous  insect  that  commentators  have  never  been  able  to
identify, and is declared beyond hope by his brethren, who carry him to his quarters: “Rosario alone
remained  in  the  Cell,  the  Abbott  at  his  earnest  entreaty  having  been  committed  to  his  care.
Ambrosio’s strength worn out by the violence of his exertions, He had by this time fallen into a
profound sleep. So totally was He overcome by weariness, that He scarcely gave any signs of life”
(M. Lewis, The Monk 71-72). During the period in which he was left alone with the false Rosario,
the monk unaccountably regains his health—Matilda later tells him that she had sucked the venom
out of his wound while he slept. But the monk, of course, was struggling with two infections: the
literal, providential one, from which he would soon recover, and the far more danger metaphorical
“infection” of sexual desire, from which he would never recover. This fact introduces a comical
undertow of meaning to the following exchange between Matilda and the monk, which takes place
after the latter regains his senses:
“I am appointed your nurse, and you must not disobey my orders.”
“You are in spirits, Matilda!” [Ambrosio, knowing they are alone, uses her
true name.]
“Well may I be so: I have just received a pleasure unexampled through my 
whole life.”
“What was that pleasure?”
“What I must conceal from all, but most from you.” (M. Lewis, The Monk 74)
Surprisingly, Lewis let this passage stand in the censored fourth edition of the novel. And
yet,  there is  good reason to suspect  Matilda “enjoyed” an unconscious  Ambrosio,  as he would
himself  later  “enjoy”  a  senseless  Antonia.  Moreover,  Matilda  is  evidently  alluding  to  sexual
“pleasure.” Thus, this episode challenges the conventional patriarchal conception of womanhood in
a  very  obvious  way.  For  the  passage  implies  that  women  were  not  really  incapable  of  sexual
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enjoyment,  as  was  generally  supposed,  but  rather  that,  in  order  to  comply  with  the  unrealistic
expectations the typical male of Lewis’s time, represented in the novel by Ambrosio, they had to
affect frigidity. This episode constitutes, indeed, one of the best illustrations of the way in which
Lewis subverted the typical patriarchal outlook on sexuality. It should also be noticed, moreover,
that the emancipated Matilda also reserved herself the right to choose her partners, and would later
refuse sexual intercourse with an estranged Ambrosio.  “I am no Prostitute,” she tells him, “My
person  is  become  indifferent  to  you,  and  ‘tis  necessity,  not  love,  which  makes  you  seek  my
enjoyment”  (M.  Lewis,  The  Monk 380).  Again,  Matilda’s  sexual  assertiveness  is  positively
extraordinary in the literature of the time. The Gothic disguise, however, made it possible for Lewis
to present such deviant representations of womanhood, although, as we have seen, once the identity
of the author became known, he was forced to bowdlerise this and many other passages.
Indeed,  it  appears  to  me  that  the  truly  subversive  content  of  Lewis’s  novel  has  been
persistenly devalued by twentieth century critics, which have generally deemed his novel inocuous
and  timid,  thus  obscuring,  I  think,  the  historical  and  cultural  significance  of  his  work.  André
Parreaux, for example, wrote: 
The scenes of ‘lust’ no longer move either to rapture or indignation, as they did the
critic of 1796-98. They sometimes look faintly ludicrous with their rather awkward
artificiality—for  instance  when  Matilda  confesses  to  Ambrosio:  ‘I  lust  for  the
enjoyment of your person (…)
Why would  Mat Lewis  write  such nonsense? Was it  because the juvenile
writer had so little experience of the realities of sex? And why does his language,
when dealing with them sound so abominably formal—even more than obscene?
(The Publication 131-32).
Louis F. Peck expressed a similar view in  A Life of Matthew Lewis: “Though some of the
original passages [in the first three editions of The Monk] display execrable lack of taste, it is hard
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to believe that they ever had power to harm the world. (…) At nineteen Lewis’ was inexperienced
and overconfident and wrote without concern for the prejudices of the day, a freedom which he
never again allowed himself” (35).
It  appears  to  me,  rather,  that,  however  inexperienced  he  might  have  been,  Lewis  was
evidently  very  much  concerned  with  those  “prejudices.”  Indeed his  bad  taste  appears  to  me  a
deliberate attempt to ridicule them. For the first time in many years, a popular novel presented a
positively libertine depiction of sexuality. Whereas his contemporaries, responding to increasingly
stringent  moral  and religious  conventions,  were  presenting  procreation  as  the  only  natural  and
legitimate end of sex, Lewis explicitly presented it as the pursuit of pleasure for its own sake. This
emancipation  of  sexuality  from reproduction,  of  course,  paved  the  way  for  the  recognition  of
homosexual love, and this is given added visibility by the tension to which conventional gender
roles are subjected in the novel.
More recent criticism has proved itself more sensitive to the destabilising tendency of the
Gothic. In Queer Gothic, for example, George E. Haggerty points out that “[n]o matter how tidy, no
marriage  at  the  close  of  the  gothic  novel  can  entirely  dispel  the  thrilling  dys-  (or  different)
functionality at the heart of the Gothic;” but mitigates this assertion by adding: “I cannot make too
broad a claim because these fictions never significantly challenge the ‘dominant fiction’ of the age”
(3). This episode in The Monk, however, very obviously challenges that fiction. But that challenge
is, nonetheless, cloaked in sentimental clichés, which are made awkward, and even ridiculous by the
context.  Thus,  I  think  The Monk provides  perhaps  the  most  relevant  precedent  for  the kind  of
subversion that Poe attempted in his tales. More precisely, Poe appears to me to be clearly indebted
to Lewis for his “bad taste.” Indeed, Lewis’s and Poe’s revision of culturally coded sentimental
categories is more comprehensive in its scope, and more radical in its tendency, than all the other
Gothic fictions we have looked at, with the possible exception of Radcliffe’s novels. The fact that
their unorthodoxy went for the most part unnoticed rather strengthens my point. They subverted the
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common sentimental language of their time in a way that allowed them to disguise their purpose.
Their  insidious  work  of  cultural  terrorism,  I  think,  is  only  comparable,  in  its  time,  to
Wollstonecraft’s rewriting of cuturally coded gender roles.
Indeed, the behaviour of Matilda is shockingly “masculine.” Initially, the monk was flattered
by Rosario-Matilda’s apparent veneration for him, and saw her as his disciple. After seducing him,
however,  she  revealed  herself  to  be  much  bolder,  more  intelligent,  and  more  learned  than  the
ignorant and pusillanimous Ambrosio.  She showed herself,  that is,  clearly his superior in every
respect. Recognising this superiority, the monk submitted to her, and the gender roles were then
more explicitly inverted than before. As a result, Matilda became repugnant to him, for he no longer
perceived her as a woman:
Left  to  himself  He  could  not  reflect  without  surprise  on  the  sudden  change  in
Matilda’s character and sentiments. But a few days had past, since She appeared the
mildest and softest of her sex, devoted to his will, and looking up to him as a superior
Being.  Now  she  assumed  a  sort  of  courage  and  manliness  in  her  manners  and
discourse but  ill  calculated  to  please  him.  She spoke no longer  to  insinuate,  but
command:  He  found  himself  unable  to  cope  with  her  in  argument,  and  was
unwillingly  obliged  to  confess  the  superiority  of  her  judgement.  Every  moment
convinced him of the astonishing powers of her mind: But what She gained in the
opinion of the Man, She lost with interest in the affection of the Lover. He regretted
Rosario, the fond, the gentle, and submissive: He grieved, that Matilda preferred the
virtues of his sex to those of her own. (M. Lewis, The Monk 231-32)
According  to  the  conventional  patriarchal  ideology,  woman  was  naturally  submissive
because physically weaker and intellectually inferior to man—indeed, submissiveness was regarded
as  the  defining  trait  of  female  behaviour.  Matilda,  however,  having  first  submitted  Ambrosio
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sexually, proceeded to submit him intellectually. Therefore, according to that same ideology, she
was “masculine,” and had forced the monk to be “feminine.”
On this point, J.-J. Rousseau’s sensibilities agree with the monk’s: “la femme est faite pour
plaire et pour être subjuguée;” and again, “il est dans l’ordre de la nature que la femme obéisse à
l’homme” (Émile 446). According to the French philosopher, this was the “natural” origin of male
and female roles: “De là naissent l’attaque et la défense, l’audace d’un sexe et la timidité de l’autre,
enfin la modestie et la honte dont la nature arma le faible pour asservir le fort” (447). The supposed
natural modesty of woman, he adds, was necessary to prod man into using his force: “L’art le plus
sûr  d’animer  cette  force  est  de  la  rendre  nécessaire  par  la  résistance”  (446).  Implied  in  such
statements,  of  course,  is  the  idea  that  sexually  assertive  women  emasculated  her  male  lovers.
Intellectually,  their  submission  should,  according to  Rousseau,  be  as  complete:  “La  raison des
femmes est une raison pratique qui leur fait trouver très habilement les moyens d’arriver à une fin
connue, mais qui ne leur fait pas trouver cette fin” (472). It follows that the male lover should
always be the teacher, and the female his pupil. These are views to which Wollstonecraft objected in
A Vindication in the strongest possible terms.
In fact, Wollstonecraft reduced to the absurd the view that identified submissiveness with
femininity, by remarking that soldiers, vulgarly regarded as the epitome of manliness, were trained
to be submissive; to have no will of their own, and never to think by themselves. If a woman who
does  not  think  of  man  as  a  superior  being  was  deemed  “masculine,”  then,  in  the  name  of
consistency, a soldier should be regarded as a  “feminine” man. But soldiers were not naturally
submissive or irrational; their education made them so, and the same, Wollstonecraft thought,  was
the  case  with  women,  whose behavior,  she remarked,  was significantly analogous with that  of
soldiers in times of peace:
As a proof that education gives this appearance of weakness to females, we may
instance the example of military men, who are, like them, sent into the world before
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their minds have been stored with knowledge or fortified by principles. (…) Soldiers,
as well as women, practice the minor virtues with punctilious politeness. Where is
then the sexual difference, when the education has been the same? All the difference
that I can discern, arises from the superior advantage of liberty, which enables the
former to see more of life.
(…) And as for any depth of understanding, I will venture to affirm, that it is
as rarely to be found in the army as amongst women; and the cause, I maintain, is the
same. It may be further observed, that officers are also particularly attentive to their
persons, fond of dancing, crowded rooms, adventures, and ridicule. Like the fair sex,
the business of their life is gallantry. — They were taught to please, and they only
live to please. Yet they do not lose their rank in the distinction of sexes, for they are
still  ranked superior  to women, though in what their  superiority  consists,  beyond
what I have just mentioned, it is difficult to discover. (Vindication 92-93)
Matthew  Lewis,  of  course,  in  the  passage  transcribed  above,  subverts  the  patriarchal
ideology in a similar way. According to Ambrosio’s notions of gender, Matilda had the mind of a
man in the body of a woman. The monk found this appalling, and longed for the lost Rosario, who
was, or appeared to be—which, in this context, makes very little practical difference—a woman
trapped in a man’s body. The real Matilda, on the contrary, because she assumed control over her
sexual  life,  openly seeking the satisfaction of her  desires,  instead of  submitting to  his,  did not
correspond to his fantasies. Ambrosio, like William the femicide and Poe’s narrators, had a craving
for a passive sexual partner that nothing but a dead or senseless woman could satisfy. This is what
makes the episode of  Ambrosio’s  “rape” so interesting.  By the providential  intervention of the
“cientipedoro,” the monk broke his vow of chastity without pleasure, and through no conscious
transgression, thus assuming a distinctly female role, as it was coded by the culture of Lewis’s time.
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The opposition between learning and womanhood which underlies Ambrosio’s sentiments is
the same that supports the prejudice against female intellectuals referred by Mary Hays. It is also
inherent to the rhetoric of Morella’s and Ligeia’s husbands, who also suggest that a woman must
either  teach  her  husband,  and  be  “unsexed,”  or  love  him  in  a  submissively  “feminine”  way.
Intellectual  ambition,  or  any  form  of  ambition  for  that  matter,  is  thus  construed  as  being
fundamentally “unfeminine.”
But  that  is  certainly  not  the  only  form  the  resentment  of  Poe’s  narrators  takes.  It  is
impossible  not  to  notice  the  extravagant  praise  they  lavish  on  the  seemingly  supernatural
“acquisitions” of their wives. However, without ever using that ugly word, as if they did not know
what they were doing, the biographers force us to conclude that their subjects were witches, thus
damning the very learning they appear to be praising, while reinforcing the same tendency to regard
learning in a woman as a demonical prodigy that underlies Glanvill’s theories as well as Ambrosio’s
sudden repulsion for Matilda.
Mabbott, responding to the seemingly unintended effect of the rhetoric of the tale, writes
that  Morella,  for  example,  “seems to  have  taken  a  dangerous  interest  in  black  magic,  for  her
invocation of  the Blessed Virgin (in  earlier  versions  of the story) is  appropriate  to  a  repentant
witch,” he tells us, without noticing the prayer, addressed to “Sancta Maria,” is also suitable for
would-be mothers—after all, she was pregnant; as for Ligeia, Mabbott is quite certain that she was
“a magician or alchemist” (Tales 222n, 330n1). This is certainly what the narrators are driving at—
but their pride is implicated in their narrative, and this discredits their testimony.
Whether he realises it or not, the supposed fact of his wife being a witch, compensates the
husband-biographer’s evident feeling of inferiority. I praising her “unfeminine” achievements he
effectively depicts his subject as a freakish undead monster. In this capacity, Ligeia and Morella
appear typical iterations of the old stereotypical representation of deviant femaleness, the monstrous
woman which “incarnate[s] male dread of women and, specifically, male scorn of female creativity”
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(Gilbert and Gubar,  Madwoman 29). Male anxiety regarding the woman intellectual, as would be
expected, became more acute as women’s role in public life became more active. It developed into a
veritable hysteria. As Wendy Martin remarks, “in the nineteenth century this fear of the intellectual
woman became so intense that  the phenomenon (…) was recorded in  medical  annals” (qtd.  in
Gilbert and Gubar, Madwoman 56). Poe’s narrators, like Ambrosio the monk, seem to be afflicted
by this hysteria to a very remarkable degree.
The reader may easily overlook how much these men resented the ascendancy their wives
had over them, but this is due to Poe’s skill at sleight of hand. Apparently, the husband submitted to
the magistery of his wife with grace, even cheerfulness and, for a while at least, until she suffered a
strange change—for both Morella and Ligeia changed in a way that did not please their husbands
sometime previously to their death—, was perfectly content to lead a peaceful existence of study
and sexual abstinence—truly a monastic life. The narrator of Morella tells us he “felt” his wife’s
superiority, “and in many matters became her pupil” (Poe, “Morella” 225); “I was sufficiently aware
of her infinite supremacy to resign myself, with a child-like confidence, to her guidance through the
chaotic world of metaphysical investigations at which I was so busily occupied during the earlier
years of our marriage,” says the narrator of “Ligeia”  (Poe, 316).
Yet, although her learning extended to widely varied areas, the only branch of knowledge in
which the narrator of “Ligeia” actually recognised his wife was an expert, and he a mere tyro, is
qualified as “chaotic,” and thus implicitly disparaged. Soon the “chaotic” domain of “metaphysics”
becomes  identified  with  “a  wisdom  too  divinely  precious  not  to  be  forbidden!,”  and  quickly
becomes obliquely identified with alchemy and necromancy (Poe "Ligeia"  316).  And then,  the
narrator convinces himself, and does a good job of convincing his reader too, that Ligeia came back
from the grave, a wonder that would indicate that she had indeed attained a forbidden knowledge,
the nature of which appears to be thus definitely settled in a way that confirms all the ominous hints
that had been thrown in the way of the reader to the effect that she had been studying evil.
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Likewise, the narrator of “Morella” chooses to mention only one of the many topics that
interested his wife. He claims she was obsessed with a sort of book that serious scholars would
never touch, and if this reading became his obsession too, this was entirely owing to her influence:
I  soon,  however,  found that,  perhaps  on  account  of  her  Presburg  education,  she
placed before me a number of those mystical writings which are usually considered
the mere dross of the early German literature. These, for what reason I could not
imagine,  were her  favorite  and constant  study—and that,  in process of time they
became my own, should be attributed to the simple but effectual influence of habit
and example. (Poe, “Morella” 230)
Thus, the narrator defers all responsibility for the choice of his readings, to which he later
refers as “forbidden pages,” over to his teacher, Morella, making it impossible to miss that he meant
witchcraft.146 He carefully selects the “wildest” of her readings, preparing his reader to receive the
apparent reincarnation of Morella, in the body of her daughter, as an indication that her interest in
the subject was not purely academic, and that she had successfully sought the cursed knowledge
that enabled her to perform such wonders. To put it bluntly, she too was a witch.
Despite their wives’ uncommonly comprehensive learning, which extended to all branches
of knowledge, then, the husbands claim that the lessons they received from them were chiefly or
exclusively  concerned  with  a  very  narrow  field  of  studies  which  they  proceed  to  revile  by
implication. Thus, they effectively reiterate the notion that all lawful knowledge is “forbidden” to
women. Still, Poe’s narrators are way too sly for univocal statements. All Morella’s husband knew,
was that the “mystical writings” which interested her had fallen in disrepute, and that they were
146 In an early incomplete draft of the tale (Mabbott’s text A, a complete transcription of which appears in his edition of
the Tales), the narrator affected even greater ignorance: “Rare and rich volumes were opened for my use; but my
wife, perhaps influenced by her Presburg education, laid before me, as I took occasion to remark, chiefly those
speculative writings which have, from causes to me unknown, been neglected in these latter days, and thrown aside,
whether properly or not, among the mass of German morality which is indeed purely wild, purely vague, and at
times fantastical. These—these speculative writings were, for what reasons I could not imagine, Morella’s favourite
and constant study, and that in process of time they became my own should be attributed to the simple but effectual
influence of habit and example” (Poe, “Morella” 225-226). He did not even pretend to know why the books Morella
read had been neglected in recent times.
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“usually” considered the “dross” of German literature; above all, he cannot begin to “imagine” why
she was so interested in reincarnation. The task of connecting the dots is always left to the reader—
let the blame for thinking ill of such an incomparable woman fall on his or her head.
In the following paragraph, however, the narrator does mention some of the authors he was
studying under Morella. Surprisingly, the names he mentions in no way corroborate his suggestion
that she was studying witchcraft: “The wild Pantheism of Fiche; the modified Παλιγγενεσια of the
Pythagoreans; and, above all, the doctrines of  Identity  as urged by Schelling, were generally the
points of discussion presenting the most of beauty to the imaginative Morella” (Poe, “Morella” 230-
31). He closes this enumeration with a paraphrase of the definition of identity given by Locke, an
author less likely to be associated with the belief in metempsychosis is hard to conceive:
That identity which is termed personal, Mr. Locke, I think, truly defines to consist in
the sameness of a rational being. And since by person we understand an intelligent
essence having reason, and since there is a consciousness which always accompanies
thinking, it is this which makes us all to be that which we call  ourselves—thereby
distinguishing us from other beings that think, and giving us our personal identity.
But the principium individuationis, the notion of that identity which at death is or is
not lost forever, was to me, at all times, a consideration of intense interest; not more
from the perplexing and exciting nature of its consequences, than from the marked
and  agitated  manner  in  which  Morella  mentioned  them.  (Poe,  “Morella”  231
emphasis mine)
His paraphrase is, by and large, correct. But that is precisely the problem: it is too close to
the letter; too much an evident paraphrase. Besides, the “I think” is embarrassingly ambiguous.
What does the writer “think:” that the definition is Locke’s, or that it is true? We cannot be sure.
Ridiculously tautological, the whole passage looks like the answer an insecure schoolboy might
provide to a question posed by a teacher. The narrator seems to shy away from definite statements,
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while buying himself some time by resorting to periphrasis. To my mind, this effectively conveys
the  impression  that  Morella  may  not  have  being  studying  evil  after  all;  that  this  may  be  a
misunderstanding prompted by the narrator’s ignorance and resentment.147
These men’s  resentment,  however,  also expresses  itself  in  other  equally insidious  ways.
Most readers will probably also be under the impression that Ligeia’s husband, though he had had
his doubts, belatedly recognised, after her death and resurrection, that his wife was superior to him
in every way, and at last became her most fervent and humble admirer. But that is not strictly true:
In the classical tongues she was deeply proficient, and as far as my own acquaintance
extended in regard to the modern dialects of Europe, I have never known her at fault.
Indeed, upon any theme of the most admired, because simply the most abstruse of the
boasted erudition of the academy, have I ever found Ligeia at fault? How singularly
—how thrillingly, this one point in the nature of my wife forced itself, at this late
period only, upon my attention! I said her knowledge was such as I have never before
known in woman—but where breathes the man who has traversed, and successfully,
all the wide areas of moral, physical, and mathematical science?
(Poe, "Ligeia" 315)
147 This supposition is strengthened, I think, by the misspelling of the name of Johann Gottlieb Fichte. In all editions
of the tale except the early incomplete manuscript, Mabbott’s text A, and the first edition of the tale, in the Southern
Literary Messenger, the name is misspelled “Fiche.” 
Thus, not only did Poe maintain his narrator’s blunders,  such as the lack of agreement between the name
“meaning” and the pronoun “themselves,” he added new ones in his revisions. The  spelling “Fiche,” indeed, can hardly
be regarded as a typo, for Poe maintained it in all the editions of the tale he supervised, including that included in the
November 1839 issue of the  Burton’s Gentleman’s Magazine,  in which Poe was employed at the time as “assistant
editor.” I believe the “mistake” is intentional, and the fact that the name was spelled correctly in the original version of
the tale seems to confirm this. Mabbott thought Poe intended to display his own learning: “Poe here expresses one of his
own strong interests” (Tales 1:237n4).
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This  is  no  rhetorical  question.  From what  he  had said  before,  the  narrator  can  only  be
thinking of one “man:” himself. Not once, not even on the most “abstruse” of themes, has he ever
found Ligeia “at fault.” From this statement flows the conclusion that he was qualified to examine
her on all the many areas encompassed by her prodigious erudition—save the dread “metaphysical
investigation” to which he makes it appear she had lured him. To hear him talk, one would think
that he was Ligeia’s equal in all fields of  legitimate human knowledge, and even more than her
equal. This is an implicit inversion of the tableau of the domestic life of the couple which is found
later in the tale: Ligeia with her hand on her husband’s shoulder, helping him to decipher some text
he found impenetrable, and the very letters of which appeared unintelligible to him. Now, on the
contrary,  the  husband  places  himself  in  the  role  of  the  teacher,  evaluating  her  progress.  He
concluded, as we have seen, that her learning was remarkable for a woman.
This has all the air of being a revision of a situation the narrator found humiliating. He
certainly did revise his appreciation of his wife’s character: “I saw not then what I now clearly
perceive” (Poe, "Ligeia" 316). Now that he arrived at the conclusion that he was the only man that
was qualified to evaluate her, he can afford to admire Ligeia; praising her, he praises himself. In
view of this, his claim that the public admires only recondite lore becomes a comical instance of
false modesty. If, in order to be admired by the culturally deprived public, one’s knowledge has to
extend to the most neglected nooks and crannies of learning, then, by all means, let  the public
marvel at him.
In the revised version of the facts, then, Ligeia had become his teacher, not because she was
more intelligent or well educated than he was, but because she was a witch. In other words, she
cheated. The male intellectual pride that exudes from his text, makes it clear that he would consider
it disgraceful to be his wife’s pupil. But Ligeia beat him only on “metaphysics,” which is his private
by-word for witchcraft, therefore his male self-regard is safeguarded. The rewriting of the character
of both Ligeia and Morella by their husbands, of course, is predicated on two false assumptions,
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neither of which is borne out by the facts: the learning of the narrator, which is sadly all show, and
the wonderful resurrection of the heroine, which is demonstrably an illusion resulting, precisely,
from his superstition, and which his ignorance allows to develop into a firm belief. Meanwhile, he
keeps telling us how much he misses his wife, and, by so doing, diverts our attention from the fact
that he actually promotes himself at her expense; that, in other words, he makes her look bad, while
boosting his own ego, correcting the past to flatter his vanity.
Like Godwin’s Memoirs,  the declared purpose of “Morella” and “Ligeia” is  to help the
reader form an estimation of the character of the extraordinary wife. She had been her husband’s
teacher; she had been a thinker. Yet, with the exception of the oracular death-bed pronouncements to
which her husband’s narrative itself is a tendentious commentary, her opinions are not reported. And
this is no fortuitous circumstance, that can be put down to the ravages of time and faulty memory. It
is strictly a matter of choice.
The narrator of “Morella,” for example, decides that: “It is unnecessary to state the exact
character of those disquisitions which, growing out of the volumes I have mentioned, formed for so
long a time, almost the sole conversation of Morella and myself. By the learned in what might be
termed theological morality they will be readily conceived, and, by the unlearned they would, at all
events, be little understood” (Poe, “Morella” 230). As always, the narrator’s praise is poisonous.
Here,  he  implies  that  Morella  was  an  unoriginal  thinker  whose  commentaries  were  not  worth
recording. These were such as flowed naturally “out of the volumes” they were reading together—
though, in all fairness, she appears to have been doing all the reading. In other words, she was
merely an explicator of other people’s thoughts who drew out the obvious unstated consequences of
a  text.  Thus,  he  appeals  to  the  stereotype  of  the  schoolmistress,  which  embodied  the  received
notions of the limitations of the female intellect.
Morella said nothing the “learned” would not “readily conceive;” the ignorant, on the other
hand, could never understand what she was saying. Like Ligeia’s husband, he appears to be praising
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his wife,  but is in fact boasting,  appealing at  the same time to his reader’s vanity.  The attitude
underlying this statement is in fact the quintessence of pedantry. Which would the reader rather do?
Be in the company of the cultivated few, or admit he is “unlearned” and cannot guess the “exact
character” of Morella’s “disquisitions?” Thus, the reader is brought insensibly into an identification
with the narrator’s apparent learning; in other words, the reader’s pride of learning reinforces the
pride of Poe’s narrator.
Of course, his boast is belied by his blunders, through which he reveals he himself had no
idea of her “meaning.” For all he understood of these subjects, Locke’s metaphysics and witchcraft
might as well  be the same thing—the narrator of “Ligeia,” who thought of reading in terms of
alchemy, was in a similar plight. Whenever the narrators of these tales praise their wives, however
extravagantly, we may be sure some sting is mingled with their flattery. This is apparently another
of Poe’s originalities. I can only think of one other fiction written in the Gothic idiom prior to the
publication of “Ligeia” in which a similar theme is handled in a similar way by a biased narrator:
“Donnerhugel’s Narrative” in Walter Scott’s Anne of Geierstein (1829).
This novel is, like Poe’s tales, named after a mysterious woman, or at least one that seemed
so to the gullible and ingenuous male protagonist Arthur Philipson, alias De Vere, who, despite his
best judgement, is filled with a superstitious dread of the title character, who he nonetheless ends up
marrying, after assuring himself she was merely a woman.148 One decisive factor in creating the
illusion that Anne might not be exactly a woman was a narrative Arthur heard from the mouth of his
rival for the love of Anne, Rudolph Donnerhugel. With a view to getting rid of the competition,
Donnerhugel fabricates a fairy tale based on local rumours concerning Anne’s ancestors, the barons
of Arnheim. As Annette, Anne’s servant, will later put it: “He is one of those prudent personages
who depreciate and find fault with the goods he has thoughts of purchasing, in order to deter other
offerers” (Scott,  Geierstein 247). In it, Anne’s maternal grandmother Hermione is portrayed as a
148 Arthur  and  his  father,  John de  Vere,  Earl  of  Oxford,  travel  incognito as  merchants,  under  the  assumed name
Philipson.
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supernatural being, the daughter of a Persian magus by the name of Dannischmend, which, through
certain unmistakable signs, Donnerhugel intimates had sold his soul to the devil.
Donnerhugel’s purpose in telling this tale was precisely that of implanting on his suggestible
rival’s mind the conviction that Anne was descended from witches and unholy spirits, and that she
could in fact be herself one or both.149 Yet, the story-teller cunningly conceals his true purpose, and
reacts with indignation when Arthur confronts him with the obvious tendency of his story:
“Bethink you, sir, that in all Christian lands, the imputation of sorcery is the 
most foul which can be thrown on Christian man or woman.”
“And I am so far from intimating such an imputation,” said Rudolph, “that,
by the good sword I wear, he that dared give breath to such a thought against Anne of
Geierstein, must undergo my challenge, and take my life, or lose his own. But the
question is not whether the maiden herself practices sorcery, which he who avers had
better  get  ready his  tomb,  and provide  for  his  soul’s  safety;  the doubt  lies  here,
whether, as the descendant of a family whose relations with the unseen world are
reported to have been of the closest degree, elfish and fantastical beings may not
have power to  imitate  her form, and to  present  her  appearance where she is  not
personally present—in fine,  whether they have permission to play at  her expense
fantastical tricks, which they cannot exercise over other mortals, whose forefathers
have  ever  regulated  their  lives  by  the  rules  of  the  church,  and  died  in  regular
communion with it.” (Scott, Geierstein 109-10)
Donnerhugel’s subterfuge had been inspired by the impression some extremely suggestive
circumstances had made on Arthur. The latter believed—or half-believed—he had just seen Anne’s
phantom. Here Scott employs the narrative device which became associated with Anne Radcliffe’s
149 Indeed, in the tenth chapter of book II, in which Anne explains all the mysteries that had so tormented Arthur, we
find that it was rumored that Count Albert, Anne’s father, “is a witch,” her grandmother “a will-of-wisp,” “Nymph
of  the  Fire,”  or  “Salamander,”  and  that  Anne herself  partook  “of  the  race  of  spirits  of  the  elements”  (Scott,
Geierstein 244, 247).
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name, the explained supernatural. Among many other surprising revelations, we later learn that the
“apparition” that haunts both Arthur and the reader throughout good part of the novel had been
staged. As it turns out, he had actually seen the real Anne, not her phantom, on her way to a secret
rendezvous with her father. Her brothers, however, profited from the occasion to pull a practical
joke on the ingenuous Arthur, and convinced her to play along with their scheme. It is to this false
apparition—which he knew all along was not really an apparition—that Donnerhugel refers above.
Incidentally, this episode of the false apparition of Anne of Geierstein is involved in the
genesis of Poe’s tales of woman. Indeed, Mabbott  discovered that Poe alludes in “Berenice” to
precisely this episode in Scott’s novel (see Mabbott, Tales 219n4). Like the Swiss heroine of Scott’s
novel,  Egӕus’s cousin Berenice was remarkably agile and devoted to “the ramble on the hill-side”
(Poe,  “Berenice”  210).150 Looking back  to  the  time when she  had been  healthy,  Egӕus  waxes
mystical: “Ah! vividly is her image before me now, as in the early days of her light-heartedness and
joy! Oh, gorgeous yet fantastic beauty! Oh, sylph amid the shrubberies of Arnheim! Oh, Naiad
among its fountains! And then—then all is mystery and terror, and a tale which should not be told”
(210). Anne of Geierstein was descended from the barons of Arnheim. She was also distinguished
by her physical vigour, which Arthur, her future husband, found it difficult to accommodate to his
rather narrow notions of femininity. Evidently, Poe is here alluding to her. More specifically, he
clearly meant to allude, as Mabbott noticed, to the episode of her apparition to Arthur as he stood
guard to the castle where they were lodged. This is indicated both by the tone and the context of the
passage in Poe’s tale.
However, Mabbott did not see a relevant connection between Poe’s story and its source. Yet,
the allusion is certainly significant. This is one of the many strategies employed by Poe to intimate
that, like Arthur, his narrator labours under an illusion. Indeed, Arthur also felt that “what he gazed
upon was immaterial and not of this world,” and could not shake the supernatural impression which
150 Anne of Geierstein, who lived in the Swiss Alps, was a skilled mountaineer.
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“subdue[d]” his “personal feelings towards Anne of Geierstein,—feelings, also, liable to be chilled
by the mysterious uncertainty which the events of that evening had cast, like a thick mist, around
the object of them” (Scott,  Geierstein 89, 98). The subtitle of the novel, “The Lady of the Mist,”
referred, of course, to the atmosphere of doubt that surrounded its title-character. This atmosphere is
successfully reinforced by Donnerhugel’s narrative. Everything would fall into place by and by.
Anne herself would later explain (in bk. 2, Ch. 10) all the mysteries that had so puzzled Arthur,
including the truth about her nocturnal escapade. After he became satisfied that she was, indeed,
only a woman, they were married and lived happily ever after. 
I say this was Poe’s way of intimating his narrator was, like the protagonist of Scott’s novel,
the victim of delusion—yet, their illusions are very different in nature. In a sense they are the exact
opposite  of  each  other.  When  he  saw  the  real  Anne  pass  him  by,  Arthur  thought  “his  own
imagination had raised up a phantom, painting to his outward senses the form and features which
engrossed his mind” (Scott, Geierstein 89). Later, Donnerhugel helped him settle on a supernatural
interpretation. But Arthur was wrong. What he saw was no phantom of the imagination. The woman
that appeared to Egӕus in his study, and who was not his cousin, on the contrary, could not have
been anything but the kind of phantom Arthur initially thought had visited him.
Donnerhugel’s narrative has significant affinities not only with “Berenice,” but also with
“Morella”  and “Ligeia.”  Although he  denies  it  in  the  most  vehement  terms,  Donnerhugel  was
deliberately denigrating the woman he intended to marry by suggesting she was a witch or an
elemental spirit. His affinity with the narrators of those tales, who lets us conclude what they would
never  tell  us—that  their  wives  had  performed  wonders  through  witchcraft—is  striking.  This
coincidence is all the more remarkable as Arthur’s belief  in the apparition is strengthened by a
reasoning that depends on his ideas of gender. Indeed, he found it easier to believe he had seen a
ghost than that so decent a girl as Anne appeared to be should go out alone in the middle of the
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night—in fact, he could not allow himself to even consider that possibility.151 Arthur was therefore
stuck between skepticism and superstition.
The credibility of Scott’s treacherous narrator was bolstered by his seeming reluctance to
convey an unfavourable impression of Anne, when that was precisely what he intended. Poe would
later employ a similar strategy to cast  a supernatural mist around “Morella” and “Ligeia.” But,
unlike  Donnerhugel,  who  skilfully  manipulates  his  ingenuous  listener  without  being  himself
deceived, Poe’s narrators seem to be manipulating themselves. One might say, therefore, that his
unreliable narrators are a fusion of Donnerhugel and Arthur: they are disingenuous like the former,
and credulous like the latter.
Poe’s narrators, however, do not think of themselves as superstitious men. They have this in
common with Arthur. But this is precisely what makes him helpless before a master storyteller like
Donnerhugel, who begins by whetting the hero’s curiosity with vague hints of the story of Anne’s
relatives, and feigning reluctance to say any more, until Arthur himself demands from him the story
he had really meant to tell all along. “I can see nothing in your narrative,” Arthur tells him, 
and understand nothing from it, unless it be, that, because in Germany, as in other
countries, there have been fools who have annexed the idea of witchcraft and sorcery
to the possession of knowledge and wisdom, you are disposed to stigmatize a young
maiden,  who  has  always  been  respected  and  beloved  by  those  around  her,  as  a
disciple of arts which, I trust, are as uncommon as unlawful. (Scott, Geierstein 133)
With this hesitating reply, Arthur signalled to the crafty storyteller, his rival, that he had
swallowed  the  bait.  In  this  passage,  while  on  the  one  hand  he  explains  away  witchcraft  as  a
superstition resulting from the prestige the learned and wise have in the eyes of the ignorant, on the
151 The omniscient third-person narrator lets us into the inner workings of Arthur’s mind. His reluctance to admit any
hypothesis that might sully the reputation of a lady predisposed him towards the supernatural: “He asked himself in
vain, with what purpose that modest young maiden, whose manners were frank, but whose conduct had always
seemed so delicate and reserved, could sally forth at midnight like a damsel-errant in romance, when she was in a
strange country and suspicious neighbourhood; yet he rejected, as he would have shrunk from blasphemy, any
interpretation which could have thrown censure upon Anne of Geierstein” (Scott, Geierstein 90).
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other, he tacitly admits the existence of the very “unlawful arts” the possibility of which he half-
heartedly denies. His is that dangerous “half-belief” of Poe’s narrators which is, in practice, already
constitutes an irresistible inducement to admit supernatural intervention.152
The story of Hermione itself foreshadows important aspects of “Morella” and “Ligeia.” Its
theme is the short and ill-fated marriage of two exceedingly learned individuals embodying the
same idea that a man’s teacher and his lover must never be united in the same person that is implied
in those tales. After his arrival at Arnheim, the Persian sage Dannischmend became the master of
the Baron, Anne’s grandfather. For the duration of his stay, a year and a day, he instructed his pupil
in the dark secrets of his unhallowed wisdom. After his departure, he was replaced by his daughter,
the ravishing and ultra-learned Hermione, who was charged with completing the baron’s education
in the arcane subjects he had been studying under her father. However, the Persian sage warned his
pupil: “if you value the permanence of your family, look not upon her as aught else than a helpmate
in your studies; for if you forget the instructress in the beauty of the maiden, you will be buried with
your sword and your shield, as the last male of your house. (…) Be kind to her, but not over kind”
(Scott,  Geierstein 140). These last words resonate ominously with Poe’s tales, whose heroes were
most certainly not “over kind” towards their wives.
I feel fairly certain that part of the inspiration for Poe’s learned women Morella and Ligeia
—especially  her—came from Donnerhugel’s  portrait  of Hermione.  Like them, she is  incredibly
learned, especially in obscure subjects, and imparted lessons on those subjects to the baron—who
would  also  become  her  husband:  “their  pursuits  were  of  a  most  extraordinary  nature”  (Scott,
Geierstein 117). She is also fluent in many tongues. Indeed, she is examined by the Bishop of
Bamberg, who is as impressed with her as Ligeia’s husband was impressed with his wife: “When
asked regarding her knowledge of languages and science, he answered, that he had been attracted to
152  When she explains him the origin of the superstitions involving her family, Anne of Geierstein shows she 
perfectly understood Arthur’s perplexity: “let us not neglect the opportunity to disabuse our English friend, of the 
absurd reports he has listened to with doubt and wonder, perhaps, but not with absolute incredulity” (Scott, Geierstein 
247).
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Arnheim by the most extravagant reports on these points, but that he must return confessing ‘the
half thereof had not been told unto him’” (117).
Her  walk  too,  like  Ligeia’s,  was  preternaturally  light.153 When  she  first  miraculously
appeared in the baron’s locked study, Hermione alighted from a pedestal, “and descended on the
floor as light and as safe as if she had been formed of gossamer;” as a dancer, “her performances
seemed those of an aerial being” (Scott, Geierstein 117). In The Life and Works of Edgar Allan Poe
[1933],  Mary Bonaparte has famously argued that Poe had unconsciously formed Ligeia  in the
image of his mother: “Thus (…) the graceful dancer is evoked, the slender consumptive that was
Elizabeth Arnold” (224).  The parallel  with  Anne of Geierstein,  however,  suggests that Poe was
deliberately evoking another graceful dancer, Hermione, whom the Bishop of Bamberg styles “a
Doctor of Theology in the dress of an Eastern dancing-girl” (Scott, Geierstein 117). While this does
not necessarily rule out Bonaparte’s claim that Poe’s work expresses an unconscious yearning after
the dead mother, in light of the strong evidence of  conscious  elaboration, Bonaparte’s statement
should be, at the very least, somewhat qualified.
According to her husband, Ligeia “came and departed as a shadow” (Poe, “Ligeia” 311).
The same thing could be said, with even more propriety, of Hermione. Upon opening his locked
study in the morning after her father had left him, the Baron found her standing on a pedestal where
a “silver lamp of the most beautiful proportions” had been; later, she vanished from her room in an
equally mysterious fashion, leaving no trace of her presence but “a handful of light grey ashes, like
those produced by burning fine paper (…) on the bed where she had been laid” (Scott,  Geierstein
121-22).
The story of Hermione may also have inspired one of the most intriguing holes in Ligeia’s
story. Her husband claims he had “never known the paternal name of her who was my friend and my
betrothed,  and who became a partner  of my studies,  and finally  the wife of  my bosom” (Poe,
153  Her husband speaks, in a passage I have looked at in the second chapter, of “the incomprehensible lightness and 
elasticity of her footfall” (Poe, “Ligeia” 311).
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“Ligeia” 311). The origin of the exotic woman who first shared the Baron of Arnheim’s studies and
then his bed being equally obscure, “the beautiful Persian was generally called” simply Hermione
(Scott,  Geierstein 117). In both cases, this circumstance strengthens the atmosphere of doubt on
which superstition thrives.
Indeed, Scott’s handling of the subject presupposes a hypothesis regarding the origin of such
superstitions that is hinted by Arthur, who like his counterpart in “Ligeia” could not all believe it,
and is later confirmed by Anne herself. Hermione, she tells Arthur:
availed herself of her foreign dress and manners, as well as of a beauty, which was
said to have been marvellous, and an agility seldom equalled, to impose upon and
terrify the ignorant German ladies, who, hearing her speak Persian and Arabic, were
already disposed to consider her as over closely connected with unlawful arts. She
was of a fanciful and imaginative disposition, and delighted to place herself in such
colours and circumstances as might confirm their most ridiculous suspicions.
(Scott, Geierstein 248)
Thus, Ligeia shared with Hermione the very qualities that had apparently given rise to the
popular  superstition.  Indeed,  according  to  her  husband,  she  too  possessed  remarkable  agility,
uncommon beauty,  and knew many different  languages.  And, as Arthur  had himself  previously
remarked,  science  and  wisdom  themselves  were  confused  by  the  ignorant  with  magic  and
witchcraft. Of course, Ligeia’s husband also associates these things with the supernatural—he too
came to believe that she was connected with the “unlawful arts,” or, as he so slyly puts it, that she
sought “a wisdom too divinely precious not to be forbidden” (Poe, “Ligeia” 316). This can easily be
explained according to Scott’s hypothesis. For the narrator reveals himself, on the one hand, as
ignorant and superstitious as those “German ladies” mentioned in the novel, who thought languages
they themselves did not understand were demoniacal, and, on the other, as suggestible as Arthur.
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Thus, “Donnerhugel’s Narrative” and “Ligeia” are both false stories, in the same sense in
which the supernatural plots in the novels of Ann Radcliffe are false. Anne of Geierstein herself,
when she explains the mysteries to her future husband, makes the relevant distinction between “the
real truth of my family history” and “the romantic legend” he had heard from Donnerhugel (Scott,
Geierstein 249). Particularly interesting to our purposes is Hermione’s death. According to Anne,
she had eventually fallen a prey to the resentment she had excited in the aforementioned “German
ladies:” “It was believed that she died of poison” (250) The circumstances surrounding her death,
however, had been, she says, “confused in popular tradition, and the real facts turned into a fairy
tale,”  which  Donnerhugel  adapted  to  his  purposes  (250).  This,  of  course,  is  very  nearly  what
happens in “Ligeia,” where, however, the reader must guess the true story. Incidentally, the idea that
the solution to such mysteries might be superfluous for an inquiring reader is intimated by Anne
herself who, when Arthur asks her for the solution to the mystery of her “apparition,” replies: “Is it
possible (…) that a man of sense, and an Englishman, cannot guess at the explanation which I have
to give, though not, perhaps, very distinctly?” (248-49).
Thus,  the  truth  about  Hermione  is  that  she  had  stood  out  from  the  women  in  her
surroundings by her learning. She did not behave like a woman was expected to, and payed with her
life for her unorthodoxy. Scott’s portrayal of her constitutes, therefore, an explicit challenge to the
conventional  representation  of  the  intellectual  status  of  women.  Lewis’s  Matilda  adds  to  an
intellectual  “male”  stance  a  sexually  transgressive  behaviour.  Such  depictions  of  deviant
femaleness, which were totally incompatible with the prevailing sentimental ideology, were entirely
absent from the femicide stories of Macnish and Dickens. Hermione and Matilda—especially her—
are gender-benders. And these characters clearly foreshadow Poe’s Morella and Ligeia. Indeed, in
the tales named after these two characters, Poe combined the subversive strategies Scott and Lewis
had deployed in their Gothic novels to heighten the culturally disruptive effect of the femicide story.
Confessions of an Unexecuted Femicide and “Madman’s Manuscript” were relatively unambitious
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hoaxes,  which  appeared  to  have  been  designed  to  expose  the  abuses  of  male  authority.  Poe’s
“Morella”  and “Ligeia,”  on the other  hand,  like  Anne of  Geierstein,  and especially  The Monk,
indirectly bring into question patriarchal values themselves.
Still, despite the fact that Matilda and Hermione foreshadow Morella and Ligeia, there is
still something that particularly distinguishes Poe’s heroines. Hermione’s tale, which so impressed
Arthur, is not told by the lady’s husband—the Baron appears neither to have borne any ill-will
towards her on account of her learning nor suspected her of witchcraft. Ambrosio is also not the
narrator of his own tale. That combination—the tale of a learned woman as told by a husband who,
as if he did not mean to, conveys the impression that she was a witch—, I insist, Poe appears not to
have found in any of  the Gothic  novels  or  magazine  short  stories  that  inspired  “Morella”  and
“Ligeia.” Some fictional narrative containing a similar idea, and which Poe may have read, may yet
surface; that is a possibility that can never be categorically ruled out. Yet, even if this hypothetical
source were to be found, this would not make the fact of there being a widely-known—at least in
Poe’s time—non-fictional precedent for all this any less significant.
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2 – “Communication of Spirits:” Godwin’s rewriting of Wollstonecraft
The narrators of Poe’s tales about learned women say what they really felt about Morella
and  Ligeia  as  if  they  had  not  meant  to  say  it.  They  evidently  felt  their  wives  were  unduly
“masculine,”  and  that  there  was  something  unnatural  about  the  way  they  had  become  their
husband’s teachers. In hindsight, however, they found a way to account for these things so as to get
rid of their feelings of inferiority. These men come to suspect their wives had been witches. Because
they say things they really did not mean to say, however, they discredit themselves as well as their
revision of their wives’ characters. They show, that is, that the wives had not been witches; that they
had only appeared so to their ignorant husbands, who feeling emasculated by their superiority, had
vindicated themselves and their offended sense of manhood through slippery rationalisations.
As I was saying, Memoirs of the Author of A Vindication of the Rights of Woman provides a
relevant precedent for all this. Indeed, in that book, Godwin reveals himself a perfect representative
of  the prejudice against  women of intellect  and learning that  his  wife’s friend Mary Hays had
denounced.  More  precisely,  he  betrays  the  same  kind  of  prejudice  through  the  same  kind  of
sentimental rhetorical mechanisms and seemingly unaccountable lapses for which Poe’s narrators
are remarkable.  I do not believe this  is a coincidence. The Gothic, and all the fictions of male
tyranny that it spawned, form the context of “Ligeia” and “Morella,” but I regard Memoirs, which
shares these important and highly unusual traits with them, as their pretext. I believe, that is, that
Poe deliberately created two parodies of Godwin’s narrative of his marriage with Wollstonecraft.
I use the word pretext to avoid misunderstanding. Although I believe Poe intended his tales
as  parodies  of  Memoirs,  I  think his purposes  for doing this  went well  beyond personal  attack.
Therefore, I say that Godwin was not so much the target of his satire but its pretext. That is, Poe
used him because he thought Godwin represented an extreme version of a sort of prejudice that was
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common to most literary men of his age, and to which Poe had alluded in his review of Barrett
Browning’s A Drama of Exile.
At this point I should mention that the influence of Godwin’s novels on Poe’s fiction was
already clear to his  contemporaries.  Indeed, Pollin reiterates an old critical  conviction when he
writes that “the themes and atmosphere of Poe’s tales often resemble those of William Godwin’s
‘nightmare’ novels,” and that the influence of these on Poe’s work may have been direct, or indirect,
since  he  “was  deeply  conscious  of  the  peculiar  genius  of  Charles  Brockden  Brown,  whose
inspiration  in  turn  was  self-ascribed  to  Godwin”  (Discoveries  107-108).  Yet,  Pollin’s  chapter
remains the only systematic survey of the allusions to Godwin in Poe’s work, seventeen in all. This
critic  remarks  that:  “Many  of  these  are  not  casual  references,  but  rather  the  keystones  of  his
criticism, or they are thematic germs out of which he develops an entire narrative rationale” (109).
Although Poe was to a certain extent certainly indebted to Godwin, whom he regarded as a better
designer of plot than Dickens, whom he deems “totally deficient in constructiveness,” it appears to
me that Pollin overstates the American author’s devotion for the author of Caleb Williams. “Godwin
as a standard of excellence,” he writes, “was (…) firmly implanted in Poe’s mind” in 1841, and by
1844 this conviction had developed into an “entrenched Godwinolatry” (114, 119).
It appears to me that the evidence on which Pollin bases such assumptions is both too scanty
and too ambiguous. Pollin’s interpretation of Poe’s writing on Godwin, indeed, appears to me to be
informed by the very preconceptions that his work in exposing Poe’s handling of sources helped to
displace. “Godwin, too” he writes, “was a visionary, although he believed in a different type of
dream from those  which  haunted  Poe”  (Discoveries  109).  For  reasons I  have  explained in  the
preceding chapter,  I  think  this  statement  may  be  only  half  correct.  Poe  no  doubt  thought  that
Godwin was a “visionary,” but appears rather to have thought of himself as, and indeed prided
himself  on  being,  a  reasoner.  In  any  event,  Pollin’s  article  deals  exclusively  with  Poe’s  overt
allusions to Godwin, when it seems to me that in this as in most other cases his “buried allusions”
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are  much  more  revealing.  But  the  allusions  of  which  I  am  speaking,  and  which  I  think  are
unquestionably  recognizable  in  Poe’s  work  are  not  to  the  novelist,  with  which  Pollin  was
particularly  concerned,  but  to  the  man  and  the  philosopher.  Indeed,  Pollin  was  specifically
interested in studying the influence of Godwin’s fiction on Poe’s, which is unquestionably very
significant. But the plots of “Morella” and “Ligeia” clearly evoke the very peculiar circumstances of
Godwin’s relationship with Wollstonecraft. In fact, the opinions expressed by the narrators of those
tales bear a distinct resemblance with the opinions Godwin himself had endorsed throughout his
life.
In those tales, when the learned wife dies and her husband becomes the chronicler of their
life together, the conflict between the two, which the husband glosses over with his praise for her,
becomes a dirty battle of words. The original conflict has different overtones in each tale. In an
ingenuous reading, Morella’s husband had no interest in sex and, in fact, gives us to understand his
marriage had been a mere formality, meant to secure for him the company of a friend; his wife, on
the other hand, apparently cursed him for his asceticism. An equally unsophisticated reading of
“Ligeia” would run as follows. Although she had never displayed proper “womanly abandonment”
to her husband, Ligeia secretly idolised him. Her devotion was such, indeed, that she defied the
sacred laws of life and death, risking her soul for his sake. Therefore, she was not less feminine than
others, as her intellectual achievements and independence appear to have suggested to her husband,
but  the most  feminine of  women.  Her  love was,  he later  decides,  “more than womanly” (Poe,
“Ligeia” 317).
However, the husband’s attempt to tell the story in his own terms—the terms of the victor—
is not successful. This is due in part to incompetent writing. The narrator says more than he intends,
intimating both the plausible solutions to the mystery and, through vicious innuendo, his grudge for
the wife he praises in so extravagantly hyperbolical terms. Another reason for his failure is the
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tension between the wife’s statements and his construal of her character. She just does not seem to
be the woman he tells us she was.
Godwin revises Wollstonecraft’s character in similar ways. In fact, the tension between the
declared intentions and the effects of his narrative about her is as evident in  Memoirs as it is in
Poe’s tales. His portrayal of Wollstonecraft, in fact, fails to conform to both his and her ideas of
female virtue—which, contrary to what is often asserted, were not identical. When he first met her,
at least, he thought she had not been all that a woman should be. She lacked, in particular, a proper
appreciation of  men, he thought. He tells us she later changed, and assumed all the conventional
charms of “sensibility,” yet, at the same time, he implies she was, even then, still not “feminine”
enough. And then, his statement of her opinions is completely incompatible with  A Vindication,
which, of course, can only mean one of two things—either she had not lived up to her ideals, or she
had recanted those ideals to at least try to become what he thought a woman should be. He thought
the second was true. Godwin’s title is therefore highly misleading. He certainly did not vindicate the
ambitious book mentioned in the title of his—he destroyed it and its author along with it, and not
only by exposing her private life. He destroyed all Wollstonecraft represented, and all she ever had
struggled for, by the same devious means that Poe’s femicide husbands had used to try to settle the
score with their wives.
We find in Godwin’s narrative, indeed, the same perplexing contrast between expressions of
the most fervent admiration for the dead wife and the most terrible insinuations concerning not only
her morals, but also her achievements and abilities. Wollstonecraft was “the object dearest to my
heart that the universe contained,” he says, and again “all that was dear to me in the universe”
(Godwin,  Memoirs 114,  116).  Godwin’s  regret  is,  indeed,  as  intense  as  that  of  the  narrator  of
“Ligeia;” but unfortunately, the resemblance does not stop there. For the narrator of “Ligeia” the
death of his  wife represented the disappointment  of  his “well-grounded expectations” ("Ligeia"
316). He mourned, in other words, for the loss of the gains he anticipated from his intercourse with
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her. And so did Godwin. The following comes from the first edition of Memoirs: “The improvement
I had reason to promise myself, was however yet in its commencement, when a fatal event, hostile
to the moral interests of mankind, ravished from me the light of my steps, and left me nothing but
the consciousness of what I had possessed, and must now possess no more!” (Godwin,  Memoirs
217n). His improvement is thus presented as the only reliable measure of her worth.
Since she had been cut down before she could realise all her potential, mankind did not
know what they had lost; but Godwin did, and therefore he felt it was his duty to write a book
clarifying  his  wife’s  legacy,  so that  the  whole  world  might  be improved.  This  is,  at  least,  the
declared purpose of his  book, which is reiterated in its very last  sentence,  in which the author
manifests  his  confidence  in  having  done  what  he  set  out  to  do:  “While  I  have  described  the
improvement I was in the act of receiving,  I believe I  have put down the leading traits  of her
intellectual  character” (Godwin,  Memoirs  122).  This is,  more or less,  the same plan that  Poe’s
narrators follow. Indeed, like them, Godwin decides to make the intellectual portrait of his wife
indirectly, by describing the effect she had on him, his “improvement,” instead of attempting to
outline her thought and its development.
Accordingly,  most  of  the  direct  speech attributed  to  Wollstonecraft  in  Memoirs consists
either of excerpts of her private correspondence, chiefly with her first partner Gilbert Imlay, the
father of her eldest child Fanny, or paraphrases of her conversation with Godwin himself. But even
these quotations are few and far between. When her voice is heard,  it  is  usually—I would say
without exception—to utter some emotionally charged, pathetic statement directly connected with
some  especially  affecting  circumstance  of  her  private  and  sentimental  life,  which  has  usually
something to do with death. Thus, it is Godwin’s policy to let Wollstonecraft be heard only when at
her most vulnerable.
While he claims that his purpose was indirectly to describe the “intellectual character” of his
wife, Godwin effectively subjects the thinker and the writer to the sentimental heroine—for it is as
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such that Wollstonecraft is presented in his book. By so doing, he also makes her a function of his
own “intellectual character.” For, according to his rhetoric, the proper way for the public to form a
faithful picture of Wollstonecraft is not, as might be supposed, reading her works, but listening to
Godwin explain how she had “improved”—or rather, was on the process of improving—him, by
means he represents, most emphatically, as non-intellectual. He casts her in the typical sentimental
role  of  the  woman  who,  by  her  sensibility  and,  above  all,  through  her  self-sacrificing  love,
reconnects the philosopher, who was lost in a world of metaphysical speculation and high idealism,
with human affections and emotions that had projected in Bulwer-Lytton’s Eugene Aram in the
figure of Madeleine.
Indeed, if  Memoirs  were all we had to go on, Mary Wollstonecraft’s thought would be as
mysterious to us as Ligeia’s or Morella’s. In all, Godwin makes only two direct quotations from the
writing she had or intended to publish throughout the entire book. Most significantly, his portrait of
the author of A Vindication does not contain a single line from that book, of which Godwin offers
only two or three very brief and loose paraphrases, and to which he alludes, without exception, in
the most dismissive terms.
He regarded it as an immature production of the first epoch of Wollstonecraft’s career, in
which  her  supposed  shortcomings  as  an  author,  to  which  Godwin  continually  alludes,  were
particularly noticeable. He had “been displeased, as literary men are apt to be, with a few offences,
against grammar and other minute points of composition” when he first read A Vindication of the
Rights  of  Men  (1790). This  was  Wollstonecraft’s  reply  to  Edmund  Burke’s  Reflections  on  the
Revolution in  France. Godwin was equally unimpressed with the writing on  Rights of Woman. In
fact,  he implies  that  she was only really  becoming a full-fledged writer  when she came to her
unexpected end, but never quite got there, remarking of the novel she left unfinished, Maria: or, The
Wrongs of Woman, that: “She was sensible how arduous a task it is to produce a truly excellent
novel; and she roused her faculties to grapple with it. All her other works were produced with a
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rapidity, that did not give her powers time fully to expand. But this was written slowly and with
mature consideration,” which, Godwin implies had never been the case in the past (Memoirs 111).
He therefore makes excuses in his wife’s name for the poor quality of the writing in all of her books
save the one she left unfinished—thus effectively representing her as a failed writer.
But  Godwin’s  greatest  objection  to  A  Vindication,  and  indeed  to  all  Wollstonecraft’s
polemical, strictly philosophical works, had nothing to do with grammar, but with alleged offenses
against gender propriety. According to him, the book was too “masculine,” and therefore entirely
out of character for his wife, who was eminently “feminine.” Thus, he effectively presents the book
as a female encroachment on the male provinces of philosophy and politics,  subjects  which he
suggests  Wollstonecraft  was  constitutionally  unfit  to  discuss  because she  was  a  woman.  “The
strength of her mind,” says Godwin, 
lay  in  intuition.  She  was  often  right,  by  this  means  only,  in  matters  of  mere
speculation.  Her  religion,  her  philosophy  (in  both  of  which  the  errors  were
comparatively few, and the strain dignified and generous) were, as I have already
said,  the  pure result  of  feeling  and taste.  She  adopted  one opinion,  and rejected
another, spontaneously, by a sort of tact, and the force of a cultivated imagination.
(Memoirs 121)
This  comes from the impassioned eulogium of his  subject  with which he concludes  his
Memoirs. It is Godwin’s final word on the subject. Wollstonecraft,  being all woman—as  her
husband assures us she was—was naturally all intuition. Godwin continues, with what appears to be
an unswerving adherence to truth,  as one who discharges an unpleasant duty: “yet, though perhaps,
in the strict sense of the term, she reasoned little, it is surprising what a degree of soundness is to be
found in her determinations” (Memoirs 121).
This terribly condescending passage illustrates the full meaning of the word “patronising”—
it puts me in mind of the passage where the narrator of “Ligeia” praises his wife for never letting
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him catch her in error. Considering how little Wollstonecraft did think, Godwin would expect her to
be wrong much more frequently on matters that absolutely required thinking. But she surprised him.
She did get things right on occasion, but for Godwin this does not prove that she was capable of
sustained, logical reasoning. No matter how one looks at it, this is a terrible thing to say about a
woman who prided herself on her rationality, and who tried to prove, and in fact did prove, that
women were intelligent beings at a time when many granted them only the sort of second-rate
intuitive cunning Godwin here attributes to her. That is precisely the point Wollstonecraft made in A
Vindication:  the  ideology  of  sensibility,  insofar  as  it  postulated  the  existence  of  a  feminine
alternative to reason properly so called, was an instrument of oppression. In fact, Godwin’s claim
that “she reasoned little” is perfectly in keeping with the opinions of Rousseau, which she had
explicitly rejected. He too, granted women  some intellectual capacity: “L’art de penser n’est pas
étranger  aux femmes,  mais  ne doivent  faire  que’effleurer  les  sciences  de raisonnement” (Émile
542).
Thus, Godwin’s portrait of Wollstonecraft as an exquisitely sensitive, but not very rational
woman is  in  explicit  contradiction  with  A Vindication of  the Rights  of  Woman,  where  she had
remarked: “Only ‘absolute in loveliness,’ the portion of rationality granted to woman, is, indeed,
very scanty; for denying her genius and judgment, it is scarcely possible to divine what remains to
characterize intellect” (121). As regards sensibility, she thought it was no substitute for reason: “I
discern not a trace of the image of God in either sensation or matter. Refined seventy times seventy,
they are still material; intellect dwells not there; nor will fire ever make lead gold;” Wollstonecraft
went on to assert flatly that “sensibility is not reason” (133). 
Never one for mincing words, Wollstonecraft further argues that the conventional system of
female education was not only cruel and inhumane, but also absurd and inadequate to the very end
for which it was designed. If the idea was to ensure that women were faithful to their husbands, it
made no sense to teach them to rely exclusively on 
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the fallacious light of sentiment; too often used as a softer phrase for sensuality. It
follows, then, I think, that from their infancy women should either be shut up like
eastern princes,  or educated in  such a manner as to be able  to think and act  for
themselves.
Why do men halt between two opinions, and expect impossibilities? Why do
they expect virtue from a slave, from a being whom the constitution of society has
rendered weak, if not vicious? (Wollstonecraft, Vindication 115-16)
I think this passage is enough to show how misleading Godwin’s unenthusiastic appraisal of
Wollstonecraft’s powers as a writer is. Here, every word counts. She thinks that all women should
be  taught  to  think.  A Vindication is  in  fact  arguably  organised  around  a  central  performative
statement: women are capable of reason. By asserting herself as a thinking woman and philosopher,
she proves the assertion. This in turn ties in with the religious side of her argument. Her ideas of
sexual equality “may be termed,” she wrote, “Utopian dreams,” but the fact that she could dream
them proved they were both feasible and just: “Thanks to that being who impressed them on my
soul,  and gave  me sufficient  strength  of  mind to  dare  to  exert  my own reason,  till,  becoming
dependent only on him for the support of my virtue, I view, with indignation, the mistaken notions
that enslave my sex” (Wollstonecraft, Vindication 105). A rational being submits only to reason. By
asserting  her  own rationality,  then,  Wollstonecraft  proves  that  women  are  rational  beings,  and
therefore must not be subjected to man, a being as imperfect as herself. 
Yet, disregarding all her subtle and cogent argumentation, Godwin the philosopher says that,
strictly speaking, Wollstonecraft did very little thinking. And he was not finished with her—not by a
long shot:
if this quality [to intuitively reach sound judgements] was of use to her in topics that
seem the  proper  province  of  reasoning,  it  was  much more  so in  matters  directly
appealing to the intellectual taste. In a robust and unwavering judgement of this sort,
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there is a kind of witchcraft; when it decides justly, it produces a responsive vibration
in  every  ingenuous  mind.  (…) When a  true  opinion emanated  in  this  way from
another  mind,  the  conviction  produced  in  my  own  assumed  a  similar  character,
instantaneous and firm. (Godwin, Memoirs 122-123)
Thus, Wollstonecraft was able to submit “ingenuous” minds to her points of view through
other  means  than  rational  argument—for,  having  hit  on  the  truth  intuitively,  she  could  not  be
expected to explain her points of view—; by a sort of “witchcraft,” which was allegedly her forte,
that appealed not to the intellect but to the emotions. Incidentally, Godwin had before remarked that
A Vindication had impressed only “ingenuous minds,” thus effectively suggesting,  as Ayres has
pointed out, that her “argument is not sophisticated enough for more educated and logical minds”
(Betwixt 29). What this means is that Wollstonecraft was really out of her element in philosophical
enquiry, or the “proper province of reasoning,” as Godwin calls it. He implies, of course, that what
her book lacked in sophistication of argument, it made up by the charming innocence of sentiment
the author displayed. The author of A Vindication, for whom innocence was simply a pretty name
for ignorance, just as sensibility was a pretty name for irrationality, would certainly not have been
flattered by such a statement.154 Yet, at the same time, Godwin tells us that Wollstonecraft exerted a
certain fascination, a glamour, one might say, that made even the philosophical Godwin adhere fully
and automatically to her opinions, without mature deliberation, and this conveys an ominous sense
of  menace  which  makes  his  eulogium  suspect.  Perhaps  his  judgement  had  been  swayed  by
Wollstonecraft’s  charms.  This  is  an  idea  which  hovers  over  his  text,  without  ever  being  fully
realised, as if this was something of which the writer himself had not been conscious. This is the
same very peculiar feeling we get from Poe’s tales.
 Wollstonecraft had “a minute attention to first impressions, and a just appreciation of them”
Godwin writes (Memoirs 122). Thus, he contrasts her way of thinking—or was it thinking? —with
154 “innocence, as ignorance is courteously termed” (Wollstonecraft, Vindication 113).
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philosophy. For philosophical thinking may perhaps best be described, and in fact often has been
described, as an attitude of permanent distrust of first impressions. Earlier in his short concluding
essay on the excellences of his wife, he had already made it very clear that philosophy was his
department:
We had cultivated  our  powers  (if  I  may venture  to  use this  sort  of  language)  in
different directions; I chiefly an attempt at logical and metaphysical distinction, she a
taste  for  the  picturesque.  One  of  the  leading  passions  of  my  mind  has  been  an
anxious desire not to be deceived. That has led me to view the topics of my reflection
on all sides; and to examine and reexamine without end, the questions that interest
me.
(…) I have been stimulated, as long as I can remember, by an ambition for
intellectual  distinction;  but,  as long as I  can remember,  I  have been discouraged,
when I have endeavoured to cast the sum of my intellectual value, by finding that I
did  not  possess,  in  the  degree  of  some  other  men,  an  intuitive  perception  of
intellectual beauty. (Godwin, Memoirs 121)
This is a crucial passage in Clemit and Walker’s reading of Memoirs. They produce the last
sentence  in  this  passage  as  evidence  of  Godwin’s  thorough identification  with  Wollstonecraft’s
ideas: “despite the vicissitudes of her own life, she struggled to keep hold of the unique combination
of introspection, observation, and intense response which comprised the self that Godwin valorized,
as he later memorialized her ‘intuitive perception of intellectual beauty,’ echoing Wollstonecraft’s
phrase in the Vindication of the Rights of Woman” (Clemit and Walker, Introduction 28).
It  appears  to  me that  this  statement  equally  misrepresents  the  two texts  under  analysis.
Godwin may himself have intended to allude to Wollstonecraft’s text; I think this is very likely.
Wollstonecraft does, indeed, use the phrase “intellectual beauty” in A Vindication. She employed it,
however, in a completely different sense. “I know,” she wrote, 
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that  it  will  require  a  considerable  length  of  time  to  eradicate  the  firmly  rooted
prejudices which sensualists have planted; (…) and to convince the world that the
poisoned source of female vices and follies, if it be necessary, in compliance with
custom, to use synonymous terms in a lax sense, has been the sensual homage paid to
beauty:—to  beauty  of  features;  for  it  has  been  shrewdly  observed  by  a  German
writer, that a pretty woman, as an object of desire, is generally allowed to be so by
men of all descriptions; whilst a fine woman, who inspires more sublime emotions by
displaying intellectual beauty, may be overlooked or observed with indifference, by
those men who find their happiness in the gratification of their appetites. 
(Wollstonecraft,Vindication 116 emphasis mine). 
Wollstonecraft means, of course, those “polite men who do not wish to be encumbered by
mind” (Wollstonecraft, Vindication 172).
In Wollstonecraft’s writing, then, the phrase “intellectual beauty” has reference to the charms
of a cultivated mind. Men, however, were accustomed to see only women’s bodies, and therefore
had put in place a system of education that thwarted their intellectual development; that conditioned
women to care for their physical appearance, to the detriment of their intellectual faculties. Thus, in
effect, Wollstonecraft is here contesting the same conventions that made most men of her time,
which she thought were themselves educated according to false principles, perceive women like her
and Catharine Macaulay as “viragos.” Godwin, fittingly enough, applies the phrase he probably
found in  A Vindication  to the sublime which had originally reference to the woman who could
appreciate it—indeed, the phrase does not appear in any other sense in any of Wollstonecraft’s
works—, and thus distorts,  as usual,  Wollstonecraft’s  ideas.  Clemit  and Walker in  turn become
accomplices to Godwin’s biased and interested rewriting of Wollstonecraft.
On the other hand, in the passage of Memoirs in which he employs the phrase, Godwin is
actually contrasting “intuitive perception” with “logical and metaphysical distinction” and his own
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“anxious desire not to be deceived,” hence, with what he regarded as reason. This, of course, was
precisely what Wollstonecraft meant by “mind”—for she too was a rationalist. Women, she thought,
were being denied,  both in theory and in the practice that presupposed it,  the only faculty that
deserved to be so termed: reason. And this is precisely what Godwin is here denying her. 
Thus,  the  ideologically  charged  contrast  between  his  representations  of  himself  and  of
Wollstonecraft is eloquent. His specialty was thinking; Wollstonecraft’s was feeling. He regrets to
say, therefore, that he has “seldom been right” in judgements of taste “but by dint of persevering
examination, and the change and correction of my first opinions” (Godwin, Memoirs 121). He had
no feeling for such things, of course. His wife, on the other hand, was peculiarly endowed to receive
aesthetic impressions, for she was, he thinks, very sensitive. He also implies, of course, as he does
throughout the whole book, that Wollstonecraft did not scrutinise her first impressions as carefully
as he did, and also that her judgement on such matters did not involve rational thought. I doubt
Wollstonecraft could ever have agreed. In any case, the trait of mind that supposedly made her such
a  good  judge  of  what  Godwin  terms  “intellectual  beauty”  was  certainly  not  what  he  (or
Wollstonecraft for that matter) would call reason or intellect. Indeed, the tendency to cling to first
impressions that, says Godwin, served her so well in matters of “imagination,” evidently rendered
her  opinions  on  all  other  matters—on  all  serious  matters  that  were  the  “proper  province  of
reasoning”—suspect.
Thus,  Godwin’s  praise  is  actually  a  back-handed  compliment,  and  a  betrayal  to
Wollstonecraft’s  thought.  Godwin takes  much more than he gives.  Instead of  reason, he grants
Wollstonecraft precisely that which she regarded as a consolation prize meant to appease subjected
women:  sensibility.  Of course,  he is  only  being gallant.  He does  not  really  regret  his  habit  of
carefully examining all sides of a question and studiously correcting first impressions, or the “desire
not to be deceived.”  This is what is called thinking, in the proper sense of the word—in any event,
that  is  certainly what  Godwin would call  thinking.  He was certainly not  about  to  quit  being a
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philosopher. The “improvement” he was getting from Wollstonecraft, then, would be that he learned
to live a little, and occasionally to suspend the exercise of reason. On her part,  he implies, she
scarcely ever thought.
It is all very well for Godwin to admit his inferiority towards his wife in matters of taste
when  his  very  admission  of  weakness  is,  in  effect,  a  declaration  of  his  infinite  intellectual
superiority as well as a validation of male intellectual pride. Furthermore, Godwin’s disparagement
of Wollstonecraft’s reasoning is firmly and evidently rooted on his conception of gender—or more
precisely sex. Indeed, he was of the opinion that the female mind was fundamentally different from
the  male  mind;  Wollstonecraft  violently  disagreed.  Yet,  this  radical  disagreement  becomes
completely obscured, as Brenda Ayres has remarked, in most modern criticism of his book.
By “logical and metaphysical distinction” Godwin evidently means that abstract thought on
which rationalists thought all truly philosophical inquiry was rooted. Abstract thought, of course,
was then regarded by most as paradigmatically male. An extreme version of this position appears in
Émile. Wollstonecraft,  who  of  course  rejected  such  notions,  called  this  “one  of  Rousseau’s
chimeras,” and presented a translation of relevant passage in a footnote:  
Researches  into  abstract  and  speculative  truths,  the  principles  and  axioms  of
sciences, in short, every thing which tends to generalize our ideas, is not the proper
province of women; their studies should be relative to points of practice; it belongs to
them to apply those principles which men have discovered; and it is their part to
make  observations,  which  direct  men  to  the  establishment  of  general  principles.
(Vindication 108n).155
The conception of gender that underlies Godwin’s  Memoirs is much closer to Rousseau’s
than it is to Wollstonecraft’s position in A Vindication—indeed, though it might not seem so at first
155 Here is the original passage: “La recherche des vérités abstraites et spéculatives, des principes, des axiomes dans les
sciences, tout ce qui tend à généraliser les idées n’est point du ressort des femmes, leurs études doivent se rapporter 
toutes à la pratique; c’est à elles à faire l’application des principes que l’homme a trouvés, et c’est à elles de faire 
les observations qui mènent l’homme à l’établissement des principes” (Rousseau, Émile 488).
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glance, it is practically identical to Rousseau’s. In the first edition of Memoirs there was a passage
that intimated this only too clearly. The passage in question, however, was omitted from the revised
second edition.  Even Godwin must have realised that it  contradicted too flatly  Wollstonecraft’s
statements on the same subject:
A circumstance  by which  the  two sexes  are  particularly  distinguished from each
other, is, that the one is accustomed more to the exercise of its reasoning powers, and
the other of its feelings. Women have a frame of body more delicate and susceptible
of  impression  than  men,  and,  in  proportion  as  they  receive  a  less  intellectual
education, are more unreservedly under the empire of feeling. Feeling is liable to
become a source of erroneous decisions, because a mind not accustomed to logical
analysis, cannot be expected accurately to discriminate between the simple dictates
of an ingenuous mind, and the factitious sentiments of a partial education. Habits of
deduction  enable us  to  correct  this  defect.  But  habits  of  deduction  may generate
habits  of  sophistry;  and  scepticism  and  discussion,  while  they  undermine  our
prejudices, have sometimes a tendency to weaken or distort our feelings. Hence we
may infer  one  of  the  advantages  accruing from the  association  of  persons of  an
opposite sex: they may be expected to counteract the principal mistake into which
either is in danger to fall. (Memoirs 216)
Here, Godwin ambiguously appeals at the same time to both the traditional view that women
are naturally “sensitive,” as opposed to rational, and to Wollstonecraft’s idea that the distinction was
not natural, but a result of an arbitrary system of education that did not develop their understanding.
But one simply cannot have it both ways.
The identification of understanding and sensibility respectively with the male and female
principles,  only  implied  in  the  latter  version,  was  explicit  here.  Although  his  appears  to  be  a
mitigated version of Rousseau’s theory, the mitigation is only apparent, insofar as Godwin implies
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that the distinction is, in part at least, natural. In practice, therefore, he completely validates the
conventional patriarchal view that man and woman complement each other intellectually.
Moreover,  the  subaltern  role  of  the  female  mind  relative  to  the  male  is  as  crucial  to
Godwin’s way of thinking as it was to Rousseau’s. The “mistakes” into which single women are
described as being in danger of falling are evidently much more disabling than those into which
men  who live without forming an association with an individual of the “opposite” sex are supposed
to be exposed to. The female intuition of which Godwin is speaking is being explicitly equated with
emotion.  Judgements  founded  on  such  intuition,  according  to  his  terms,  are  valueless  unless
validated by “male” logical thinking. Therefore, in practice, he indirectly reiterates the view that a
woman needs a man’s reason to guide her and preserve her from the errors into which her sex is
depicted as being constitutionally prone to fall  into; that she is  doomed eternally to pursue the
reason that she can never attain but must be content to admire in man. This supposed handicap
could never be compensated, not even by the intercourse with rational beings, that is, men, who, on
the other hand, could get along very well, though perhaps less agreeably, without women.
Godwin  makes  allowances  for  individual  variations—this  is  what  makes  his  statements
appear less aggressive than Rousseau’s. Not all men grasp the fine points of philosophy as well as
he does,  just  as not  all  women are as sensitive to  beauty as Wollstonecraft  was.  But  this  only
underlines the masculinist point he is making. For he thought that he and his first wife were almost
pure manifestations of the male and female principles:  “Mary and myself  perhaps each carried
farther than to its common extent the characteristic of the sexes to which we belonged” (Godwin,
Memoirs 216). The way he contrasts the functioning of his mind with Wollstonecraft’s, of course,
reproduces this scheme. Wollstonecraft “reasoned little,” and felt much, and therefore approached to
pure femininity. By the same token, Godwin, being even less sensitive than “some other men” to the
“pleasures  of  the  imagination,”  represented  the  pure  “male,”  that  is,  the  philosopher.  Hence,
Wollstonecraft was practically incapable of logical thinking because she was  all  woman. His life
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with her made him a better, more agreeable man; what he supposed was his essential male character,
however, was untouched: he remained a philosopher. Wollstonecraft, on the other hand, who once
had presumed to be a philosopher, eventually gained enough sense to stop trying. Indeed, this is
what her supposed conversion to “sensibility” amounts to.
The contradiction between this unquestionably patriarchal discourse and  A Vindication is
absolute. Wollstonecraft argued against giving “a sex to mind:” “considering woman as a whole
(…) instead of a part of man, the inquiry is whether she have reason or not. If she have, which, for a
moment, I will take for granted, she was not created merely to be the solace of man, and the sexual
should  not  destroy  the  human  character”(Vindication 122).  This,  she  thought,  could  never  be
established  until  both  sexes  were  given  equal  opportunities  of  developing  the  understanding.
Wollstonecraft also argued that “the received opinion of female excellence” had been “separated by
specious  [and,  one  might  add,  male]  reasoners  from  human  excellence.  Or,”  she  defiantly
concludes, “they (…) kindly restore the rib, and make one moral being of a man and woman; not
forgetting to give her all the ‘submissive charms,’” like Swedenborg and Rousseau had done (111,
122, 102). She also rejected, of course, the idea of the intellectual complementarity of the sexes,
here expressed in her own words: “man was made to reason, woman to feel; (…) together, flesh and
spirit,  they  make  the  most  perfect  whole,  by  blending  happily  reason  and sensibility  into  one
character” (132). Evidently, Godwin was one of the “specious reasoners” she mentions. Tragically,
however, Wollstonecraft never realised it. Or perhaps she overestimated her influence on him, for,
as we shall see later on, the views he would later express in  Memoirs on the subject are clearly
foreshadowed by, and perfectly consonant with Political Justice.
Wollstonecraft, then, being the most “womanly” of women, was also the least capable of
reason. But, for Godwin this is precisely what made her the perfect companion for a philosopher.
With him, she could finally exercise to the utmost “the art of communicating happiness:” “No one
knew better than Mary how to extract sentiments of exquisite delight, from trifles, which suspicious
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and  formal  wisdom would  scarcely  deign  to  remark”  (Godwin,  Memoirs 109).  By  creating  a
nurturing domestic environment, Wollstonecraft lessened the heavy burden of reason for him. In her
society, the philosopher was eveidently not as anxious not to be deceived as he once had been. He
permitted himself to relax. As a result, his “manly” speculations became bolder, acquiring some of
that charming feminine recklessness that characterised his bewitching companion, through whose
influence the coldness of his logic was tempered with the warmth of feeling and the awful aridity of
his precise reasonings softened. Through this apparently favourable assessment of Wollstonecraft’s
influence of him, of course, one can clearly detect an hint of Godwin’s anxiety that she might have
seduced him into error through her “female” charms.
In her finest writings, that is, when she kept to the proper province of the female mind, the
“picturesque,” Wollstonecraft exercised, according to her husband, the same abilities that made her
such  an  agreeable  domestic  companion.  Thus,  although  he  pays  lip-service  to  Wollstonecraft’s
ideas, Godwin actually weasel-words his way into an admission of what is known as the doctrine of
the  separate  spheres.  Wollstonecraft,  I  insist,  vehemently  opposed  this  view,  and  staunchly
maintained  that  women  as  well  as  man  were  autonomous  individuals,  both  intellectually  and
morally. And she also rejected, most emphatically, the idea that women’s only purpose in life was to
please men, which clearly flows from Godwin’s rhetoric.
And  of  course,  by  applying  the  principle  of  the  separate  spheres  to  his  critique  of
Wollstonecraft’s works, Godwin subjects them to a critical criterion that they were not designed to
meet and which their author did not even recognise. A Vindication was certainly not a “picturesque”
work, but a book that appealed to reason—or, as Godwin implies, a book that was intended to
appeal to reason, for he thinks that Wollstonecraft had failed, as he thought she had to, in meeting
this aim:
The public at large formed very different opinions respecting the character of the
performance.  Many  of  the  sentiments  are  undoubtedly  of  a  rather  masculine
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description. (…) There are also, it must be confessed, occasional passages of a stern
and rugged feature, incompatible with the true stamina of the writer’s character. But,
if they did not belong to her fixed and permanent character, they belonged to her
character pro tempore, and what she thought, she scorned to qualify.
Yet,  along  with  this  rigid,  and  somewhat  amazonian  temper,  which
characterized some parts of the book, it is impossible not to remark a luxuriance of
imagination, and a trembling delicacy of sentiment, which would have done honour
to a poet, bursting with all the visions of an Armida and a Dido. (Memoirs 75)
 Like Brenda Ayres,  I  do not believe “Wollstonecraft  would have been flattered” by his
praise  of  her  “’trembling  delicacy  of  sentiment’”  (Betwixt  30).  Indeed,  Godwin  here  makes  a
wholesale dismissal of the arguments in A Vindication by referring them to what he construes as the
false “male”—that is, rational—persona he thought she had assumed in the book. Even worse, he
maintains that her warm feelings shone through the flawed logic of the book. In other words, he
claims that Wollstonecraft had revealed her true “feminine” self in despite of herself, her beliefs,
and her intentions, thus defeating the argument she was trying to make.
The  best  part  of  Wollstonecraft’s  book,  then,  would  be  its  emotional  content.  Since
“sensibility” is the peculiar characteristic of the female mind, the display of “feeling” should be the
object of a book written by a woman. Wollstonecraft, being the most womanly of women, was,
therefore, particularly endowed to write a moving book. By the same token, however, she was also
the least qualified to write a rational book. Thus, Godwin effectively demolishes A Vindication, for
any reader who approaches Wollstonecraft’s vigorous political treaty in search of pathetic tableaux
must be sorely disappointed. It is nothing if not argument, and, this is exactly what Wollstonecraft
intended: “I wish (…) rather to address the head than the heart” (Vindication 96). Wollstonecraft’s
arguments are precisely what Godwin is construing, by implication, as the unduly “masculine” part
of her book. These arguments, he further implies, though they may seem so, are not truly rational,
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nor even reasonable, because she was not really “masculine,” hence, not truly rational. As Godwin
sees it, they are rather the pseudo-rational arguments of a pseudo-masculine woman.
Godwin thus presents  A Vindication  as an act of intellectual transgenderism. He forgets to
mention that this was exactly how Wollstonecraft expected most people would perceive it, and also
that she had refuted, by argument, the accusation:
from every quarter have I heard exclamations against masculine women; but where
are they to be found? If by this appellation men mean to inveigh against their ardour
in hunting, shooting, and gaming, I shall most cordially join in the cry; but if it be
against the imitation of manly virtues, or, more properly speaking, the attainment of
those talents and virtues, the exercise of which ennobles the human character, and
which raise females in the scale of animal being, when they are comprehensively
termed mankind;—all those who view them with a [philosophical] eye must, I should
think, wish with me, that they may every day grow more and more masculine 
(Wollstonecraft, Vindication 74)
Wollstonecraft thought that in order to change society, language itself had to be revised: “the
word masculine,” she maintained, “was only a bugbear” (Vindication 76). For her, therefore, the
phrase “masculine woman” was a contradiction in terms, unless “masculine” meant “rational,” in
which  case,  she  ironically  challenges  her  male  public  to  follow her  example:  “I  presume that
rational  men will excuse me for endeavouring to persuade them to become more masculine and
respectable” (Vindication 76).
Thus, she very deliberately set out to write what the world would perceive as a monstrously
masculine book, with the view to confound the very conceptions of intellectual differences between
the sexes to which Godwin attempts to reconcile her: 
Dismissing then those pretty feminine phrases, which men condescendingly use to
soften our slavish dependence, and despising the weak elegance of mind, exquisite
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sensibility, and sweet docility of manners, supposed to be the sexual characteristics
of the weaker vessel, I wish to shew that elegance is inferior to virtue, that the first
object of laudable ambition is to obtain a character as a human being, regardless of
the distinction of sex; and that secondary views should be brought to this simple
touchstone.
(…) wishing rather to persuade by the force of my arguments, than dazzle by
the elegance of my language, I shall not waste my time in rounding periods.
(Wollstonecraft, Vindication 75)
Wollstonecraft certainly did not aim to please a patriarchal establishment which, as Godwin
implies,  was comprised almost  exclusively of “literary men” (Memoirs  121).  The conclusion is
inevitable. Clemit and Walker term Memoirs of the Author of a Vindication of the Rights of Woman
“Godwin’s frankest vindication of Mary Wollstonecraft’s beliefs and conduct” (42). This, appearing
in their introduction to that book, is meant to put the reader in what they regard as the proper frame
of mind. But the statement could not be more misleading, unless, of course, we credit Godwin’s
claim that Wollstonecraft had completely recanted the opinions she had expressed in the book to
which his title refers—which, for reasons that may appear obvious by now, but which I try to clarify
below, appears to me a wholly implausible hypothesis.
Memoirs is in fact an assassination of Wollstonecraft’s character as an author. First, Godwin
questions her ability to carry off her intentions,  that is,  of writing a rational book, and then he
compliments her for doing the exact opposite of what she intended. Finally, assuming a bizarre
essentialist position on personal identity, Godwin says that the author of A Vindication was not the
true  Wollstonecraft,  and  purports  to  correct  the  public’s  perception  of  her  character  with  the
authority of the only man to whom she had supposedly revealed her true self, attributing to her all
that “sweet docility” which she thought was falsely and perversely associated with feminility.
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Godwin’s unacknowledged overriding purpose was to redeem his wife’s character from the
accusation of masculinity, and this required showing that she had the exquisite sensibility attributed
to her sex, and very little of the male intellectual traits. He calls her “the greatest ornament her sex
ever had to boast! A woman, with sentiments as pure, as refined, and as delicate, as ever inhabited a
human heart!” (Godwin,  Memoirs 108). She helped the cause of her sex not by argument, as she
intended—that  was  man’s  way,  Godwin thought—, but  by  melting  the  public  into  tears:  “The
Vindication of the Rights of Woman is undoubtedly a very unequal performance, and eminently
deficient in method and arrangement. When tried by the hoary and long-established laws of literary
composition, it can scarcely maintain its claim to be placed in the first class of human productions”
(76). As an intellectual product, therefore, the book is worthless, but as an emotional document
Godwin claimed it was invaluable: “Mary Wollstonecraft will perhaps hereafter be found to have
performed more substantial  service for the cause of her sex, than all  the other writers, male or
female, that ever felt themselves animated in the behalf of oppressed and injured beauty” (76).
Though  he  did  not  scruple  to  make  the  most  unflattering  insinuations  about  his  wife,
Godwin now once again decides to be gallant, and uses “beauty” as a synonym of “woman.” There
is perhaps no greater insult to Wollstonecraft’s memory in the entire book. She spent hundreds of
pages  arguing  against  the  notion  that  women  were  the  “fair  sex.”  Hers  was  not  the  cause  of
“beauty,” but, as her title indicates, of justice. In fact, as she saw it, the struggle for gender equality
was as much the cause of women as it was of men. As she conceived it, this was a struggle for the
dignity of humanity. Godwin’s sexual revision of Wollstonecraft, therefore, “not only destroys her
reputation, but (…) belittles her writing and theory, pitching her as a ‘woman of feeling’ in contrast
to the ‘man of reason’” (Caine, qtd. In Ayres, Betwixt 30).
Godwin  claims,  however,  that  by  the  time  she  died  his  wife  had  completely  lost  her
“ruggedness,” meaning by this that she had repudiated the “masculine” feelings she had expressed
in A Vindication. According to him, she had overgrown them as well as the book itself. The reader
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who wished to know the real Wollstonecraft should not waste time with that failed book, and is
instead advised to proceed directly to the later Letters Written During a Short Residence in Sweden,
Norway, and Denmark (1796), where Godwin thought all the exquisite sensibility of her delicate
character was displayed unalloyed, without the dross of “masculine” feelings that had affected all
her previous literary efforts: 
perhaps a book of travels that so irresistibly seizes on the heart, never, in any other
instance, found its way from the press. The occasional harshness and ruggedness of
character,  that  diversify  her  Vindication  of  the  Rights  of  Woman,  here  totally
disappear. If ever there was a book calculated to make a man fall in love with its
author, this appears to me to be the book. She speaks of her sorrows, in a way that
fills us with melancholy, and dissolves us in tenderness, at the same time that she
displays a genius which commands all our admiration. Affliction had tempered her
heart to a softness almost more than human; and the gentleness of her spirit seems
precisely to accord with all the romance of unbounded attachment.
Thus softened and improved, thus fraught with imagination and sensibility, 
with all, and more than all, ‘that youthful poets fancy, when they love,’ she returned 
to England, and, if he so pleased, to the arms of her former lover.
(Godwin, Memoirs 95)
Letters  is  here hailed as the expression of the femininity  Wollstonecraft  had supposedly
ceased  to  deny;  that  is,  of  her  true  sexual  identity.  Whereas  her  previous  efforts  had  been
“diversified”—notice  the  patronizing  euphemism  for  “spoil”—this  book  was  the  epitome  of
“female” sensibility, in its purest form, as opposed to male rationality. Godwin’s praise of Letters is
ultimately  no  less  damaging  to  Wollstonecraft’s  reputation  than  his  scathing  criticism  of  A
Vindication had been. As Brenda Ayres points out, he “gives her no credit for the substance of the
book—only for the feminine emotion” (Betwixt 131). That is all he ever gives her credit for. In fact,
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he implies that by that time Wollstonecraft was past even trying to be rational—that is, in his terms,
she had ceased to ape man—, and that this was what made the book better than its predecessor. This
is, incidentally, a passage in which the resemblance between Godwin and the narrator of “Ligeia” is
particularly striking. Expressions like “softness almost more than human,” with its suggestion of an
angelic nature alien to the earth, for example; or “the romance of unbounded attachment” to the
unworthy Imlay, which perfectly parallels Poe’s “more than womanly abandonment to a love, alas!
all  unmerited,  all  unworthily  bestowed,”  bespeak  the  same  kind  of  posthumous  ideological
reframing of the dead wife’s memory that we have seen in that tale (“Ligeia” 317).
Godwin reduces Letters to a sentimental outburst by a martyr of sensibility, only interesting
as a heart-rending document of the self-sacrificing love of a woman for a man that did not deserve
her,  Gilbert  Imlay,  her  companion at  the time,  in whose behalf  Wollstonecraft  had travelled to
Scandinavia as a business agent in a desperate attempt to save their relationship. Godwin implies
that the “heart” of woman must be “tempered” by the sacrifice for a man that does not deserve her.
The claim that her book was “calculated to make a man fall  in love with its  author” is
another insult to all Wollstonecraft stood for. As she regretfully remarked, pleasing men was all that
was expected of  a woman.  Enslaved by man,  woman “has  never  thought,  much less acted for
herself. She has only learned to please men,” and needs a “husband to supply the place of reason”
(Wollstonecraft,  Vindication  117).  Godwin,  therefore,  projects  on  Wollstonecraft  the  very
stereotypes she subverted in A Vindication. Indeed, his sexualised praise of Letters does to her work
what his description of their marriage did to her life. A woman is made to please, and to please men;
and her book is an extension of her person. Wollstonecraft had changed. She was no longer the wild
woman  who,  Godwin  writes,  had  once  been  guilty  of  a  “too  contemptuous  and  intemperate
treatment of the great man” Edmund Burke (Godwin, Memoirs 73).
Indeed, Godwin implies that when she wrote her “vindications,” Wollstonecraft had been, in
manners  and  personal  appearance,  as  “masculine”  as  her  books.  We have  already  detailed  his
566
conception of  A Vindication  as an androgynous book, characterised by the contrast  between its
improperly “masculine” and its “feminine” parts. He thought that:
The contradiction, to the public apprehension, was equally great, as to the person of
the author, as it was when they considered the temper of the book. In the champion of
her sex, who was described as endeavouring to invest them with all the rights of man,
those whom curiosity prompted to seek occasion of beholding her, expected to find a
sturdy,  muscular,  raw-boned  virago;  and  they  were  not  a  little  surprised,  when,
instead of all this, they found a woman, lovely [this is the key word] in her person,
and, in the best and most engaging sense, feminine in her manners.
(Godwin, Memoirs 76)
After all, she was a proper woman, says Godwin. But when we pause to think for a minute,
we  realise  he  is  actually  validating  the  expectation  he  attributes  to  the  public  concerning  the
appearance of the author of a feminist essay, thus indirectly endorsing the kind of prejudice that
Wollstonecraft’s friend Mary Hays mentioned in regard to Catharine Macaulay. He certainly seems
to have been himself surprised by finding that Wollstonecraft was not what he terms an “amazon.”
However, piling insult upon insult, Godwin indirectly admits that, lovely though she was,
Wollstonecraft’s  appearance  at  the  time  she  wrote  A  Vindication was  in  keeping  with  the
expectations her book created—at least, on a male readership that shared Godwin’s prejudices. But
all that changed for the better, says Godwin, when she fell in love with the painter Henry Fuseli:
She began to think that she had been too rigid, in the laws of frugality and self-denial
with which she set  out in her literary career; and now added to the neatness and
cleanliness which she had always scrupulously observed a certain degree of elegance,
and  those  temperate  indulgences  in  furniture  and accommodation,  from which  a
sound and uncorrupted taste never fails to derive pleasure. (Memoirs 79)
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Here is another textbook example of the kind of malicious weasel-wording at which Scott’s
Donnerhugel and Poe’s bereaved husbands were so adept. Had Wollstonecraft’s personal hygiene
ever been brought into question? If so, this was probably the first time any intimation of it ever saw
its way to print. By implicitly denying an accusation before it had been made, Godwin actually
raises a suspicion which he indirectly admits was not unfounded. He gives us to understand, through
all  this,  that  before  Fuseli  came  along,  Wollstonecraft  had  been  a  case  of  arrested  sexual
development, and that this was equally noticeable in her writing and in her personal appearance.
Supposedly, she found then that she was “formed for domestic affection,” but Fuseli, who
was forty years her senior and married, rejected her, and so, according to Godwin, it was not until
1793, when she became involved with Gilbert Imlay, that Wollstonecraft had a chance to develop
her true nature (Memoirs  81). During her association with the father of her first child she finally
achieved, her future husband implies, full “feminine” maturity, sexually as well as sentimentally.
And Godwin consistently equates femininity with loveliness. According to his unhappy simile: “She
was a like a serpent upon a rock, that casts its slough, and appears again with the brilliancy, the
sleekness, and the elastic activity of its happiest age. She was playful, full of confidence, kindness
and sympathy. Her eyes assumed new lustre, and her cheeks new colour and smoothness. Her voice
became cheerful; her temper overflowing with universal kindness” (88).
Is the oldest, most enduring symbol of temptation in Western culture the best Godwin could
come up with to illustrate his future wife’s transformation? Indeed, after intimating that his wife
was the most purely spiritual of women, now he tacitly associates her with the idea of carnality,
thereby deploying the two poles of the conventional  sentimental  representation of woman.  The
symbol he chooses, the serpent, carries with it the negative view of sexuality inherent to the biblical
myth of the Fall. His handling of the image particularly evokes the ideas of lubricity and duplicity.
All this, however, seems so out of place, so contradictory to his statements about Wollstonecraft,
that we get the feeling the effect is unintended.
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The only relevant traits of the comparison are—must be—the beauty of the serpent, and the
fact that it is restored by the shedding of the old, tattered skin, with a shiny new one. But the other
associations  evoked by his  comparison cannot  be dismissed offhand, by stipulation:  we simply
cannot think of serpents without being reminded of those other associations—one suspects Godwin
also had these ideas at the back of his mind. In this, as in many other matters, the idea that Godwin
could have been unaware of the effect he achieved is incredible. At some level, he must have been
aware  of  what  he  was  saying,  just  as  he  must  have  been  aware  that  he  was  destroying
Wollstonecraft’s  reputation.  At the same time,  however,  such awkward remarks  have the air  of
involuntary slips of the pen. We really get the impression Godwin was not consciously aware of the
obvious  implications of this embarrassingly revealing passage. This, then, is what I mean when I
say that Memoirs and Poe’s tales about learned women share the same singular tone.
Much  worse  than  Godwin’s  admission  that  Wollstonecraft  seemed masculine  is  the
complementary assertion that she was, in fact, very feminine, in the double sense of being lovely
and devoted to domesticity. Indeed, this carries the insinuation that she recognised the error of her
past ways and renounced all that she had struggled for to devote herself to a man, which is much
more damaging to her character as an intellectual than the accusation of masculinity, which, as we
have seen, Wollstonecraft thought the inevitable consequence of her outspoken advocacy of equal
rights and opportunities for women.
In fact, Godwin tacitly construes her aggressive arguments as a consequence of her long
celibacy. She resented men, in other words, because she had not yet been able to get herself a male
lover. Therefore, Godwin implies, completely misconstruing her book in the process, she resented
all men. With Imlay, however: “Her confidence was entire; her love was unbounded. Now, for the
first time in her life she gave a loose to all the sensibilities of her nature” (Godwin, Memoirs 89).
Fittingly  enough,  for  Godwin’s  purposes,  it  was  during  this  period  that  Wollstonecraft  became
pregnant for the first time. 
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Thus, Godwin deploys that “morality that sanctifies or vilifies all women into submission”
(Gilbert  and  Gubar,  Madwoman 64).  In  other  words,  he  posthumously  “domesticates”
Wollstonecraft. I am appropriating a term used by Wollstonecraft herself, who conceived herself to
be writing against those “men who, by their writings, have most earnestly laboured to domesticate
women” (Vindication  133). Indeed, when he says that Wollstonecraft was “formed for domestic
affection,” he implies that she was not “formed” for public intervention, or rational debate, and, in
this sense, effectively “domesticated” Wollstonecraft in precisely the sense she here gives to the
word.
According to Memoirs, Wollstonecraft finally found the error of her past ways, recognising
that the true “feminine” character is only properly expressed in the home, through the attachment, or
more precisely submission, to a man. Her involvement with Fuseli  would have first shaken her
convictions, and by the time she became pregnant of Imlay’s child her ideas had suffered a complete
reversal. Indeed, Godwin proposes “to state her principles upon”  the matter of conjugality, “such at
least as they were when I knew her best,” thereby implicitly recognising the contradiction between
the ideas he attributes to her and the opinions she had expressed in  A Vindication (Memoirs  79).
According to his narrative this was a veritable conversion. I must insist, however, there is no textual
evidence of this conversion in any of her works, for, as we shall see, that insoluble contradiction
Godwin imagined existed  between the  “vindications” and the  books  Wollstonecraft  wrote  after
meeting Fuseli, like Letters and Maria: or, The Wrongs of Woman, simply does not exist.
Buried in Godwin’s text, however, or rather concealed in its surface, there is another layer of
even more viciously misogynous innuendo. After having defused her polemical writings with the
double argument that they were unduly “masculine” but essentially “feminine,” he now depicts
Wollstonecraft  as  a  repentant  virago,  who  was  reformed  through  heterosexual  love.  The  wild
amazon, whose character had been distorted into a simulacrum of masculinity, was finally tamed
through copulation; cured of her masculine illusions, and converted to the doctrine of the separate
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spheres.  Memoirs  is, in this sense, clearly Godwin’s “answer to the accusations that his wife was
‘masculine,’  celibate,’  ‘amazonian,’  ‘homosexual  or  bisexual,’”  and  consequently  “[m]ore  an
endorsement of himself as a lover” than anything else (Ayres, Betwixt 28).
Sadly,  Imlay was not  worthy of  the  treasure he  had discovered.  Still,  as  we have seen,
Godwin  thought  this  may  have  been  a  blessing  in  disguise,  for  he  believed  Wollstonecraft’s
misfortunes had refined her  personality.  When he finally  came along,  she was finally  ready to
express  all  her  exquisite  sensibility: “no  two  persons  ever  found  in  each  other’s  society,  a
satisfaction  more  pure  and refined.  (…) She seemed to  have  attained that  situation,  which  her
disposition and character imperiously demanded, but which she had never before attained; and her
understanding and her  heart  felt  the benefit  of it.  (…) She was a  worshipper  of domestic  life”
(Godwin, Memoirs 109).
As he domesticates the woman, Godwin also domesticates her work. The same supposed
inability to organise her thought that disqualified Wollstonecraft for polemical writing, was, Godwin
thought, perfectly acceptable in “sentimental works,” which is how he classifies both  Letters  and
her fiction. Not that the limitations of the author were any less conspicuous there; but they were
irrelevant, if not positively a merit, in books which he thought aimed solely at the communication of
emotion. In fact, Godwin seems to have felt that the same flaws that had infuriated him so in  A
Vindication, were charming in a properly feminine work. Godwin’s appraisal of Wollstonecraft’s
first novel Mary: A Fiction (1788) illustrates this. Always the most severe critic of his wife’s work,
he thought the book had been, as far as composition is concerned, a rather inauspicious debut, but
he thought that this was perfectly immaterial:
The story is nothing. He that looks into a book only for incident, will probably lay it
[Wollstonecraft’s novel]  down with disgust.  But the feelings are of the truest and
most exquisite class; every circumstance is adorned with that species of imagination,
which enlists itself under the banners of delicacy and sentiment. A work of sentiment,
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as it is called, is too often another name for a work of affectation. He that should
imagine that the sentiments of this book are affected, would indeed be entitled to our
profoundest commiseration. (Godwin, Memoirs 66)
The  “story,”  the  actual  design  of  the  plot,  requires  method,  constant  and  undeviating
attention to detail, as well as the ability to keep the whole steadily in view. In other words, the
“story” required some cold, dispassionate, manly thinking, and Wollstonecraft, being a woman, and,
according to him, one in whom what he regarded as the peculiar weakness of her sex, excitability,
was carried to rashness, was quite incapable of this. The only interest of her books was, therefore,
the “ingenuousness” of the feelings she expressed. Thus, the same inability to control her emotions
and think coolly that made her a bad writer, strictly speaking, was the strength of her best, because
least ambitious, work, which represented emotion almost “unadulterated” by reflection.
Again, Godwin reduces Wollstonecraft, and through her all women, to sensibility. And thus,
in absentia he corrects her published work, submitting her to the reason of man—submitting her,
that is,  to the reason of the manly philosopher. At his hands, she became a symbol of the very
idealised conception of womanhood against which she fought. She became the domestic angel of
patriarchal ideology, who proves her worth—her superhuman worth—by the ultimate sacrifice to
love, which he, like all the writers she attacked in  A Vindication, construes as the only way by
which a woman can purify her sensuous nature. 
He compares her with Dido, Calista, and Armida, all of whom perfectly correspond to the
ideal woman, devoted to her male lover to the point of sacrificing her life or dignity, as she was
typically portrayed in sentimental literature. The first kills herself for the love of Aeneas when he
rejects her; the second is a character in Nicholas Rowe’s The Fair Penitent (1702) who kills herself
for being forced to marry a man she did not love; the last is a beautiful Saracen queen in Tasso’s
Gerusalemme  Liberata (1581)  who  plans  to  kill  herself,  but  instead  consents  to  become  her
Christian  lover’s  slave.  In  the  following  chapter,  Godwin  tells  us  that  during  the  time  of  her
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involvement with Fuseli “her sensibility was destroying her,” and also that “Mary was (…) a female
Werter” (Memoirs 87, 88). She was simply too good for this corrupt world, Godwin implies. This is
also the moral the femicide extracts from his own story.
And like Poe’s femicide narrators, Godwin has a way of smuggling a hidden barb into every
compliment he pays his wife. Aside from the ideological deconstruction of her works through the
rhetoric  of  sensibility,  however,  these  barbs  often  take  the  form of  some apparently  gratuitous
insults  which often disturb his superficial  meaning. Indeed, if  on the one hand Godwin overtly
disparages Wollstonecraft’s public intervention by portraying her as a sweet, accommodating, and
very spiritual woman, possessing all the virtues conventionally attributed to her sex, on the other he
defeats his  own argument by suggesting that  she was,  in  reality,  at  the same time aggressively
“masculine,” and overly sensuous.
Godwin’s account of Wollstonecraft’s one-sided romantic involvement with Fuseli in the
first edition of  Memoirs, which, as Godwin puts it, put an end to a period of “upwards of thirty
years” of “celibacy and seclusion,” illustrates my meaning: “Never was there a woman on the face
of the earth more alien to that mire and grossness, in which the sensual part of our species are
delighted  to  wallow”  (Memoirs  209n).  Considering  Wollstonecraft  did  not  die  a  virgin,  the
statement  is  manifestly  hyperbolical.  In  the  very  next  sentence,  however,  Godwin  makes  what
appears to be a blunder: “no one knew more perfectly how to assign the enjoyments of affection
their respective rank, or to maintain in virgin and unsullied purity the chasteness,” and here comes
another awkward remark, “of her mind” (209n). Her mind, as opposed to her body. Thus, Godwin
effectively draws attention to the fact that she did not keep her  body “chaste,” thus indirectly
reminding his reader of her future transgressions to the moral conventions of her time, for which she
was almost universal maligned, and even  ostracised by many of her friends. In fact, the final words
of his sentence, by directly contradicting his initial statement of Wollstonecraft’s “spirituality,” work
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almost as a punchline. Thus, innuendo works against Godwin’s ostensible rhetoric, which, again, is
exactly what happens in “Morella” and “Ligeia.”
Some may be inclined to argue that Godwin and Wollstonecraft were at the forefront of a
modern cultural  movement that questioned the absolute value of chasteness, and that their own
experiment in cohabitation proved it. This, however, would be a misunderstanding. While this may
be  said  of  Wollstonecraft,  who  openly  tackled  the  role  of  sexuality  in  conjugality,  and  even
acknowledged female desire,  Godwin clearly states that the indulgence of sensual pleasure was
“gross,” and this perfectly reflects his overall view of sexuality. Indeed, although he condescended
to get married, he consistently repudiated sexual pleasure—at least in public—, and even went so
far as to deny it. The point is that Godwin makes his wife a compliment she manifestly does not
deserve. With the most hyperbolic sentimental rhetoric, he tells us that she was an angel on earth,
but appears not to realise that he ridicules his own claim by showing us that she was not as “alien”
to all that “grossness” of the flesh he had repudiated in the strongest possible terms. But then, she
never claimed to be an “angel”—on the contrary, she repudiated this sort of language.156 Godwin, of
course, also ridicules himself by such evident contradictions, which afford the strongest possible
evidence that he was not fully conscious of the effect he had produced. I can think of only one
plausible  explanation  for  this.  Godwin’s  overpowering  urge  to  destroy  the  woman  who  had
threatened his fragile male pride, of which he appears to have been unaware, seems to have clouded
his judgement.
Of course, he did not mean this crude joke at his wife’s expense. Still, had he intended a
satire  on  his  wife’s  sexual  morals,  he  could  not  have  conveyed  the  impression  that  she  was
promiscuous more effectively than he did. Godwin comes across as a man who vainly attempts to
convince  himself  that  his  wife  was  an  “angel.”  Still,  although  the  comic  effect  was  certainly
156 For example, in a footnote to ch. IV of A Vindication, entitled “Observations on the State of Degradation to Which
Woman is  Reduced by Various Causes:” “Into  what  inconsistencies  do men fall  when they  argue without  the
compass of principles. Women, weak women, are compared with angels; yet, a superior order of beings should be
supposed to possess more intellect than man; or, in what does their superiority consist?” (Wollstonecraft 121n).
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unintended,  it  is  perfectly  consistent  with  Godwin’s  sentimental  rhetoric.  Indeed,  the  typical
sentimental representation of the ideal woman is rooted on a paradox. One the one hand, she is
completely  identified  with  the  senses,  hence  with  the  flesh  and the  earth;  on the  other,  she  is
depicted as a purely spiritual being whose nature is essentially alien to earth, and especially to the
pleasures of the flesh. Such representations are themselves based on a paradoxical understanding of
the term “sensibility,” which simultaneously expressed the susceptibility to sensuous impressions
and a connection with a world of pure spirituality. Therefore, the seemingly unintended effect is not
inconsistent with Godwin’s argument, but flows from a paradox that is integral to his design. In a
way, therefore, one might even say the joke reinforces that design, but also its fundamentally and
irredeemably unrealistic quality.
This passage, it is true, did not make it to the second edition. But, although it lost some of its
crudeness in the revision, the insinuation remained in place. If anything, it was even clearer in the
revised second edition: “She visited him; her visits were returned. Notwithstanding the inequality of
their years, Mary was not of a temper to live upon terms of intimacy with a man of merit and
genius, without loving him. The delight she enjoyed in his society, she transferred by association to
his person” (Godwin, Memoirs 78). In addition to making Wollstonecraft appear constitutionally
promiscuous, Godwin depicts her as being completely dependent on male “genius.” “As a painter, it
was impossible she should not wish to see his works, and consequently to frequent his house;” and,
once there, she just could not retain her equanimity around a man who “amused, delighted and
instructed her” (78). It was all perfectly inevitable. She just could not be intimate with a remarkable
man without falling in love with him.
What the joke lost in crudeness in the revision, it gained in the ridiculous vanity of the writer
—for Godwin seems not to realise how inappropriate the indirect compliment he pays himself here
is. Brenda Ayres, who unlike most other critics who dealt with Memoirs is not convinced that love
forgives  all,  maintained  that  the  book was  an  unreliable  biography  of  Wollstonecraft  not  only
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because of “the distortion and paucity of facts,” but also and chiefly because “Godwin uses it as a
forum to inflate his own ego at the expense of his deceased wife” (Ayres, Betwixt 29).
Godwin  appears  to  be—he  must  have  been—unconscious  of  the  fact  that  the  implied
compliment he pays himself backfires on him. It may be tempting to interpret this evident lack of
conscious awareness of the obvious meaning of his text in psychoanalytic terms, but I think that
would be digging too deep. The unintended meaning runs in a very shallow undercurrent—one
might say as shallow as the writer appears. His offended pride seems to have blinded him to the
flattering implications of his book. Wollstonecraft had evidently threatened Godwin’s brittle ego.
The author’s ill-will towards his subject is apparent in every page of the Memoirs, but he was blind
to  the  clues  by  which  he  inadvertently  revealed  the  true  story  of  his  relationship  with
Wollstonecraft. These tell a story of petty grudges that exposes Godwin’s claims of a life of perfect
domestic bliss as a pious fiction.
This ill-will is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in Godwin’s account of Wollstonecraft’s
work as a teacher:
No person was ever better formed for the business of education; if it be not a sort of
absurdity to speak of a person as formed for an inferior object, who is in possession
of  talents,  in  the  fullest  degree  adequate  to  something on a  more  important  and
comprehensive scale. Mary had a quickness of temper (…) She was occasionally
severe and imperious in her resentments; and, when she strongly disapproved, was
apt to express her censure in terms that gave a very humiliating sensation to the
person against whom it  was directed.  Her displeasure however never assumed its
severest form, but when it was barbed by disappointment. When she expected little,
she was not very rigid in her censure of error. (Memoirs 59)
This of course means that, however humiliating her “censure” may have been, her silence
was  even  more  humiliating.  Godwin  portrays  Wollstonecraft  as  the  strictest,  most  terrifying
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schoolmistress in existence. She may have been “formed” for the “inferior” business of teaching—
and in that sentence alone lurks a world of malignant insinuation that I will let go by untouched—,
but  let  the  student  thread  carefully  who  takes  her  lessons.  Are  these  the  traits  that  peculiarly
qualified Wollstonecraft for the business of education? The anarchist philosopher surely does not
mean to extol the advantages of authoritarianism in the classroom.
But let the reader withhold his judgement. In the sequence, we find Godwin is not really
talking of the teacher: “to whatever the defects of her temper might amount,” and he evidently
thought they amounted to a lot, “they were never exercised upon her inferiors in station or age. (…)
With  children  she  was  the  mirror  of  patience”  (Memoirs  59).  But  then,  why did  he  decide  to
mention defects that had nothing to do with his ostensible subject, her activity as a teacher? More
importantly, if not to the children, to whom was that “censure” directed which gave such a “very
humiliating sensation?” It is impossible not to guess that the great man himself had felt humiliated
by her censure. Thus, he implies what Poe’s narrators flatly state: that his wife had become his
teacher. And this humiliated him as much as it did them.
Brenda  Ayres  speaks  of  “Godwin’s  conviction  that  she  [Wollstonecraft]  possessed  an
extraordinary  proficiency  in  teaching,”  remarking  that  in  this,  as  in  all  other  matters,  Godwin
credited her only with supposedly feminine virtues, and never with reason, while also noticing that
he “presents very few details about her experiences with the Kingsboroughs,” for whom she had
worked as a governess, “other than to compliment her for liberating the children and ‘govern[ing]
them by their affections only’” (Ayres, Betwixt 28; Godwin, Memoirs 65). On this point, however, I
think she credits Godwin with more good sense than he displays, for he actually defeats his own
rhetoric, effectively pointing out to us that she was not as conventionally “feminine” as he himself
appears to have intended to suggest.
“I have heard her say,” he writes, “that she was never concerned in the education of one
child, who was not personally attached to her;” had he stopped here, he would have conveyed the
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idea that  she ruled her pupils  with affection,  but  he simply cannot  seem to resist  adding “and
earnestly concerned not to incur her displeasure” (Godwin,  Memoirs 60). This final twist changes
everything. She never even had to scold her students because they were as terrified to contradict her
as Godwin implies he had been. Perhaps the most remarkable thing about Memoirs is that Godwin
seems often to succumb to the temptation of taking a cheap shot at his wife. Again, he tells us that
she was very feminine, while showing this was not the case. Such perplexing, apparently pointless,
insinuations strengthen my hypothesis that he concealed his resentment even from himself.
Here  all  the  not  so  vague  hints  of  wounded  pride  coalesce  into  a  resented  jab  at
Wollstonecraft.  Like the narrator of “Ligeia,” Godwin uses his narrative about his wife to exact
posthumous retaliation for the humiliating feeling she had given him, and to assert himself as a
great man. Earlier in the narrative, indeed, he had already accused Wollstonecraft of not showing
great men the respect he thought was due to them. He recalls being greatly displeased at her on this
account on their very first meeting, in 1791:
We touched on a considerable variety of topics, and particularly on the characters and
habits of certain eminent men. Mary, as has already been observed, had acquired, in a
very blameable degree, the practice of seeing every thing on the gloomy side, and
bestowing censure with a plentiful hand, where circumstances were in any respect
doubtful. I, on the contrary, had a strong propensity, to favourable construction, and
particularly, where I found unequivocal marks of genius, strongly to incline to the
supposition of generous and manly virtue. (Godwin, Memoirs 80)
At the time Godwin could not conceal that he was offended, just as he had been offended, in
glancing over her A Vindication of the Rights of Men, by Wollstonecraft’s irreverence for the “great
man” Edmund Burke. As Ayres puts it: “Whether Godwin realized it or not, he seems to have been
threatened personally as a man that a woman dared to take on a man of such stature as Burke”
(Betwixt 29). 
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Of course, Godwin implies that Wollstonecraft had, at that time, no just appreciation of men
in general. Thus, he indirectly devalues her criticism of Burke as the expression of a resentment
which is implicitly construed as the result of her frustration as a woman. For Godwin every woman
was “formed for domestic affection,” and Wollstonecraft was more so than most. She needed a man,
but  she  did  not  know it.  Thus,  in  effect,  Godwin,  once  again  reiterates  that  typical  masculine
prejudice against female intellectuals that Mary Hays would later describe, as we have seen, in her
portrait of Catharine Macaulay.
Yet, although he accuses Wollstonecraft of being resentful, it is his own resentment that is
displayed to greatest effect in his book. Wollstonecraft had very good reasons to censure Burke and
Rousseau, and stated them very clearly. Godwin, on the other hand, appears to have been carried
away  by  his  feelings  about  her.  This,  the  unintended  ridicule  in  Godwin’s  writing  about
Wollstonecraft,  is  highlighted by Poe’s tales  narrated by men that harbour similarly ambivalent
feelings for their dead wives.
Poe  had  a  very  keen  sense  of  ridicule.  Godwin,  on  the  contrary,  took  everything  very
seriously, himself most of all, and as a result often sounded pompous and self-centred. There was
apparently room for only one philosopher in the Godwin household. By rewriting Wollstonecraft as
a  sentimental,  thoroughly  “feminine”  character  Godwin  got  rid  of  the  competition.  Yet,  his
resentment  exceeds  this  ideological  neutralisation  of  Wollstonecraft—for  Godwin  cannot  help
showing that Wollstonecraft was not as “feminine,” in the sense he gave to the word, as he says she
was. Thus, Godwin ends up writing a very unphilosophical book, filled with gratuitous apparently
incongruous aggression, to prove that Wollstonecraft’s books were unphilosophical.
He appears to have been himself not fully aware of what he was doing. This could well have
been the secret of his success, just as it was the secret of the success of Poe’s narrators. Before
fooling the public, in other words, these men appear to have thoroughly fooled themselves. This,
incidentally, is precisely the picture Poe paints of the author of Memoirs in his review of Lives of the
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Necromancers (1834), the last book Godwin published before his death in 1836. This is a short
article  misleadingly  titled  “Godwin’s  Necromancy”  that  appeared  in  December  1835  in  the
Southern Literary Messenger only days after Poe had assumed the editorship of the paper:
There is about all the writings of Godwin, one peculiarity which we are not sure that
we have ever seen pointed out for observation, but which, nevertheless, is his chief
idiosyncrasy—setting  him peculiarly  apart  from all  other  literati of  the  day.  We
allude  to  an  air  of  mature  thought—of  deliberate  premeditation  pervading,  in  a
remarkable  degree,  even  his  most  common-place  observations.  He  never  uses  a
hurried expression, or hazards either an ambiguous phrase, or a premature opinion.
(…)  We  are  never  tired  of  his  terse,  nervous,  and  sonorous  periods—for  their
terseness, their energy, and even their melody, are made, in all cases, subservient to
the sense with which they are invariably fraught. No English writer, with whom we
have  any  acquaintance,  with  the  single  exception  of  Coleridge,  has  a  fuller
appreciation of the value of words; and none is more nicely discriminative between
closely-approximating meanings. (70)
Poe, at least, is usually very deliberate, and the ambiguity of the statement, coming from
him, appears to me a sure sign of derision. When he says Godwin’s thinking seems mature; that his
writing seems premeditated, we may be sure he means every word. As Pollin remarks, this passage
clearly implies Poe’s “familiarity with other works by Godwin as well as with critical writing about
him” (Discoveries  110). Indeed, his statements are not about the “Necromancy,” as he calls it, in
particular, but about Godwin’s writing in general.
The extravagant, albeit dubious, praise lavished on the author is soon subverted by the same
kind of innuendo that characterises Godwin’s biography of Wollstonecraft. In this book, Poe tells
us, Godwin apparently intended an exposé of the impostures that had been perpetrated on mankind
throughout the ages by pretended magicians. Yet, Poe chooses to tell us what the author had  not
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done, before giving us to understand, in apparent contradiction with what he had just written, that he
could not exactly tell what it was that the author had intended:
Unlike the work of Brewster, the Necromancy [Poe never uses the actual title of the
book] of Mr. Godwin is not a Treatise on Natural Magic. It does not pretend to show
the manner in which delusion acts upon mankind—at all events, this is not the object
of the book. The design, if we understand it, is to display in their widest extent, the
great range and wild extravagancy of the imagination of man. It is almost superfluous
to say that in this he has fully succeeded. (“Godwin’s Necromancy” 70)
Thus, Poe undermines Godwin in two ways. First, by casting doubts on the intelligibility of
his  design.  According to  Poe’s  criticism,  as  we have  seen,  this  was inexcusable.  Secondly,  by
making an unflattering comparison with Sir. David Brewster’s  Letters on Natural Magic (1832),
from which Poe himself apparently borrowed most of the material for his article on “Maelzel’s
Chess Player” (Southern Literary Messenger, April 1836). While that author attempted to  explain
some  of  the  more  spectacular  hoaxes  ever  recorded,  Godwin,  Poe  tells  us,  succeeded  only  in
showing how gullible man can be, without explaining how the illusions were perpetrated. And what
is more, he is not altogether sure that this was Godwin’s intention. The implication is, of course, that
Godwin may have involuntarily displayed his own gullibility.
Indeed,  Poe,  through  his  usual  feats  of  misdirection,  leads  the  reader  to  overlook  the
manifest irony of the only positive statement he makes concerning Godwin’s “Necromancy,” which
is reiterated throughout the piece. The irony hits the heights of ridicule in the following passage:
The avowed purpose of the volume now before us is to exhibit a wide view of human
credulity. ‘To know’ — says Mr. Godwin – ‘the things that are not, and cannot be, but
have been imagined and believed, is the most curious chapter in the annals of man.’
In extenso we differ with him. 
There are more things in Heaven and Earth, Horatio,
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Than are dreamt of in thy philosophy.
There are many things, too, in the great circle of human experience, more
curious than even the records of human credulity—but that they form one of the most
curious chapters,  we were at  all  times ready to believe,  and had we been in any
degree skeptical, the Lives of the Necromancers would have convinced us.
(“Godwin’s Necromancy” 70)
The  brazen  insolence  of  this  equivocal  passage  belies  Pollin’s  claim  that  Poe  idolised
Godwin. In fact, it appears to me almost impossible to keep a straight face while reading this. Poe
here suggests that Godwin’s writing was “fraught with meaning,” but that the writer had not always
known what that meaning was. As if to illustrate his point, Poe’s text is itself “fraught with” a
“meaning” that he makes it impossible to suppose was unintended. We cannot know what he had in
mind that was more curious even than “human credulity,” but I could hazard some guesses, none of
which is very creditable to the reviewed.
This kind of innuendo is especially significant in view of Godwin’s personal history. His
reputation as a philosopher was, in those days, at its lowest ebb. Despite presenting himself as a
rationalist, there had always been a visionary strain to Godwin, which became more pronounced in
his later years, after Wollstonecraft’s death. As Pollin remarks in the following passage, Poe had,
from his earliest references to him, emphasised this side of Godwin:
the  earliest  reference  is  in  the  tale  “Loss  of  Breath,”  published  in  the  Southern
Literary Messenger, September 1835, although composed much earlier. Poe remarks,
“William Godwin, however, says in his ‘Mandeville,’ that ‘invisible things are the
only realities,” and this, all will allow, is a case in point. It may be assumed that the
observation, plucked from the end of Godwin’s novel, represents a reading of the
entire  work  by  Poe.  Echoes  of  the  quotation  can  be  found  in  “Berenice,”  also
published  in  1835.  “Realities  of  the  world  affected  me  as  visions  ...”  (…).  The
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mixture  of  the  real  and  the  unreal,  of  the  world  of  the  imagination  and  that  of
detailed,  mundane reality,  runs  through the  whole  body of  Poe’s  work.  It  is  not
surprising to find a strong echo of this very phrase in the preface to “Eureka,” the
work that Poe considered his greatest contribution to thought: “To the dreamers and
those who put faith in dreams as in the only realities.” (Discoveries 109)
I have my doubts that Poe took  Eureka as seriously as modern critics tend to do, and the
history of his handling of Godwin in his writing is itself an indication that he did not. What this
shows us, is that Poe’s unreliable, deluded narrators, and Poe’s “dream” rhetoric itself, had from the
start  been  associated  in  his  mind  with  Godwin,  who  the  American  invariably  portrays  as  an
incorrigible visionary. It should be noticed, indeed, that the remark about  Mandeville comes from
the openly satirical tale “A Decided Loss.”  Poe, to be sure, did not put faith in the dreams of his
narrators.  They evidently confused these dreams with realities,  and by explicitly  referring their
deliriums to him, Poe suggests that so did Godwin.
Furthermore, by tracing an expression in “Berenice” to Godwin, Pollin shows that Poe had
him particularly in mind when he created his first femicide, Egæus, and there is ample evidence to
suggest that he was a reference also for the creation of the narrators of “Morella” and “Ligeia,” tales
which, being declared monuments to a learned wife, are even more reminiscent of Godwin. This in
turn furnishes a point to the suggestions Poe makes in his review of the “Necromancy.” Godwin was
delirious and said more than he intended. This is certainly true of his  Memoirs of Wollstonecraft,
which is  certainly “fraught with” unintended “meaning.”  Unless—and here is  the sting—unless
Godwin really intimately meant what he said, in which case we would have to assume that he really
hated  Wollstonecraft.  Indeed,  by  placing  the  emphasis  of  his  criticism  on  deliberation,  Poe
implicitly  rejects  the  kind  of  “sympathetic”  criticism  illustrated  by  most  modern  reading  of
Memoirs. By this term I mean the charitable practice of responding to what one thinks the writer
meant to say, not to what he actually wrote. The point of the implied comparison between Godwin
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and Poe’s violent narrators, of course, is that only a femicide at heart could  mean what Godwin
wrote.
The parallel between “Ligeia” and “Morella,” in particular, and Godwin’s  Memoirs brings
into relief the ambiguity of his discourse. Although the ambiguity is incompatible with the declared
aims of the writer, that does not mean that it can simply be dismissed—any more than the ambiguity
in Poe’s tales can be dismissed, like Wilbur and Thompson advise us to do. Indeed, Godwin appears
to have come straight out of one of Poe’s tales, and we can see through his rhetoric just as we can
see through the absurdities of Poe’s narrators.
In a brief notive of George Gilfillan’s Gallery of Literary Portraits, which appeared in the
antepenultimate issue of the Broadway Journal, in December 27, 1845, Poe singles out the article
on Godwin as “the most original and judicious of these sketches,”  adding that he was “a very
remarkable  man,  not  even  yet  thoroughly  understood” (Rev.  of  Sketches  of  Modern Literature
351).157 Pollin saw this as a sign of “a new intensity in” Poe’s “fervor for Godwin” (Discoveries
122). Yet, Gilfillan praises Godwin’s fiction at the expense of his philosophy, which he criticises
very harshly. His article, indeed, is typical of the way in which Godwin was commonly perceived in
those days. By this time, the star of the man who had once been hailed by many as the leading
philosopher of his generation had long since faded. The best that Gilfillan could say in defence of
Godwin’s most famous philosophical work,  Political Justice, was that “its author was a harmless
and sincere enthusiast,” that “gossamer though its web was, it caught for a season such dragon-flies
as Coleridge and Wordsworth,” and, lastly, that “its more obnoxious parts were either expressly or
silently renounced by the writer himself” (“William Godwin” 24). In other words, Godwin was a
harmless fool, and should have confined himself to writing novels. For as a fiction writer, indeed,
Gilfillan ranked him with the absolute best.
157 Poe’s very short text is a notice of the American reprint of Gilfillan’s book entitled Sketches of Modern Literature 
and Eminent Literary Men: Being a Gallery of Literary Portraits.
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The most remarkable thing about Gilfillan’s article, however, is that it describes Godwin’s
fiction in a way that assumes a complete identification of the author with his first-person narrators.
Godwin, Gilfillan wrote,
imagines  a  character  after  his  own  heart;  a  quiet,  curious,  prying,  philosophical
being, with a strong underdash of the morbid, if not of the mad; and he thickens
around him the circumstances, which, by making him altogether a misanthrope, and
nearly a maniac, bring out all the powers and the passions of his nature. (…) Each
narrative takes the shape of an autobiography, and the incessant recurrence of the
pronoun  I  transports  you to a confessional,  where you hear told you, in subdued
tones, a tale which might “rouse the dead to hear.”
(Gilfillan, “William Godwin” 19-20)
Gilfillan’s appraisal of Godwin’s fiction foreshadows, of course, what would later become
the common critical representation of Poe’s own work and character.158 In fact, he “declares that”
Godwin “founded a small but distinguished school of writers in England and America,” which leads
Pollin to wonder “whether Poe included himself in this group” (Discoveries 122). Indeed, Gilfillan
identifies Godwin with his  narrators  in  exactly  the same way that  critics  of  Poe’s  fiction have
identified  him  with  his.  The  portrait  he  thus  derives  of  the  author,  therefore,  has  an  uncanny
resemblance with the idea most critics make of Poe, and indeed with the popular myth created
around him.
158 It  is  worth remarking,  however,  that  Gilfillan himself  would later  paint  Poe  with  very  different  colours,  in  a
biographical sketch of that author that appeared originally in the London Critic in 1854, and which clearly betrayed
the influence of Griswold’s infamous obituary. Gilfillan’s sketch,  incidentally,  is  an important  landmark in the
establishment of the mythology of Poe as the epitome of the damned poet. “Poets,” Gilfillan tells us, “as a tribe,
have been rather a worthless, wicked set of people; and certainly Edgar A. Poe, instead of being an exception, was
probably the  most worthless and wicked of all his fraternity. (…) He had absolutely no virtue or good quality,
unless you call  remorse a virtue,  and despair a  grace.  Some have called him mad; but we confess we see no
evidence of this in his history. He showed himself, in many instances, a cool, calculating, deliberate blackguard.
(…) One might call him one of the Gadarene swine, filled with a devil, and hurrying down a steep place to perish in
the waves; but none could deny that he was a ‘swine of genius’” (Gilfillan, “Egdar Allan Poe” 326-27). Gilfillan
particularly emphasised the singularity of Poe’s character throghout his article: “In character he was certainly one of
the strangest anomalies in the in the history of mankind;” “A case so strange as Poe’s compels us into new and more
searching forms of critical, as well as of moral analysis” (327, 331).
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Poe was unquestionably  aware  of  his  debt  to  Godwin’s  fiction,  which Gilfillan’s  article
makes impossible to miss, but, by drawing attention to this article, specifically, Poe also brings to
our attention the fact that precisely those characters on whom G. R. Thompson and Richard Wilbur
have based their portrait of him as a superstitious misanthrope obsessed with the dead, particularly
dead females, who spent his time poring over obscure and suspicious lore, and was haunted by
mystical visions, had in fact much more in common with Godwin than they did with Poe. In those
days, Godwin was known as an enthusiast and a misanthrope, as well as for his obsession with his
late first wife. It was then common understanding, moreover, that he had destroyed her reputation
with Memoirs.
While  the  fact  is  undeniable,  most  twentieth-century  critics  have  tended  to  exculpate
Godwin,  and also  to  gloss  over  the  ways  in  which  he  distorted  Wollstonecraft’s  character  and
opinions. His contemporaries, however, were not as forbearing; in fact, for the most part, they were
indignant. And then, after the death of Wollstonecraft, Godwin suddenly became, also like Poe’s
narrators, very interested in the occult. This, I insist, was how he was mostly remembered in Poe’s
time. This suggests that Poe was not merely passively influenced by Godwin’s fiction, but that he
deliberately created characters whose opinions and feelings resembled his, in order to poke fun at
the older man. Indeed, the narrators which have persistently been regarded as alter-egos of Poe,
appear to have been intended as caricatures of Godwin.
Modern critical  discourse on Godwin,  however,  by concentrating on his philosophy, has
obscured what was perceived in his time as his conversion from a rationalist philosopher with a
visionary tendency, to a full-fledged visionary. Indeed, after the death of Wollstonecraft, Godwin,
the  well-respected  author  of  An  Enquiry  into  Political  Justice,  appeared  to  suffer  a  complete
transformation. In 1799, he publishes St. Leon, a perplexing novel set in sixteenth century Europe
and narrated in the first person by a man who found the proverbial philosopher’s stone. According
to the author’s own preface, the novel reflected this change of heart on the subject of conjugality:
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the affections and charities of private life being every where in this publication a
topic of the warmest eulogium, while in the Enquiry concerning Political Justice they
seemed to be treated with no great degree of indulgence and favour. (…) all I think it
necessary to say on the present occasion is, that, for more than four years, I have
been anxious for opportunity and leisure to modify some of the earlier chapters of
that work in conformity with the sentiments inculcated in this.
(Godwin, Preface to St. Leon 52)
St. Leon is therefore ostensibly presented as a document of Godwin’s conversion to domestic
affection  during  his  time  with  Wollstonecraft.  However,  the  protagonist’s  wife  is  a  mirror  of
patience, and of all those traits Godwin valued in a woman. She appears to be, in fact, all that he
would have wanted Wollstonecraft to have been. By the time his “Necromancy,” as Poe calls it, was
published, nearly four decades later,  Godwin was a shadow of his former self.  The fashionable
philosopher who once prided himself on his fine “metaphysical distinctions” had given way, to the
morose, reclusive student of alchemy and witchcraft whom one could easily mistake with one of
Poe’s visionary narrators.
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3 – The Conflicting Conceptions of Gender in Godwin and Wollstonecraft
In her book Betwixt and Between: The Biographies of Mary Wollstonecraft (2017), Brenda
Ayres remarks that, although “[m]ost scholars agree that Godwin’s biography of Wollstonecraft is
biased an unreliable,” “very few readers and scholars are willing to separate Wollstonecraft from
Godwin’s image of her” (24, 25). This is in fact a natural effect of Memoirs, which presupposes the
fundamental  identification  of  the  writer  with  his  subject.  Godwin,  the  repentant  gamophobe,
depicted his union with Wollstonecraft as the realisation of that original pre-sexual wholeness of
“man” which underlies the biblical myth of creation. Through his union with Wollstonecraft the
mythical “rib” had been symbolically  restored to him. Each spouse had what  the other lacked;
together they made up a perfect and complete human being. This rationale allowed Memoirs, which,
as has been pointed out by Mizi Myers, “is more an autobiography by Godwin than a biography of
his wife,” to be regarded, for all intents and purposes, as Wollstonecraft’s autobiography (qtd. in
Ayres, Betwixt 24).
This  idea  is  simply  incompatible  with  Wollstonecraft’s  strictly  individualist  views.
“Probably,” she wrote,
the prevailing opinion, that woman was created for man, may have taken its rise from
Moses’s poetical story; yet,  as very few, it  is presumed, who have bestowed any
serious thought on the subject, ever supposed that Eve was, literally speaking, one of
Adam’s ribs, the deduction must be allowed to fall to the ground; or, only be so far
admitted as it proves that man, from the remotest antiquity, found it convenient to
exert his strength to subjugate his companion, and his invention to shew that she
ought to have her neck bent under the yoke, because [the whole creation was only
created for his convenience or] pleasure. (Vindication 95)
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In  order  that  the  mythical  unity  might  be  restored,  woman  had  to  be  absorbed—or
reabsorbed—into  man.  Wollstonecraft,  affirming  the  principle  of  the  priority  of  reason  over
revelation, which is inherent to the very structure of her religious thought, utterly rejected this myth:
I may be allowed to doubt whether woman were created for man: and, though the cry
of irreligion, or even atheism, be raised against me, I will simply declare, that were
an angel from heaven to tell me that Moses’s beautiful, poetical cosmogony, and the
account of the fall of man, were literally true, I could not believe what my reason told
me was derogatory to the character of the Supreme Being: and, having no fear of the
devil before mine eyes, I venture to call this a suggestion of reason, instead of resting
my  weakness  on  the  broad  shoulders  of  the  first  seducer  of  my  frail  sex.
(Wollstonecraft, Vindication 149)
Yet,  Godwin’s portrait  of Wollstonecraft  revolves around this  very conception of gender
complementarity. Her best work was not  A Vindication, nor even  Letters Written During a Short
Residence In Sweden.  He thought all her literary performances were flawed and fragmentary, and
valuable only as documents of her suffering; her best work, he suggests, and that in which her
character  was  expressed  to  the  fullest,  was  Godwin himself,  which  she  was  in  the  process  of
improving. Thus, evoking an old trope of lyrical poetry, he casts her as the muse of  his  work. In
fact, he implies that this is where the true Wollstonecraft should be sought. By being attributed the
honorary, let us call it spiritual, authorship of the work of her lover, of course, she is courteously
denied material or intellectual authorship.
Supported by his sense that they were as one, Godwin arrogated to himself  the right of
making  confessions  in  Wollstonecraft’s  name.  Surprisingly,  as  Brenda  Ayres  notices,  since
Wollstonecraft’s rehabilitation in the 1970s his right to produce what he effectively presents as an
autobiography of his wife has seldom been seriously challenged. On the contrary, Memoirs came to
be regarded as the “gospel truth about her” (Betwixt 16). 
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Pamela Clemit’s  and Gina Luria Walker’s introduction to a recent edition of  Memoirs is
paradigmatic of the modern assessment of both Wollstonecraft’s figure and Godwin’s biography of
her.  According to  them “the  Memoirs  was a  work  of  unprecedented  biographical  frankness.  It
included candid discussion of every phase of Wollstonecraft’s  unconventional  career  (…) From
Godwin’s  point  of  view,  such  directness  was  an  attempt  to  enact  in  the  public  sphere  the
revolutionary doctrine of sincerity he had advocated in  An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice”
(Clemit  and  Walker,  Introduction  11).  They  further  argue  that  Godwin  had  used  “Rousseau’s
writings,” particularly the autobiographical  Confessions  and  Reveries du Promeneur Solitaire, his
interest in which they attribute to Wollstonecraft’s influence, “as a means of shaping ‘individual
history’” in Memoirs:
In order to restore a harmonious relationship with the physical and social world, he
[Godwin] argues, the thinker of good faith must first look for it within himself. By
exploring the depths of his own being, the individual will discover not only his own
nature, and how it has been distorted by social circumstances, but also the nature of
man himself. In this way, self-analysis forms a way of rethinking social and political
relations. Yet, Godwin’s construction of Wollstonecraft’s revolutionary consciousness
forms an advance on Rousseau’s thought, since it demonstrates the inseparability of
individual and social experience in a woman’s life, as well as in a man’s.
(20)
Clemit  and  Walker  thus  slide  insensibly  into  an  equiparation  of  Memoirs  to
Rousseau’s  Les  Confessions,  thereby  effectively  granting  Godwin’s  writing  about  his  wife  the
authority of an autobiography. They imply that he had the same kind of intimate inside knowledge
of Wollstonecraft that he had of himself, and, indeed, that he knew her better than she knew herself.
Strictly speaking, however, Godwin’s is an unauthorised biography—for he does not produce any
documental  evidence  of  her  conversion  to  his values—,  but  he  presents  it  notwithstanding  as
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spiritually closer to the true character of his wife than anything she had written. This is of course
highly problematic.
The whole point of Rousseau’s confessing was to present the world with a candid expression
of the way he intimately viewed himself, as opposed to the way he would like others to perceive
him; this  he called “une enterprise qui n’eut jamais d’exemple et  dont l’exécution n’aura point
d’imitateur”  (Confessions 3).  What  makes  such  a  venture  so  difficult,  apart  from  strictly
epistemological  considerations,  is  that in order to succeed one must  overcome both shame and
pride. In other words, if the reader will permit me the anachronism, the greatest obstacle to writing
such a book is one’s ego.  Memoirs, however, from this point of view, is very different from Les
Confessions.  The author’s ego is not exposed in any significant way by his act of “confessing”
another’s  faults.  On  the  contrary,  by  being  “sincere”  about  Wollstonecraft,  Godwin  actually
promotes  his  own ego  at  her  expense.  In  fact,  one  might  say  that  Memoirs is  distinctly  pre-
Rousseauan, in the sense that the writer seems at times not to realise he had what we refer by the
word ego. Godwin’s contemporaries were acutely aware of this fact.
Robert Southey expressed indignation in a 1804 letter to William Taylor, where he criticises
Godwin for what he calls his “want of all feeling in stripping his dead wife naked as he did, & such
a wife – & taking such another home when the picture of <that first> hung over his fireplace, –
indeed,”  he  added,  “my  flesh  is  not  made  of  such  Quaker  fibre,  nor  my  blood  of  such  toad
temperature as not to be irritated by these recollections.” What Southey found repulsive about the
book, then, was precisely the misplaced “candour” of Godwin’s Memoirs, and the fact of his having
later married a woman that he thought was all that Wollstonecraft was not, both of which constitute,
in his view, a betrayal of her memory.159
159  History has not been kind to Mary Jane Clairmont, who became Godwin’s second wife. In 1913, Henry Noel
Brailsford expressed much the same opinion in his  Shelley,  Godwin,  and their Circle:  “Mrs.  Clairmont  was a
strange successor to Mary Wollstonecraft. She was a vulgar and wordly woman, thoroughly feminine, and rather
inclined to boast of her total ignorance of philosophy” (169). Thus, she was perceived as being exactly the opposite
of her predecessor.
591
Clemit and Walker,  on the other hand, accept Godwin’s “sincerity” as both morally and
intellectually  virtuous.  His  “belief  in  the  duty  of  truth-telling,”  they  write,  “was  based on  the
Dissenting principle of ‘candour,’ which might best be described as the disposition to form impartial
judgements in all affairs” (Clemit and Walker, Introduction 14). Thus, Clemit and Walker praise
Godwin for the full disclosure of his wife’s personal life as an exercise in candor, suggesting he cast
aside all selfish considerations for a higher political end. I must confess I cannot accompany this
line of argument. I recognise the virtue of exhibiting one’s own foibles; but what is the merit of
exhibiting one’s  wife’s  defects,  especially  when that  wife was also a rival?  Paradoxically,  they
present him at the same time as a disinterested party and as someone who is emotionally involved
with his subject. In other words, they implicitly credit Godwin with having achieved that elusive
“synthesis of reason and sympathy for which he was searching” (16). According to them, indeed,
“he was in part” initially “attracted to Wollstonecraft because he thought her Letters “exemplified”
that synthesis (16). This, however, appears to be wringing a meaning out of Godwin’s words that
they can never support. For he stresses the point that “reason” is intrinsically male in a way that
makes it perfectly clear that such a “synthesis” could only be achieved by a man and, in fact, never
so much as hints that Letters had anything to do with reason. Wollstonecraft was too “feminine” to
be reasonable, he implies. He does, however, credit himself with having achieved said “synthesis,”
in “fulfilment of the lessons he had learned from Wollstonecraft,” as Clemit and Walker, following
Godwin’s suggestion, put it (24).
Thus, he indirectly validates the view expressed by the myth of the “rib:” by absorbing, as it
were, Wollstonecraft, he had become a total man, adding her feeling to his reason. And this allows
him to make a moral unit of him and Wollstonecraft. This too is in unison with Rousseau’s views on
the subject:  “La relation sociale des sexes est  admirable.  De cette  societé résulte une personne
morale dont la femme est l’oeil et l’homme le bras, mais avec telle dépendance l’une de l’autre, que
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c’est de l’homme que la femme aprend ce qu’il faut voir, et de la femme que l’homme aprend ce
qu’il faut faire” (Émile 472-73).
Clemit  and  Walker’s  reading  is  useful  because  it  faithfully  interprets  the  tendency  of
Godwin’s  recasting  of  Wollstonecraft’s  figure.  This  faithfulness,  however,  highlights  the
paradoxical nature of his arguments as well as the way in which they contradict Wollstonecraft’s
recorded opinions. This peculiarity of their interpretation is equally noticeable in their praise for the
structure of Godwin’s narrative. He was, they tell us,
concerned with the formation of Wollstonecraft’s identity as a woman intellectual,
and this involves the organization of her life into a coherent structure. Adopting the
structural principle of the Confessions, Godwin depicts Wollstonecraft’s history as a
series of ‘revolutions’ or turning-points which threaten to alienate her from society,
but in fact lead to a growth in moral and political awareness. (Clemit and Walker, 21)
All these “crises” correspond to events in Wollstonecraft’s personal and sentimental life.
Godwin  claims  that,  despite  her  misfortunes,  she  retained  a  “‘generous  confidence’”—this  is
Godwin’s  expression—that  proved  her  spiritual  stamina  (Memoirs  105).160 This  “confidence,”
according to Clemit and Walker, “not only provides the key to Wollstonecraft’s own improvement,
but also makes her an agent of change in others, including himself” (Introduction 22).
Again,  Godwin’s  contemporaries  were  far  less  enthusiastic.  One  of  the  first  published
reviews of Godwin’s book, which appeared in a publication of which Wollstonecraft herself had
been  a  regular  collaborator,  The  Analytical  Review, argued  that  Godwin  had  not  written  an
intellectual biography at all. Since Wollstonecraft’s opinions would inevitably attract criticism, said
the Analytical, 
160 The sentence in which this phrase occurs is a good illustration of Godwin’s sentimental approach to Wollstonecraft:
“Mary rested her head upon the shoulder of her lover, hoping to find a heart with which she might safely treasure
her world of affection; fearing to commit a mistake, yet, in spite of her melancholy experience, fraught with that
generous confidence, which, in a great soul, is never extinguished” (Godwin, Memoirs 105).
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we think it was due to Mrs. G. [that is, Godwin owed it to Wollstonecraft], to have
stated  how  those opinions were formed, and the  reasons  by which she supported
them.
It  is  indeed  a  bald  narrative  of  the  life  of  a  woman,  very  eventful  and
touching. We think it entitled to very limited praise. In another respect it is deficient.
It gives us no correct history of the formation of Mrs. G.’s mind. We are neither
informed of her favourite books, her hours of study, nor her attainments in languages
and philosophy.  She  contemplated  nature  with  rapture,  we are  told,  and enjoyed
much of it’s inspiration. Of this there can be no doubt; but (…) we think too little is
told us concerning the subjects of Mrs. G.’s study, and her manner of studying.
(Rev. of Memoirs [Analytical Review] 169)
The Analytical wholly rejected, therefore, the complete sentimentalisation of Wollstonecraft
carried out by Godwin. She should have been allowed to justify her actions in her own words;
instead, he chose to make revelations about her life that would inevitably destroy her reputation,
barely mentioning her critique of the moral codes she had broken. The anonymous author of the
review further points out that he did not portray her as a working intellectual, but rather as an
idealised picture of a sentimental, inspired seer. Indeed, the review anticipates that this portrait of
Wollstonecraft will result in the complete dismissal of Wollstonecraft as an intellectual before her
arguments  are  even  considered,  thus  preventing  the  rational  debate  she  was  trying  to  prompt.
Evidently, the Analytical was not persuaded by Godwin’s claim that Wollstonecraft had suffered a
conversion to domesticity and the religion of sensibility. If Wollstonecraft had changed her mind as
completely as Godwin suggests she did in the last years of her life, news of this would certainly
have reached the Analytical, but we find no evidence of this in the review.
Equally decisive is the fact that the Analytical could accurately predict the three aspects of
Wollstonecraft’s  conduct  that  would be met  by strong criticism before such criticism had been
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voiced: “We conceive exceptions will be taken to her conduct in three respects; and we think too
little attention is given to such probable exceptions in the narrative” (Rev. of Memoirs [Analytical
Review] 169). These were, firstly, her having dispensed with the “public ceremony of marriage;”
secondly the “versatility of her attachments,” or in other words, what would be perceived as her
promiscuity; and finally, the “attempts to destroy herself,  when she had a child deserted by it’s
father” (170-172). By qualifying the “exceptions” as “probable,” the reviewer suggests that Godwin
could not possibly have ignored the scandal his book would originate. The review, incidentally,
although cautiously detaching itself from Wollstonecraft, attempts precisely to justify, or vindicate
her in her own terms—which is what one would expect from Godwin’s title. Considering that the
reviewer accuses Godwin of telling the public nothing about Wollstonecraft’s intellectual life, the
closing sentence is bitterly ironic: “Imperfect as these memoirs are, we have no fellowship with
him, who can read them without a tear” (172). That is precisely the problem. Instead of the feminist
intellectual  she  had been,  Godwin presents  the  public  with  a  conventionally  pathetic  image of
Wollstonecraft as a woman consumed by her exquisite sensibility. The  Analytical, then, seems to
regard Memoirs as a wasted opportunity for promoting female intellectuality. Incidentaly, the irony
here appears to have been completely lost on Clemit and Walker: “The reviewer deplored Godwin’s
self-referential  interpretations,  concluding that  too great  detail  was given about Wollstonecraft’s
premature death,  but adding, ‘Mr. G’s feelings on the occasion do him credit, and it is impossible
not to feel with him’” (“Introduction” 33 emphasis mine). 
Clemit and Walker’s introduction to Memoirs, as I have already stated, is perfectly typical of
the common modern assessment of the book. Indeed, most modern biographies of Wollstonecraft
have taken for granted her conversion to the ideology of sensibility.  “For Wollstonecraft, in Barbara
Taylor’s words, ‘the cost of womanhood was high—but high also the price of refusing it. Too high
for Wollstonecraft herself, who could no more deny her sensuality than repress her intellect—yet
the dilemma which she posed loses none of its significance through her own inability to resolve it’”
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(Clemit and Walker, “Introduction” 28). Godwin thought that the rationalism of the  Vindications
was a denial of Wollstonecraft’s true feminine nature; Taylor evidently agrees. And so does Janet
Todd, according to whose biography of Wollstonecraft the planed second volume of  Vindication
“would concern the wrongs of woman and accept that women could not simply be inserted into the
male Enlightenment Enterprise, as the earlier book implied. Feminine feeling was destructive in the
world as it was, but might also be beneficial, and the choice between reason and sensibility once
presented to women was simply too stark, as the letters to Imlay indicated” (Mary Wollstonecraft
383). 
In order to understand such statements, one must first trace to its roots the unlikely alliance
between Godwin and these critics, which may seem paradoxical to those unacquainted with the
history of feminism. Godwin thought that reason was masculine, and sensibility feminine, and in
this respect his opinion basically coincided with the most widely received ideas of his time and,
particularly, with the authors Wollstonecraft attacked in A Vindication. An important faction within
modern feminism thinking agrees with Godwin on that point.
Modern feminism has mostly emphasised the specificity of the female mind and, for this
reason, has had an ambivalent relationship with Wollstonecraft, to put it mildly. In “Mary Does,
Alice  Doesn’t:  The  Paradox  of  Female  Reason  in  and  for  Feminist  Theory,”  Joan  B.  Landes
accurately identifies the causes of this estrangement. “While protesting against the double standard
in moral theory,” she writes, 
Wollstonecraft participates in the very same project of ‘remasculinization’ of virtue—
allowing for a gendered redistribution of virtue (…).
Finding  paradoxes  in  Wollstonecraft’s  and  so  many  versions  of  liberal
feminism, today’s feminist philosophers of difference defend the specificity of the
embodied,  female  subject  as  a  ‘theoretical,  libidinal,  ethical  and  political  agent.’
Likewise, in place of Wollstonecraft’s faith in reason, feminists of a post-modernist
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persuasion cast suspicion on the concept of human subject as a conscious, rational or
self-transparent entity. Many would even link abstract reason to masculine forms of
violence. In this atmosphere, Mary seems hopelessly trapped by the antinomies of a
modern consciousness—not an agent, but a victim of modernity’s ruses (…).
(Landes, “Mary Does” 55)
Wollstonecraft represents what came to be known as “liberal feminism,” and which could
perhaps more accurately be described as feminist rationalism. The view that Wollstonecraft aimed at
a “remasculinisation” of virtue, however, attributes to her the very assumption she had rejected: that
reason, hence virtue, were fundamentally and exclusively male. I think Wollstonecraft’s struggle has
a specific historical context that such views fail to consider. She lived in an age when a “woman
thinker” was considered by most to be a contradiction in terms. Inasmuch as she established, by her
work and example, the falsity of this idea, Wollstonecraft paved the way for the feminist thinker of
our day. Besides, an argument could be made that, despite the emphasis she placed on reason, she
also did recognise the fundamental specificity of the “embodied” female. In any event, the idea that
she had denied its  specificity,  entails  the identification of “sensibility” with femaleness—which
Wollstonecraft also denied.
Generally speaking, the common modern reading of Wollstonecraft builds on the very ideas
she most emphatically denied. In the terms of her theory the idea of “remasculinising” reason and
virtue is simply nonsensical. For Wollstonecraft “feminine sensibility” and “masculine reason” were
absurd  expressions—incidentally,  as  absurd  as  the  other  possible  combinations  of  the  terms,
“masculine sensibility” and “feminine reason.” Thus, although, to modern ears, accustomed to the
rhetoric of difference, this may seem reactionary, in her time it made perfect sense. She did not
think that a woman denied her womanhood by studying philosophy, or by being a rationalist for that
matter, any more than she thought a man was emasculated when he betrayed emotion.
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In  A Vindication,  Wollstonecraft  assumed a  position  that  is  simultaneously  feminist  and
rationalist. Because she shares Godwin’s belief that reason is male, Janet Todd, for example, thinks
the two were intrinsically incompatible, and therefore concludes that the “early” Wollstonecraft—
that is, Wollstonecraft before her supposed  conversion—believed “that the sexual difference should
be abolished” (351). But by “reason” Todd and Wollstonecraft mean two very different things. For
the former, the term denotes a patriarchal cultural construction; for the latter it meant the ability to
form autonomous  opinions  and  justify  them.  Todd’s  phrase,  incidentally,  echoes  a  sentence  of
Wollstonecraft, but in a way that I think is misleading: 
A wild wish has just flown from my heart to my head, and I will not stifle it though it
may  excite  a  horse-laugh.  -  I  do  earnestly  wish  to  see  the  distinction  of  sex
confounded in society, unless where love animates the behavior. For this distinction
is, I am firmly persuaded, the foundation of the weakness of character ascribed to
woman; is the cause why the understanding is neglected, whilst accomplishments are
acquired with sedulous care: and the same cause accounts for their preferring the
graceful before the heroic virtues. (Vindication 126)
Thus, Wollstonecraft did not advocate the “abolishment” of all sexual difference, nor did she
think this was possible. The way in which she qualifies her statement is decisive. She would have
done away with what she regarded as the unnatural distinctions created by a system of education
that did not develop the understanding of women. What she meant, of course, was that she wished
women would cease to be regarded as inferior beings,  and that the accusation of “masculinity”
would no longer be hurled at  female intellectuals. She nonetheless maintained that there was a
difference, but that this pertained only to love, which she conceived strictly as a sexual relationship.
Wollstonecraft  appears  to  me,  in  fact,  remarkably  consistent  throughout  her  works.  She
systematically refused to grant men the exclusive of intellect, or women the exclusive of sensibility.
In her terms, both had minds and bodies, hearts and souls. The idea that underlies  Memoirs and
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Rousseau’s theory of sexual difference alike is that women “feel” and man “think.” Wollstonecraft
would agree with Todd that this distinction is too stark. By “reason” and “intellect” she meant the
ability to think that she thought was shared by all humans, regardless of their sex. Therefore, while
she did not deny sexual difference, she did emphasise, for the purposes of establishing the figure of
the female intellectual, the common human ground. While she never said that men and women were
exactly alike,  then, for reasons that are easy to understand, she insisted that the latter were not
intellectually inferior to the former.
Women  were  intellectually  equipped  to  understand  abstract  thought.  They  could  even
understand the speculations of men like Rousseau, who denied them the use of reason. And they
could  also  produce  speculations  of  their  own.  Wollstonecraft  also  believed that  a  woman  who
studied, say, natural philosophy or metaphysics autonomously, instead of confining herself to the
kind of subaltern “practical” investigation Rousseau prescribed to women, was not “masculine”—
that was her point. Yet, slighting all her work on the process, Todd sides with Godwin, to tell us that
Wollstonecraft’s demands were “masculine.”
At her trial for adultery, Maria “wrote a paper, which she expressly desired might be read in
court”  (Wollstonecraft,  Maria 130).  This  paper,  in  which  she  pleads  her  own case,  is  itself  an
indictment of the law that did not allow her to represent herself. It is also a vindication of the rights
of woman in general, and a critique of the practical legal indissolubility of the marriage bond in
particular, in which Wollstonecraft recaps, for the most part, the arguments she had first advanced in
1792 in A Vindication of the Rights of Woman. Alluding to her marriage, the defendant begins by
declaring  to  the  court  that  she  had  “submitted  to  the  rigid  laws  which  enslave  women,”  and
continues as follows: 
The whole point of the argument of  A Vindication of the Rights of Woman is to show that
rationalism—as the author understood it—and feminism are not incompatible. Wollstonecraft did
not recognise, therefore, the dilemma mentioned by Barbara Taylor, and there is no evidence but
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Godwin’s word to indicate that she ever changed her mind about that. In my opinion, the apparent
agreement  between Godwin’s  image of  the latter-day Wollstonecraft  and the  discourse  of  most
modern feminism, on the one hand, and the tension between that discourse and Wollstonecraft’s
own philosophy on the other, caused critics to overstate the differences between A Vindication and
her later books. Where many critics have seen a change of mind, indeed, I see nothing but a change
of literary genre. Her unfinished novel, Maria: or, the Wrongs of Woman, for example, is often cited
—notably by Janet Todd—as reflecting a major shift in her ideas, yet, in the climax of the novel,
included  in  the  last  chapter  of  the  second  volume,  Wollstonecraft  puts  in  the  mouth  of  her
protagonist exactly the same arguments she had herself developed in A Vindication.
I exclaim against the laws which throw the whole weight of the yoke on the weaker
shoulders, and force women, when they claim protectorship as mothers, to sign a
contract, which renders them dependent on the caprice of the tyrant, whom choice or
necessity has appointed to reign over them. Various are the cases, in which a woman
ought to separate herself from her husband; and mine, I may be allowed emphatically
to insist, comes under the description of the most aggravated.
(Wollstonecraft, Maria 130)
Maria  also  formally  refuses  to  obey  the  laws  that  “make  women  the  property  of  their
husbands” (Wollstonecraft,  Maria 130). Furthermore, she traces the wrongs of woman, illustrated
by her story, to a “false morality (…) which makes all the virtue of women consist in chastity,
submission, and the forgiveness of injuries” (131). This, of course, is the same argument that had
been developed by Wollstonecraft in propria persona.
Finally, Maria affirms her sacred right—indeed, her sacred duty—to disobey unjust laws, on
the grounds that private conscience takes priority over the rule of law. Woman, she writes, “must be
allowed to consult her conscience, and regulate her conduct, in some degree, by her own sense of
right. (…) if laws exist,  made by the strong to oppress the weak, I appeal to my own sense of
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justice” (Wollstonecraft, Maria 132). These statements presuppose that women are rational beings,
hence fully responsible for their acts. Accordingly, Maria also frees Darnford, the man with whom
she had had an adulterous relationship, “from the charge of seduction,” with the argument that he
was “the man of my choice” (133). The idea that he had “seduced” her, of course, presupposed that
women were not morally responsible for their acts.
But the portion of Maria’s paper where the echoes of Wollstonecraft’s Vindication are more
clearly heard is her final solemn address to the jury: “I appeal to the justice and humanity of the jury
—a body of men, whose private judgment must be allowed to modify laws, that must be unjust,
because definite rules can never apply to indefinite circumstances” (Wollstonecraft,  Maria 133).
Thus, the appeal for the rights of woman becomes a challenge to patriarchy, or more precisely, the
form  the  argument  takes  presupposes  the  rule  of  patriarchy,  making  it  the  object  of  explicit
problematisation. Women are allowed no voice in the legal system—men always decide for them.
Much like Wollstonecraft  had  done in  A Vindication,  Maria  exhibits  her  rationality  in  order  to
demonstrate the fundamental injustice of the rule of man. By oppressing women, men, who are in a
position of power, betray the common humanity of both.
Significantly, in his reply, the judge completely ignores Maria’s arguments: 
The judge, in summing up the evidence, alluded to ‘the fallacy of letting women
plead their feelings, as an excuse for the violation of the marriage-vow. (…) We did
not want French principles in public or private life—and, if women were allowed to
plead their feelings, as an excuse or palliation of infidelity, it was opening a flood-
gate for immorality. What virtuous woman thought of her feelings? — It was her
duty  to  love  and  obey  the  man  chosen  by  her  parents  and  relations,  who  were
qualified by their experience to judge better for her, than she could herself.’
(Wollstonecraft, Maria 133)
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Maria,  of  course,  did  not  plead  her  “feelings,”  as  the  judge  here  suggests.  His  pre-
established, hence unassailable conviction that women are not capable of reason, determines his
refusal to engage in rational debate with her. The question was settled beforehand. Man thinks;
woman feels. Therefore, whenever a woman argues a case, she must be pleading her feelings. This
is what may accurately be described as implicit bias. Evidently, Wollstonecraft projected on this
scene  her  own frustration  at  being  dismissed  from philosophical  debates  with  similar  pretexts.
Indeed, I find no evidence of a change of heart in this scene, written within days of her death. On
the other hand, it is shocking to realise how Godwin dismissed Wollstonecraft’s arguments with
almost the same arguments the judge here employs. Yet, at the same time, he himself published the
unfinished manuscript of  Wrongs of Woman:  how could he not have realised how thoroughly it
contradicted his claims? I can only conclude that he was afflicted by the same peculiar blindness of
the judge, and that this prevented him from seeing nothing but “feeling” in a text written by a
woman.
As for Letters Written During a Short Residency in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, Todd,
echoing Godwin’s narrative, writes that: “In her earlier books, whatever their tenor, Wollstonecraft
had  stressed intellectual merit; in this new one [Letters from Norway], she would openly declare
herself  the heroine and insist  on the value of the personal—she would allow ‘feeling to be my
criteria’ and her remarks and reflections would flow ‘unrestrained’” (Memoirs 367 emphasis mine).
The idea that personal involvement is incompatible with “intellectual merit,” however, is totally
alien to Wollstonecraft’s thought. Besides, even in Letters, there is nothing to indicate that she saw a
contradiction,  or  even  a  tension  between  intellect  and  womanhood;  or  between sensibility  and
maleness, for that matter.
 Wollstonecraft’s meditations on nature in that book have often been cited as evidence of her
supposed conversion to the ideology of sensibility, but this idea too can ultimately be traced to
Godwin, who, as we have seen, stated that Wollstonecraft’s religion and philosophy “were (…) the
602
pure result of feeling and taste” (Memoirs 121). This is, again, in direct opposition to A Vindication,
where she had written “I consider religion in a light opposite to that recommended by Dr Gregory,
who treats it as a matter of sentiment and taste” (Wollstonecraft, Vindication 115). She advocated,
instead, a “rational religion,” which consisted in “submission to the will of a being so perfectly
wise, that all his wills must be directed by the proper motive—must be reasonable” (255). Yet,
whenever  a  contradiction arises  between Wollstonecraft’s  statements  and Godwin’s,  it  has  long
since become customary to take his word against hers.
Todd, for example, as we have seen, thought Letters marked Wollstonecraft’s acceptance of
female specificity, despite the fact that her meditations on the sublime being evidently inspired,
precisely, by male writers like Rousseau and Burke. In reality, Wollstonecraft’s interest in spectacles
of natural grandeur in no way contradicts the thoughts she had articulated in  A Vindication—the
Analytical, incidentally, clearly did not see any contradiction there, quite the opposite; it suggested
Godwin  had  placed  disproportionate  emphasis  on  that  aspect  of  her  intellectual  life.
Wollstonecraft’s strategy was not to question the idea of rationality, but rather appropriating male
discourses to challenge the idea that they were specifically male and could not be understood by
women.
Here is perhaps the most notable of the “sublime” descriptions contained in Letters Written
During a Short Residence: 
The pine and fir woods, left entirely to nature, display an endless variety; and the
paths in the wood are not entangled with fallen leaves, which are only interesting
whilst they are fluttering between life and death. The grey cobweb-like appearance of
the aged pines is a much finer image of decay; the fibres whitening as they lose their
moisture, imprisoned life seems to be stealing away. I cannot tell why—but death,
under every form, appears to me like something getting free—to expand in I know
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not what element; nay, I feel that this conscious being must be as unfettered, have the
wings of thought, before it can be happy. (Wollstonecraft 88-89)
Then, encountering a cataract—one of the typical embodiments of the sublime—, she sees it
as a symbol of the constant flow of consciousness. The thoughts the contemplation of this spectacle
inspire are, for Wollstonecraft, both a foreshadowing and a proof of the immortality of the thinking
being: 
the tumultuous emotions this sublime object excited were pleasurable; and, viewing
it, my soul rose, with renewed dignity, above its cares—grasping at immortality—it
seemed as impossible to stop the current of my thoughts, as of the always varying,
still the same, torrent before me—I stretched out my hand to eternity, bounding over
the dark speck of life to come. (Wollstonecraft, Letters Written 89)
The waterfall, although being constantly in flux, retains its identity. Looking at it, the mind
of the beholder is turned on itself, and through the analogy between consciousness and the waterfall,
projects itself on eternity. Despite the mystical undertones of this discourse, one must not forget that
Wollstonecraft is in fact presenting herself emphatically as a thinking being, thus proving, in the
terms of A Vindication, that women are rational, hence immortal beings: “the nature of reason must
be the same in all,  if  it  be an emanation of divinity,  the tie that connects the creature with the
Creator; for can the soul be stamped with the heavenly image, that is not perfected by the exercise
of its own reason?” (122).
Thus, contrary to Godwin’s claims, Wollstonecraft regarded true religion as emanating from
reason—her religious outlook may be termed rationalist deism. Her experiments with the sublime in
Letters, in fact, entail the mixture of reason and sensibility she had always advocated. For, in  A
Vindication, she had not expressed a desire to abolish sensibility—any more than she expressed a
desire to abolish sexual difference—; to be more precise, she never denied the delight derivable
from  sensuous  impressions.  She  thought  the  mind—meaning  reason—was  expanded  by  the
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experience of the sublime. The way she conceived of this experience embodied her idea that reason
and  sensibility  were  not  opposing,  mutually  exclusive  principles,  but  rather  complementary,
inseperable aspects of the individual mind.
Indeed, as we have seen, Wollstonecraft  thought that the social  and political  reform she
envisaged required a revision of language. For her, certain words were commonly used in a false
sense  that  reflected  a  mistaken and perverse  understanding of  gender,  and therefore  should  be
restored to their true, natural sense. “Sensibility” was one such word. In the common acception,
which she regarded as unnatural, it  denoted an attitude that promoted feeling at the expense of
thinking. What was vulgarly termed “sensibility,” then, she regarded as the absence of habits of
reflection—such as she applied to sublime spectacles like the cataract. She did wish to abolish,
therefore, the system of education that created what she regarded as an exclusive subjection to the
senses. Women were trained to please men, and, as this required them not to reason, they were in
effect led to think of themselves as bodies without minds or souls: “Surely she has not an immortal
soul who can loiter life away merely employed to adorn her person, that she may (…) soften the
cares of a fellow-creature who is willing to be enlivened by her smiles and tricks, when the serious
business of life is over” (Wollstonecraft, Vindication 98). This kind of “feminine” sensibility, then,
was suited only for a “little soul that cannot extend its views beyond the present minute division of
existence” (100). Her description of the experience of the sublime, on the other hand, inasmuch as it
embodied what she regarded as the proper understanding of sensibility, was also a statement of her
basic assumption that women are rational. Therefore, such descriptions can in no way be construed
as evidence that she had finally embraced “female” sensibility.  The “sensibility” Wollstonecraft
embraced—which she had always embraced—is not feminine, but common to all human beings.
In  Letters, therefore, Wollstonecraft carried on the project of  A Vindication by showing to
the reader that she was not a “little soul,” and was able to “grasp at immortality” as well as male
reasoners like Rousseau and Burke. Thus, in Letters she continues to pursue an aggressive program
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of gender-bending which was designed to show that “the sexual distinction which men have so
warmly insisted upon, is arbitrary” (Wollstonecraft, Vindication 265). Therefore, Wollstonecraft was
not  trying to  abolish sexual  difference,  as Todd suggested,  but only this  “arbitrary distinction,”
which, it is implied, should be replaced with a more natural one.
Modern feminism, as we have seen, has mostly looked upon her project in the light of a
“remasculinisation”  of  reason.  For  Wollstonecraft,  however,  the  project  was  rather  the
“demasculinisation,” or “desexualisation” of reason. She did think that most women were irrational
and “little souls,” but, in all fairness, she thought most men were equally degraded. She thought,
that is, that they too were, by and large, not trained to think autonomously, or to bend their thoughts
toward abstract conceptions. Most men thought, or at least felt, women were nothing but body, and
thus, by enslaving women, they enslaved themselves. Hence, they too were “little souls.”
Wollstonecraft’s emphasis on sameness instead of difference made perfect sense at a time
when the very possibility of the woman intellectual was still very much a contested issue. Under
that heading, I include the woman scientist, the woman historian, as well as the woman philosopher.
This possibility has since become an actuality. We still live in a patriarchal society, I think there can
be no doubt of that, but women are now present in all branches of academia and scientific research.
This was not the case at all in Wollstonecraft’s time.
She was well aware that she was cutting a picture that confuted the traditional distinction
between men and women; or, in other words, that people would perceive her as “masculine.” But
she thought that the conceptions of gender from which such judgements flowed were fundamentally
flawed and based on irrational myths. This, of course, is recognised, in principle both by Clemit and
Walker  and  Janet  Todd,  but  they  think  that  Godwin  and  Wollstonecraft,  the  latter-day
Wollstonecraft, that is, shared the same project of revision of the gender relations, the most perfect
expression of which would be Memoirs, which according to the first of these critics “are designed to
stimulate us to make new ‘uses’ of Wollstonecraft through its portrayal of her as an agent of reform,
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through  its  representations  of  the  contested  categories  of  ‘male’ and  ‘female’ as  Godwin  and
Wollstonecraft tried to rethink them, and through its lyrical evocation of their shared ‘experiment’ in
living” (Clemit and Walker , Introduction 36).
Actually,  Godwin stimulates  us  to  abuse Wollstonecraft,  I  think,  for  his  revision  of  the
concepts of “male” and “female” does not coincide with hers—in fact, Godwin’s understanding of
gender  was  as  fundamentally  reactionary  as  hers  is  revolutionary.  The  modern  reception  of
Wollstonecraft’s work has been a long series of misunderstandings which can ultimately be traced to
Memoirs, itself a tragic story of misunderstanding. Again, Clemit and Walker’s introduction to the
book  is  a  perfect  illustration  of  this.  There,  they  identify  Godwin’s  anarchist  project  with
Wollstonecraft’s vision of equality between the sexes. The principle of “candour,” they tell us, 
was  central  to  Godwin’s  theory  of  anarchism,  in  which  the  exercise  of  rational
judgement will lead to individual men and women gradually becoming wiser, until
government withers away because it no longer is necessary. As he wrote in a chapter
‘Mode of Effecting Revolutions:’ ‘The revolutions of states (…) consist principally
in the change of sentiments and dispositions in the members of those states. The true
instruments for changing the opinions of men are argument and persuasion.’”
(Clemit and Walker, Introduction 14).
Thus,  they  transcribe  this  passage  of  the  first  edition  of  Political  Justice  as  if  it  were
perfectly unproblematic for their theory. They imply, that is, that gender equality had been inherent
to Godwin’s vision of a world without  government  from the beginning,  and that  this  idea also
pervaded  his  assessement  of  Wollstonecraft’s  importance.  In  reality,  this  reading  evinces  an
egregious critical blindness.
Wollstonecraft and Godwin did indeed share a belief radical, but peaceful political reform.
They believed, that is, in a revolution of mentalities that would bring into existence a society of
rational, responsible individuals, who took an equal share in the conduction of the affairs of the
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state. I am also certain that Wollstonecraft would agree that the only means to bring about the kind
of political change they advocated were “argument and persuasion.” The problem is, in  Memoirs
Godwin  explicitly  denies  Wollstonecraft,  and  by  extension,  all  women,  the  ability  to  argue
rationally. Therefore, he denies that she could ever be an active agent of change. He clearly implies
that she could only aspire to assist him in the task of persuading rational individuals, that is, men, of
the  need  for  change.  By  so  doing,  of  course,  he  also  indirectly  denies  her  the  status  of  full-
citizenship in his republic, which was strictly an association of  rational individuals. In practice,
Godwin ascribes to Wollstonecraft the role of muse of  his revolution, which differed materially
from hers in being a revolution of men. Through the sentimental rhetoric he develops in Memoirs,
indeed, and specifically by his identification of woman with beauty, he reiterates this emphatically
male political outlook, according to which women could only aspire to ornament, as it were, the
world, and create an agreeable domestic environment for men. Whatever our own convictions on
this subject may be, it must be recognised that Wollstonecraft violently disagreed, not only with this
particularly sentimentalised version of the doctrine of the separate spheres, but with the core ideas
that determine it. 
Indeed,  Godwin  reconciled  Wollstonecraft  precisely  with  the  very  notion  of  “female
sensibility” that she found absurd. He makes it very clear that “feeling” was, for Wollstonecraft, a
substitute of “thinking,” and this is precisely the sort of “sensibility” she meant to abolish. And then,
by equating “feeling” with femaleness, he indicates that this “sensibility” was proper of the female
mind, thus recuperating the notion of sexual identity she had rejected. 
Through this argument, moreover, he arrogated himself the write to correct her intuitions
from a “male” rational perspective. His portrait of her may challenge conventional morality, but it
posed no challenge to the traditional notions of sexual difference. Wollstonecraft, on the other hand,
placed  herself  neatly  across  available  gender  roles.  She  expected  people  would  think  her
“masculine,” but thought the phrase absurd. Inasmuch as it explodes the identification of specific
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behaviours with sex, her theory tends toward the idea of gender—incidentally, this is something that
cannot be said for Godwin’s theory, which rather reiterates the idea that patriarchy was based on the
natural intellectual inferiority of women relative to men.  Indeed, the idea of gender,  that is,  of
culturally  determined  sexual  roles  or  behaviours,  could  not  be  conceived  until  all  differences
between  the  sexes  ceased  to  be  regarded  as  natural  and  necessary,  and  this  is  precisely  the
conceptual change Wollstonecraft promoted, by reducing the natural hypothesis to the absurd. “I
have been led to imagine,” she ironically observes, “that the few extraordinary women who have
rushed in eccentrical directions out of the orbit prescribed to their sex, were male spirits, confined
by mistake in female frames. But it is not philosophical to think of sex when the soul is mentioned”
(Vindication 103).
As Poe suggests in his review of A Drama of Exile, Mary Wollstonecraft represented a third
sex. For, according to the received notions on the subject, she was neither “male” nor “female;” in
the common language there was no name for what she was. But then, according to her, the notion
associated in the common language with these terms was not true to reality. Wollstonectaft knew
that the “vindicator” of the rights of woman would be deemed masculine, but: “It would be just as
rational to declare that the courtiers of France,” meaning the aristocracy of the Ancien Régime,
“were not men” (Vindication 129).
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4 - “Friendship melting into Love:” Love and Marriage in Godwin, Wollstonecraft, and
Poe
Godwin’s portrait of Wollstonecraft is as idealised as those Poe’s narrators make of Morella
and Ligeia. One might say, to use Richard Wilbur’s expression, that he too “Pythagorised” his wife
out  of  this  world,  by  representing  her  as  someone  completely  alien  to  earthly  concerns.  This
spiritual  nature  was  reflected,  according  to  Godwin,  both  on  her  religious  and  philosophical
opinions, which he claimed were arrived at through a sort of enthusiasm, and on her notions of love.
As  usual,  however,  Wollstonecraft’s  recorded  opinions  about  conjugality  formed  the  greatest
possible contrast with both Godwin’s representation of her ideas and with his own theories on the
subject. A similar contrast appears to subsist between what Morella appears to have been saying to
her husband, and the construal he places on her words. In both texts, the contrast creates a comical
effect, which was clearly unintended by the narrator.
As we have seen, it has been suggested that Wollstonecraft’s “early” rationalism resulted in a
wholesale  repression  of  “sensuality,”  and  that  she  would  later,  after  her  first  heterosexual
experiments, distance herself from that view: “Wollstonecraft now saw sexual desire as natural and
right for women” (Todd, Mary Wollstonecraft 236). The implication, of course, is that she had, as
Godwin claims, changed her mind. According to the same critic, Godwin also was supposed to have
realised “how much the strident vindicator had softened” the second time they met (380). 
But  this  is  another  egregious  misrepresentation  of  Wollstonecraft’s  ideas.  Although  she
agreed with Godwin that procreation was the proper end of sex, she had never rejected sensuality.
Nor did she contest woman’s right to be loved, as has been suggested. That is a complete inversion
of her priorities. She argued, instead, against the idea that women “were made” solely “to be loved,”
and therefore “must not aim at respect, lest they should be hunted out of society as masculine”
(Wollstonecraft, Vindication 103). She argues, therefore, against the idea that an intellectual woman
was “unlovable.” She did not preach sexual liberation, of course—how could she, when the first
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reliable and widely-available contraceptive methods were more than a century away?—, but neither
did she condemn sexual enjoyment—and this was a bold enough view in her time. She remarked
that “pleasure is considered” by men “as mere relaxation; while women seek for pleasure as the
main  purpose  of  existence,”  and thus,  “to  their  senses,  are  women  made  slaves”  (129).  Thus,
Wollstonecraft did not reject sensuality, but thought that women were taught to value nothing else.
This, then, was what she wished to see changed.
In fact, Godwin was the one repudiating sensual pleasure—he went so far as to deny it. His
ideal conception of love was entirely detached from sexuality. “The tendency of a cultivated and
virtuous mind is to render us indifferent to the gratification of sense (…). We soon learn to despise
the mere animal function (…) We absurdly imagine that no better road can be found [than sex] to
the sympathy and intercourse of minds” (Political  Justice  [1985] 871).161 On his part,  then,  he
thought it highly desirable to abandon sex altogether in favour of a purely intellectual intercourse.
Indeed, philosophical men like himself had already lost, he suggests, all interest in sex. Still, the
preservation of the species required that they continued to subject themselves to the indignity of
copulation—but he believed that was about to change. 
His rigidly puritanical stance reaches its climax in a passage of  Political Justice  where he
makes an apocalyptic prediction. He thought that the time was nearly at hand when men would
finally “cease to propagate, for they will no longer have any motive, either of error or duty, to
induce them (…). In addition to this they will probably be immortal. The whole will be a people of
men, not of children” (Godwin  Political Justice  [1793] 871). In other words, since the need to
replenish the earth  would disappear,  sex would no longer  be  a  duty for  men.  Moreover,  since
immortality will come as the result of perfect wisdom, men will also lose any desire to engage in the
debasing practice of sexual intercourse. It is hard to know whether Godwin’s ideal “men” would
161 I have used Isaac Kramnick’s edition of Political Justice, which follows the third edition, the last overseen by 
Godwin.
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have any use for women at all in their sexless earthly paradise, where the reason of the male would
have governed unchallenged.
Being an atheist, Godwin projected on the earth and on the not-so-distant future the hope
that most rationalist philosophers of his epoch, which were typically deist, placed in the afterlife.
Wollstonecraft herself, which in this respect is a more typical representative of the Enlightenment,
followed the more common practice, and projected her version of the rationalist utopia of a “world
where sensation will give place to reason” on the afterlife, while remarking that male writers had
tacitly denied woman a place in this golden future: “How women are to exist in that state where
there is to be neither marrying nor giving in marriage, we are not told. For though moralists have
agreed that the tenor of life seems to prove that  man is prepared by various circumstances for a
future state, they constantly concur in advising woman only to provide for the present” (Vindication
94, 102). One could almost fancy she was replying to her husband from the other side of the grave.
On the other hand, Godwin’s denial of the pleasures of sex, which he presents as a terrible
ordeal (at least for  men) or, at best, a drudgery, is a little too extreme, and inevitably makes him
look like a hypocrite—especially after his marriage with Wollstonecraft. Indeed, he did not move
away from his disparagement of sex when he got together with her; instead he embodied his vision
of a bodiless intercourse in his account of his relationship with Wollstonecraft, deploying in the
process all the sentimental commonplaces of ideal womanhood. He tells us that Wollstonecraft was
as little interested in sensual pleasure—that “mire and grossness,” as he called it—as he was, and
that  their  refined  love  nearly  approximated  the  ideal  sexless  purity  he  had always  longed  for.
Indeed, their love was so refined, he tells us, that it did not require the presence of its object—in
fact, it  required its absence.  For absence “bestows a refined and aërial delicacy upon affection,
which it  with difficulty  acquires in any other  way. It  seems to resemble the communication of
spirits, without the medium, or the impediment, of this earthly frame” (Godwin,  Memoirs  209n,
104). 
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In fact, he claims he had fallen in love with Wollstonecraft, he tells us, in absentia, when he
read Letters. The reading of her “lovely” book becomes, in retrospect, the prehistory of their love
affair. According to this narrative, then, their sympathy first manifested through that most abstract
of  relationships,  that  between  a  reader  and  the  author  of  a  book—it  was,  indeed,  the
“communication of spirits.” Godwin the reader, then, is supposed to have fallen in love with the
Wollstonecraft’s innermost self, the “author” of the book he describes as the product of pure female
sensibility. Wollstonecraft’s physical appearance, he thereby implies, had nothing to do with his
affection, and this made his love remarkably free from the “grossness” of sensual attachments from
the beginning. However, Godwin recognises the “spiritual” intercourse quickly became “physical.”
Some months after having fallen in love with the author, the philosopher became intimate with the
woman. They started visiting each other regularly, and, he avows: “From that time our intimacy
increased by regular, almost imperceptible degrees” (Godwin, Memoirs 103). 
Incidentally, this idea is clearly evoked by a passage in “Ligeia,” to which I have already
alluded, where the narrator alleges, as a defence for all the conspicuous gaps in his story, that the
rare excellences  of his  wife “made their  way into my heart  by paces so steadily and stealthily
progressive that they have been unnoticed and unknown” (Poe, "Ligeia" 310). Thus, Poe’s narrator
intimates, once again, what Godwin openly admits, namely that it was not a case of love at first
sight, and, indeed, that there had been a time when he was not sensitive to his future wife’s very
peculiar  charms, but  was even repulsed by her.  Indeed, as we have seen,  on first  meeting her,
Godwin had been very displeased with Wollstonecraft, whom he thought very masculine both in
person and in opinions. This was that memorable occasion in which she had criticised the “great
man” Burke. Moreover, in both the tales and Memoirs, the beginning of the adventure determines
the  narrator’s  embarrassing  ignorance  of  certain  key  facts  about  his  wife’s  life  prior  to  their
liaison.162
162 Ligeia’s husband cannot remember where he first met his wife. He also cannot remember anything about her family.
As he writes, “a recollection flashes upon me that I have never known the paternal name” of the woman he knew
only as Ligeia (Poe, “Ligeia” 311).
613
“Ligeia” and “Morella,” then, appear to depict the same smooth transition from asexual to
sexual  intercourse expressed by the simile  Godwin applied to his  own case: “It  was friendship
melting into love” (Memoirs 104). Indeed, the transition appeared so smooth to Poe’s narrators that
they seemed not to have realised it, a possibility which Godwin’s rhetoric also lets us envisage:
The partiality we conceived for each other, was in that mode, which I have always
regarded  as  the  purest  and  most  refined  style  of  love.  [Indeed,  Godwin  never
materially revised his views on love.] It grew with equal advances in the mind of
each. It would have been impossible for the most minute observer to have said who
was  before,  and  who  was  after.  One  sex  did  not  take  the  priority  which  long-
established custom has awarded it, nor the other overstep that delicacy which is so
severely imposed. I am not conscious that either party can assume to have been the
agent or the patient, the toil-spreader or the prey, in the affair. When, in the course of
things,  the  disclosure  came,  there  was  nothing,  in  a  manner,  for  either  party  to
disclose to the other.
(Memoirs, 103-104). 
In the conventional, socially coded game of seduction, woman was  supposed to break the
rules of delicacy, and man to lure her into error. This is here contradistinguished from the “natural”
development of affections Godwin illustrates with the “melting” image. He regards as natural only
that  love which comes unnoticed,  without  any of the obtrusive lewdness and treachery that  he
associates with traditional courtship. Hence, the natural “melting” beguiles the “grossness” with
which Godwin regarded sexual transactions. For there was sex, he finally admits, when he states his
reason for refusing to marry Wollstonecraft at first: “that which (…) is of all things most sacredly
Likewise, Godwin, although he did not ignore the paternal name of his wife, alluding to the period in which
Wollstonecraft  had  adopted  Imlay’s  name,  tells  us  that  “the  name she  bore”  was  “perfectly  immaterial,”  and
referred to her as “Mary” throughout his book (Memoirs 108). And, as the Monthly Review maliciously observed:
“Where she was born, her husband does not know” (180).
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private, to blow a trumpet before it, and to record the moment when it has arrived at its climax,”
was ridiculous, he thought (Godwin, Memoirs 105).
This is perhaps the only point on which Godwin’s ideas on sex differ materially from those
of Rousseau: “Dans l’union des sexes chacun concourt également à l’object commun, mais non pas
de la même manière.  De cette diversité naît la première différence assignable entre les rapports
moraux  de  l’un  et  de  l’autre.  L’un  doit  être  actif  et  fort,  l’autre  passive  et  faible:  il  faut
nécessairement que l’un veuille et puisse, il suffit que l’autre résiste peu” (Émile 446). Nevertheless,
Godwin’s rejection of the marriage institution is still very much based on a typical sentimental view
of love, from which eroticism is entirely absent. For him, love and friendship are manifestations of
the same refined spiritual  affection.  In  fact,  he implies  that  both tend,  by their  very nature,  to
spiritualisation. Godwin gives us to understand that his fleshless love should never be confused with
that despicable lust that usurps its name among the unphilosophical. His “male” mind was attracted
to Wollstonecraft’s “female” mind, and vice-versa; sex sort of just happened.
We have  no  way  of  knowing  whether  Wollstonecraft  would  have  subscribed  Godwin’s
understanding of love by the end of her life, or corroborated his version of their story, but she left
enough written on the subject to warrant an educated guess. The presupposition that the experiment
in  cohabitation  with  Godwin  was  the  result  of  a  common  political  agenda  has  obscured  the
indisputable fact that the phrase “friendship melting into love” would have made absolutely no
sense for the author of A Vindication.” Wollstonecraft was categorical: “love and friendship cannot
subsist in the same bosom; (…) for the same object, [they] can only be felt in succession,” and in
that order (Vindication 142).
For Wollstonecraft, the word “love” should only be employed in its strictest technical sense,
to denote an appetite, or passion. Love was “the common passion, in which chance and sensation
take place of choice and reason,” and “is, in some degree, felt by the mass of mankind;” she also
called it a “fever” (Wollstonecraft, Vindication 99). Thus, she makes it very clear that love was, by
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definition, the suspension of rationality, and therefore could never be confused with friendship, a
word  which  she  appropriated  to  strictly  intellectual  affections.  Although  she  highly  valued
continence—and not  precisely  chastity—, Wollstonecraft  nonetheless  recognised  sexual  appetite
was natural  for  both sexes:  “Women as well  as  men ought  to  have the common appetites  and
passions of their nature, they are only brutal when unchecked by reason” (Vindication  200). This
sentence,  which  is  taken  from  A  Vindication,  incidentally,  clearly  belies  Todd’s  claim  that
Wollstonecraft had, before her involvement with Imlay, denied that sexual desire was “natural and
right for women” (Mary Wollstonecraft  236). On the contrary, Wollstonecraft had always refused
the sentimental view that took, as it were, sex out of love.
The first stage of any union between a man and a woman, the ultimate purpose of which
must be (on this point she is perfectly explicit) the begetting and raising of children, was necessarily
love, which Wollstonecraft conceived, without any sentimentality, as sexual desire. As she saw it,
this stage could never be bypassed. And this created the main problem which A Vindication attempts
to  address.  Wollstonecraft’s  was  basically  a  bourgeois  conception  of  conjugality,  reviewed  to
accommodate the rights of women. “Females” were generally “denied all political privileges, and
not allowed, as married women, excepting in criminal cases,  a civil  existence” (Wollstonecraft,
Vindication 256). Wollstonecraft thought that both parents should be involved in the education of
their children, though in different ways, and advocated monogamy, though not at all cost, as the best
way to ensure this collaboration. But the lasting relationship she envisaged could never be based on
love, which she regarded as a self-limiting emotion. Such a collaboration would not be possible
until sexual relationships were established on an equalitarian basis.
“Love,  considered  as  an  animal  appetite,”  and as  such Wollstonecraft  thought  it  should
always be regarded, “cannot long feed on itself without expiring. And this extinction in its own
flame, may be termed the violent death of love” (Vindication 141).  “Love, from its very nature,” its
sexual nature, that is, “must be transitory. To seek for a secret that would render it constant, would
616
be as wild a search as for the philosopher’s stone, or the grand panacea: and the discovery would be
equally useless, or rather pernicious, to mankind” (98).
The fire image expresses in Wollstonecraft the idea of the self-consuming nature of desire,
which  is  explicitly  contrasted  with  friendship,  conceived  as  a  permanent  attachment  based  on
mutual respect. Godwin’s idea of “friendship melting into love” is, therefore, wholly incompatible
with  her  conception  of  matrimonial  relationships.  “This  is,  must  be,  the  course  of  nature—
friendship or indifference inevitably succeeds love” (Wollstonecraft, Vindication 99).
It was neither possible nor desirable, she thought, to struggle against the course of Nature by
attempting artificially to keep the “flame” alive, to use her own metaphor. Friendship was the only
possible foundation of a lasting relationship, and, since it was incompatible with desire, “a master
and mistress of a family ought not to continue to love each other with a passion” (Wollstonecraft,
Vindication 99). The relationship that had been first  established on love,  then,  should gradually
become the association of two responsible individuals for the purpose of raising a family. This did
not mean, however, that the sexual appetite was altogether extinguished, only that the couple kept it
under check—especially, thought Wollstonecraft, the man. Maternity marks the term of the “fiery”
stage of marriage, and the beginning of a new stage, but only if the man was rational enough to
exercise some self-restraint, which was not very probable at a time when people of both sexes were
being educated, as she thought, to only value the gratification of their senses.
This disenchanted but realistic take on sexuality is nothing like Godwin’s apocalyptic vision
of a world without sex. Unlike him, Wollstonecraft was of the opinion that human beings could not
behave “rationally” all the time. She openly acknowledged the role of sexual desire and sensual
fruition in conjugality that Godwin did his best to sweep them under the rug. He thought that there
was nothing pleasant or sacred about sex, and that it was rather dirty and undignified, and therefore
the  sooner  man  got  over  it  the  better.  Wollstonecraft,  on  the  other  hand,  having  a  broader
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understanding of human nature, thought this was neither viable nor desirable. Her take on sexuality
may sound rather bleak to modern ears, but nowhere as bleak as Godwin’s:
Love, such as the exalted pen of genius has traced, exists not on earth, or only resides
in those exalted,  fervid imaginations  that  have sketched such dangerous pictures.
Dangerous, because they not only afford a plausible excuse to the voluptuary who
disguises sheer sensuality under a sentimental veil, but as they spread affectation, and
take from the dignity of virtue. (…) Virtue and pleasure are not, in fact, so nearly
allied in this life as some eloquent writers have laboured to prove.
(Wollstonecraft, Vindication 142). 
Yet, Godwin’s sentimental notion of the coexistence of friendship and love, as well as his
ideal picture of a love that resembled “the communication of spirits,” implies precisely this alliance
between virtue and pleasure. On her part, Wollstonecraft, so far from rejecting pleasure, actually
affirmed it  against  what she termed “metaphysical notions respecting that passion” (Vindication
255). Godwin’s conception of love, on the other hand, could hardly be any more “metaphysical,”
and in this  respect it  strongly resembles that of the narrator of “Morella,” who is  a little more
extreme in his rejection of the “physical,” and a little more consistent—but not much. Not content
with disparaging sexual activity, the latter actually denies categorically—or appears to deny—that
he  had  had  sexual  intercourse  with  his  wife,  thereby  making  its  otherwise  unremarkable
consequence, pregnancy, appear as an unprecedented wonder—a downright miracle. His marriage
was not a real marriage, he insists; the omission of sexual intercourse made it a mere formality. He
has to insist, lest the reader get the wrong idea from his wife’s pregnancy: “my soul, from our first
meeting, burned with fires it had not before known; but the fires were not of Eros, and bitter and
tormenting to my spirit was the gradual conviction that I could in no manner define their unusual
meaning, or regulate their vague intensity. Yet we met; and fate bound us together at the altar; and I
never spoke of passion, nor thought of love” (Poe, “Morella” 229).
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I  honestly  cannot  understand  how anyone  could  have  taken  a  narrator  seriously  whose
reasoning is based on a premise so obviously contradicted by subsequent events. But this is no more
than  the  reductio  ab  absurdum of  Godwin’s  rhetoric:  he  too  claimed  that  his  marriage  with
Wollstonecraft was not really a marriage, but a revolutionary experiment in cohabitation, based on
so ostensibly spiritualised an affection that, were not for his wife’s pregnancy, we would no doubt
surmise that the couple had completely got over sex, in anticipation of Godwin’s prediction that
“man” would, sooner rather than later, “cease to propagate.”
Morella and her husband, judging from the latter’s testimony, spent the first period of their
marriage studying together. He claims that the unravelling of the mysteries of personal identity was
all they cared about—at least, that seems to be the idea, for his discourse is as vague and full of
innuendo as that of his fellow-narrator in “Ligeia,” and this makes it very difficult to know for
certain what was going on exactly. Whatever it was, after some time, the narrator alleges a strange
change came over his “friend” which rendered her repulsive to him. After this  change, they no
longer studied—or whatever it was that they were doing—together. This is the second mystery of
“Morella,” which the narrator felt was somehow obscurely connected with the first, the “nature” of
his affection for her.
At  this  point  in  the  narrative,  a  pregnancy was  the  last  thing  the  reader  would  expect.
Convinced that the “fires were not of Eros,” the thought seems never to have crossed the narrator’s
head either, until, on the last night of her life, Morella herself told him she was about to give birth to
a child—his child. It should have appeared obvious to him then that he had been sorely mistaken
about the “nature” of the “fires;” that they were “of Eros” after all.  Yet, even then, he remains
apparently convinced that he and Morella had never engaged in sexual intercourse.
The narrator’s negative “not  of Eros,” however, implies his recognition that his story does
look  trivial.  He  appears  perfectly  aware  that  the  burden  of  proof  is  on  his  side.  His  story  is
presumably  one  of  those  unbelievable  truths  that  Poe’s  narrators  so  often  try  to  palm  on
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unsuspecting readers. But this is where his problems start in earnest. His authority is corroded from
the outset by doubt. He had “never before known” “fires” such as those in which he burned for
Morella; he does not recognise them. But if he does not know their “nature,” how can he be so
certain that they were “not of Eros;” how he can he positively assert they had nothing to do with her
pregnancy? Everything, from that “backward” reasoning that proceeds from effects to their habitual
causes, to the narrator’s blunders, corroborates the impression that he was wrong, that is, that he did
not known what “Eros” meant, and therefore was not competent to judge whether what he felt was
it. His claim that this were “fires” such as he had “never before known,” then, becomes a clear
indication of sexual inexperience. This is corroborated by Morella’s own testimony, for she clearly
reproaches  him for  his  ignorance  of  sexual  matters.  He,  of  course,  cannot  for  the  life  of  him
understand  what  she  was  telling  him  just  before  she  died,  but,  considering  how  obvious  her
allusions are, this fact, in itself, confirms his ignorance.
On  the  night  she  died,  Morella  called  her  husband  to  her  side  to  make  the  following
announcement: “I am dying, yet shall I live,” to which he replies “Morella!” (Poe, “Morella” 232).
This expletive indicates bafflement. Even this late in the story, when Morella was about to give birth
to  their  child,  and  therefore  must  have  been  noticeably  pregnant,  the  narrator  proves  himself
incapable to guess the solution to this riddle without her help. She was dying, yet would live on.
What in the world could Morella mean?
She spells it out for him, and proceeds to curse the exasperating, clueless father by parables:
“The days have never been when thou couldst love me—but her whom in life
thou didst abhor, in death thou shalt adore.”
“Morella!”
“I repeat that I am dying. But within me is a pledge of that affection—ah,
how little! —which thou didst feel for me, Morella. And when my spirit departs shall
the child live—thy child and mine, Morella’s. But thy days shall be days of sorrow—
620
that  sorrow which is  the  most  lasting of  impressions,  as  the  cypress  is  the most
enduring of trees. For the hours of thy happiness are over; and joy is not gathered
twice in a life, as the roses of Paestum twice in a year. Thou shalt no longer, then,
play the Teian with time, but, being ignorant of the myrtle and the vine, thou shalt
bear about with thee thy shroud on earth, as do the Moslemin at Mecca.
(Poe, “Morella” 232-33)
This is certainly an ornate tirade, but with it Morella actually specifies the meaning of her
previous statement.  She was dying, but also pregnant,  therefore,  would live on in her child.  In
addition, she was not pleased with her husband, whom she reproaches for his lack of “affection.”
This, of course, chimes with his own claim that the fires had not been “of Eros.” Morella, however,
clearly states that her child was a “pledge” of what little affection he had showed for her.
The only extraordinary thing about this exchange, I think, is the narrator’s seeming inability
to understand it. Indeed, he remains as stupefied as ever: “Morella! (…) Morella! how knowest thou
this?” (Poe, “Morella” 233). Unfortunately for him, Morella did not live long enough to offer any
further clarification. He must spend the rest of his existence searching for the answer—which he
feels is involved in the solution of the other two provoking mysteries of the “fires” that seemed but
were not love and of the change that came over his wife.
But there is nothing in Morella’s words to suggest her pregnancy was extraordinary, on the
contrary, she appears to have been convinced it was perfectly ordinary, and so, in a sense, she is not
so much prophesying an unexpected event  as  she is  stating a  fact  which must  have been very
obvious  by  that  time.  Dawn  Keetley,  in  “Pregnant  Women  and  Envious  Men  in  ‘Morella,’
‘Berenice,’ ‘Ligeia,’ and ‘The Fall of the House of Usher’” seems to have been the first to draw
attention to this distinctive aspect of “Morella.” In a tale where 
the  reader  knows the  wife  to  be  literally  pregnant,  the  narrator’s  unawareness  is
particularly astonishing. The narrator describes his wife’s state as unfathomable (…).
621
The narrator of ‘Morella’ can apprehend his wife’s condition only as an illness, when
he can aprehend it at all. That the narrator retains what on some level can only be a
willful blindness to his wife’s state is evident in the fact that he sees a wasting illness
(…); the perversity of apprehending the swelling belly of a pregnant woman this way
seems driven by the need to repress what must be quite visible evidence of the truth.
In the end, Morella has to tell the narrator, on the very day of the birth, that she is
about to deliver a child” (Keetley, “Pregnant Women” 5).163
Indeed, the mother did not even venture to predict the sex of the child, which would be more
of a gamble, but merely insists that it was  his child and hers.  If anything, her insistence suggests
that she knew her husband would be surprised. She also predicts her own death, it is true, but this
cannot have come as a surprise to her husband either, for he was himself expecting it. The final
portion of her address is scarcely more obscure.
Like the dying queen in Perrault’s “Peau D’Ane,” she was of course telling her husband that
he would never find happiness with another woman. More precisely, she places a curse on him: he
would never remarry, and would mourn the loss of the woman he despised for the rest of his days.
This cannot have come as a surprise to him either. He had already told us that she was well aware of
how irksome she had become to him: “she seemed conscious of my weakness or my folly, and,
smiling, called it Fate. She seemed, also, conscious of a cause, to me unknown, for the gradual
alienation of my regard” (Poe, “Morella” 231). This cause, then, at once obvious to Morella and
totally obscure to him, is one of the mysteries of the tale. The solution is obvious, I think: Morella’s
pregnancy itself, of which the narrator was obviously unaware. Indeed, the announcement of this
163 Keetley’s article is an exercise in psychoanalytical interpretation (in my opinion, one of the best in its kind in Poe
studies). Such readings, however, tend to regard the narrator’s phantasies as an expression of Poe’s own obsessions,
disregarding  the  well-coded  distance  between  the  author  and  his  fictional  character.  “In  the  end,”  Keetley
concludes, “the reason Kleinian envy can usefully illuminate the fictional protagonists of Poe is that his fiction
emerged at an unprecedented high point in the growing cultural tendency to give the mother-child dyad primacy—a
process  in  which  [Melanie]  Klein  also  participated.  (…)  Poe  shares  with  Klein  a  belief  in  innate  hostility,
compensatory idealization, and an entrenched drive toward destruction” (“Pregnant Women” 12).
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pregnancy is the only thing that could have come as a surprise to the narrator in Morella’s dying
words.
Indeed, the only new facts Morella’s statement brings to the story are her pregnancy, and that
the narrator had fathered a child. The reader certainly could not have guessed it from what been said
up to that point. Morella’s dying speech is the first intimation of sexual activity in the tale—for,
indeed, no effect can be more safely referred to a cause than pregnancy to sexual intercourse, unless
some extraordinary, indeed miraculous insemination is admitted. And, according to the narrator’s
own admission, adultery was out of the question: she had “shunned society, and, attaching herself to
me alone, rendered me happy” (Poe, “Morella” 229). Yet, if the narrator really stands behind his
statement about the “fires,” I cannot quite see how he could account for his wife’s pregnancy. At the
time,  then,  the  news  must  have  been  as  surprising  to  him as  they  are  to  the  reader  who first
encounters his tale.
His surprise at his wife’s words, then, strongly suggests the narrator had not realised his wife
was pregnant until she went into labor. Yet, he had noticed something different about her in the
months that preceded this crisis. At that point, his feelings changed too: he was no longer pleased by
her society, as he once had been, but irritated by it. The chronology of this change is consistent with
pregnancy: “the time had now arrived,” he confesses, “when my wife’s society oppressed me as a
spell. (…) Shall I say I longed with an earnest and consuming desire for the moment of Morella’s
decease? I did; but the fragile spirit clung to its tenement of clay for many days—for many weeks
and irksome months—until my tortured nerves obtained the mastery over my mind, and I grew
furious through delay” (Poe, “Morella” 232).
Poe’s  narrators  have  a  way of  ignoring  the  most  obvious  solutions.  In  the  months  that
preceded the birth of their child, Morella had changed. Was that not to be expected? Perhaps the
nature of the “change” in his wife, then, was what the narrator found so extraordinary? But this too
seems perfectly trivial: “the crimson spot settled steadily upon the cheek, and the blue veins upon
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the forehead became prominent” (Poe, “Morella” 231). The narrator thought that she was dying.
After some “months,” she did die, but she also gave birth to a child, and the changes he mentions
could as  easily  have been caused by her pregnancy.  Morella,  as we have seen,  knew why her
husband could not wait to see her dead. The cause for this, although “unknown” to the narrator, is
also obvious enough. Her pregnancy appears to have put an abrupt end to what seems to have been
a rather intense sex-life.
Indeed, his mounting irritation at  the delay in the satisfaction of his “consuming desire”
suggests the old “fires” were not yet quenched. He could no longer bear the touch of her fingers, her
“low”  insinuating  voice,  and  her  “meaning”  eyes.  Without  realising  it,  he  had  evidently  been
sexually attracted to his wife, and, apparently, he found these things as titillating as ever after her
change, only now his desire could no longer be satisfied. At length, his irritation was projected on
the  object  of  unsatisfied  desire,  and  “sublimated,”  as  it  were,  into  a  passion  to  “Pythagorise”
Morella, as Wilbur puts it.
This is in keeping with Wollstonecraft’s theory of matrimonial relationships. As we have
seen, pregnancy signalled the critical period in a sexual relationship when love should give way to
friendship. “The tenderness which a man will feel for the mother of his children,” she wrote, “is an
excellent substitute for the ardour of unsatisfied passion” (Wollstonecraft,  Vindication  200). The
implication is  that the woman’s libido was inhibited during pregnancy, but the man’s remained
active. Therefore, as we have seen, Wollstonecraft thought that the man was forced to repress his
sexual desire, a feat which required rationality. The narrator of “Morella,” of course, was not very
rational, and he evidently felt no “tenderness” for the mother of his child.
At this juncture, one has a choice of either crediting the narrator, in which case the birth of
the second Morella is either a miracle or, as he seems more inclined to believe, a diabolical trick, or
question  the  narrator’s  initial  assertion  that  Eros  had  never  visited  their  home.  Indeed,  the
“mystical” meditations on “personal identity” in which the narrator gets hopelessly tangled are a
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way to accommodate the birth of their daughter to that assertion—which is really the axiom of the
narrator’s  problem.  In  other  words,  the  reader  must  choose  between  an  utterly  improbable
hypothesis which is actually contradicted by the evidence, and the rational explanation intimated by
Morella.
The whole tale is an extended meditation on Morella’s words, predicated on the supposition
that she was talking “mysticism.” The narrator seems particularly interested, however, in proving
that she was wrong about his “ignorance.” His mangling of one of her allusions towards the end of
the narrative, however, confirms that he totally missed her point. Speaking of the obscure period
after his daughter’s christening, in which he lost track of time, he tells us, as if he intended thus to
wrap the moral of his own tale: “Nor was I indeed ignorant of the flowers and the vine, but the
hemlock and the cypress overshadowed me night and day” (Poe, “Morella” 236). Evidently, he
meant  to  deny Morella’s  assertion that  he was “ignorant  of the  myrtle and the vine,”   but,  by
replacing the first with the generic term “flowers,” he proves beyond a doubt that he attaches no
special  significance  to  this  particular  “flower,”  and  in  that  manner  confirms  the  ignorance  he
intended to deny (Poe, “Morella” 233 emphasis mine).
The allusion to the “myrtle” is, of course, text-book stuff. The ancient Greeks and Romans
consecrated the plant to Aphrodite, or Venus, the goddess of love—and this was evidently Morella’s
way of intimating her husband’s ignorance of all things venereal. He evidently did not get any of
this, and consequently also did not know what it was that he was denying. And how could someone
that did not know that the myrtles were of Venus, be so certain that the “fires” he felt were not of
Eros?  He  appears  to  have  been  as  little  conversant  with  the  biological  mysteries  of  human
reproduction as he was with classical mythology.
The narrator may not have spoken “of passion, nor thought of love,” but he certainly appears
to have  made love without realising it.  Only this can account for his perplexity.  His wife, who
should know, and who incidentally did speak of love, albeit in an allusive fashion, was evidently
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convinced that he was the father. But how could he possibly  ignore that he had had sex with his
wife? Morella hints an explanation for that too. According to her, the narrator was “ignorant” not
only of the “myrtle,” but also of the “vine,” which suggests that he may have ignored wine in the
same way that he had ignored sex, that is, that he may have been equally unfamiliar with the effects
of both. In other words, he may have been drunk when he and Morella engaged in sexual activities.
The association  of  the  myrtle  and the vine depends on a  third classical  allusion,  at  the
beginning of Morella’s sentence, to Anacreon of Teos, or the Teian, an ancient Greek lyrical poet
well-known for his devotion to love, wine, song, and revelry.  Thomas “Anacreon” Moore, who is
reported to have been a great influence on Poe’s early poetry, published in 1800 to great popular
acclaim a translation of an ancient anthology of poems attributed to the Greek poet, often referred to
as the  Anacreontea, the authenticity of which was, nevertheless, seriously challenged even in his
time (Cf.  Mabbott,  Tales 236n).  Mabbott,  who never  suspects  Poe’s  earnest  narrators  of  being
anything but a stand-in for the author, interpreted the reference in Morella as a broad, unspecific
allusion to the work of Anacreon, by which Poe merely intended to display his own learning. The
reference to Anacreon, however, is very meaningful. The well-established association of the Greek
poet with wine and love would be obvious to anyone the least bit acquainted with his reputation
(considering the success of Moore’s translation, any self-respecting magazine reader in Poe’s time),
however, the myrtle, the vine, and Anacreon, the three elements combined in Morella’s allusion, are
seldom mentioned together.
There is a famous passage in Virgil’s Eclogues in which the association of the myrtle and the
vine  respectively  with  Venus  and  Bacchus  is  referred (10.7.61,62),  and  the  Anacreontea  itself
documents the wine-fuelled amatory exploits of the legendary poet. The very first poem of that
collection, here given in Moore’s translation, portrays an inebriated and amorous Anacreon: “His lip
exhal’d, whene’er he sigh’d, / The fragrance of the racy tide;” “Quick from his glowing brows he
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drew / His braid, of many a wanton hue; / I took the braid of wanton twine— / It breath’d of him,
and blush’d with wine!” (Odes 24-5). 
However, though Anacreon’s devotion to the vine and the myrtle is confirmed by the highest
authority, it seems that nowhere in the canon of Ancient literature is his name mentioned together
with  the myrtles  and the  vine.  This  relatively  unusual  combination  does  appear,  however,  in  a
source not nearly as prestigious, but which nevertheless enjoyed great popularity in the late 1700s
and early 1800s both in England and the United States, and, indeed, through an arbitrary association
which its author could not have foreseen, would, a few decades before the publication of “Morella,”
become  permanently  associated  with  American  patriotism.  I  am  referring  to  the  hymn  of  the
Anacreontic Society of London, an association of good-natured amateur musicians that gathered at
the “Crown and Anchor Tavern in the Strand.”164 The first stanza of this jolly little ditty ran as
follows:
To Anacreon in Heav’n, where he sat in full glee,
A few sons of harmony sent a Petition,
That he their inspirer and patron would be;
When this answer arriv’d from the jolly old Grecian—
Voice, Fiddle, and Flute,
164  The hymn of the Anacreontic Society of London, also known as “To Anacreon in Heaven,” supplied the
melody for many American patriotic songs, among which “Defence of Fort McHenry” (1814) by Francis Scott Key,
which was finally officially adopted as the American national  anthem in 1931, under the title “The Star-Spangled
Banner.”
My argument presupposes that Poe knew the song. As O. G. Sonneck showed in his study of the origins of
“The Star-Spangled Banner,” the hymn of the Anacreontic Society, originally published in 1778, remained for decades a
favorite in England. Sonneck lists 21 publications in magazines and anthologies of popular music between 1780 and
1804. Its inclusion in The Songster’s Miscellany, published in Philadelphia in 1817, and in The Universal Songster: or,
Museum of Mirth, which appeared in London in 1832 (and was reprinted in 1834) shows that the original song remained
popular in both sides of the Atlantic for many years. Indeed, for a while, the song in a sense usurped the place of
Anacreon’s own poems. Indeed, “‘To Anacreon in Heaven,’” Sonneck remarks, “became popularly known (…) as ‘The
Anacreontic Song.’ Of the many Anacreontic songs of the time it appears to have been the only one to have gained such
distinction” (55).
Concerning its reception in America, Sonneck writes: “it is now known that the musical intercourse between
England and America was too lively in those days to have permitted such a well-known air as ‘To Anacreon in Heaven,’
published in the most popular collections, to have remained barred from our shores” (Star-Spangled Banner 61). Poe
can simply not be supposed to have ignored one of the most popular songs of his time, and one which was then known
simply as the anacreontic song.
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No longer be mute,
I’ll lend ye my name and inspire ye to boot:
And, besides I’ll instruct ye, like me, to intwine
The myrtle of Venus with Bacchus’s vine (Tomlinson, “To Anacreon in Heaven” 21)
The poem is composed of six uniform stanzas of nine verses. The ninth verse forms, with the
alternating forms “twine” and “entwined” at the end of the eight, a sort of burden to the song. Thus,
the  unusual  combination  that  we found in “Morella” is  the central  motive  of  the hymn of  the
Anacreontics. A translation of Anacreon’s fifth ode by a very young Thomas Moore, contained a
similar passage, but the myrtle was there replaced by the rose: “Let us, with the clustering vine, /
The rose, Love’s blushing flower, entwine” (Moore, Preface xxiii). I suspect Moore’s translation
may itself have been inspired by “To Anacreon in Heaven.”  In the original Greek, the flower was
unquestionably a rose (ῥόδον), which was also associated with Venus.
There may, however, be another learned joke implied in Poe’s text. In his 1827 commentary
to  the  ode,  John Broderick  Roche mentions  that:  “The ancients  used perfumes and wreaths  of
flowers in their entertainments, because they imagined, (as Plutarch remarks) that odours hindered
the wine from overpowering them” (First Twenty-Eight Odes 34n). Presumably, it is to this custom
that the ode alludes. The same commentator also points out, however, that in the weaving of such
garlands, or chaplets, the myrtle was also sometimes used, a flower which, he writes, “in reality,
possessed an astringent quality, and may dissipate the fumes of wine,” a virtue he did not recognise
to the rose (34n). This intertextual connection strengthens the supposition that Morella meant to
suggest her husband was drunk when he made love to her when she told him he was “ignorant” of
both the myrtle and the vine, for, according to Roche, the former is the  only flower that had the
virtue of offsetting the deleterious influences of wine.
In any case, the song of the Anacreontics resonates significantly with Poe’s tale and, indeed,
when the reader connects the two, the seemingly vague allusion acquires, suddenly but irreversibly,
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a definite meaning that has an obvious, and humorous bearing on the plot. Although he was never as
crude as other ancient  poets,  like Martial  for example,  love was in Anacreon’s time, as Moore
himself put it, “rather an unrefined emotion, and the intercourse of the sexes was animated more by
passion than sentiment” (Odes 14). In other words, the broad-minded approach to love of Classical
Antiquity was in stark contrast with the demure sentimentality of Moore’s and Poe’s time. The
allusion thereby brings into strongest relief the signs that show the narrator’s opinions on the matter
were distorted by the sentimental whitewashed depictions of love typical of his time, in which sex
was either very subtly hinted or altogether omitted.
The narrator’s own pedantry also forms a comical contrast with the Anacreontic Society
which,  judging  from  its  hymn,  made  no  serious  claim  to  scholarship,  but  evidently  prided
themselves  on  being  acquainted  with  love  and wine.  The allusion  to  the  drinking  song of  the
Anacreontics strengthens, moreover, our already well-founded suspicions that Morella had not only
taught  him how to read,  but  also how to love.  The irresistible  emergence  of  the  sexuality  the
narrator denies, both through Morella’s pregnancy and through her allusions, expose to ridicule his
notions of love, and with it his fiction of a wholly spiritualised marriage.
The narrator  was also at  a loss to explain the resemblance between the mother  and her
daughter. He thought it absolutely extraordinary. His ignorance of sexual matters perfectly accounts
for this fact. Since he rules out as a matter of course the natural explanation, his efforts to solve this
mystery  are  totally  misguided.  No  matter  how  hard  he  tried,  neither  Fichte,  Schelling,  the
Pythagoreans, or Locke, which the narrator tells us he had studied under Morella, could ever help
him understand why a daughter resembles her mother, or how babies were born—even if he could
get some sense out of them, which, judging from his text, seems very doubtful.
It  appears  to me that  the ridicule  clearly reflects  on Godwin.  In  Memoirs,  he implicitly
recognises his relative sexual inexperience. Wollstonecraft, of course, had already had a daughter by
Imlay: “She had already had some experience on the subject in the case of Fanny; and I cheerfully
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submitted in every point to her judgement and her wisdom” (Godwin, Memoirs 112). Thus, Godwin
admits  he  did  not  understand  the  philosophy  of  childbirth,  and  I  think  that  Poe  deliberately
exploited the comical potential of such statements.
In fact, Godwin ignored, or affected to ignore, a great deal more. Not only does he express
repulsion for sex, like Morella’s husband, he describes his relationship with his wife in terms that
suggest this played no appreciable role in their relationship. This climaxes in his claim, which I
have  already  mentioned,  that  their  intercourse  was  almost  like  “the  communication  of  spirits”
(Godwin, Memoirs 104). Thus, I insist, Godwin’s conception of love is scarcely less “metaphysical”
than that of Morella’s husband. As a result, his wife’s pregnancy, and her much more outspoken take
on  sexuality,  haunt  his  narrative  as  effectively  as  Morella’s  words  haunt  her  husband’s  tale,
constantly reminding the reader of the sexuality he denies. He plainly states, at least, that he and his
wife did not think of love until they made it. Thus, the extreme prudery he displays in dealing with
such matters results in the ridiculous suggestion that they had sex without realising that they were
doing it, which is exactly the same impression that we get from “Morella.” Poe’s narrator, on the
other hand, appears to have been truly as ignorant of sex as Godwin affects to be, and this appears
to me to have been Poe’s way of intimating that Godwin was a hypocrite. Indeed, the blindness of
Poe’s narrator is too preposterous to be credible. One gets the feeling, that is,  that it  would be
impossible for any real person to be as ignorant as Poe’s character shows himself to be.
He thinks of his daughter as “the second Morella” (see “Morella,” 236). His choice of a
name manifests his conviction in the supernatural rebirth of the first, which must in turn be traced to
his deep-rooted conviction that the “fires” were “not of Eros.” Indeed, his narrative totally erases his
own involvement in the affair: in effect, he tells us that the child was all Morella. Like the narrator
of “The Black Cat,” he comes up with a nonsensical explanation that supplies the place of the chain
of  probable  cause.  Since  this  explanation  is,  however,  totally  unconvincing,  we  are  forced  to
conclude that, unbeknownst to the narrator, the “fires” were exactly what they seemed, a sexual
630
metaphor. And this sexual metaphor then sets the whole text a-flaming. Consider for example the
most outrageously “quaint” paragraph in the tale, in which the narrator details his intercourse with
his wife in the early days of their marriage: 
In all of this,  if I err not, my reason had little to do. My convictions,  or I forget
myself,  were in  no manner  acted upon by the ideal,  nor  was any tincture of the
mysticism which I read, to be discovered, unless I am greatly mistaken, either in my
deeds or in my thoughts. Persuaded of this, I abandoned myself  implicitly to the
guidance of my wife, and entered with an unflinching heart into the intricacies of her
studies. And then—then, when poring over forbidden pages, I felt a forbidden spirit
enkindling within me—would Morella place her cold hand upon my own, and rake
up from the ashes of a dead philosophy—some low singular words, whose strange
meaning burned themselves in upon my memory. And then, hour after hour, would I
linger by her side, and dwell upon the music of her voice—until, at length, its melody
was tainted, with terror, —and there fell a shadow upon my soul—and I grew pale,
and shuddered inwardly at those too unearthly tones. And thus, joy suddenly faded
into horror, and the most beautiful became the most hideous, as Hinnom became Ge-
Henna. (Poe, “Morella” 230 emphasis mine)165
In her famous psychoanalytical study of Poe, Marie Bonaparte maintained that “Morella,” as
also “Berenice” and “Ligeia,” were tales of “transference,” and that Poe himself had unconsciously
projected on the title characters his infantile sexual attraction for his own mother:
Thus the bonds which once united the tiny boy to his mother are recalled, as also his
dependence on her for instruction in the forbidden, ‘accursed’ lore—doubtless sexual
knowledge—of  which  she  held  the  key.  Due,  however,  to  the  original  incest
prohibition, which imposed a sex barrier between mother and child, the boy’s first
165 In the second part of this dissertation I have commented on the grammatical blunder in this paragraph.
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resentment is later visited upon the wife, with the result that his “joy” fades “into
horror.” Thus, Poe’s ungratified libido, to which normal channels of satisfaction were
denied, became changed into the morbid anxiety to which these Tales bear witness.
(Life 222)
I think that Bonaparte’s insight is flawless. The passage of the tale I have just transcribed
clearly intimates that the knowledge Morella was imparting to her husband was sexual, and also that
he was unaware of this fact. However, it appears to me that Bonaparte’s identification of Poe with
the narrator is unwarranted by the text, and indeed that he must have been as fully aware of the
sexual undertones of these statements as Bonaparte herself. Before the ridiculous accumulation of
expressions of doubt in this paragraph, indeed, the idea that Poe shared his narrator’s ignorance, or
unawareness of sex, cannot be seriously entertained. In fact, Bonaparte’s phrase “ungratified libido”
is misleading in the context. She thought that “Morella,” as all of Poe’s tales of woman, provided
evidence of the writer’s impotence. To be more precise, she thought that the narrator was impotent,
and identified him unproblematically with Poe himself. However, Morella’s pregnancy affords very
strong evidence that he had had sexual intercourse with her at least once. Besides, the hints that
indicate  that  Morella  was  imparting  sexual  knowledge,  which  Bonaparte  herself  brings  to  our
attention, let us conclude sex was habitual with them. Indeed, if he ignored sex once, what was there
to prevent him from keep on ignoring it?
But this disguised account of his narrator’s sexual initiation appears designed to intimate to
the reader his ridiculous blindness. Indeed, if we discount the “mystical,” as in fact the narrator
himself advises us to do, the intercourse being described looks like nothing in the world but sex, or
rather as what one imagines sex would look like to a man that had no clue of what was going on,
even  though  he  was  one  of  the  parties  involved—if  such  an  absurd  man  can  be  conceived.
Therefore, Bonaparte was, I believe, right in considering that the tale represented the horror with
which a child regards sex; she suggests that Poe was himself unaware of this content, but the sheer
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absurdity of his narrator’s claims suggest otherwise. There was, he tells us, nothing “metaphysical”
about his thoughts and deeds (or he forgets himself). Thus, the narrator himself challenges us to find
something else which may fit his description—something physical.
Though ignorant of the obvious key to the mysteries of procreation,  sex,  the narrator is
actually right about the statements about which he is less certain—this is generally true of all of
Poe’s narrators. “Reason,” to be sure, “had very little to do” with his love (the time-worn complaint
of  all  lovers,  from Alcaeus,  Sappho,  and Anacreon down to our  time),  and even less  with his
ramblings—his  conclusions are  in  fact  outrageously irrational;  and there was,  after  all,  nothing
spiritual  about  his  “thoughts”  or,  more  to  the  point,  his  “deeds,”  which,  judging  from ulterior
developments, were as gross and sinful as the average honest husband’s. In the early incomplete
draft of the tale (Mabbott’s text A), Poe made it even clearer that his narrator was not thinking: “In
all this, if I think aright, my powers of thought predominated” (“Morella” 226). This is the same
ridiculously tautological diction that we find everwhere in the tale, and which makes it impossible
to take the narrator seriously.
Given  the  collapse  of  the  superficial  “mystical”  or  “metaphysical”  meaning,  the  only
meaning  that  remains  viable  is  the  distinctly  sexual  suggested  “physical”  meaning.  Thus,  for
example,  to  “enter”  “into  the  intricacies  of  her  studies”  stands—can  only  stand—for  sexual
penetration. Indeed, the word “intricacies” is probably a buried allusion to “The Intricacies of Diego
and Julia” in  Tristram Shandy, which I have already mentioned a propos of Ligeia’s eyes. There,
Sterne had ostensibly, but very unconvincingly, denied that a sexual encounter was taking place,
through  ambiguous  “metaphysical”  language,  and this  appears  to  me  to  be  precisely  the  same
strategy that Poe employs in “Morella.”
Poe  may  also  have  drawn inspiration  for  this  passage  from James  Hogg’s  The  Private
Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified Sinner (1824),  and specifically  from an episode in the
“Editor’s  Tale”  that  precedes  the  main  narrative  where  the  word  “metaphysical”  is  used  in  an
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ostensibly ironical way in reference to clandestine sexual activity. The “Editor’s Tale” deals with the
marriage of Lord and Lady Dalcastle, the official parents of the protagonist of the main narrative,
the “justified sinner” of the title. The two spouses had very different views on married life. The
Lady, who was as ostensibly averse to sexual activity as the narrator of “Morella,” complained that :
“The laird would neither pray morning nor evening. He  would not even sing psalms, and kneel
beside her while she performed the exercise; neither would he converse at all  times, and in all
places, about the sacred mysteries of religion, although this lady took occasion to contradict flatly
every  assertion  that  he  made,  in  order  that  she  might  spiritualize  him  by  drawing  him  into
argument”  (Hogg,  Private  Memoirs 10-11).  The  “Laird,”  however,  did  not  consent  to  be
“spiritualised.”
Their contrasting expectations regarding married life had been apparent from their wedding
night: 
The laird went up to caress her [Lady Dalcastle]; but she turned away her head, and
spoke of the follies of aged men, and something of the broad way that leadeath to
destruction.  The  laird  did  not  thoroughly  comprehend  this  allusion;  but  being
considerably flustered by drinking, and disposed to take all  in good part,  he only
remarked, as he took off his shoes and stockings, “that, whether the way was broad or
narrow, it was time that they were in their bed.” (Hogg, Private Memoirs 5)
The “laird” was evidently as ignorant of the “metaphysical” meaning of his wife’s words as
the narrator of “Morella,” but unlike him, he did not pretend to understand what she told him.
Instead, he turns her scriptural imagery to racy sexual metaphor. Indeed, the narrator of “Morella”
appears  to  combine  Lord  Dalcastle’s  ignorance  of  “metaphysical”  subjects  with  his  wife’s
puritanical scorn for sexual activity.
However,  the  episode  which  bears  the  most  distinct  resemblance  with  Poe’s  tale  is  a
memorable interview between the Lady and her spiritual adviser, the reverend Wringhim, during
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which  the  reader  is  given  to  understand  the  hero  of  the  main  narrative  had  been  conceived.
Wringhim,  after  hearing  the  Lady’s  complaints  about  her  husband,  went  to  scold  him  for  his
impiety, and returns to “his metaphysical associate,” as the Lady is sarcastically styled, to report his
“wonderful success:” “it was their custom,” the editor-narrator remarks, “on each visit, to sit up a
night in the same apartment, for the sake of sweet spiritual converse” (Hogg, Private Memoirs 15).
In the sequence, of course, it becomes clear their association was not wholly spiritual. Although
their interview was private, Martha, the servant, overheard a heated discussion of a particularly
knotty point of religious doctrine: “If the listener’s words were to be relied on, there was no love, no
accommodating principle manifested between the two, but a fiery burning zeal, relating to points of
such minor importance that a true Christian would blush to hear them mentioned, and the infidel
and profane make a handle of them to turn our religion to scorn” (16). As it turns out, what the
eavesdropping maid construed as “a fiery burning” religious “zeal,” was, in fact, “love,” as may be
gleaned from subsequent developments. For although Lady Dalcastle “would not consort with her
husband,” the “saintly and afflicted dame, in due time, was safely delivered of a fine boy” (16).
The humorous effect in “Morella” is based on the narrator’s ignoring the only way his wife
could have become pregnant—as the editor in Hogg’s narrative pretends to ignore the only way
Lady Dalcastle could have become pregnant. He too felt a “fire” that drew him to his wife, and also
claimed that it  was a sort of “metaphysical” enthusiasm, giving us to understand they too, like
Wringhim and Lady Dalcastle, were only “spiritual associates.”
Hogg, moreover, clearly hints that the Lady’s religious mania had developed into a case of
sexual fetishism. That is, that religious zeal had become with her a sort of substitute for sexual
desire  to  the point  the two became so closely associated in her mind as to be inseparable and
indistinguishable. This realisation affects, of course, all previous references to spiritual intercourse.
It now becomes clear, for example, what truly lay behind the lady’s wish that her husband might
discuss religious matters with her “at all times, and in all places,” and what the narrator had meant
635
when he said that she contradicted her husband “in order that she might spiritualize him by drawing
him  into  argument”—evidently,  her  efforts,  which  had  proved  completely  ineffective  on  her
uncultured husband, were not wasted on the reverend Wringhim, who appears to  have been as
excited by “metaphysics” as she was. Again, we glimpse the same kind of fetishism behind the
statements of Morella’s husband, who also appears to have been aroused by her “metaphysical”
disquisitions.
The narrator cannot make any sense of the fire as a mystical symbol, and neither could
anyone else; considered as a sexual metaphor, however, it makes perfect sense, especially in the
context of conjugality. “Enkindled” by the joint effect of his wife’s touch and “meaning” words, the
lover “would linger by her side,” “hour after hour,” until the melodious voice which conveyed that
“meaning” that  so disturbed the husband was “tainted with horror,”  and his  pleasure turned to
distress. This disturbing transition, however, contrary to what one would expect had the thing not
been sex, was repeated habitually. Despite his horror, he kept coming back, apparently quite often,
for some more “lingering.” And whenever he did “linger” by his wife, just as her low voice became
a scream, he “shuddered inwardly.” Evidently,  Morella did not merely  talk about sex. It  would
appear that what her husband construed as screams of terror were, in reality, screams of pleasure;
his inner “shuddering,” on the other hand, suggests that their intercourse was mutually satisfying—
what else could it possibly mean? From the start, it had been the narrator’s word against his wife’s
that sex, the trivial cause of all non-miraculous pregnancies, had formed an important part of their
intercourse. After all is said and done, he himself unwittingly suggests that this was indeed the case.
These things had precisely the trivial meaning the narrator denies, and this is turn suggests
that Morella’s meditations on “that identity which at death is or is not lost forever” were no more
mystic than their intercourse was “metaphysical.” After so much “lingering” by each other’s side, a
pregnancy would be far from unexpected. The verb “linger,” of course, chimes in with Morella’s
statement that, as a lover, the narrator “played the Teian with time,” and with his own admission
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that he could no more “regulate” the “intensity” of the “fires” than he could understand their nature
(Poe, “Morella” 229).
Mabbott thought the phrase “play the Teian with time” alluded to the view, attributed to
Anacreon in Child Harold’s Pilgrimage, that old men are not immune to love: “Love conquers age
(…) / So sings the Teian, and he sings in sooth” (qtd. in Mabbott 237n10). Thus, Mabbott believes
Morella was telling her husband that he would not know love in his old age, after her passing. But
this reading is not quite viable in the context. She tells him he will “no longer (…) play the Teian
with time,” which means, of course, that she is referring to something he had been in the habit of
doing with her (emphasis mine). Via Anacreon, she evokes the idea of unrestrained sexual ardour.
This, in the context, can only be taken as an oblique allusion to the oldest known contraceptive
method, coitus interruptus, which, of course, required the man somewhat to “regulate” the “fires” of
his passion.  Morella’s pregnancy may not have been entirely unexpected—to her, at least, it was
evidently no mystery—, but it may have been unplanned. In other words, the narrator may have
“lingered”—a highly significant choice of words—a little too long.
The  possibility  of  Poe  intending  to  crack  sexual  jokes,  however,  has  seldom  been
considered, as, through identification with the prudish narrators of “Morella” and “Ligeia,” he is
normally thought of as a writer who is peculiarly disconnected from the prosaic realities of love;
therefore, sexual innuendos in his works have generally been regarded as unconscious slips. But one
has only to consider one of his early tales, “Loss of Breath,” to realise just how inaccurate this
perception of Poe as someone blind to sexuality is. This tale was an extended sexual metaphor of
impotence, a tour de force in double entendre, which in many ways anticipates Poe’s later fictional
treatment of conjugality. As Ellen Weinauer has pointed out, “‘A Decided Loss’ would suggest that,
from the  beginning of  his  publishing  career,  marriage  was certainly  on Poe’s  mind” (“Undead
Wives” 174). Here is the opening scene of that tale:166
166 Weinauer also remarks that: “Critics have paid little attention to ‘A Decided Loss’ or its later avatars; and whatever
treatment  the  story  has  received  offers  little  analysis  of  the  immediate  post  nuptial  setting  of  the  narrator’s
mysoginistic attack” (“Undead Wives” 174).
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“Thou wretch!—thou vixen!—thou shrew!” said I to my wife on the morning of the
our  wedding,  ‘thou  witch!  —thou  hag!—thou  whipper-snapper!—thou  sink  of
iniquity!—thou  fiery-faced  quintessence  of  all  that  is  abominable!—thou—thou”
here standing upon tip-toe, seizing her by the throat, and placing my mouth close to
her  ear,  I  was  preparing  to  launch  forth  a  new  and  more  decisive  epithet  of
opprobrium,  which  should  not  have  failed,  if  ejaculated,  to  convince  her  of  her
insignificance, when, to my extreme horror and astonishment, I discovered that I had
lost my breath. (Poe, “Loss of Breath” 62)
Here we find the narrator about to kill his wife at the end of their wedding night, and calling
her a witch, which is exactly what the more subtle narrators of “Morella” and “Ligeia” suggest their
wives were. He also significantly maligns her as a “sink of iniquity,” thus evoking the mythical
view that  identifies  women with  sexuality,  and sexuality  with  corruption.  His  “loss  of  breath,”
significantly  termed an  inability  to  “ejaculate,”  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  remarkably  transparent
disguise  of  his  impotence.  The narrator,  it  is  true,  means his  loss  of  breath  quite  literally,  and
acknowledges the paradox the statement involves. He should be dead, yet he was alive. At the same
time, he also intimates, through that involuntary eloquence we so often find in Poe—or, I should
rather say, in his characters—, that this preposterous hypothesis disguised the real nature of his
problem, which he was too mortified to face: 
Throwing myself upon a chair. I remained for some time absorbed in meditation. My
reflections,  to  be  sure,  were  of  no  consolatory  kind.  A  thousand  vague  and
lachrymatory fancies took possession of my soul—and even the idea of suicide flitted
across  my brain;  but  it  is  a  trait  in  the  perversity  of  human nature  to  reject  the
obvious and the ready, for the far-distant and equivocal (Poe, “Loss of Breath” 63).
And  this,  of  course,  is  precisely  what  the  narrator  of  this  tale,  like  his  counterparts  in
“Berenice,” “Morella,” “Ligeia,” and “The Black Cat,” proceeds to do. Poe, on the other hand,
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exploits  the  public’s  own  “perversity”  to  disguise  the  true  submerged  meaning  of  his  double
entendre tales, where the sexual is disguised as “metaphysical,” and an assortment of ridiculously
learned allusions are deployed to further the ruse.
The hostility of Lackobreath towards his wife, then, is evidently rooted in his feeling of
humiliation for not having been able to perform sexually on their wedding night, but his impotence
is transfigured into “pulmonary incapacity” (Poe, “Loss of Breath” 63). The intensity of his feelings
of  humiliation—he  felt  even  the  house  pets  were  laughing  at  him—,  however,  which  seem
manifestly exaggerated when referred to the ostensible cause of his mortification, intimates the real
nature  of  the  problem.  This  sexual  performance  anxiety,  of  course,  must  be  understood in  the
broader context of the masculinist attitudes and perceptions which Poe was evidently challenging.
Significantly, Mr. Lackobreath shrinks from the possibility of self-murder, but has no qualm about
“seizing” his wife “by the throat” (61). He evidently projects his feelings of inadequacy and self-
loathing on her. In other words, Lackobreath felt emasculated, and took it out on his wife, which I
think is also what happens in “Morella” and “Ligeia.”
“Loss of Breath,” incidentally, is an early example of Poe’s use of a variety of sexual word-
play that may ultimately be traced to  Tristram Shandy.  We have already seen how he used eye
contact  in  “Ligeia”  as  a  metaphor  of  sex,  and  how  this  strategy  depended  on  an  allusion  to
Slawkenbergius’s tale in Sterne’s novel. In that tale, the “low” voice of the characters was another
sign of sexual intimacy. In “Loss of Breath,” then, Poe employed a similar strategy, but there sexual
intercourse is more ostensibly associated with violence. To his surprise, Mr. Lackobreath found that
“the powers of utterance” he thought were “totally destroyed, were in fact only partially impeded,”
adding: 
I discovered that had I at that interesting crisis, dropped my voice to a singularly
deep guttural, I might still have continued to her [his wife] the communication of my
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sentiments; this pitch of voice (the guttural) depending, I find, not upon the current of
the breath, but upon certain spasmodic action of the muscles of the throat.
(Poe, “Loss of Breath” 63)
The “interesting crisis” to which he refers, of course, is the opening scene of the tale, when,
as he was strangling his wife, he found himself constrained to interrupt the torrent of verbal abuse
he had been showering on her. This is paradigmatic of the strange transference of “feeling” peculiar
to his narrative. At that particular time, it was the wife’s respiratory tract—not the narrator’s—that
was being constrained, therefore, she was the one who should not be able to speak but in a low
guttural tone. And the same reasoning applies to Ligeia, whose voice as she “wrestled with the
Shadow,” and “amid the most convulsive writhings of her fierce spirit,” “grew more low” (Poe,
“Ligeia” 317). Thus, what had been in Tristram Shandy a metonym of sexual intimacy, becomes, in
Poe’s grotesque tales,  a metonym of the sexual aggression that is the only viable outlet  for the
sexual  drive  of  Poe’s  repressed  narrators.  Indeed,  I  cannot  agree  with  Weinauer,  who,  despite
recognising  that  the  narrator’s  assault  of  his  wife  constitutes  a  “misogynous  attack,”  sees  the
narrator’s loss of breath has evidence that Poe was “equally, if not more, concerned with the effects
of marriage on men,” than he was with its  effect  on women,  with the argument  that  “it  is  the
husband who is killed by marriage, the one who loses his breath” (“Undead Wives” 174, 178). 
The hostility of the narrators of “Morella” and “Ligeia” is, of course, as clearly rooted in
sexual  anxieties—their  sexual  anxieties,  not  Poe’s.  Indeed,  contrary  to  what  appearances  may
suggest, Poe is perhaps the author least suited to psychoanalytical readings. For he specialised in the
conscious  simulation  of  the  “unconsciousness” of  his  narrators;  he developed,  that  is,  his  own
method for dramatising that “perversity,” as Lackobreath calls it, by which the obvious and trivial,
but  unacceptable  sexual  content  is  given  an  acceptable,  if  illogical,  form.  By  means  of  this
“perversity,”  the  narrator  is  permitted  to  ignore,  or  pretend  to  ignore,  the  real  meaning  of  his
complaints. 
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Psychoanalytic  readings,  then,  presuppose  the  author’s  unawareness  of  the  latent  sexual
content of his work. Sexual content in Poe’s tales, however, is made “latent,” so to speak, for the
purposes of satire. And it seems to me that “serious” tales like “Morella” and “Ligeia” are, in that
respect,  no  different  from “A Loss  of  Breath.”  His  tales  of  femicide,  and  indeed  all  tales  of
femicide, continue a tradition of literary representation of marriage in Gothic fiction which probed
the role cultural and ideological factors played in promoting and validating male sexual aggression.
The femicide  story tended to  highlight  how an increasingly stringent  moral  code  had rendered
sexuality  invisible  in  the  public  sphere.  Sexual  content  had  to  be  disguised  under  a  cloak  of
sentimentality and therefore, in a sense, had become invisible. It also suggested that there was an
intimate  relationship  between  this  wholesale  repression  of  sexuality  and  violent  male  sexual
behaviour.
In “Morella” and “Ligeia,”  however,  Poe went a  step further,  and suggested the sort  of
sexual anxiety he had first depicted in “Loss of Breath” was itself associated with another kind of
male anxiety, which expressed itself in hostility toward female intellectuals. Godwin, in this sense,
was the perfect representative of the femicide mentality. His belief that the “earthly frame” was an
“impediment” to love, conceived as the “communication of spirits,” perfectly embodied that radical
sentimentality  that  equated the body with corruption (Memoirs  104).  His  thinly veiled hostility
towards women, which for Godwin clearly represented the flesh, was, from a symbolic point of
view, almost explicitly femicidal. His aggressive revision of Wollstonecraft was, in another sense,
no less femicidal. Poe’s tales dramatise, I think, the contemporary conflict between this extreme
masculinist sentimentality and a more reasonable take on sexuality and gender relations, which is
represented in the tales by the female title-characters.
Ironically, Godwin’s and Wollstonecraft’s relationship was perfectly representative of this
conflict,  and,  by  writing  tales  that  clearly  evoke  their  story,  and  Godwin’s  narrative  of  it  in
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particular, Poe meant, I think, to highlight this fact. Indeed, she had been one of the staunchest
opponents of the wholesale repression of sexuality that Godwin had advocated: 
To speak disrespectfully of love is, I know, high treason against sentiment and
fine feelings; but I wish to speak the simple language of truth, and rather to
address the head than the heart. To endeavour to reason love out of the world,
would be to out Quixote Cervantes, and equally offend against common sense;
but an endeavour to restrain this tumultuous passion, and to prove that it should
not be allowed to dethrone superior powers, or to usurp the sceptre which the
understanding should ever coolly wield, appears less wild.
(Wollstonecraft, Vindication 96)
Surely, Poe’s narrators illustrate the dangers of reasoning love out of the world. They offend
against common sense by falling back on masculinist sentimental superstitions. But then, so did
Godwin. This, I believe, was the point Poe was trying to make.
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5 – The Return of Wollstonecraft
Morella’s husband’s conviction that her words enclosed some occult import, then, is a direct
consequence of his inability to recognise their obvious and trivial meaning. He thus misinterprets
her according to his own superstition. And Morella sounds remarkably like Wollstonecraft. She too
had an interest in metaphysics, and sometimes adopted a decidedly mystical tone. She even spoke of
reincarnation on occasion.  Godwin,  on the other  hand, creating an artificial  separation between
Wollstonecraft’s  feminism  and  her  religious  thought—which  were  very  much  integrated—
misrepresents her thought much like Poe’s narrators misrepresent that of their wives.
In  reality,  in  A Vindication religion  itself  was  subordinated  to  the  overriding  feminist
argument, as the following passage makes clear: 
I come round to my old argument; if woman be allowed to have an immortal soul,
she must have, as the employment of life, an understanding to improve. And when, to
render the present state more complete,  though every thing proves it  to be but  a
fraction of a mighty sum, she is incited by present gratification to forget her grand
destination, [nature] is counteracted, or she was born only to procreate and rot. Or,
granting brutes, of every description a soul, though not a reasonable one, the exercise
of instinct and sensibility may be the step, which they are to take, in this life, toward
the attainment of reason in the next; so that through all eternity they will lag behind
man, who, why we cannot tell, had the power given him of attaining reason in his
first mode of existence. (Wollstonecraft 132)
This passage shows us a Wollstonecraft that is very different from what Godwin’s portrait of
her would lead us to expect. He painted her as somewhat of a mystic. Here, however, rather than
presenting an intuitive vision of religion, she is subjecting accepted religious notions to rational
criticism, in order to expose what she regards as their inherent contradiction. If reason, which is
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effectively denied to women, is what distinguishes humans from other animals, then woman is not
human,  hence,  has  no  soul.  To  highlight  the  fact  that  women  had  been  excluded  from  the
Enlightenment  enterprise,  she proposes an ironical  epicycle,  that  would reconcile  the idea of a
general emancipation of all humans with the idea that women were not capable of reason. The idea
of reincarnation, of course, is not meant to be taken seriously. This is another way of saying that
men’s unrealistic notions concerning women inevitably lead to superstition; it is the kind of theory,
she suggests, that men might come up with to accommodate their irrational notions about women
and justify their absolute rule.
When, in A Vindication and in Letters she insisted that women were immortal, and indeed,
that she herself was immortal, she meant to say that women were endowed with reason. I have
argued before that Ligeia was making the exact same point, and that her husband misunderstood
her. She was saying that she was “part and parcel” in God, but, in his masculinist interpretation, the
female subject is subsumed under “man.” By “we,” the narrator thought, she meant “Man,” and this
is the fundamental assumption behind the ingenuous interpretation of the tale. This assumption in
turn pivots on the mythical view, which Ligeia’s tone helps effectually to evoke, that woman was
made for man.
This ingenuous reading of the tale is perfectly captured by the letter Philip Pendleton Cooke
wrote to Poe about “Ligeia,” which I have already quoted in the first chapter: “The whole piece is
but a sermon from the text of ‘Joseph Glanvill’ which you cap it with—and your intent is to tell a
tale  of  the  ‘mighty  will’ contending  with  &  finally  vanquishing  death.”  That  is  certainly  the
narrator’s intention. The conception of immortality that underpins the narrator’s interpretation of
the motto is, however, highly unusual. There would be nothing unusual, of course, about stating the
immortality  of  the  soul,  but  the  narrator  takes  Ligeia’s  words  to  refer  to  some sort  of  earthly
immortality. Indeed, he is convinced that Ligeia returned in her own body, and that the motto of the
tale anticipated, as Cooke immediately realised, her supposed resurrection: “For God is but a great
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will pervading all things by nature of its intentness. Man doth not yield himself to the angels, nor
unto death utterly, save only through the weakness of his feeble will” (Poe, "Ligeia" 310). The
narrator of the tale, then, reads this passage as a prophecy of Ligeia’s return—again, identifying her
with the “man” in the second sentence. Thus, the apparent fulfilment of the prophecy retroactively
settles the meaning of the passage for him. As we have seen, however, his belief that Ligeia returned
from the grave is clearly an illusion of his own creation. Thus, her words became a self-fulfilling
prophecy for him.
According to the official interpretation, expressed by Cooke in the above quotation, then,
man  dies  because  he  consents  to  die.  Ligeia  supposedly  proved  the  assertion—she  had  not
consented  to  die.  More  precisely,  and  still  according  to  the  suggested  interpretation,  man  dies
because his will lacks “intentness.” Therefore, it is implied, man would overcome the contingency
of death if only he would will it, and keep his purpose steadily in view. One gets the distinct feeling
that “man” dies… because he gets distracted.
This is a very singular conception indeed. The narrator claims he found it in Glanvill, but the
passage could never be located. The English divine, as we have seen, did pen some very suggestive
theories about witches and the power of their concentrated wills to effect great wonders, but, as far
as can be ascertained, it never occurred to him that man died because he got distracted. It did occur,
however, to Godwin.
 “In a word,” he asked in the first edition of Political Justice, in the same chapter where he
predicted the end of sex, “why may not man be one day immortal?” ([1793] 862). For Godwin, it is
all a matter, precisely, of “willing” it: 
If our involuntary thoughts can derange or restore the animal economy, why should
we not in process of time, in this as in other instances, subject the thoughts which are
at  present  involuntary  to  the  government  of  design?  If  volition  can  now  do
something, why should it not go on to do still more and more? (…) if we have in any
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respect a little power now, and if mind be essentially progressive, that power may,
and, barring any extraordinary concussions of nature, infallibly will, extend beyond
any bounds we are able to prescribe to it.
(Political Justice [1793] 865 emphasis mine)
Godwin conceived history in teleological terms. Society was imperfect because it was not
organised according to rational principles, but rather arbitrary forms that had been handed down by
tradition.  As  these  forms  were  gradually  replaced  with  those  suggested  by  reason,  as  Godwin
thought would inevitably come to pass, society would evolve to a state of absolute political justice,
in  which hierarchical relations and government itself  would disappear.  In other words,  Godwin
thought man would live more and more deliberately. And as in the body politic, so in the body
proper. Once man exerted complete voluntary control over his body, his health would be perfect,
and  consequently  life  could  be  indefinitely  extended.  This  is,  again,  from the  first  edition  of
Political  Justice:  “We are sick and die,  generally  speaking,  because we consent to suffer these
accidents. This consent in the present state of mankind is  in some degree unavoidable. We must
have stronger motives and clearer views, before we can uniformly refuse it” ([1793] 869 emphasis
mine).
The  expectation  that  social  reform  would  result  in  an  increase  in  life  expectancy  is
reasonable enough, especially considering the appalling sanitary conditions among workers during
the  Industrial  Revolution.  But  Godwin  is  not  speaking  metaphorically.  Rather  than  a  cautious
promise of increased longevity and vitality, he commits himself to the belief that the development
of “man’s volition will permit him to overcome death, which has hitherto determined his existence;”
man,  he  writes,  will  “banish  death”  and  “maintain  the  body  in  perpetual  youth  and  vigour”
(Political Justice  [1793] 866). Godwin is being quite literal. The time has not yet arrived, however,
for man to “uniformly refuse” death, that is for all men to be immortal. But he leaves the door ajar:
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even  as  he  wrote,  some  exceptionally  enlightened  wight  might  possibly  overcome  death  in
anticipation of the general emancipation, for death was then only “in some degree unavoidable.”
However, by far the most original aspect of Godwin’s theory is his claim that the “principle
of immortality”—this is, again, from the first edition of  Political Justice— “can be considered as
partaking of “the nature of attention;” “though the faculty of attention may at present have a very
small share of ductility, it is probable that it may be improved in that respect to an inconceivable
degree” ([1793] 867). This view implicates a strong correlation between life and consciousness,
and, conversely, between its  interruption and death: “If an unintermitted attention to the animal
economy be necessary, then, before death can be banished, we must banish sleep, death’s image.
Sleep is one of the most conspicuous infirmities of the human frame” (867-68). Godwin, therefore,
aspires to extend consciousness to all aspects of the animal economy.
In  his  view,  then,  in  order  to  become immortal,  all  man had to  do  was  to  abolish  the
“unconscious.” I am using the word in its broadest possible sense. For Godwin, man will be in
“perfect” health of body when his life, biologically considered, becomes as it were, a period of
uninterrupted consciousness, or, in other words, when life itself becomes an entirely voluntary act.
The theory, although relegated to an appendix, was not omitted, nor even substantially altered in the
final revision of  Political Justice.  According to the revised text, we should keep “our voluntary
motions” from “degenerating into involuntary,” as “the true perfection of man” is “to attain, as
nearly as possible, to the perfectly voluntary state;” who is to say that we may not “finally obtain an
empire over every articulation of our frame?” (Political Justice [1985] 773-74). In order to achieve
this  state  of  perfection,  man  must  develop  “the  skill  of  carrying  on  a  great  number  of
contemporaneous processes without disorder,” so as never to lose sight of the functioning of the
body (Political Justice [1985] 774). “Man,” as Godwin had made explicit in the first edition of the
text,  would  not  sleep,  that  he  might  keep  perpetual  vigilance  over  even  those  most  minute
physiological functions that now elude his “will.”
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Godwin’s seemingly neurotic obsession with the “animal economy,” bordering on mania, is,
to my mind, just a step away from the glorious deliriums of Daniel Paul Schreber. Man may any
time  soon  become  immortal,  provided  he  achieves  perfect  control  of  all  his  bodily  functions.
Godwin is a philosopher, hence, a most rational and deliberate man. He is, therefore, at the forefront
of human improvement. The conclusion is inevitable: if only he could keep his attention rivetted to
his “animal economy,” which means no sleep, he might just become the harbinger of the glorious
age of human perfection. In a word, why might not Godwin one day be immortal?
His bold prophesying was all the more remarkable for its novelty. No one had ever dared
attach such brilliant hopes to the prospect of human perfectibility.167 Naturally, Godwin’s prophecy
did  not  go  unnoticed  by  his  detractors.  It  afforded  a  perfect  pretext  for  satire—in  fact,  many
caricaturists found that they had no need to distort Godwin’s statements about immortality, which
were ridiculous enough in and of themselves.
Perhaps the best example of this is Isaac D’Israeli’s Flim-Flams! or, The Life and Errors of
My  Uncle  (1805),  a  lampoon  of  political  radicalism and  rationalist  philosophy  which  targeted
Godwin personally, focusing, precisely, on the wild anticipations of a world without “propagation.”
Godwin is there represented in the novel by the self-conceited and ostensibly absurd philosopher
Caconous, to whose bombastic statements D’Israeli appends footnotes with similar dicta extracted
from Godwin’s  Political Justice.  In fact,  possibly with a view to prevent formal accusations of
slander that the reviews of the first edition had hinted, D’Israeli was extra careful in the second, and
often included full references, complete with page number, to the first edition of Political Justice.168
167 Indeed, he prides himself on being the first that ventured to assert that man would inevitably become immortal as a
result  of  his  intellectual  improvement,  and not  merely  that  his  longevity would improve as  a  consequence  of
technological and social progress. In that respect, he claims, not without reason, that his theory is wholly original:
“The authors who have published their conjectures respecting the possibility of extending the term of human life are
many. The most illustrious of these is probably lord Bacon; the most recent is Condorcet, in his  Outlines of a
History of the Progress of the Human Mind, published since the appearance of this work. These authors however
have inclined to rest their hopes rather upon growing perfection of art than, as is here done, upon the immediate and
unavoidable operation of an improved intellect” (Political Justice [1985] 770-71n).
168 Flim-Flams!, published anonymously in 1805, and in a revised and enlarged edition the following year, has never
been republished since and therefore remains one of Isaac D’Israeli’s most obscure books. The author seems to have
thought that the book, who was received with severity, was not a credit to his name, and never acknowledged
authorship.
648
Of special interest  to us is chapter XVII, in this second, substantially altered,  edition of
Flim-Flams!, the motto of which is a direct quotation of Godwin’s text, with which D’Israeli did not
tamper but by adding some emphatic capitals: “If VOLITION can now do something, why should it
not GO ON, to do still MORE and MORE?” ([1806] 1:210). This title sets the tone of the satire. It
was wise of D’Israeli to let the sentence speak for itself; he could scarcely have heightened its
comic effect. Underlying Godwin’s rhetorical question is the only argument he presents in support
of his hypothesis that man will soon overcome sickness, death, and sex by mere dint of volition—
that is what he means by “more and more.” The reasoning behind this hardly justifies Godwin’s
pretensions to correct Wollstonecraft’s “faulty” logic; on the contrary, the reasoning it expresses is
shamelessly fallacious, not to say childish.
First,  Godwin “suggests” (this is his word) that our being able to achieve  something  by
voluntary exertion—who will dare gainsay him? —somehow supports his proposition that we may
effect anything—provided, of course, we are not distracted or fall asleep. This is a fallacy according
to Aristotelian and inductive logic alike. And then, the terms of Godwin’s proposition are too vague;
indeed,  his  initial  tautological  assertion  that  volition  “does  something”  is  so  vague  as  to  be
practically meaningless, and the “proposition” itself hardly deserves the name, as it too can mean
practically anything. And then, Godwin further presents the impossibility of disproving this pseudo-
proposition,  which is  too vague for verification,  as evidence of its  veracity—another breach of
philosophical decorum.
The story of  the publication of  Flim-Flams!  is  detailed in Samuel Smiles’s  A Publisher and His Friends:
Memoir and Correspondence of the Late John Murray (1891). As this book provides the only published evidence
for the attribution of the satirical novel to D’Israeli, I transcribe here the relevant passages:
“In 1804 Mr D’Israeli was engaged upon a work which is now all but forgotten, and of which Lord
Beaconsfield [Benjamin Disraeli] seems not to have been aware, as he makes no mention of it in the
Memoir of his father prefixed to the ‘Curiosities of Literature’ in 1865.
“The author, however, as is evident from his constant allusions to it, and its anxiety about its success,
attached great importance to this book, which was entitled ‘Flim-Flams! or the Life and Errors of my
Uncle (…).’ The work is rather ridiculous, and it is difficult now to discern its purpose, or even the humor
with which the author would appear to have prided himself” (1: 43).
Despite D’Israeli’s high hopes, the book was harshly criticised, and fearing a libel suit might be filed against
him, he even considered interrupting the printing of the second edition (see Smiles, A Publisher 44-46).
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Godwin,  however,  is  careful  not  to  claim that  the indisputable fact  that  man has a  will
demonstrates the proposition he is too cautious to state flatly. Though at first the writer may appear
prudent, this procedure is itself misleading. The reasoner, it seems, would not extract the reader’s
consent at any price, but is anxious that his claims be appreciated under the proper light. He thus
projects an image of scrupulousness and honesty. Of course, by so doing, he lets his “suggestion”
stand without any valid argument, while effectively placing it beyond the reach of empirical test. In
addition,  his  suggestion  that  his  honesty  guaranteed  the  validity  of  the  claim is  fundamentally
dishonest. The rhetorical devices of “suggestion” employed by Godwin here are, incidentally, very
similar to those for which Poe is known.
D’Israeli  also  indirectly  accuses  Godwin  of  attempting  to  further  his  argument  by
unscrupulously associating it with an illustrious natural philosopher, Benjamin Franklin. And he
was  absolutely  right.  The  title  of  chapter  XVII  of  the  second  edition  of  Flim-Flams!, “The
Omnipotence  of  Mind over  Matter,  Being a  Veracious  Account  of  a  Shake  from a  Pear-Tree”
([1806] 1: 210),  alludes to  a  “sublime conjecture” attributed by Godwin to Franklin,  whom he
presents, in an addition he made to the second revised edition, and kept in the third, as “a man
habitually  conversant  with  the  system of  the  external  universe,  and  by  no  means  propense  to
extravagant speculations” (Political Justice [1985] 770).169
This is an argument of authority if ever I saw one—the last thing one would expect from a
rationalist.  Surely, a speculation championed by such a man cannot  be “extravagant,” though it
might look that way to those less “conversant” than he with natural philosophy. Once more Godwin
is caught red-handed trying to sway the public’s judgement by unphilosophical means; inducing his
reader,  that  is,  to  turn  off  his  mind,  abandon  all  hope of  understanding  the  issue,  and submit
implicitly and without criticism to the judgement of an expert. This is a very serious offense indeed
against the principles laid out by Descartes.
169 Franklin’s “sublime conjecture” appears in page 862 of the first edition.
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Godwin forestalls this accusation, however unconvincingly, by placing his conjecture on the
margin of his arguments, insulating them, as it were, from such bold predictions—which, of course,
is also a way of placing it beyond the reach of rational analysis. This strategy became even more
evident in the third edition, where he relegated a slightly less enthusiastic proposal to an appendix,
with the following prefatory remark: “What follows must be considered as eminently a deviation
into the land of conjecture. If it be false, it leaves the system to which it is appended, in all sound
reason, as impregnable as ever” (Political Justice  [1985] 770). From a methodological point of
view, I find the suggestion that his hypothesis could be proved false intriguing.
But, if the conjecture had nothing to do with the argument, why mention Franklin at all,
then, when his very name, and the prestige that it carried, was liable to prevent an unprejudiced look
on the matter? Godwin, it would seem, wants to have the cake and eat it too. This is exactly the kind
of name-dropping for which Poe’s narrators are notorious—but Poe was writing fiction, and thus
had, as he made very clear in “The Philosophy of Composition,” a duty to deceive the public.
Godwin could not, and certainly would not, claim such a license for his philosophy. Yet, and quite
unaccountably, he certainly did grant himself this license.
D’Israeli’s satire also implies the more serious imputation that Godwin borrowed the credit
of  the  renowned natural  philosopher  for  his  theory by fraud.  In  order  to  hint  at  this,  D’Israeli
transcribes, in his footnote to the title of Chapter XVII, Godwin’s appeal to Franklin, as it stood in
the second edition of the Enquiry, with added emphasis and occasional comments: 
We find in “POLITICAL JUSTICE” (two strangely-coupled words) this memorable
observation: / “FRANKLIN, a man habitually conversant with the system of external
universe, and by no means propense to extravagant speculations, conjectured that
MIND will one day become omnipotent OVER MATTER. In  whatever sense HE
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understood this expression, WE are certainly at liberty to apply it in the sense WE
THINK PROPER.” (Flim-Flams! [1806] 1: 212n)170
Again,  D’Israeli’s  quotation  is  surprisingly  accurate.171 Godwin’s  haughty  disregard  for
Franklin’s “meaning,” in a context where he praises the older man’s good sense, is as disconcerting
as it is indefensible. And then Godwin was apparently as little concerned with Franklin’s “meaning”
as he was with his actual “words.” Indeed, it is by no means certain that the American had ever
uttered  the  words  which  are  attributed  to  him  in  Political  Justice,  in  whatever  sense.
Disconcertingly candid, as always, Godwin admits this. The following footnote appeared in the first
edition  of  Political  Justice:  “I  have  no  other  authority  to  quote  for  this  expression  but  the
conversation of Dr. Price. Upon enquiry I am happy to find it confirmed to me by Mr. William
Morgan, the Nephew of Dr. Price, who recollects to have heard it  repeatedly mentioned by his
uncle” (862 emphasis mine). Judging from an alteration he made to the note in the second edition of
Political Justice, Godwin later found out that the evidence was slightly less compelling than he had
initially thought. The adjective “repeatedly” (underlined in my transcription) disappears, to indicate
that Morgan heard his uncle mention Franklin’s dictum only once—however, Godwin compensates
what was lost in frequency by distinctness: his friend now “distinctly remembers” his exchange
with his uncle (Political Justice [1796] 1: 365).
But  frankness  and  honesty  are  not  necessarily  the  same  thing.  In  this  case,  Godwin’s
apparent scrupulousness is once again misleading. While we discuss whether Franklin actually said
170  I have not seen the original second English edition of Political Justice, from which D’Israeli seems to be quoting.
However, a “First American Edition From the Second London Edition Corrected” is available in Google Books,
from which I transcribe the relevant passage: “Let us then in this place return to the sublime conjecture of Franklin,
a man habitually conversant with the system of the external universe, and by no means propense to extravagant
speculations,  that  ‘mind will  one  day  become omnipotent  over  matter.’ In  whatever  sense  he  understood  this
expression, we are certainly at liberty to apply it in the sense we shall think proper. It is surely not unreasonable to
ask, If the power of intellect can be established over all other matter, why not over the matter of our own bodies?”
(Godwin, Political Justice [1796] 2: 377). The last sentence quoted was kept from the first edition, but would be
omitted in the third.
171 He does not provide, however, a precise reference for the passage, which is absent from the first edition of Political
Justice, from which he quotes the motto for the chapter. This leads me to infer that D’Israeli had used the second
edition of  Political Justice when he wrote the first version of the novel, and that he had the first edition in hand
when he revised the text for the second edition of his novel.
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what Godwin says, on the force of second-degree hearsay, he said, we are apt to lose sight of a more
important question: what could he have meant by such a statement? Indeed, we have no context for
Godwin’s quotation, which is broad enough to be construed in any number of ways.
In the third edition Godwin corrected his hand, to a certain extent, but in a very awkward
way. This final revision, incidentally, is foreshadowed by another slight alteration he had made to
the  second  edition.  Godwin  mentions  Franklin’s  “conjecture”  twice  in  Political  Justice—in  all
editions of the text. First, in connection to the foreseeable extinction of “manual labour” as a result
of technological progress: “Hereafter it is by no means clear that the most extensive operations will
not be within the reach of one man; or to make use of a familiar instance, that a plough may not be
turned into a field, and perform its office without the need of superintendence” (Godwin Political
Justice [1793] 845). This must not have seemed too bold a prediction to late eighteenth-century
English  audiences,  who  had  witnessed  industrial  and  agricultural  developments  such  as  their
immediate ancestors could never have conceived. Later in the book, Godwin recovered the sentence
Franklin had supposedly uttered in support of his own conjecture that man would soon become
practically immortal.
In  the  first  edition,  then,  the  footnote  stating  the  source  of  Godwin’s  information  was
appended to the  first  of  these allusions  to  Franklin,  the portion  of  the text  where the possible
extinction  of  manual  labour  is  mentioned,  which  may  be  construed as  a  tacit  avowal  that  the
American was talking of the Industrial Revolution’s effect on the structure of labour, or, in other
words, that he could not possibly have meant the sentence in the sense Godwin will later in the book
give it. In the second edition, however, the footnote migrates to the portion of the text that predicts
the ultimate triumph of mind over matter, and the banishment of death and disease. D’Israeli was
probably not the only one to point out to Godwin that one should not make free with another man’s
words.
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Accordingly, in his final revision of the text, the footnote returned to its original position,
and  the  following  sentence  was  added  when  Franklin  was  mentioned  in  the  chapter—now an
appendix—about immortality. “The sense he [Franklin] annexed to this expression seems to have
related to the improvements of human invention, in relation to machines and the compendium of
labour” (Godwin,  Political Justice  [1985] 770-771). Finally, Godwin admits that Franklin could
never  have  endorsed  his  conjecture.  Still,  rather  than  remove  his  unscholarly  allusion  to  the
American philosopher, he boldly admitted he could not care less about Franklin’s meaning. Godwin
does not seem to realise his candour exposes the fundamental dishonesty of his procedure, while
also exposing his gigantic ego. He just makes things too easy for a shrewd and scholarly satirist like
D’Israeli,  who  maliciously  intimates  that  Godwin  was  not  merely  a  fool,  but  a  stubborn  and
conceited fool.  The following sample of dialogue,  featuring Caconous,  D’Israeli’s  caricature of
Godwin, in the aforementioned chapter XVII of Flim-Flams! (2nd ed.), and which clearly alludes to
Godwin’s handling of Franklin’s name (if not exactly of his words), illustrates this:
“Pray, Mr. Caconous, (…) in what manner may a man build up a system, so 
indisputably his own, that no reasonable person shall ever lay claim to it?”
The  great  metaphysician  replied,  “In  whatever  sense  a  great  genius
understands a particular expression, we are positively at liberty to apply it, in the
sense we think proper. It is thus I make something out of nothing!”
This was true—and give CACONOUS but an ABSURDITY, for his premises,
and he would keep up such a racket in his metaphysics, that he seemed as disorderly
as a drunken man, in a dark room! ([1806] 1: 211-212)
D’Israeli may have had a political bias against Godwin, the majority of whose arguments
were  not  as  easy  to  rebate,  but  his  satire  cannot  be  dismissed  on  that  account.  Much  of  its
effectiveness comes from the reader’s sense that D’Israeli deals much more fairly with Godwin than
he himself had dealt with Franklin. The humorist quotes Godwin with scrupulous accuracy in his
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notes, and sometimes even in his text. Something is very wrong when the comedian can afford to be
more scholarly than the butt of his jokes. The climax of the satire comes precisely with a parody of
Godwin’s prospect of the perfectibility of man:
Here he proceeded in a state of orgasm!
He asked us, why were we such fools as to consent to be sick, or to die? That
a man was only old, because he did not  persist in being young. Why were we not
immortal? In the approaching age of Will-ye Nill-ye, the whole earth will be covered
with a people of men, and not of children! There will be no sexes! The desiccating
power of metaphysics (for it has wonderful dryness) will shrivel up every lineament
of sex in  the animal  machine;  then men will  cease to  propagate!  they will  sleep
without night-caps, and be metaphysicked—Will-ye Nill-ye!
(Flim-Flams! [1806] 1: 216-217)
The reader not directly acquainted with Godwin’s text would no doubt suppose this to be an
extravagant  caricature  of  his  opinions.  Lest  we suspect  him of  distorting  his  sources,  D’Israeli
himself transcribes, in a footnote, and as accurately as usual—except for the added emphasis—the
corresponding passages in Godwin’s actual text. Almost everything Caconous says while in “a state
of orgasm” can be found, in very nearly the same words, in  Political  Justice, and in a tone that
expresses  the  same  enthusiastic  faith  in  the  inevitability  of  the  apocalyptic  metamorphosis  of
“man.”
The caricaturist intervenes only in flatly stating what Godwin obscurely implies. Without the
need to “propagate,” Godwin says sexual intercourse will no longer be necessary; D’Israeli takes up
where he left  off, drawing the obvious inference that the distinction of “sex” itself  would then
disappear.  Tapping on the widespread false etymology of the word “metaphysics,” as the study of
what lies  beyond physical reality, D’Israeli uses it  to denote the fundamentalist rejection of the
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“physical,” i.e., matter, the senses, and the body.172 He maliciously implies this mistaken conception
of “metaphysics” will inevitably shrivel up the student’s every “lineament of sex,” that is, his sexual
characteristics,  to  such an extent  that  he will  find himself  unable to  “propagate.”  Again,  in all
fairness, the idea of the contraceptive properties of metaphysics is not altogether alien to Godwin’s
thought. Incidentally, this is the same ironic use of the term that we have found previously in this
chapter in Hogg’s Private Memoirs.
The emphasis placed by D’Israeli  on sex,  moreover,  lends  an equivocal  meaning to  the
phrase “state of orgasm,” in the first sentence. The word, in its etymological meaning, as D’Israeli
no  doubt  knew,  referred  to  a  swelling,  and  was  already  employed  in  physiology,  since  the
seventeenth-century, as the Oxford English Dictionary attests, to denote a state of excitement in any
organ of the body caused by an excessive accumulation of “humours” that required release, but
already tended to be mostly applied, in that sense, to sexual matters (see def. 2a). The word had also
a psychological sense, but the process of specialisation that eventually made this sense inviable in
modern English was already under way. An innocent reading of D’Israeli’s text was, of course, still
technically possible in 1805—but only technically, in such a highly sexualised context.
The physiological undercurrent evoked by D’Israeli is, therefore, not merely a metaphor for
Caconous enthusiasm: the suggestion is  that  that  he perversely satisfied a  necessity  of  “animal
economy”  through  the  impassioned  speech  in  which  he  denies  that  necessity.  In  other  words,
D’Israeli’s humour depends on the idea that Caconous’s philosophy is a revulsive for his pent-up
libido.  In D’Israeli’s satirical  vocabulary,  moreover,  “metaphysics” is  code for the unreasonable
denial of the contingencies of physical existence. The general idea is that Godwin’s philosophy is
full  of  sublimated sexual  meanings  that  should  be obvious  to  anyone but  those who share his
puritanical deliriums.
172  According to the OED the term was originally applied to the “thirteen books of Aristotle dealing with questions of
‘first philosophy’ or ontology:” “This title doubtless originally referred (as some of the early commentators state) to
the position which the books so designated occupied in the received arrangement of Aristotle’s writings (…). It was,
however, from an early period used as a name for the branch of study treated in these books, and hence came to be
misinterpreted as meaning ‘the science of things transcending what is physical or natural.’”
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The original  version  of  the  novel  was  even harsher  on  Godwin.  There,  Godwin’s  most
extravagant statement crops up in a scene in which the narrator’s uncle Jacob, Kill-Joy (a caricature
of  Godwin’s  friend  Thomas  Holcroft),  and  Caconous173 are  discussing  the  pros  and  cons  of
marriage,  and  in  which  the  latter  expresses  his  general  scorn  for  women:  “Is  this  an  age  for
marriage? Look at the puny two-footed calves about us! In an age of universal emancipation ‘MEN
will  cease  to  propagate,  and  the  whole  will  be  a  people  of  men,  and  not  of  CHILDREN!’”
(D’Israeli, Flim-Flams! [1805] 3: 60-61). The inevitable footnote reads “Literally transcribed from
POLITICAL JUSTICE!”  (61n).  The  emphasis,  of  course,  is  placed  on  “men,”  to  suggest  that
Godwin thought the world would be much better off without women. Thus, D’Israeli renders more
perceptive Godwin’s own suggestion that the “universal emancipation” he championed in Political
Justice was not that “universal.”
Flim-Flams! was published, of course, at a time when the philosopher had already broken
his resolution of never marrying, and, though D’Israeli certainly had no more sympathy for her
project  of  political  emancipation  than  he  had  for  Godwin’s,  I  believe  he  meant  to  allude  to
Wollstonecraft when he had Caconous say: “When a woman once has a system of her own in her
head, will she give it up to her husband’s hypothesis?” (Flim-Flams! [1805] 71-72). These words,
being ascribed to a character that ostensibly represents Godwin in his bachelor days, when he was at
the peak of his popularity, are invested with a sort of tragic irony. Without so much as mentioning
her name, D’Israeli reminds us that Godwin had indeed married a woman that had a “system” in her
head, suggesting that he resented her for her independence, and also for having caused him to give
up his “hypothesis” concerning marriage. And then, of course, Wollstonecraft had championed the
emancipation of woman, which Godwin had tacitly rejected in his most influential work. D’Israeli’s
satire,  therefore,  slyly  intimates  that  the  marriage  of  two  individuals  with  such  radically
incompatible views could not be a happy one, no matter what Godwin said.
173 In the first edition of the novel the character’s name was hyphenated: “Caco-nous.”
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My reason for bringing D’Israeli into the discussion is to show how closely Godwin’s public
image in  the early nineteenth-century matched the profile  of Poe’s narrators,  and how much it
differs from the idea we have of Godwin today. The two defining traits of D’Israeli’s caricature of
him, aside from his suspicion of women, are a rigid puritanical negation of sexuality, and what can
only  be  termed  his  superstitious  belief  in  the  indefinite  extension  of  life.  Indeed,  Godwin’s
“conjecture” that man would banish death, being ostensibly based on an intuition that overrides
reason and logical inquiry, is, in the proper sense of the term, a superstition. Ironically, this belief in
an intuited “truth” one cannot justify rationally exactly corresponds to Godwin’s own description of
the way in which Wollstonecraft formed her opinions, and not the description of the way he reached
his.  In  this  case,  at  least,  he  appears  not  to  have  been as  “anxious” not  to  be  deceived or  as
suspicious of first impressions as he claims in  Memoirs  to have  always been. In short, D’Israeli
provides a relevant historical precedent for the sort of satire I think Poe intended.
D’Israeli also ridicules the way in which Godwin deliberately twists Franklin’s words to
accommodate them to his visionary theory. This process is comparable to the way in which the
narrator of Poe’s tales projects his superstition on his wife’s words, taking them out of context and
disregarding their meaning. This in turn appears to me a perfect metaphor of the kind of misreading
of Wollstonecraft’s words that Godwin’s  Memoirs  invites, and which is exemplified by Todd and
Clemit and Walker’s assessments of her. Morella was talking of her physical relationship with her
husband, but he forces a “metaphysical” meaning unto her words, to suggest she was prophesying
her  own  reincarnation.  Something  very  similar  happens  in  “Ligeia.”  In  that  tale,  the  narrator
projects on his wife’s words precisely the kind of highly unusual “conjecture” that D’Israeli had
found so hilarious in Political Justice. 
But,  although  the  construal  the  narrator  places  on  Ligeia’s  words  matches  Godwin’s
conjecture,  the words themselves, as I have previously pointed out,  resemble many passages in
Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication. Here is an example:
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Gracious Creator of the whole human race! hast thou created such a being as woman,
who can trace thy wisdom in thy works, and feel that thou alone art by nature exalted
above her, —for no better purpose? — Can she believe that she was only made to
submit to man, her equal, a being, who, like her, was sent into the world to acquire
virtue? — Can she consent to be occupied merely to please him; merely to adorn the
earth,  when her  soul  is  capable  of  rising to  thee?  — And can she rest  supinely
dependent on man for reason, when she ought to mount with him the arduous steps of
knowledge? (Wollstonecraft, Vindication 136)
Like Ligeia, Wollstonecraft is claiming that she is “part and parcel” in God, that is, that
woman is a complete and autonomous human being unto herself. This is the religious expression of
her feminist argument. Through the exercise of reason, she is capable of recognising the evidence of
a governing principle in Nature, and from that to deduce the idea of God. By addressing herself
directly to this superior being, Wollstonecraft demonstrates, in the terms of her deism, at the same
time her rationality and her “immortality,” that is, that she too has a soul. She thought, of course,
that the theory of the separate spheres denied women souls.
I  think  Godwin honestly  did  not  understand what  Wollstonecraft  was trying  to  say and
achieve  any more  than  Poe’s  narrators  understood their  wives.  This  passage  also  illustrates  an
important  difference  between  their  styles.  In  his  own  work,  he  is  seldom  in  control  of  the
suggestions that run below the grammatical, obvious sense of his statements, and this often results
in involuntary comic. Wollstonecraft, on the contrary, put such suggestions at the service of her
arguments, and in this sense was a much more sophisticated, and deliberate writer than he was.
In the passage quoted above, for example, the sexual undercurrent complements the obvious
meaning, by suggesting that man’s desire to subject women was rooted in male sexual anxiety. This
suggestion  in  turn  chimes  in  with  Wollstonecraft’s  claim  that  women  were  not  really  being
subjected to man’s reason, most men being, as she saw it, as fully irrational as most women, but to
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his lust. Thus, woman was in fact forcefully constrained to submit to his sexual appetites, and this
subjecting was disguised, in the language of man, as a submission to reason. She states elsewhere in
the book that the education women received compelled them to be “the slaves of casual lust, which
is now the situation of a very considerable number who are, literally speaking, standing dishes to
which  every  glutton  may  have  access”  (Wollstonecraft,  Vindication  208).  The  idea  of  sexual
submission—or more precisely, Wollstonecraft’s revolutionary refusal to assume this position—is
also  suggested,  in  the  passage  I  quoted  earlier,  by  her  use  of  the  term  “supinely.”  Although
ostensibly applied in reference to intellectual subjection, Wollstonecraft had already told us that this
sort of language was a ruse, thereby subverting it. By impeding the intellectual development of
woman, man was really interested in avoiding her sexual emancipation—that is, in keeping her in
the submissive sexual stance evoked by the term “supine.” Such sexual implications, although not
openly  stated,  are  not  extraneous  to  her  rhetoric.  They  are,  I  think,  integral  to  her  project  of
linguistic subversion.
Yet, Godwin flatly states, as we have seen, her religion and philosophy were “the pure result
of feeling and taste,” not of reason (Memoirs 121). The interpretation of her religious statements—
which  were  really  political  statements—he  encourages  readers  to  make  returns  an  image  of
Wollstonecraft that is not that far removed from the image Poe’s narrators convey of their wives.
Indeed, her insistence that woman is “immortal,” and that she herself was immortal, can only be
construed, in Godwin’s terms, as partaking of a spirit of wild mysticism. Thus, he suggests, that
Wollstonecraft shared the unshakable intuitive faith in her own immortality that the narrator of the
tale attributes to Ligeia.
Almost every word that is attributed to Wollstonecraft in the book contributes to this image.
He reports, for example, that some days prior to her death, Wollstonecraft told him “‘that she should
have died the preceding night, but that she was determined not to leave me’” (Godwin,  Memoirs
113). I see no reason to question Godwin’s veracity. But his choices can and should be questioned.
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On the one hand, he either dismisses or distorts all of Wollstonecraft’s public pronouncements in a
way  that  makes  her  appear  a  visionary  obsessed  with  death,  and  on  the  other  he  chooses  to
emphasise  intimate  statements  such  as  this.  This  scene,  whether  he  realised  it  or  not,  plays  a
decisive  role  in  his  rhetoric,  as  it  apparently  corroborates  his  claim  that  Wollstonecraft  had
eventually resigned to the “feminine” role of being the helpmate of her husband. Indeed, he makes
it appear that she lived only for his sake, and even that her love had conquered, temporarily at least,
death, and this through an act of will. Thus, his narrative supports the same kind of self-serving
male fantasy that we find in “Ligeia.”
Although he does not quote a single line from A Vindication, Godwin thus predisposes the
reader to find signs of the mysticism he attributes to Wollstonecraft in that book, and, indeed, in all
of  her  books.  But  her  religious  views  are  inseparable  from  the  political  argument.  For
Wollstonecraft, absolute monarchy and extreme patriarchy, for example, were two sides of the same
coin:  “What  but  a  pestilential  vapour  can  hover  over  society  when  its  chief  director  is  only
instructed in the invention of crimes, or the stupid routine of childish ceremonies? Will men never
be wise? — will they never cease to expect corn from tares, and figs from thistles?” (Vindication
85). Man, which had always been the undisputed ruler of society, had never been rational; he had
always expected impossibilities. At the root of all his errors was domestic inequality:
we shall not see women affectionate till more equality be established in society, till
ranks are [confounded and women freed, neither shall we see that dignified domestic
happiness, the simple grandeur of which cannot be relished by ignorant or vitiated
minds; nor will the important task of education ever be properly begun till the person
of a woman is no longer preferred to her mind. For it would be as wise to expect corn
from tares, or figs from thistles, as that a foolish ignorant woman should be a good
mother. (Wollstonecraft, Vindication 263)
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This is no doubt what Godwin had in mind when he complained of the “homily-language” in
some passages of A Vindication (Memoirs 70). This was, he thought, one of the many defects that
plagued the book. But Wollstonecraft’s appropriation of biblical imagery is always deliberate. She
uses the same evangelical parable to condemn the two complementary aspects of man’s folly, the
social  and  the  sentimental.  Her  usage  of  such  metaphors,  being  consistent  with  the  overall
argument, reinforces the internal cohesiveness of the book. Yet, the kind of steady adherence to a
pre-defined  purpose—which  is  arguably  a  description  of  good  writing—illustrated  by  such
sophisticated  rhetorical  strategies,  is  precisely  the  kind  of  thing  Godwin  tells  us  she,  being  a
woman, was incapable of doing. Thus, he makes this kind of rhetorical effect invisible.
In my view, Godwin’s worse crime was to neutralise the aggressiveness of Wollstonecraft’s
rhetoric by sentimentalising her figure. This aggressiveness was the most distinctive trait of her
work. Because she refused to think or act in a “feminine” manner, Wollstonecraft also refused to
plead submissively for equal rights. Rather, she demanded those rights, in the name of womankind,
while actively threatening man’s rule through a form of cultural terrorism the like of which had, I
think, never been attempted. She was not the first, however, to argue that the subjection of women
contradicted the principles of Reformation. Some protestant thinkers had been arguing for years that
fathers  and  husbands,  inasmuch  as  they  acted  as  mediators  between  women  and  God,  were
performing the same function priests performed for the faithful in Catholic societies.
William Law’s popular manual of “practical devotion,” A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy
Life,  published in 1729, contained the same basic religious argument that Wollstonecraft  would
develop,  many  years  later,  in  A  Vindication.  It  is  impossible  to  know  for  certain  whether
Wollstonecraft read this book, but Law had a great influence on the founders of Methodism, and
therefore  she  almost  certainly  came  into  contact  with  the  argument  through  her  Methodist
acquaintances. Like Wollstonecraft, Law considered that reason was man’s true “nature:” “All men
(...) as men, have one and the same important business, to act up to the excellency of their rational
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[that is, divine] nature, and to make reason and order the law of all their designs and actions” (Law,
Serious  Call  153).  Law  thus  reconciles  rationalism  with  religion  by  the  same  argument
Wollstonecraft would use: God is reason itself, and it is man’s duty to live up to his divine nature.
Blind devotion to the ministers of the Gospel should be replaced with an enlightened submission to
pure reason. Law’s view that man’s irrationality is the result of a perverse upbringing that betrays
his  true nature is  also typical  of  Enlightenment  philosophy.  According to  this  view,  “education
should be considered in no other light, than as the art of recovering to man the use of his reason,”
that is, to restore him to the original purity of his nature (237).
Law also maintained that there was a common standard of excellence that applied to all
human beings,  regardless of sex or  class.  “Thus,  in  all  orders  and conditions  either  of  man or
woman, this is the one common holiness, which is to be the common life of all Christians” (Law,
Serious  Call  127).  This  view  may  be  termed  individualism.  Law,  however,  unlike  most
contemporary thinkers, detaches woman from man, treating her as an individual moral agent. She
too is an individual, and it was the duty of every individual to become rational, that is, to adopt the
broadest possible outlook, in order to recognise in all circumstances which actions promoted the
common good. Reason, understood as the power of abstraction and generalisation, was virtue, hence
women could not possess one without the other.
Law also rejects the idea that woman is by nature more sensitive, and therefore more prone
to irrationality, than man: 
It is generally said, that women are naturally of little and vain minds; but this I look
upon to be as false and unreasonable, as to say, that butchers are naturally cruel; for
as  their  cruelty  is  not  owing to their  nature,  but  to  their  way of  life,  which has
changed their nature; so whatever littleness and vanity is to be observed in the minds
of women, it is like the cruelty of butchers, a temper that is wrought into them by that
life which they are taught and accustomed to lead. (…) we cannot charge any thing
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upon  their  [women’s]  nature,  till  we  take  care  that  it  is  not  perverted  by  their
education. (Law, Serious Call 352-3)
And, as Law saw it, the nature of woman had indeed been perverted by the expectations of
man, which had always ruled over her: “mankind seem to consider them [women] in no other view,
than as many painted idols, that are to allure and gratify their passions; so that if many women are
vain, light, gugaw creatures, they have this to excuse themselves, that they are not only such as their
education has made them, but such as the generality of the world allows them to be” (Law, Serious
Call 350). It is worth noticing that “mankind” is being used as a gendered term, which was unusual
at the time. “Mankind,” degrading women to the status of objects of desire, betrays the common
nature  of  “humankind,”  therefore,  sin  against  God.  This,  as  we  have  seen,  is  exactly
Wollstonecraft’s argument. A society directed by men blames women for behaving exactly as they
were  expected  to  behave.  We even  find  and  echo  of  Law’s  phrase  “little  and  vain  minds”  in
Wollstonecraft’s “little soul” (Vindication 100).
Law even advocated female intellectuality. Rejecting the idea that women should keep to a
narrow sphere of interest, he encouraged them to extend their studies to all those areas of abstract
thought  from which  she had hitherto  been banned:  “They [women]  are  not  indeed suffered  to
dispute with us [men] the proud prizes of arts and sciences, of learning and eloquence, in which I
have much suspicion they would often prove our superiors; but we turn them over to the study of
beauty and dress, and the whole world conspires to make them think of nothing else” (Law, Serious
Call 348). Law’s “suspicion” may be condescending; however, it also poses an implied challenge to
man’s pride. If man is  as  superior as he thinks, why is he afraid of the competition? This is, of
course, another of the core elements of Wollstonecraft’s rhetoric.
Indeed, when she set herself to the task of advocating the rights of woman, she tapped on an
existing tradition of dissent. Many of the ideas she develops in A Vindication had been circulating
for quite a long time, and, although they may have been polemic, were not altogether unacceptable,
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in  certain  circles  at  least.  But,  despite  the  superficial  resemblances,  Wollstonecraft’s  project  of
political  reform was  much more  ambitious  than  Law’s.  She  wanted  a  revolution  in  the  home;
whereas he was a reformist. Though advocating that women be permitted to study and compete with
men on the arts and sciences, in his ideal picture of a family, woman was still very much subjected
to man. To maintain this balance of domestic power, Eusebia, his fictional ideal wife, advises her
daughters  not  to  marry  “till  you  find  a  man  that  has  those  perfections,  which  you  have  been
labouring after  yourselves;  (…) with whom it  is  better  to  live,  than to want  the benefit  of his
example” (Law, Serious Call 370). 
In  practice,  Law displays  a  zeal  to  avoid  that  women take  the  upper  hand.  In  order  to
guarantee that the traditional balance of power in the home is not disrupted, he creates the expedient
of having women voluntarily seeking “superior” men to whom they may “rationally” submit. Law
thus perpetuates the notion that ideal marriages are those in which the wife meekly resigns to the
superior authority of the husband. The fact that Law fails to even consider the changes that the
emancipation  of  women  would  necessarily  operate  in  the  traditional  power  structure  speaks
volumes. The only reason why Eusebia, Law’s wise model-mother, was permitted to advise her
daughters was because she was a widow, or the task should have devolved upon the husband. By
making her  a  widow, then,  Law manages  to  show how a  rational  wife  should  behave without
questioning  the  sacred—to  him—patriarchal  authority.  Wollstonecraft,  of  course,  subverted  the
discourse that supported the existing structure of power.
It  may appear  to  the  reader  that  I  am digressing,  but  it  appears  to  me that  one  cannot
understand  the  nature  of  Wollstonecraft’s  enterprise  unless  one  realises  how she  subverted  the
language that was available to her. Her genius lay precisely in subversion. She appropriated for
herself  the theories used to justify the subjection of women in a way that is at once extremely
aggressive and incredibly subtle; in particular she appropriated religious imagery to threaten man’s
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sense of superiority, and exploit male sexual and intellectual anxieties. And this is what Godwin
made it very hard for readers to realise.
Man condemned woman to servitude.  “Make them free,” Wollstonecraft wrote, “and they
will quickly become wise and virtuous, as men become more so; for the improvement must be
mutual, or the justice which one half of the human race are obliged to submit to, retorting on their
oppressors, the virtue of man will be worm-eaten by the insect whom he keeps under his feet”
(Wollstonecraft,  Vindication 247). The etymological sense of the word “virtue,” itself a vestige of
the old notion that morality is male by definition, clearly intimates that man will be unmanned by
his  injustice.  It  appears  to  me that  the  suggestion is  intentional:  in  the  language of  reason the
sentence translates as “man will lose that which makes him human;” but, in the language “of man,”
it means that he will lose that which makes him masculine. 
As long as he persists in considering intellect as a sexual characteristic, then, man will feel
threatened, indeed, emasculated by intellectual women. Wollstonecraft suggests that he should feel
threatened. Indeed, she fostered the fear of unenlightened men, through a sort of psychological
terrorism.  Perverted  men  might  not  be  persuaded  to  act  in  the  behalf  of  women—or,  as
Wollstonecraft  would prefer to say,  on their  own behalf:  “Educated in slavish dependency,  and
enervated by luxury and sloth, where shall we find men who will stand forth to assert the rights of
man” (Vindication 114). Perhaps fear of emasculation might stimulate such men to action. For man
could never get rid of this anxiety, Wollstonecraft tells us, until he became wise, that is, until he
understood the true meaning of virtue,  and accepted to live with women on terms of  equality.
Therefore, women could not depend on men to bring about the change Wollstonecraft envisaged.
They had to force the change, and one of the ways to do this, perhaps the only one, she thought, was
to subvert his language.
She sought  to  emancipate  sexual  differences  from the  traditional  dominance-submission
model, and, by so doing, helped, as I have before stated, to establish the idea of gender. At the time,
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this was certainly a revolutionary notion. Therefore, she expected to be misunderstood. Her tragedy
was not having realised that Godwin was among those who, not being able to understand her, would
feel  threatened by her.  Virginia  Woolf,  who realised,  in  part,  that  Wollstonecraft  was not  what
Godwin had made her out to be, proclaimed Wollstonecraft’s immortality, or rather predicted her
resurrection when she was still very much buried in oblivion, where her husband had left her. “She
whose sense of her own existence was so intense,” Woolf wrote, 
died at the age of thirty-six. But she has her revenge. Many millions have died and
been forgotten in the hundred and thirty years that have passed since she was buried;
and  yet  as  we  read  her  letters  and  listen  to  her  arguments  and  consider  her
experiments, above all, that most fruitful experiment, her relation with Godwin, and
realise the high-handed and hot-blooded manner in which she cut her way to the
quick of life, one form of immortality is hers undoubtedly; she is alive and active,
she argues and experiments, we hear her voice and trace her influence even now
among the living. (“Four Figures,” 199-200)
Although Woolf had not much sympathy for Godwin—she called him “the little man with
the  big  head”—Woolf’s  version  of  Wollstonecraft  is  still  basically  his  (“Four  Figures”  197).
Wollstonecraft’s extraordinary life encompassed many different experiments, the least relevant of
which was certainly not her career as a female philosopher. But Godwin presented himself as her
most  important experiment—this did not make him look too good, but it  made her look much
worse. I think Wollstonecraft is only now beginning to have her well-deserved revenge on Godwin.
Wollstonecraft’s  true  resurrection  will  be  the  full  recognition  of  the  female  intellectual.
“Ligeia,” which I have called a feminist apocalypse, is, I believe, a prophecy of this resurrection,
which would come as people realised the necessity of separating Wollstonecraft from Godwin’s
portrait  of  her.  In  order  that  her  intellectual  achievements  might  be  appreciated  correctly,  her
interests must no longer be confused with the interests of her conqueror, for her true experiment was
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intellectual  emancipation—likewise,  the  interests  of  Ligeia  must  not  be  identified  with  her
conqueror.  This,  I  believe,  was Poe’s point.  It  may be more accurate to say, however,  that Poe
realised  the  significance  of  Wollstonecraft’s  example,  and  used  her  story  as  a  blueprint  for  a
prophecy of his own. This is the prophecy that is buried in his tale, that woman would one day rise
to challenge man’s de facto monopoly of intellect.
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Appendix:
The following is  a  chronology of  the publication  of  The Confessions  of  an Unexecuted
Femicide by Robert Macnish in the periodical press. Whenever possible, I have indicated, between
round brackets, the online repositories which hold digitised collections of the papers in question.
1 – Britain and Ireland
- Albion 20 Aug. 1827 (?)
Note: I could not find a copy of this publication, from which the American papers who published
the story claim to have taken it.  The  British Museum Catalogue of Printed Books. Supplement:
Newspapers Published in Great Britain and Ireland, 1801-1900 mentions an Albion of Liverpool,
which ran continuously from Jan. 1, 1827 to Oct. 30, 1871.
- St. James Chronicle (?)
Note: This publication is mentioned by Macphun in the fourth pamphlet edition and may be 
presumed to be the original two-installment version of Confessions.
- The Standard 23 Aug. 1827. (British Newspaper Archive)
Note: As I explain in the main text, this is the earliest newspaper edition of the two-part version of 
Macnish’s tale that I saw.
- The Liverpool Mercury 24 Aug. 1827.
- The Kaleidoscope, or, Literary and Scientific Mirror. 28 Aug. 1827.
- Belfast Commercial Chronicle 29 Aug. 1827. (British Newspaper Archive)
- Saunder’s News-Letter (Dublin, Ireland) 29 Aug. 1827. (British Newspaper Archive)
- Tipperary Free Press 1 Sep. 1827. (British Newspaper Archive)
- Cumberland Pacquet, and Ware’s Whitehaven Advertiser 4 Sep. 1827. (British Newspaper 
Archive)
- Inverness Courier 12 Sep. 1827 (British Newspaper Archive)
- The Atlas (London) 23 Sep. 1827. (British Newspaper Archive)
- Sun (London) 10 Oct. 1827 (British Newspaper Archive)
- Bell’s Life in London, and Sporting Chronicle 14 Oct. 1827. (British Newspaper Archive)
- Pertshire Courier 1 Nov. 1827. (British Newspaper Archive)
2 – United States
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- The New-York Mirror, and Ladies Literary Gazette 6 Oct. 1827: 98-99. (Hathi Trust)
- Phenix (Alexandria) Gazette 9 Oct. 1827. 1. (Chronicling America)
- American Watchman and Delaware Advertiser 16 Oct. 1827: 1. (Chronicling America)
- North American, or Weekly Journal of Politics, Science and Literature 1:23 20 Oct. 1827: 183. 
(Proquest)
- Midgeville Southern Recorder 22 Oct. 1827. (Newspaperarchive.com)
- The Casket, or Flowers of Literature, Wit & Sentiment Nov. 1827: 422-425. (Hathitrust)
- Indiana Palladium 3 Nov. 1827 (1st. installment), 24 Nov. 1827 (conclusion). (Hoosier State 
Chronicles)
Note: The only complete publication in America of which I am aware.
- The Ariel: A Literary Gazette 17 Nov. 1827: 116-17. (Hathitrust)
- Hagertown Mail 13 Feb. 1829 (Newspaperarchive.com)
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